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The Army of Catalonia: Organization, Operations, and Logistics, 1807-1814

John Leckey Morgan
Loyola University Chicago

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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

THE ARMY OF CATALONIA
ORGANIZATION, OPERATIONS AND LOGISTICS
1807-1814
VOLUME ONE

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

BY
JOHN LECKEY MORGAN JR.

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

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Dedication

To Janice E. and John L. Morgan

Whalen Thomas

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<u>AN</u>	<u>Archives Nationales</u>
<u>CM</u>	<u>Correspondance Macdonald</u>
<u>CN</u>	<u>Correspondance Napoleon</u>
GQG	Grand Quartier General
L	Letter
LS	Signed Letter
PL	Plaq or bound file
Qx (qx)	Metric Quintal (cwt/hundred weight)
<u>SHAT</u>	<u>Service Historique de l'Armee du Terre</u>
UCN	Unpublished Correspondence of Napoleon

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The period of 1805 to 1809 was the high water mark of Napoleon's political and military power. The Grande Armée had during the period of Austrian, Prussian and Polish campaigns grown into one of the world's greatest armies; certainly the best of its day. Napoleon had honed it into a precise instrument of destruction, with which he had scored a string of stunning victories.

The Grande Armée was certainly the best led army in Europe, and it was its organization which allowed it to be a war winning weapon welded by Napoleon's skillful hands. It is the extraordinary organization of the Grande Armée rooted in the Corps d'Armée system and its staff that was its secret.

By late 1807, Napoleon had defeated his opponents in central Europe and concluded the Treaties of Pressburg (1805) and Tilsit (1807) which brought a tenuous peace to France. The Emperor, however, saw the probability of an Austrian resurgence and retained the bulk of Grande Armée in Germany while he began to organize yet a new but less potent army for the invasion of Portugal and ultimately of Spain. The Catalan operations were to be an intimate part of this new extension of French imperial ambition and Napoleon's continuing struggle against Great Britain.

It is during this period of imperial expansion too, that French ambition out-ran its resources, making Napoleon's dictum "make war feed war" an absolute necessity. The French Ministry of War organized the new Armée d'Espagne with younger and more green conscripts as well as more allied contingents so as to maintain the strength of the Grande Armée in Germany, and the Armée d'Italie.

The formation of General Philibert-Guillaume, Comte Duhesme's Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales was particularly important in the context of the beginning of the war. It was virtually thrown together with some of the greenest of troops, an incomplete staff and no viable war plan. This was a disaster waiting to happen, and did. It certainly could not hold its own against the insurgents and required reinforcement in the very first months of the war. Throughout the war the French army in Catalonia lacked the strength and the resources to prevail against nearly impossible odds. The manpower difficulties of the French Empire and Catalonia's status as a secondary front doomed it to a low manpower priority despite its strategic requirements.

Similarly, in logistics, the French armies spread across Europe could not obtain from France all of their supply necessities, and what they got they paid dearly for, for French resources were already over extended. Napoleon's 1805 campaign in Austria and the campaigns of 1806-07 in Prussia and Poland severely strained France despite the support the Grande Armée obtained from the Austrian and German countryside. The policy of making war feed war was an "economy of force" measure to stretch scarce resources. The extraordinarily expensive French concentration for the war in Spain and

the continued maintenance of the Grande Armée in Germany, anticipating a Austrian war further taxed France and made the "war feeding war" policy an absolute necessity.

The French armies in Catalonia, however, quickly exhausted the resources of the country and successive commanders could not support the army off of the land. Clearly, support from France was needed and their continual demands for money and supplies strained both the French countryside and its treasury. The war in eastern Spain was characterized by the back and forth push between the Emperor and his Ministry of Military Administration with the French command in Catalonia over the necessities of war. Indeed, the campaigns in Germany, Italy, or the Low Countries, would never prepare Napoleon for the logistical shock presented by the barren and backward theater of Spain.

Insurgent warfare was the distinguishing characteristic of the Peninsular War and though it was hardly new in the Napoleonic era (note the insurgent operations in Prussia 1806; Naples, 1806, where General Duhesme fought; and the Tyrol, 1809 where Baraguey d'Hilliers fought) but it was taken to brutal heights in Spain 1808-14. The unexpected result, however, would be that it virtually hamstrung the French occupation, particularly in Catalonia. Neither the Emperor nor his commanders were prepared for such a severe and protracted contest.

As to Military government, Napoleon undoubtedly expected an occupation like that of Holland, Naples, Italy, or Germany, where he could establish a government on the French model grafted off of the pre-existing structure. In Catalonia the insurrection practically destroyed the pre-existing government apparatus making a completely new

organization necessary. The French were simply unprepared for the difficult requirements of establishing a military government from the ground up in the Spanish 'running sore.'

This dissertation will discuss the organization, operations and logistics of the Army of Catalonia through the Peninsular War and its establishment of a military government from 1808 to 1810. This will fill a gap in Napoleonic military history and will elucidate the method of organizing and supporting large military units. It will also shed light on the reciprocal influences of military organization and the conduct of military operations.

This work will examine the organization and operation of the French Intendance and will shed light on the workings of this organization from the Ministry down to the soldiers in the field. It will also focus on the actual supply of selected foods to the army, to illustrate the discussion. Finally, it will examine the structure of the French military government, illuminating the political aspects of managing an army at war.

This work, will improve on existing scholarship on the organization, operations and logistics of a Napoleonic Army. Past and current scholarship generally focused on the social history of the armies, such as Colonel H. C. B. Rogers' Napoleon's Army, John R. Elting's Swords Around a Throne, David Chandler's The Campaigns of Napoleon, Richard Cobb's The Peoples Armies, or Lee Kennett's The French Armies of the Seven Years' War. Another area of focus includes Scott Bowden's Napoleon's Grande Armée of 1813 and Armies at Waterloo, and Scott Bowden and Charles Tarbox Armies on the Danube, 1809. Another type of such history are those many organizational and operational studies issued by the pre-World War I Historical Section of the French General Staff, notably Lieutenant Colonel H. Coutanceau's La Campagne de 1794 à

l'Armée du Nord which provides an in-depth study of the organization of the Armée du Nord and its operations.

I will use a synthesis of these various approaches to obtain a unique view of the structure of the Army of Catalonia and its evolution from 1807 to 1814 juxtaposed against the operational history of the war. This treatment of the army's and the war's history is in turn juxtaposed against the administrative functioning of the staff in managing its force structure. This way of addressing the problem of military organization and operations from the perspective of the staff sheds new light on a hitherto dark area of Napoleonic military history.

Logistics, like organization is also an area of military history that has received increasing attention of late, of which Martin van Creveld's Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton, H. de Nanteuil's Daru et l'Administration Militaire sous la Révolution et l'Empire, Georges Lechartier's Les Services de l'Arrière à la Grande Armée en 1806 - 1807, and Captain A. Pernot's Aperçu Historique sur le Service des Transports Militaires, are but a few.

In the sphere of logistical history I will exploit the goldmine of knowledge contained in General Paul Thiebault's Manuel Général du Service des États-Majors Généraux et Divisionnaires dans les Armées, and thoroughly examine the structure and functioning of the French logistical machinery in the Army of Catalonia, in three areas. These will include, first the operations of the Ministry in Paris, and the Army Intendance in Catalonia giving a 'birds eye view' of the whole logistical system. The second sphere is the 'worm's eye view,' that is the examination of the Intendance in one area of its

operations, that is of supply, specifically meat supply and its quality control. Finally, we will discuss transportation, by land and sea, which hauled the enormous supply requirements to the troops of the Army of Catalonia. The provision of these supplies and by extension all the supply requirements of the Army of Catalonia is seen in the context of the war, in the reciprocal influence of logistics and operations, often showing that the logistical tail does indeed wag the operational dog.

In the area of military government, I will discuss the early history of the improvised government in Catalonia from 1808 to 1810 and its effect on French operations, and concluding with a discussion of the organization of the permanent government established by Marshal Macdonald, going beyond the treatment of Pierre Conard in his Napoléon et Catalogne.

This area of Napoleonic history is one of considerable importance. Generally, administrative, organizational, logistical and civil aspects of war are critical factors in the successful outcome of a war, and understanding them is similarly critical to understanding the history of war. Nowhere is this more true than in the study of Napoleonic War. Hence, the detailed examination of a single army in the field is an extremely important undertaking while the study of the Army of Catalonia is particularly enlightening.

This study will not only shed light on an otherwise dark area of Napoleonic history, it will also highlight the administrative methods of the French Army which will put Napoleonic military operations in a new perspective. Finally, this study will be useful both as history and as a ready guide to the military theorist, logistician or commander seeking historical perspective on the nature of modern war.

The French military occupation of Catalonia was rooted in the Franco-Spanish campaign in Portugal in 1807 and in the succeeding deposition of King Charles IV. The Division and Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales opened the occupation under the conditions of the Franco-Spanish alliance treaty against Portugal. Catalonia would be part of the line of communications for the invasion of Portugal and Napoleon secretly ordered it to undertake the military occupation of the province in conjunction with the deposition of Charles IV. The commander, the fire eater General Philibert Guillaume, Comte Duhesme (1766-1815) was to take the strong points of the province, but only managed to take Barcelona and Figueras by a ruse though Rosas and Gerona refused to allow French entry, and the other strong points in Lower Catalonia.

The mission of General Duhesme's Corps was to occupy Catalan strong points, subdue the province and cooperate in the ultimate subjection of the Iberian Peninsula. The Corps was, however, incompletely organized and manned with an administration that was not war ready. Its troops were of indifferent quality, too. Though it possessed some excellent veteran French units, the bulk of its units were raw French, Italian and Neapolitan conscripts. When the actual rebellion began in May 1808, Duhesme's Corps was unable to cope with it. His military operations were a failure, which stunned the French command, heartened the insurgents, and his Corps was, by late summer, blockaded in Barcelona and Figueras.

The Emperor sent reinforcements in a division under General Honore-Charles-Michel-Joseph, Comte Reille (1775-1860) made up of even worse troops, mere conscript and National Guard sweepings completely incapable of handling the ever deepening

insurgency which gripped the populace, making every tree, boulder or crossroad lethal. The nature of the war and Napoleon's unwillingness to expend adequate resources in men and material on the corps doomed its mission to failure. Napoleon's military policy in Spain only changed when the whole theater collapsed forcing him to personally intervene with the Grande Armée. To Catalonia, meanwhile, he sent a new commander and heavy reinforcements upgrading Duhesme's small corps to a full Corps d'Armée, the V then VII Corps.

General Laurent, Comte Gouvion Saint-Cyr (1764-1830) and the VII Corps flooded into Catalonia determined to reduce the rebellious province, beginning with the reduction of Rosas. Once completed, he dashed on to Barcelona to relieve the beleaguered city in one of the most daring marches of the war, winning a brilliant battle on the way at Cardadeau. This second step completed, he set about the conquest of Lower Catalonia, an operation which culminated in the hard fought but less than decisive Battle of Valls which all but destroyed the Catalan regular army in January 1809. His final task would be the reduction of Gerona, a major fortress requiring a major effort.

As Saint-Cyr set about this major siege, intrigue in Paris and Napoleon's dissatisfaction with Saint-Cyr's seemingly slow progress at pacifying this, the most rebellious province in Spain, destroyed his command. Napoleon replaced him with Marshal Charles-Pierre François Augereau, Duc de Castiglione (1757-1816). The whole episode of the Siege of Gerona is a story of incredible bravery of the troops and vicious infighting within the high command.

When Augereau actually took command of the VII Corps he found serious administrative torpor in the management of the army and the province, and set about their reformation. Unfortunately, his lackluster performance in the field and his virtual slavery to the logistical support of his newly promoted and reinforced Army of Catalonia, particularly the ever hungry garrison of Barcelona disappointed Napoleon, and his embarrassing personal vendetta against General Duhesme, the governor of Barcelona enraged the Emperor enough to finally sack the aging Marshal in favor of the newly minted Marshal Etienne-Jacques-Joseph-Alexandre Macdonald, Duc de Tarente (1765-1840), whose prodigies of bravery and battlefield know how at Wagram won him a Marshal's Baton.

Marshal Macdonald, perhaps the hero of the war, made a manful attempt to place the government on a firm and efficient footing and hopefully to humanize this hitherto brutal war. Despite his significant administrative improvements both in the army and the French government, his military deficiencies and logistical problems led to his dismissal, like Duhesme, St.-Cyr and Augereau before him. Replaced by General Charles-Mathieu Isidore, Comte Decaen (1769-1832) after the embarrassment of the insurgent capture of Figueras and the costly siege to retake it, the new commander set about building on the significant work of Macdonald. He too, was faced, however, with the same problems as Macdonald, and in addition the Anglo-Sicilian invasion of 1812-13. Finally, Decaen fell like Macdonald because of his failures in the field and was replaced by Marshal Louis-Gabriel Suchet, Duc d'Albufera (1770-1826), who combined the armies of Aragon and Catalonia in the final climactic months of the Napoleonic Wars. His unpleasant task was

to withdraw to the Pyrenees, leaving French garrisons through Aragon and Catalonia which would serve as the anchor for a new invasion that never came. The war died almost as quietly as it began with the Treaty of Valençay, the French evacuation of Upper Catalonia and the abandonment of its dearly held fortresses.

This war was one which placed intense stress on the occupying French Army and on the resources of the French Empire. Napoleon nevertheless saw this as a strictly secondary front, and treated it as such, starving it in favor of more decisive fronts such as Central Spain in 1808. In 1812, Napoleon did not exactly withdraw troops from Catalonia but certainly denied strength replacement. In 1813-1814 he positively used the armies in Spain as a manpower pool to fight the decisive campaigns in Germany and France.

The structure of the French army in Catalonia then was a critical aspect of its capacity to prosecute the war. Generally, it was one of the most international and varied of forces. The first chapter lays out the structure or gross schema of the army, and its various parts. Its international character was a salient feature and a unique problem for commanders to overcome in the midst of war. The second aspect of force structure I examine is the actual material structure of the army and its evolution through the war. It changed commanders, and frequently restructured itself all in the face of the demands of military operations within the framework of Imperial policy.

It was logistics which so grossly determined the scheme of military operations through the war. Indeed, Marshals Augereau and Macdonald and General Decaen were forced, much to Napoleon's chagrin, to make logistical support the center piece of their

operations, particularly the supply of the division sized garrison at Barcelona. In the face of this Sisyphean task, all the French command could do was to supply the troops as well as they could and conduct active operations again, in fits and starts. The Intendance, which managed the enormous logistical structure of the army, was terribly strained by logistical demands. The work output of the officers of the Intendance was staggering, and they had to contend not only with local scarcity but with all of the military problems of the war which rudely impinged upon his own operations.

The logistical difficulties of the army were certainly exacerbated by the insurgents and exacted an enormous price on the Army of Catalonia, particularly in transporting assembled supplies to the garrisons and in the regular requisition of them from the field. It visibly made decisive operations nearly impossible. Placed in a perpetual stalemate, the French commanders, considering their available strength, could only hold onto their strong points and temporarily conquer areas and defeat insurgent forces in the field.

It was the administrative staff of the Army of Catalonia which kept the structure functioning, if creakily, under the most trying of military circumstances. It virtually held the occupation together, and without its remarkable efficiency despite severe constraints and Imperial demands, the occupation would have collapsed.

The problems of the French military administration and its occupation policies were many, but its sheer consistency kept the army in the field after sustaining crushing blows, such as the siege of Gerona, the disaster of Figueras and the Anglo-Sicilian invasion. The French army was always a force to be reckoned with and only Napoleon's massive troops withdrawals in 1814 lessened its power.

One of the most remarkable structures of the war which certainly increased logistical efficiency and calmed somewhat the virulence of the guerilla war was the military government. When Napoleon promoted Marshal Augereau, Governor of Catalonia, giving him virtual vice-royal powers, the Marshal began to plan the organizational structure of a new Catalan government which his predecessors were unable to accomplish due to overwhelming military considerations. For Augereau too, this remained only a plan, for Napoleon unceremoniously sacked him for incompetence. Augereau could not conquer the province in the face of Catalan popular opposition and overwhelming logistical difficulties. His operational torpor looked even worse in the Emperor's eyes because of his embarrassing vendetta to destroy General Duhesme, governor of Barcelona. (Napoleon could forgive many things but not personal embarrassment.) After five months in command Napoleon replaced him with Marshal Macdonald who took up and completed a new military government. His success at establishing a viable government and his heroic though failed attempt to infuse humanity into the war and reduce its brutality was one of the great episodes of the Napoleonic wars, and made him one of its heroes.

The French military government came in two distinct stages; the improvised government of 1808-10 and the established government of 1810 which lasted to the end of the war. The former was a mere graft of the Royal system and an absolute failure at administering the province and supporting the Army. It was Marshal Macdonald's government, however, that established some workable system to accomplish both of these tasks.

CHAPTER II

THE STRUCTURE OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN CATALONIA 1807-1814

§1. The Command Structure

From the inception of the Division and Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales in 1807 to the end of the war when the Armée d'Aragon absorbed the Armée de Catalogne, the division numbering from 3,000 to 12,000 men was the basic building block of the army both for military operations and the occupation of Catalonia. The French command tailored its structure to this theater by establishing separate field and territorial/garrison commands (Arrondissement Territorial). General Severoli's division (May 1810) was a typical example of an active field division with 8,265 men, with three infantry brigades, cavalry, artillery and engineers.¹ The brigade or division sized Arrondissement Territorial was the typical garrison command based on a district, such as Gerona or Figueras. The 2e Arrondissement Territorial at Figueras (December 1810) for example, had 6,448 men in two brigades, cavalry, gendarmerie, artillery and a regimental

¹This division had the 1er Léger, 2e Léger, 4e Ligne, 6e Ligne, 7e Ligne, Dragons Napoléon, Chasseurs Royaux, sappers, train, artillerie à cheval and à pied. SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1811; C(8)362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

depot.² Both of these commands reflected the divisional structure established during the revolution, creating as it were, self contained miniature armies.³ The command was also geographically organized between Upper and Lower Catalonia and formally established as the Division and later Corps of Upper Catalonia.

The French command evolved both structurally and in size throughout the war, from division to Army, which reflected both mission requirements and operational necessities. During the siege of Gerona the VII Corps Commander, General Gouvion Saint-Cyr, created the bifurcated corps structure. The Division de Troupes employées au Siège de Girone was one corps, with over three divisions and a divisional suite.⁴ The other half of the VII Corps included the covering force, and the garrisons.

In 1810, Napoleon created from the VII Corps the independent Army of Catalonia which by 1811 had two subordinate Corps, one in Upper and one in Lower Catalonia. The former, the Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne, had one active division, three

²The 2e Arrondissement Territoriale had brigades under Generals Nogues and Lefebvre, with the 1er and 2e-23e Léger, 1er-32e Léger, 1er and 2e-79e Ligne, 1er Westphalien, 1er Bataillon du Gear, 1er Bataillon de Tarn de Garrone, 1er-24e Dragons, Gendarmerie and Dépôts Italien. SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1811.

³David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966) 154; Albert A. Nofi, Ed., Napoleon at War, Selected Writings of F. Loraine Petre, (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1984) 23-25; Robert S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare, The Theory of Military Tactics in Eighteenth-Century France, Columbia Studies in the Social Services, No. 596, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957; reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1967) 255-257 (page references are to reprint edition).

⁴SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809.

separate brigades, two garrison brigades, artillery and engineers.⁵ The Corps in Lower Catalonia was a separate command within the divisional garrison of Barcelona, and had two brigades, cavalry, artillery and engineers and some attached garrison commands, such as Mataro, Hostalrich, Lerida, and Tarragona.⁶ The Army retained this geographical structure until the Army of Aragon absorbed it into a new Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, in December 1813.⁷

In Catalonia, as in the rest of the Grande Armée, Napoleon relied upon the Corps d'Armée system as the organizational substructure on which to base the conquest of this rebellious province. The Emperor, the Minister of War, General Henri Jacques Guillaume Clarke, Duc de Feltre (1765-1818); and, to some extent, the various commanders of the Army of Catalonia tailored these subordinate commands both to their mission and to the talents of each particular commander. Catalonia was a theater which pushed its French commanders to the limit, and required men of the finest quality. Napoleon, unfortunately, chose only one such commander, Gouvion Saint-Cyr. Since this was a secondary front,

⁵SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne, 15 March 1811.

⁶SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1811; C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 16 July 1812.

⁷SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814; C(8)371, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814; C(8)371, Armée d'Espagne, Situation, 1 April 1814; Armée de Catalogne, Situation, 15 April 1814; C(8)372, Tableau de l'Organisation des Armées d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 December 1813.

it was second in priority for men and material. The Emperor consistently chose second rate though (like Marshal Macdonald and General Decaen) talented men.⁸

⁸Nofi, Napoleon at War, 25. On 7 June 1809, Napoleon wrote to his stepson, Prince Eugene Beauharnais (1781-1824), Vice Roy of Italy on the Corps d'armée: "A corps of 25,000-30,000 men can be left on its own. Well handled, it can fight or alternatively avoid action, and maneuver according to circumstances...because an opponent cannot force it to accept an engagement, but if it chooses to do so it can fight alone for a long time. A division of 9,000-17,000 men can be left for an hour on its own without inconvenience; it will contain a foe several times more numerous than itself, and will win time for the arrival of the army. Correspondance de Napoléon I, (Paris: Henri Plon et J. Dumain, 1863) [No. 15310, Napoleon to Eugene Napoleon, 7 June 1809], 19:80-82; Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 154; Laurent Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations de l'Armée de Catalogne en 1808 et 1809 sous le Commandement du Général Gouvion Saint-Cyr, (Paris: Chez Anselin et Pochard, 1812) 26.

§2. Infantry

The French infantry regiment as used in Spain were either light (léger) or line (ligne) and was organized, under the Imperial Decree of 18 February 1808. It was by its "table of organization," 3,900 strong and composed of a regimental staff and five battalions. The first four were the bataillons de guerre or combat battalions and the fifth was the bataillon de dépôt, for recruitment, replacements, supply and training. Infantry regiments were also assigned a 4 pdr artillery company, which provided immediate fire support. Its personnel was drawn from the regiment and the company was attached directly to the regimental commander.⁹

The battalions were commanded by chefs de bataillon and composed of one grenadier company (heavy shock troops), one voltigeur company (light skirmisher troops) and four fusilier or line companies. The depot battalion commanded by the Major was organized into four depot companies. The infantry company consisted of an orderly room staff and 120 soldiers.¹⁰

The major units, like brigades and divisions were (except for the rare instance of major cavalry units) organized around the infantry. The 1st Division in the Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, for example, was entirely infantry. Its 1st brigade had five battalions, the 3rd battalions each of the 16e Ligne and 2e Suisse and three

⁹See Table 1. Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 63; CN, No. 13574, Décret, 18 February 1808, 16:38-341; Philip Haythornwaite, Napoleon's Line Infantry; Men-at-Arms Series (London: Osprey Publishing Co., 1983) 20, 23-25; Napoleon's Light Infantry, Men-at-Arms Series, (London: Osprey Publishing Co., 1983) 11-16, 26-27.

¹⁰Albert A. Nofi, "Napoleon at War", Strategy and Tactics, 32, (May 1972) 18.

battalions of the 7e Ligne. The 2nd brigade had four battalions, each a 3rd battalion of 2e, 37e, 56e and 93e Ligne.¹¹

¹¹Each regiment actually had the strength of a brigade with its four battalions and when the battalions of a single regiment are combined under one command, they will form either an entire or the bulk of a brigade. The regiment is an administrative unit, while the brigade is an operational one. Général de Brigade Jean-Baptiste, Baron Esprit de Latour's (1764-1815) Brigade de Reserve in late 1812, for example, it's staff and three battalions and the 23e Leger with a staff and two battalions. SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1812. SHAT, C(8)485, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 28 May 1808.

§3. Cavalry

The types of French cavalry employed in Catalonia included Cuirassiers, Dragoons, Hussars and Chasseurs à cheval. They were generally organized in four or five field squadrons and a depot squadron. The cuirassier regiments were organized by a Decree of 31 March 1807 into five squadrons of two companies, and each company with two troops, and 800-960 men.¹² The dragoons were organized with four squadrons (of two companies), three mounted and one dismounted,¹³ while the Chasseurs à cheval and hussar regiments had four to six squadrons of two companies with two troops. All of their regimental organizations were identical.¹⁴

The French cavalry in the Peninsula was not always well mounted due to difficulties in the regimental depots procuring suitable horses in France or Italy. In Catalonia, the 24e Dragons, a uniquely well-horsed regiment in General Souham's division, had in December 1808, 707 men and 755 horses,¹⁵ and by March 1809 the depot at Lodi had another 143 horses.¹⁶ Colonel Delort, its commander, was able to procure

¹²See Table 2. Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 40; Emir Bukhari, Napoleon's Cuirassiers and Carabiniers, Men-at-Arms Series, (London: Osprey Publishing, Ltd., 1977) 4, 5-16.

¹³Emir Bukhari, Napoleon's Cavalry, (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1979) 63.

¹⁴Emir Bukhari, Napoleon's Line Chasseurs, Men-at-Arms Series, (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd. 1977) 3-14; Bukhari, Napoleon's Hussars, Men-at-Arms Series, (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1978) 5-18.

¹⁵SHAT, C(8)465, Situation, VII Corps, 5 December 1808.

¹⁶Archives Nationales, AFIV1181, État de l'effective en Chevaux de Troupe des Dépôts des Régiments de l'Espagne, 14 March 1809.

adequate mounts though the rest of the corps' 3,328 cavalry had only 3,234 horses. Its depot at Lodi had more animals than any dragoon regiment in France.¹⁷

French heavy cavalry generally rode heavy Norman and Flemish animals while the light cavalry rode French and German horses. The quality of French cavalry mounts in Spain was seriously degraded after 1812 when the Russian campaign swept away 150,000 horses.¹⁸

A unique feature of French cavalry formations in Catalonia, and throughout the Grande Armée, after 1808 was the introduction of the provisional regiment. This was a regiment amalgamated from companies and squadrons drawn from other units. These units had a distinguished combat history in Catalonia and provided much of the cavalry support there until phased out in 1811. At the beginning of the war, two of the four cavalry regiments represented in the French command were provisional. They were the Provisional Cuirassier and Chasseur regiments. The Regiment Provisoire, later the 3e Provisoire Cuirassiers, was formed of the 1st company, 5th squadrons each from the 4e, 6e, 7e and 8e Cuirassiers. The Regiment Provisoire de Chasseurs à cheval was organized from the 1st company, 4th squadrons of the 14e, 15e, 19e, 23e and 24e Chasseurs à cheval.¹⁹

The French cavalry in Catalonia was either organized in brigades, or dispersed through the divisions. It was twice, organized into a division but never into higher

¹⁷Ibid. Colonel, later General Jacques Antoine, Baron Delort (1773-1846).

¹⁸Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 41-42.

¹⁹SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 15 December 1807; Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 28 May 1808.

formations.²⁰ The Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales had a "division" of two separate cavalry brigades,²¹ and Marshal Suchet's Army of Aragon and Catalonia had a separate "Corps Cavalry."²²

On the whole, however, the cavalry was divided between the divisions in the corps or army. In July 1809, for example, the three divisions, and separate siege "corps" in the VII Corps each had its own complement of cavalry. Division Souham had bodies of the 24e Dragons and 3e Provisoire Chasseurs à cheval in both of his two brigades, while only one of three in Division Pino had both the Dragons Napoléon and Chasseurs Royaux. General Duhesme's garrison of Barcelona, also provided the 3e Provisoire Cuirassiers (and three cavalry depots) to one of its three brigades. The corps also had a reserve in the 10e Hussards.²³

²⁰Like Marshal Murat's Cavalry Reserve in the Grande Armée used during the successive campaigns from 1805 to 1809. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 147; David Johnson, Napoleon's Cavalry and Its Leaders, (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc. 1978), 35.

²¹SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 28 May 1808.

²²In January 1814, Marshal Suchet's Division de Cavalerie under Général de Brigade Alexandre, Vicomte Digeon (1771-1826) had two brigades of two regiments each and a separate regiment. SHAT, C(8)372, Situation Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne 15 January 1814. By May, the Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne had a "corps cavalry" or "cavalry reserve" of two regiments (brigade) under Général de Brigade Jean Baptiste, Baron Meyer de Schauensée (1777-1860). SHAT, C(8)371, Situation Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814.

²³SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809. Division Souham was under General Joseph, Comte Souham (1760-1837).

§4. Artillery

The French Corps Artillery in Catalonia was organized as a division level command, with a staff headed by either a Général de Division or Brigade, assisted by a colonel, Chef d'État-Major (or major) and two or three captains. The Commandant administered the Corps Artillery (Police Générale); issued the corps commander's orders, submitted bimonthly "Situations" and correspondence (personnel and equipment) to the Corps Chef d'Etat-Major and monthly Situations and correspondence to the Ministry of War (6e Division, Bureau d'Artillerie). Finally, he assumed command of the artillery reserve if needed.²⁴

The Direction du Parc (Artillery) headed by a Colonel or Major (Directeur) managed this huge accumulation of material. His "staff" included two or three captains (adjoints), a Garde Principal/Général,²⁵ Conducteur Principal (d'artillerie),²⁶ two

²⁴Paul Thiebault, Manuel Général du Services des État-Majors Généraux et Divisionnaires dans les Armées, (Paris: Chez Magimel, 1813) 365-366; Georges Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arrière à la Grande Armée en 1806-1807, (Paris: Librairie Militaire R. Chapelot et Cie. 1910) 63-64. The Chef d'État-Major corresponded with the Commandant d'Artillerie de la Grande Armée when the Corps was part of the Grande Armée. In the case of the VII Corps/Armée de Catalogne such correspondence was carried on with the Ministère de la Guerre.

²⁵Principal Storekeeper (supply sergeant).

²⁶Conductors.

Conducteurs Ordinaires, Maîtres/Chef Artificier,²⁷ Ouvriers vétérans,²⁸ a company of artificers and other workmen.²⁹

His duties included establishing depots and entrepôts, directing the forges, foundries, workshops and wheelwright shops for artillery maintenance. Additionally, he oversaw the corps ammunition, and remount horse supply.³⁰ As artillery supply officer, he managed expenditures, funding, supply and administration of materials (such as receiving the Ordonnances de Crédit),³¹ and submitted the numerous administrative reports to the Ministry of War, such as the Bordereaux généraux,³² Inventaires généraux,³³ États de Remis and États de Consommation.³⁴

The third part of the artillery staff is the Inspection du train, headed by a chef de bataillon or captain (Inspecteur). He managed forage and harness, troop discipline, pay and inspection.³⁵ Finally, there were the field artillery commands in the subordinate divisions and installations (fortresses).³⁶

²⁷Chef artisans, e.g., blacksmiths, wheelwrights, coopers, etc.

²⁸Veteran laborers (artificers).

²⁹Thiebault, Manuel Général, 366-67.

³⁰Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arrière, 64.

³¹Orders for payment.

³²Register of payment and issues.

³³Inventories,

³⁴Statement of supplies received and consumed.

³⁵Thiebault, Manuel Général, 366-367.

³⁶Tbid.

There were five "skill" subdivisions for the artillery branch as such; (Artillerie à pied, Artillerie à cheval, Pontonnières, Ouvriers, and Armuriers), and four support divisions (Train d'Artillerie, Cannoniers gardes-côtes, Cannoniers vétérains and Cannoniers sédentaires).³⁷ The artillery units were organized in regiments of two battalions, each of two five company divisions. The regimental staff³⁸ consisted of a colonel (commander), four chefs de bataillon (commanders), and nineteen others.

Company strength for the foot artillery (1805) was 100 men, and 96 for horse artillery. Napoleon changed this with the Decree of 18 October, 1811 to four officers and 110 men (foot) and four officers and 96 men (horse).³⁹ A company had six or eight cannon, depending upon the caliber and unit mission.⁴⁰ The 11e Cie. Artillerie Italien had, for example, 18 cannon (4pdr and 8pdr).⁴¹

³⁷Of these subdivisions, the Pontonnières, Armuriers, Cannoniers gardes-côtes, Cannoniers vétérans and Cannoniers sédentaires never served in Catalonia. John Elting, Swords Around a Throne, Napoleon's Grande Armée, (New York: The Free Press, 1988) 75; Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 75.

³⁸See Table 4.

³⁹George Nafziger, Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, (Novato, Californai: Presidio Press, 1988) 34. A representative British Field Artillery (à pied) company had five officers and 145 men. Nafziger, The British Military, Its System and Organization, 1803-1815, 42.

⁴⁰Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arrière, 64-65; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 358-359.

⁴¹SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 15 December 1807.

A Corps d'Armée had one company of horse and one and a half companies of foot artillery with twelve guns per division.⁴² The Corps Artillery Park stored all the equipment including cannon.⁴³ It had a personnel reserve usually comprised of a company of foot artillery, ammunition, and material (often enough to equip an artillery train company with 150 vehicles); and other workers numbering as much as 500-600 men.⁴⁴ It also held spare vehicles, field forges, supplies and impediment not carried with the artillery companies.⁴⁵

The artillery train was a transportation asset, formed into six company battalions. An "elite" company supported the horse artillery, four line companies supported the foot artillery and Park, and a depot company trained recruits and remounts. A lieutenant commanded the company and a captain commanded the battalion assisted by a small staff.⁴⁶

⁴²The artillery companies carried an approvisionnement or basic load with them and the demi-approvisionnement remained with the Park. Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arrière, 65.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid, 71. Comparatively, Captain Bayne's second light 6pdr Brigade, Royal Artillery had in May 1809, fourteen vehicles (limbers, caissons, forge and stones carts) 81 horses including saddle horses and 26 mules. Major General Alexander Dickson, The Dickson Manuscripts, 5 vols., ed., General Collingwood Dickson, (Woolwich: Royal Artillery Institution, 1905, reprinted, Cambridge: Ken Trotman, 1987), 1:vii.

⁴⁵Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 255.

⁴⁶This battalion staff included an artiste Veterinarie, master sadler, and a master armorer. The companies had two harness makers and two blacksmiths. Ibid, 254-255; Robert Wilkinson-Lathan, Napoleon's Artillery, 6-12.

The "French Division Artillery" consisted of two artillery companies, one train, and 12 guns.⁴⁷ A chef de bataillon commanded, assisted by a captain and a conductor. For example, General Duhesme's division artillery in 1809 had two foot and two horse artillery companies, two train companies and a platoon of artificers.⁴⁸

The corps artillery is merely larger. Duhesme's consisted of a commandant and a small staff with a conducteur d'artillerie heading the Park and Trains. Its units were the 7e/2e Artillerie à cheval and 6e/6e Bataillon (bis) du train attached to the 1st Division; and the 11e/Artillerie à pied and 1er/Train d'Artillerie de la Garde attached to the 2d Division. The Corps did not have any organic artillery of its own.⁴⁹

⁴⁷Lechatier, Les Services de l'Arrière, 65,203.

⁴⁸SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809.

⁴⁹The staff included two captains and a lieutenant, small as compared to the Engineer Staff of four captains and four lieutenants. SHAT, C(8)485, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 28 May 1808.

§5. Engineers.

Corps or Armies drew their engineer support from the Corps Impérial de Génie,⁵⁰ whose sapper and miner battalions served as "magazines" from which the field corps drew companies.⁵¹ Generally, the corps engineers consisted of a Parc du génie, one or more sapper companies and a miner or pontoon detachment. A colonel commanded these engineers with a chef de bataillon as his Chief of Staff and a Directeur du Parc.⁵² Normally, mission requirements, topography, roads and fortifications of the country determined the size of this command.⁵³

The Corps engineer organization in Catalonia was a staff of eight company grade officers.⁵⁴ The VII Corps Engineers had a Général de Brigade commanding, a colonel, Chief of Staff; chef de bataillon as Chef du Parc, and seven staff officers; three sapper and one miner company⁵⁵.

⁵⁰Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 269-270. The Corps Impérial de Génie in 1804 had a headquarters of 384 officers (with three Généraux de Division and six Généraux de Brigade) and 340 gardes or employees who supervised the maintenance of fortifications. By 1812 the Corps had eight sapper battalions, six miner battalions and an Engineer Train battalion (Train du Génie) for the parc of equipment. Each battalion had six field companies and a depot company. Roger, Napoleon's Army, 86.

⁵¹Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 86.

⁵²Lechatier, Les Services de l'Arrière, 73-74; Thiebault, Manuel Général, 382-385.

⁵³Thiebault, Manuel Général, 383.

⁵⁴SHAT, C(8)485, Situation, Corps d'Observation de Pyrénées Orientales, 28 May 1808.

⁵⁵See Table 4. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps 1 July 1809; J. Belmas, Journaux des Sièges faits ou soutenus par les Français dans la Peninsule de 1807 à 1814, 4 vols., (Paris: Chez Firmin Didot Frères et Cie 1836) 2:655; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation

The Corps of Engineers was organized with a headquarters element of 364 engineer officers (1804) and 340 employees (including maintenance personnel, such as caretakers, storekeepers, clerks and artificers). Its units included five sapper battalions and nine miner companies. The engineer mission included construction, and maintenance of field and permanent fortifications,⁵⁶ reconnaissance,⁵⁷ siege and tactical engineer operations and command of engineer districts.⁵⁸

The sapper battalions were the engineer work horses, completing every type of engineer operation; while the miner battalions specialized in the underground warfare of mine and countermine. The sappeurs ouvriers or sapper artificers were organized in 1811 to manufacture and repair engineer material. These troops normally served as one miner company per corps and often a sapper company to a division.⁵⁹

Division de Général Reille, 1 April 1809; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation Siège de Girone, 15 September 1809.

⁵⁶Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 269-270; Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 85-87.

⁵⁷SHAT, C(8)36, Général de Division Verdier, Reconnaissance de la Côte de la Méditerranée depuis Calell jusqu'à Lescala et Rosas, 25 February 1810; Cours Élémentaire de Fortification, ou Éléments de l'art de construire, attaquer et défendre les retranchements et les places, à l'usage des élèves de l'École spéciale impériale militaire: Rédigé d'après les ordres de M. le Général Bellavene, commandant Directeur des études de la dite École, (Paris: Chez Valade, 1809) 10-13.

⁵⁸Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 270.

⁵⁹Ibid.

§6. Transportation.

The Bataillons du Train des Equipages Militaires were the Corps/Army units responsible for the movement of supplies. Established by the Imperial Decree of 26 March 1807,⁶⁰ it was a centralized "corps" like the artillery and engineers and, within the Corps, placed under the orders of the Commissaires Ordonnateurs.⁶¹

The French command in Catalonia received its first train units in the spring of 1809; the 16e, 17e, 18e and 19e Brigades de Mulets de Bât, organized as separate companies⁶² under a sous lieutenant, with 80 men and 120 mules.⁶³ In 1810, the Ministry sent the 2e and 5e Bataillons d'Équipage Militaire to Catalonia. These were 499 man battalions commanded by a captain and organized with a staff and four companies.⁶⁴ A

⁶⁰CN, No. 12178, Napoleon to General Dejean, 26 March 1807, 14:542-543; Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 568-569.

⁶¹G. Couget, "L'Arme de Train de l'Empire à nos Jours (1807-1878); Revue Historique des Armées No. 3, 1978 (special)11; Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 94-95; Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arrière, 88-89.

⁶²AN, AFIV1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 31 May 1809. There were nineteen mule Brigades. The VII Corps had its own train of 408 Mules to which these four Brigades were added. AFIV 1183, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Étapes et Équipages, Général de Division Dejean, Ministère Directeur de l'Administration de la Guerre, Rapport à l'Empereur, 4 October 1809.

⁶³AN, AFIV 1183, Bureau des Étapes Convois, Rapport à Ministre-Directeur de l'Administration de la Guerre, 30 January 1809.

⁶⁴The thirteen Bataillons des Train des Équipages Militaires and nineteen brigades de Mulets were grouped and had two centralized depots at Pau and Commercy, (1809). AN, AFIV 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 15 June 1810.

sous-lieutenant commanded the 100 man (36 vehicle) companies.⁶⁵

These two battalions were a distinct improvement in transportation support over the use of contract and requisitioned transport,⁶⁶ to support the difficult resupply of Barcelona.⁶⁷

⁶⁵AN, AFIV 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, May 1809; AFIV 1184, Bureau des Étapes et Équipages, [General Dejean] Rapport à l'Empereur, 7 June 1809, AFIV 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 15 June 1810.

⁶⁶By October 1809, the VII Corps had 200 farm vehicles and 600 horses in its train. AN, AFIV 1183, General Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 4 October 1809.

⁶⁷AN, AFIV 1183, Bureau des Étapes et Équipages, Général Dejean, Comte de Cessac, Rapport à l'Empereur 24 January 1810. As Comte Daru aptly states: "Le service des équipages et transports militaires, est l'un des plus importants de l'armée, puisque c'est par lui que toutes les autres branches de l'administration sont vivifiées". Pierre-Antoine-Noël-Bruno, Comte Daru (1767-1829) held many administrative posts during the Revolution and Empire, notably as Intendant Général, Commissaire Général de la Grande Armée, Directeur de l'Administration de la Grande Armée and Ministre de l'Administration de la Guerre. Colonel H. de la Barre de Nanteuil, Le Comte Daru ou l'Administration Militaire sous la Révolution et l'Empire, (Paris: J. Peyronnet et Cie, 1966) 19; Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arrière, 88; citing letter, Daru to Napoleon, 6 February 1808.

§7. Gendarmerie.

Napoleon organized the Gendarmerie in Catalonia by the Decree of 6 July 1810 as the 6th Legion, a "regiment" with 20 brigades of gendarmes à cheval and 100 brigades à pied. The six man brigades were lumped into six 187 man companies.⁶⁸

As an Army asset, it remained with the headquarters, but Force Publique (military police) detachments were occasionally distributed to posts or divisions. Gendarme duties included the security of the headquarters, the maintenance of order during the supply distributions, and regulation of places of entertainment.⁶⁹ Operational functions include following up the rear of the army, regulating the flow of troops during battle, apprehending deserters, and managing prisoners of war. Other duties include regulating army vehicles, camp followers and employees.⁷⁰ In Catalonia, also, the Gendarmerie conducted anti-insurgent and anti-bandit operations.⁷¹

⁶⁸SHAT, X(f)171, Extrait des Minutes de la Secrétaire d'État, 6 June 1810.

⁶⁹Emmanuel Martin, La Gendarmerie Française en Espagne et au Portugal, (Paris: Librairie Léauteu, 1898), 21-22, 83-86. In 1811, the 6e Légion de Catalogne numbered 724 men. The Force Publique detachment distributed through the Armée de Catalogne was 75 men, SHAT, X(f)171, Inspection Général de la Gendarmerie, Marshal Moncey to General Clarke, 11 March 1811.

⁷⁰Thiebault, Manuel Général, 460-470.

⁷¹Bernard Charron, "La Participation de la Gendarmerie Impériale de la Guerre d'Espagne" (Ph.D. dissertation, Université de Bordeaux, 1972) 34.

§ 8. The French Naval "Slice" in Catalonia.

French naval involvement in Catalonia, encompassed naval support for the Army's logistical efforts, such as naval escorts, for French supply shipping, passing command correspondence, patrolling, clearing the sea lanes and fighting corsairs and British warships. To accomplish this, the Ministry of Marine assigned a naval detachment with ships to the French garrisons in the Catalan ports, such as Barcelona and Rosas.

Following the French defeat at Trafalgar, 1805, the Emperor made a concerted effort to reconstitute the French Navy which had suffered from serious decay since the beginning of the Revolution. Beginning a massive rearmament project, he dispersed the large dockyards (such as Brest) to smaller ones, facilitating French coastal traffic and reconstituted the Mediterranean naval squadrons.⁷² Napoleon ordered his Naval Minister, Vice-Amiral Denis Decrès, Duc de Saint Germain (1761-1820), to increase ship construction in 1807.⁷³

Decrès undertook this massive project and drafted 3,500 ship builders. By November, construction was under way, as the Emperor urged him on: "Activez l'armement des deux frégates de Toulon ainsi que de la Danae..."⁷⁴ By March 1808,

⁷²Philippe Masson and Jose Muracciole, Napoléon et la Marine, (Paris: J. Peyronnet et Cie., 1968) 224-225.

⁷³Je vois avec surprise que je n'ai à Gènes ni à Toulon aucune frégate en construction. Mon intention est que sur-le-champ vous en fassiez mettre en construction deux à Toulon...J'ai besoin de frégates dans la Méditerranée...Donnez aussi ordre à Toulon de mettre en armement l'Uranie et l'Incorruptible, afin d'avoir toujours là deux frégates. CN No. 13221, Napoleon to Vice-Amiral Decrès, Ministre de la Marine, 6 October, 1807, 16:69.

⁷⁴CN No. 13331, Napoleon to Vice-Amiral Decres, 1 November 1807, 16:140-141.

Decrès built 43 vessels (12 at Toulon).⁷⁵ Between 1809 and 1814, the French Navy received 45 capital ships, fifteen frigates and nearly 900 lesser vessels.⁷⁶ The Emperor's goal was to create a 4,800 ship navy at an expenditure of 480 million cubic feet of timber; enough to set back French forests nearly two centuries.⁷⁷

On the Mediterranean, the immediate threats to French logistical shipping for the Army of Catalonia (specifically Barcelona) were the Catalan corsairs and the patrols of the Royal Navy. For example, Admiral Thomas Cochrane Lord Dundonald (1775-1860) took a French merchantman in 1808 filled with munitions for the Army in Spain at the Bay of Almeria.⁷⁸ Such actions induced the Emperor to escort his merchant shipping convoys with warships. One such escort occurred on 29 March 1809. Vice-Admiral Honoré Comte Ganteaume (1755-1818), commander of the Mediterranean Squadron, formed a division at Toulon of five capital ships, two frigates, and two small bricks. His

⁷⁵CN No. 13698, Napoleon to Decres, 29 March 1808, 16:454-455.

⁷⁶Auguste Thomazi, Napoléon et ses Marins, (Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1950) 249.

⁷⁷Masson and Muracciole, Napoléon et la Marine, 246.

⁷⁸Donald Thomas, Cochrane, Britannia's Last Sea-King, (New York: The Viking Press, 1978) 124; J.W. Fortescue, Dundonald, (London: Macmillan and Co., 1895) 54-55. Napoleon was apprehensive about the safety of moving strategic materials by sea:

"Order the evacuation of the artillery of Gerona upon Figueras. I do not approve of its evacuation by sea because that is too risky."

UCN No. 4156, Decision, April 15, 1810, 3:529.

mission was to escort merchant ships to Barcelona which carried: 30,000 quintals of grain, flour and rice; 300,000 pounds of powder; and one million cartridges.⁷⁹

The second form of naval support was to the Catalan ports. For example, in June 1812 two warships were assigned to Barcelona. These were: Le Chebek de Neptune and La Goesette de Cerf.⁸⁰ The Barcelona command supported its naval "slice" with approximately 3,500 F. a month and "...payés sur ordonnance du Commissaire des guerres principal de Barcelone d'après un crédit mensuel de 4,000 frs. par mois faits pour cet object par M. Le Général Gouverneur."⁸¹ These ships were permanent parts of the garrison and their crew drew rations as such.⁸² This squadron guarded the port, escorted ships, dispatched messages to France and pursued Spanish corsairs.

⁷⁹CN No. 14970, Napoleon to Vice-Amiral Ganteaume, 29 March 1809, 18:401-402. The Emperor stressed that time was of the essence and the convoy must sail immediately, the cargo was 12,000 quintals of grain, flour and rice (9 ounce pounds), 150,000 pounds of powder and 500,00 cartridges. In May 1810, General Lacuée reported to Napoleon on revictuling Barcelona "...by means of commerce protected by the Marine." and the Emperor ordered "...all necessary measures for protecting... vessels carrying grains into Catalonia". UCN, No. 4213, Decision, May 7, 1810, 3:552. A week later, General Dejean requested "...gunboats to protect the commercial expeditions to Barcelona...". UCN, No. 4233, Decision, May 15, 1810, 3:567.

⁸⁰SHAT, C(19)9, Bureau des Vivres No. 163. Commissaire des guerres G. Raymondon to Ministre Directeur Lacuée, 10 June 1812.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²SHAT, C(8)271. Commissaire des guerres Mongenot, Journal du Blocus de la Place de Barcelone, February 1814.

§9. The Allied Contingents.

Few French armies possessed within their ranks as high an admixture of allied and foreign soldiers as the Army of Catalonia. It had Westphalian, Berg, Wurtzburg, Saxon, Nassau, Italian, Neapolitan, Swiss, and Spanish contingents throughout its history, and its percentage of foreign troops was higher than most French armies of the period. For example, the Armée d'Allemagne in 1809, had 186,725 men with 71,694 or 38.39% foreign and allied,⁸³ as compared with half in the Army of Catalonia.

In 1807 the Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales had 5,605 Italian and Neapolitan troops; 71.1% of its 7,887 men.⁸⁴ As the division grew into the Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, the influx of French troops reduced this percentage to 45.3% or 6,461 out of 14,253.⁸⁵ By July 1809, it had 45.8% foreign/allied troops, or 25,122 out of 54,794.⁸⁶

In 1810 the foreign contingent in the Army of Catalonia rose to 56.8% or 26,970 out of 47,519 troops.⁸⁷ This was its highest point since 1807 to the end of the war. In

⁸³The allied elements in the Armée d'Allemagne were mostly Saxon, Barvarian and Wurtemberg with a small admixture of Corsicans and Italians. Scotty Bowden and Charles Tarbox, *Armies on the Danube, 1809*, Armies of the Napoleonic Wars Research Series, (Arlington, Texas: Empire Games Press, 1980), 56-64.

⁸⁴SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 15 December 1807.

⁸⁵SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 28 May 1808.

⁸⁶SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809.

⁸⁷SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

1811, Napoleon transferred two divisions from the Army of Catalonia to Marshal Suchet's Army of Aragon, and later to the Grande Armée for the Russian Campaign. By December, the Army of Catalonia shrank to 24,740 men and its allied elements to 4,814 men or 19.45%.⁸⁸ In 1812, however, it nearly doubled its allied and overall strength to 8,121 out of 40,816, or 19.89%.⁸⁹ In 1813, the Emperor again halved the Army of Catalonia to 23,925 men and its allied contingent quartered, to 2,978 men or 12.4%.⁹⁰ Finally in 1814, the Ministry of War stripped the combined Army of Aragon and Catalonia of troops to defend France. Its allied contingents melted away as the European political realignment left France and Italy isolated. When the war ended in May 1814, there remained only 188 Catalan troops attached to Marshal Suchet's army a mere 0.09% of its 19,315 troops.⁹¹

⁸⁸SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1811. The Corps d'Armée en Haute-Catalogne similarly had 4,730 foreign troops of the strength of 25,270 or 18.7%. SHAT, C(8)371, Situation Corps d'Armée en Haute-Catalogne, 1 August 1811.

⁸⁹SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 16 July 1812.

⁹⁰The garrison of Tarragona had the 7e de Ligne Italien, Gendarmes Espagnole, the Compagnie Departementale and the 1er Chasseurs à cheval Italiens while the garrison of Lerida had a detachment of the 7e de Ligne Italien. Neither of the blockaded fortresses submitted Situations. SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 30 June 1813.

⁹¹SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814.

The Grand Duchy of Berg

Napoleon created the Grand Duchy by the Decree of 14 November 1808. It included lands seceded from Prussia, Kleve, the Duchies of Mark and Dortmund, the Castle of Wesel, Bavaria, Ansbach and the Herzogtum of Berg.⁹² The Berg Army was an amalgam of units drawn from the older provinces and newer Grand-Ducal formations.⁹³

In 1806, the Grand Duke, Marshal Joachim Murat (1767-1815) organized the 1st Berg Infantry Regiment with four battalions of eight, 100 man companies. To ensure pro-French reliability, he drafted French troops into its ranks. In August 1808, the Duchy reorganized the regiment into the 1st and 2nd Infantry Regiments each with three battalions of six 120 man companies. Both regiments shared a four company depot battalion, based on the French model. Berg later organized a third and fourth infantry regiment, and adopted the French conscription system to keep a flow of men to the Army. In 1811, Berg reorganized its infantry into regiments of two battalions and a depot company. Each battalion contained eight 120 man companies which were: one grenadier, one voltigeur and six fusiliers.⁹⁴

⁹²There were four departments: the Rhine, the Seig, the Ruhr and the Ems. Otto von Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies (1): Westphalia and Kleve-Berg, Man-At-Arms Series, Martin Windrow, ed., (Berkshire: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1975) 4; Georges Lefebvre, Napoleon, vol. 2, Napoleon from 18 Brumaire to Tilsit 1799-1807, (new York: Columbia University Press, 1969) 245; F.M. Kircheisen, Napoleon, Tns. Henry St. Lawrence, (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1972; reprint 1932 ed.)346-347 (page references are to reprint edition).

⁹³von Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies (1) 7.

⁹⁴Ibid.

Berg had two Chevaux-Légers regiments and one amalgamated artillery/engineer battalion composed of five companies, each of horse and foot artillery, sappers/miners, pontoners, and a train. Finally, it had a Gendarmerie and National Guard, based on the French model.⁹⁵

In January 1809, the Emperor ordered the formation of a composite division organized under the auspices of the King of Westphalia. Composed of 6,000 Westphalian, Berg, Wurtzberg and Saxon troops, it was earmarked for service in Catalonia.⁹⁶ Berg provided the 1er and 2e Regiments du Berg (four bns with 2,919) temporarily to General Reille's Division, later reorganized as General Verdier's Division.⁹⁷

These two regiments played a distinguished part in the siege of Gerona in 1809, extraordinary casualties, and participated in some of its fiercest fighting.⁹⁸ The Berg contingent suffered terrible casualties from combat loss and epidemic sickness following the autumn rains,⁹⁹ and by the end of the siege only 30% of its beginning strength

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶CN, No. 14681, Napoleon to Berthier, 11 January 1809, 18:195.

⁹⁷This brigade was under General Amey. See Table 7. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Division de Général Reille, 1 April 1809; Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:663.

⁹⁸Oman, Peninsular War, 3:47-48. General Verdier assaulted on the breaches on 19 September 1809, amidst a terrific fire. Though General Amey's German column penetrated the breach and got far as some buildings inside they were thrown back with 296 casualties. Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:604-612.

⁹⁹Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:612; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:49-50.

remained. The 1st Regiment had 577 men and 662 men in the hospital, or 54% and 52% of its troop strength out of 1,327 and 1,274 men respectively.¹⁰⁰

The Duchies of Nassau-Usungen/Nassau-Weilburg

The twin Duchies of Nassau became members of the Confederation of the Rhine in 1806 and reorganized its Army in 1808, establishing the 1st and 2d Nassau Infantry; with two six company battalions: one grenadier, one voltigeur and four fusilier. Nassau's light cavalry was the Reitende Jager Regiment. The contingent used the Austrian regulations from 1803 until 1810, when it adapted the French regulations. Both infantry regiments saw service in Spain, but the 1st Nassau Regiment served in the Army of Catalonia from 1810. The regiment was an amalgam of the pre-1803 1st Battalion (one grenadier and three fusilier companies), 4th Battalion (one light and one fusilier company) and new recruits (1,494 men), and assigned to General Rouyer's division.¹⁰¹ By May 1810, Marshal Augereau transferred the Nassau regiment to the garrison of Barcelona

¹⁰⁰Despite their grave sick rate, the Berg troops still fought well, as in action against the miquelets at Olot, on 23 December 1809. SHAT, C(8)37, Letter, General Souham to Marshal Augereau, 25 December 1809; Letter, Général de Division Souham to Marshal Augereau, 25 December 1809; "État des officiers sous-officiers et soldats morts, blessés ou perdus", 23 December 1809. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810.

¹⁰¹Otto von Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies (2) Nassau and Oldenburg, Men-At-Arms Series (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1976), 3-6; Otto von Pivka, Armies of the Napoleonic Era, (New York: Taplinger, 1979), 171-172; Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany 1648-1849, (New York: Knopf, 1964), 367. "Actes relatifs à la confédération des états du Rhin et à la dissolution de l'Empire Germanique, 12 Juillet 1806," Leopold Neumann, Recueil des Traités et Conventions Conclues par l'Autriche, (Leipzig, 1856, reprint ed., Krause Reprint 1971), 2:202-217.

(1,270 men)¹⁰² where it served until November 1813, when Nassau defected to the Allies, and Napoleon had it disarmed and escorted to France as prisoners of war.¹⁰³

The Kingdom of Westphalia

Napoleon formed this kingdom at the Peace of Tilsit, 1807, and awarded it to his brother Jérôme Napoléon Bonaparte. He carved it out of the former territories of Hesse-Cassel, Brunswick, Paderborn, Stolberg-Wernigerode and slivers of some Prussian states. Divided into eight departments, Napoleon incorporated it into the Confederation of the Rhine.¹⁰⁴

He required it to field a 25,000 man army including 20,000 infantry, 2,500 cavalry and 1,500 artillery. During the Peninsular War, King Jerome provided the 2nd Westphalian Division to the VII Corps as part of the reinforcements to besiege Gerona.¹⁰⁵ The division established a depot at Perpignan and entered Catalonia in May 1809. It participated heroically in the siege of Gerona, twice assaulting the fortress on 8 July and

¹⁰²It had 1,270 men. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

¹⁰³Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies (2), 18-19.

¹⁰⁴F.M. Kircheissen, Napoleon, Tns. Henry St. Lawrence (Freeport New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1972), 409-410. Von Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies, 1:15.

¹⁰⁵See Table 5; Westphalia had to provide 9,500 men for in Spain 1809; 2,500 in 1810; 2,000 in 1811; 1,000 in 1812 and finally 200 in 1813. The contingent steadily fell as Westphalia's requirement to supply troops to German, the Baltic Fortresses and Russia increased. Connelly, Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms, 143-145; Von Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies, 1:15; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809; Von Pivka, Armies of the Napoleonic Era, 256-258.

19 September 1809 suffering terrible losses.¹⁰⁶ By December 1809, only 884 men remained under arms. Of its total strength of 4,610 men, it had a staggering 3,583 (77.7%) in the hospital.¹⁰⁷

In March 1810, the division received 650 fresh men, and Marshal Augereau assigned it the garrison of Gerona until April 1811 when the Westphalian battalions were returned home. A 500 man amalgamated contingent of Westphalian units remained in Catalonia until 1813.¹⁰⁸

The Kingdom of Saxony

After the crushing Prussian/Saxon defeat at Jena-Auerstadt in 1806, Napoleon concluded a military alliance with the Elector of Saxony, Frederick Augustus. In exchange for Saxon military support, Napoleon created the Elector, King of Saxony, Grand Duke of Poland (1807), and a member of the Confederation of the Rhine.¹⁰⁹ The King

¹⁰⁶SHAT, C(8)35, Armée d'Espagne, 7e Corps, Siège de Girone, Rapport Général du Génie sur le Siège de Girone, 20 September 1809. Archives Nationales AFIV1621, plaque 3(I), Affaires d'Espagne, Siège de Girone, "Lettre de Général Verdier 9 July 1809. AN, AFIV1621, plaque 3(III), Affaires d'Espagne, Siège de Girone, Rapports de l'Artillerie sur le Siège de Girone. Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:533-538, 602-613. Oman, Peninsular War, 3:31-33, 46-49.

¹⁰⁷SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1809.

¹⁰⁸In January 1813, the 1er-1er Ligne Westphalien formed part of the Garrison of Figueras, and the two companies of the 1er Westphalien Artillerie formed part of the Army Artillery. Von Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies, 1:17; SHAT, C(8)371, Situation Corps d'Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1813.

¹⁰⁹F.M. Kircheisen, Napoleon, 380; Otto von Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies (3); Saxony 1806-1815, Men-At-Arms Series, (London: Osprey Publishing, 1979), 5.

reorganized the Saxon army along French lines in 1810 with two infantry divisions, a cavalry division, an artillery regiment plus two companies.¹¹⁰

The Saxons sent the 4th "Prinz Clemens" Infantry Regiment to Catalonia in 1810, (1,658 men). Marshal Augereau assigned it to the garrison of Barcelona, where it remained until 1811.¹¹¹

The Confederation of the Rhine

When Napoleon formed the Confederation of the Rhine in July 1806, it included the Kingdoms of Bavaria, Saxony, Westphalia, Wurtemberg, the Grand-Duchies of Berg and Hesse-Darmstadt, the Duchies of Nassau-Usingen, Nassau-Weilberg, Hohenzollern-Hechingen, Hohenzollern-Zigmaringen, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Mecklenburg Schwerin, Oldenburg and the Saxon Duchies of Weimar, Gotha, Meinengen and Colberg.¹¹² The Confederation sent to Catalonia in May 1810, the 5e and 6e de Ligne de Confederation du Rhin (1,128 and 535 men respectively), and the Bataillon de Princes (286 men).¹¹³

¹¹⁰von Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies, 3:9-10; von Pivka, Armies of the Napoleonic Era, 231; Lt. Colonel Sauzey, Les Allemands sous les Aigles Français, Essai sur les Troupes de la Confédération du Rhin 1806-1813, vol. 3, Les Saxons dans nos Rangs, (Paris, 1907, reprint edition, Paris: C. Terana, 1987), 30-33, (pages refer to reprint edition).

¹¹¹See Table 6. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne 31 May 1810.

¹¹²Kirsheisen, Napoleon, 354; Neumann, Recueil des Traités et Conventions, "Traite de Confederation des États du Rhin, 12 July 1806, 2:202-212.

¹¹³One battalion of the 5e de Ligne de Confederation du Rhin was from the Saxon Duchies of Coburg-Saalfeld, Gotha-Altenburg, Hildburghausen, Meiningen and Weimar. The regiments were assigned to Division Rouyer and the battalion to Division Verdier. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810; von Pivka, Armies of the

The Kingdom of Italy

The Republic and later (1804) Kingdom of Italy fell under the Vice-Roy, Prince Eugène de Beauharnais (1781-1824), and since 1800, its Army was organized into seven divisions numbering 23,000 men.¹¹⁴ It expanded with continued Imperial troop demands to 44,00 infantry, 6,000 cavalry; 6,000 naval (three frigates) and 120 guns by 1808, and Italy contributed a considerable contingent to the Catalan front.¹¹⁵ In 1807, it provided General Millossewitz's brigade to the Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, including three battalions, 2e-2e, 3e-4e, and 2e-5e de Ligne Italien, a light battalion, the 1er Velites Royaux, two companies of the Dragons Italien and Chasseurs Royaux Italiens, totaling 3,423 men.¹¹⁶ Through 1808, the Vice-Roy reinforced the Catalan front,¹¹⁷ mostly to General Pino's Division.¹¹⁸

Napoleonic Era, 234-236.

¹¹⁴These were the Legione Italica, Divisiona Italica, Divisiona Polacca, Divisiona del Ierno, Corps Distaccato, and the Guarda de Presidente. Otto von Pivka, Napoleon's Italian and Neapolitan Troops, Men-At-Arms Series, (London: Osprey Publishing, 1979)5.

¹¹⁵Ibid, 6.

¹¹⁶SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 15 December 1807.

¹¹⁷SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 28 May 1808; SHAT, C(8)355, Supplément à l'État d'Emplacement de l'Armée d'Espagne, Défense de la Frontière, 12-30 June 1808; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation VII, Corps, 6 January 1809.

¹¹⁸SHAT, C(8) 362, Division de Général Pino, 12 October 1809; C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810.

The contingent served in the Italian Division, under General Pino and later General Philippe Severoli through 1811. In 1812, the Emperor reduced it for service in the Russian campaign, and by 1813 withdrew its remaining troops for service in Italy to repel the Austrian invasion.¹¹⁹

The Kingdom of Naples

Like the Kingdom of Italy, Naples provided a large contingent to Catalonia. In 1806, after its conquest and the accession of Joseph Bonaparte as king, the new government reorganized the remains of the Royal army.¹²⁰ It totaled 11,000 troops and consisted of two regiments each of line and light infantry, chasseurs à cheval, eight companies of foot artillery, one of horse artillery, twelve companies of "d'artilleurs littoraux," six companies of sappers, engineers, a legion of gendarmerie, a train battalion, the Garde Royale and two foreign units, the Royale-Corse and Royale-Africaine. Its administrative machinery was a shallow imitation of the French system.¹²¹

¹¹⁹SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1812.

¹²⁰Most of the Royal army fled to Sicily with King Ferdinand and Queen Marie Caroline. Consequently, the Napolitan war machine nearly collapsed. King Joseph and his Minister of War, Christophe Saliceti had the unenviable task of restoring it. von Pivka, Napoleon's Italian and Neapolitan Troops, 25; Connelly, Napoleon's Satellite Kingdom, 72; and R.M. Johnston, The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy, and the Rise of the Secret Societies, 2 vols., (London: Macmillan and Co., 1904; Reprint, New York: De Capo Press, 1973) 2:90.

¹²¹Jacques Rambaud, Naples sous Joseph Bonaparte 1806-1808, (Paris:Librairie Plon, 1911) 282-292; Connelly, Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms, 86-89.

Naples provided two battalions, the 1er, 2e-1er de Ligne Napolitan (1,912 men), an amalgamated squadron of the 2e Chasseurs Napolitan, and Regiment Provisional de Chasseurs/Dragons (160 men) to the Catalan front in 1807¹²². In January 1808 the 1er, 2e-2e de Ligne Napolitan came to the VII Corps.¹²³ For the siege of Gerona, General Gouvion Saint-Cyr lumped the Neapolitan contingent into Division Verdier as a separate brigade,¹²⁴ and in 1810, Marshal Augereau reorganized it into a division under General Pignatelli.¹²⁵ The Neapolitan Division was, however, short-lived for the troops constituted a chronic disciplinary problem. Their desertion and crime rate was the highest in the Army of Catalonia. Part of the problem was due to the demands placed upon Naples to supply troops. These strained King Joseph's shaky administration and forced him to empty his prisons, drafting hundreds of jailbirds, goldbricks, and other riffraff into his army.¹²⁶ Napoleon was furious over the abysmal quality of these troops, as with the arrival of a convoy of exceptionally poor Neapolitan recruits at Turin in June 1810:

The King of Naples is ridding his country of ruffians who are costing us very dear. Declare that I hold General Grenier and Marshal Perignon

¹²²SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 15 December 1807; C(8)362, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 28 May 1808.

¹²³SHAT C(8)362, VII Corps, Situation, 6 January 1809; and Situation, VII Corp, 1 July 1809.

¹²⁴SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1809, and Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810. General Jean Antoine Comte Verdier (1767-1839) commanded Division Verdier.

¹²⁵SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

¹²⁶SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810; von Pivka, Napoleon's Italian and Neapolitan Troops, 25.

responsible if ruffians come to us instead of soldiers...for these rascals inflict the whole army.¹²⁷

Within the year, Napoleon cleared the Neapolitan contingent from Catalonia.¹²⁸

The Miscellaneous Contingents

The Army in Catalonia had odd units such as the Catalan counterinsurgents, specially formed French battalions, and a Swiss contingent (on both sides of the conflict). These included the bataillons étrangers, such as the Swiss regiments. Switzerland provided excellent mercenaries to the French Army since the seventeenth century¹²⁹ and, by 1805, supplied four infantry regiments (1st to 4th). The independent cantons of

¹²⁷UCN, No. 4304, Decision, June 14, 1810, 3:603-604.

¹²⁸SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1811.

...le 5e bataillon de marche...est parti de Naples pour se rendre en Catalogne. Mon intention n'est pas d'encombrer la Catalogne de mauvais soldats et d'engrosser les bandes de brigands. Si ce bataillon est composé de galériens ou de bandits, ou d'hommes mal habillés et mal armés, on le renverra à Naples. En général, écrivez au Roi que je n'ai pas besoin de nouvelles troupes napolitaines en Espagne, et que je n'en veux plus.

CN, No. 16765, Napoleon to General Clarke, 6 August 1810, 21:23.

¹²⁹During the French Revolution, the Swiss withdrew its contingent of eleven regiments after the massacre of 600 Gardes Suisses on 10 August 1792 during the storming of the Tuileries. A "Capitulation" (convention) between the two countries in 1803 negotiated by the pro-French Swiss Military organization gave France this contingent. Alexandre Paguët, Histoire de la Confédération Suisse, 7e Ed., 2 vols., (Paris: H. Georg, Libraire, Editeur, 1879) 2:353-356; Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 375-376; George Allen, The French Revolution, 4 vols., (Philadelphia: George Barrie's Sons, 1923) 2:252-256; Rodolphe de Castella de Delley, Le Régiment des Gardes-Suisses au Service de France, (Sainte Paul Fribourg: Editions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1974) 168-173.

Neuchâtel¹³⁰ and Valais provided a battalion each. These units totaled 4,000 men and were organized as "national" units but paid by France on the French pay scale.¹³¹

Two Swiss Battalions served in Catalonia. The 3e-2e de Ligne Suisse and its depot served there from 1807 to 1812, (550 men), when the Ministry of War withdrew it.¹³² The Bataillon Valaisan entered Catalonia in 1808 and withdrew in 1811. It averaged about 250 men in five companies and did excellent service¹³³. There was even in 1808 a Swiss regiment serving in the Spanish Army, the Regiment de Wimpffen, which General Duhesme unsuccessfully attempted to recruit into his Corps.¹³⁴ From this regiment, Duhesme formed a "unit" of twenty-nine Swiss deserters attached to the garrison of Barcelona in 1809.¹³⁵

¹³⁰The Bataillon de Neuchâtel, recruited voluntarily from Marchal Berthier's lands as Prince de Neuchâtel, were in essence a private army which served in Spain. Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 378.

¹³¹Ibid, 376.

¹³²SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées-Orientales, 15 December 1807; C(8)362, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées-Orientales, 28 May 1808; C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809; C(8)362, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne, 15 March 1811; C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1812.

¹³³The Bataillon Valaisan was organized on the same basis as the other Swiss regiments of the Capitulation. When France annexed Valais in 1810, it combined the Bataillon Valaisan with the Tirailleurs du Pô and the Tirailleurs Corses into the 11e Regiment d'Infanterie Légère. Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 377-378.

¹³⁴This regiment was at Tarragona in June 1808, and Duhesme unsuccessfully tried to recruit it. CN, No. 13586, Napoleon to Général Clarke, 20 February 1808, 16:349-350; Oman, Peninsular War, 1:310.

¹³⁵These "Deserteurs Suisse" were probably organized as a disciplinary company for the most unsavory details on the post, similar to the Chasseurs de Flessingue on Walcheren Island which was formed from a depot of deserters or other unit of "refractaires." Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 434-435; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII

Another odd battalion which served in Catalonia was a battalion of the Régiment de la Tour d'Auvergne, formed in 1805 to attract the Royalists and Chouans of the Northwestern Department of France.¹³⁶ The unit was named after La Tour d'Auvergne, the late First Grenadier of France. His nephew was its first commander.¹³⁷ One of its battalions served in Catalonia from 1810 to 1811 (Division Verdier).¹³⁸

Throughout the war, the French used various National Guard (Gardes Nationales) and light units drawn from the French frontier departments. These included the Chasseurs des Pyrénées-Orientales¹³⁹ and the Bataillon Départemental assigned to the garrison of Barcelona.¹⁴⁰ Other units included the Bataillons de Gars, d'Aude and de Haute Garone,

Corps, 1 July 1809.

¹³⁶The memory of the Royalist and Chouan revolts of the Vendean "counter revolution" caused bitter rifts in France until the middle of the nineteenth century. The last Vendean revolts were in 1832 and, prior to the formation of this regiment, the last insurgency was Chouan insurrection to 1799 which was put down by the Armée d'Autichamp in November. André Montagnon, Les Guerres de Vendée 1793-1832. (Paris: Librairie Académique Perrin, 1974) 270.

¹³⁷The regiment was unfortunately dogged by corruption. Napoleon relieved La Tour d'Auvergne in December 1808 for incompetence, corruption and "shaking down" officer candidates for money. Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 358. "The colonel of the Tour d'Auvergne Regiment is incapable of commanding it; named another colonel." UCN, No. 2533, Napoleon to General Clarke, December 8, 1808, 2:563.

¹³⁸SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810; C(8)362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

¹³⁹SHAT, C(8)362, VII Corps, Situation, 6 January 1809.

¹⁴⁰SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Division de Général Reille, 1 April 1809; C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810.

de Tarn Garreau,¹⁴¹ the 3e Provisionale de Bayonne, and the Pionniers Volontaire Étrangers.¹⁴² All of these units were transferred out of Catalonia (or disbanded) by the end of 1813.

Finally, the French command formed a variety of Catalan regular and irregular units. Amongst the later were the Gendarmes Catalans formed in 1811 by Marshal Macdonald and General Suchet and assigned to an Arrondissement Territorial for police and escort duty, and officered by Frenchmen who lived in Spain prior to 1808.¹⁴³ In 1812, General Decaen converted this Gendarme company into the Guides Catalans, and assigned them to the Arrondissement de Girone until the end of the war.¹⁴⁴ Other "regular" units included the Compagnie Municipale¹⁴⁵ formed in Barcelona; the Bataillon

¹⁴¹SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne, 1 August 1811; Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1812.

¹⁴²SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1812; C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 16 July 1812; C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1812.

¹⁴³This unit was assigned initially to the Adjutant Commandant Molard's 2e Arrondissement Territoriale, and later to Adjutant Commandant Dumolard's 3e Arrondissement Territoriale. SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne, 1 August 1811; C(8)171, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1812; SHAT, X(f)170, Letter, No. 328, General Decaen to General Clarke, 16 December 1811; Letter, Marshal Macdonald to General Clarke, 19 September 1811; Ministère de la Guerre, 2e Division, Bureau de la Gendamerie Impériale, Chef de Bureau Pryvé Rapport fait au Ministre de la Guerre, 14 October 1811; Minute of Letter, General Clarke to General Decaen, 15 November 1811; Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 364-465.

¹⁴⁴SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1812; C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1812; C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 30 June 1813; C(8)372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814.

¹⁴⁵This Compagnie Municipale remained an active unit in the Garrison of Barcelona until the end of the war in May 1814. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810; C(8)371, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814.

de la Haute Catalogne;¹⁴⁶ the Gendarmes Espagnole;¹⁴⁷ the Irregular Troop Battalion; and the Compagnie Departmentale.¹⁴⁸

Finally, there were Catalan counter-insurgent units which made themselves the scourge of the guerrillas. They included the Chasseurs de Montagnes; formed by Général Duhesme in Barcelona in 1809, and remained on active service until late 1813.¹⁴⁹ Additionally, there were five Compagnies Miquelets distributed through Upper Catalogne¹⁵⁰ and other municipal Miquelet companies, such as the Miquelets de Santa Coloma.¹⁵¹ Additionally, there were other small counter-insurgent bands, the "Partisans,"¹⁵² a battalion of "Troupes Irregulars,"¹⁵³ and some local chasseur units formed

¹⁴⁶SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 August 1811.

¹⁴⁷This unit remained active until 1813. A similar unit, the Gendarmes de Tarragone, was activated in January 1814 and lasted several months. SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1812; C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1813; C(8)372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814.

¹⁴⁸The Bataillon Departmentale numbered some 400 men, appeared in 1810 and dropped out of the Army of Catalonia within in a few months. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810.

¹⁴⁹SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809; C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 30 June 1813; Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 365.

¹⁵⁰Miquelet companies were activated in 1811, and they remained in the force until 1812. SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne, 1 August 1811; C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 16 July 1812.

¹⁵¹SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1812.

¹⁵²This small partisan band was formed in 1812, but only served through the year and disappeared. SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 16 July 1812; C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1812.

¹⁵³SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 16 July 1812.

in 1813, that is the Chasseurs de l'Amprudam, the Chasseurs de Girone and the Chasseurs de Barcelone. They remained on active service until January 1814.¹⁵⁴ These units served as scouts, counter-guerrillas, spies and agents provocateurs to lure insurgents into French ambushes.¹⁵⁵

The organizational structure of the Army of Catalonia, that is, the different regiments and the mix of branches (infantry, Gendarmerie, etc.) did not have any direct material effect on its operational or administration performance. The infantry reorganization of February 1808¹⁵⁶ which increased company strength of the field and depot battalions (six companies each), enhanced the combat efficiency on the company level, and their administrative efficiency on the regimental level. Increased strength allowed the Ministry of War and the army commanders greater administrative and operational flexibility. Like the reorganization of 1803, which combined battalions and regiments of 140 demi-brigades into 117,¹⁵⁷ the Ministry gained streamlined and flexible regiments, which it could move by battalion as desired. The battalion then was the operational building block of the army while the regiment, its administrative one.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁴SHAT,C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1813; C(8)372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814.

¹⁵⁵Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 365.

¹⁵⁶Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 61-63; Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 214-215; Scotty Bowden and Charlie Tarbox, Armies of the Danube 1809. Armies of the Napoleonic War was research series (Arlington Texas: Empire Games Press, 1980), 25-29. Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 214; Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 339-341.

¹⁵⁷Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 207.

¹⁵⁸Comte Morand, De l'Armée Selon la Charte et d'après l'Expérience des Dernières Guerres (1792-1815), (Paris: Librairie Militaire de L. Baudoin, 1894), 123-130.

The administrative effect of this was that the Ministry could assign battalions or squadrons to different armies at will without breaking the organizational integrity of the regiment. Hence, there were in the Army of Catalonia throughout its history a regimental presence represented by as little as detachments or single battalions up to the entire regiment, with depot. For example, the 93e Ligne had in 1809 its 3rd battalion in the VII Corps¹⁵⁹ and its other battalions in Prince Eugène de Beauharnais' Armée d'Italie.¹⁶⁰

This allowed the Ministry to build large formations quickly. It built the Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales with seven infantry regiments, six of which "contributed" one battalion while one regiment, gave two battalions.¹⁶¹ Additionally, in 1812, Napoleon ordered each infantry regiment to form a sixth field battalion,¹⁶² to allow greater Ministerial flexibility.

In the army itself, the commander and chief of staff could form commands at will. Marshal Macdonald for example formed detachments to meet specific operational needs. On 16 November 1810, he sent a detachment of two battalions and cavalry to escort a

¹⁵⁹SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809.

¹⁶⁰Bowden and Tarbox, 1809, 110.

¹⁶¹SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 15 December 1807.

¹⁶²Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 213.

convoy.¹⁶³ He also formed large semi-permanent, commands such as, the five Brigades du Blocus for the siege of Figueras in 1811.¹⁶⁴

One aspect which had a profound impact on the Army of Catalonia and its conduct of the war was its high admixture of allied troops. As we have seen, this army was one of the most polyglot commands of the war, which placed unique demands on the Ministries and the army command. The Army of Catalonia had units of six nationalities and four languages. Like the Ausro-Hungarian Army in World War I, this caused real problems.¹⁶⁵

The differing languages caused administrative problems throughout the higher French command as the Ministry and the Army coordinated movements and administration for the foreign units. When, for example, the Westphalian Division arrived at Perpignan on its way to Catalonia in 1809, the commander of the 10e Division Militaire General Jean Pierre Lacombe Saint-Michel (1751-1812) probably dealt with the division in French¹⁶⁶ but on the battalion level an undoubted language problem existed. Consequently, information such as troop situation reports were translated into French

¹⁶³SHAT, C(8)133, Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements, 2e Cahier, Instruction, 16 November 1810.

¹⁶⁴SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne, 1 August 1811.

¹⁶⁵The nationality and language problems of the Austro-Hungarian Army was one of major proportions effecting unit efficiency and severely hampering their war effort. Despite the fact that German was the language of service, there were six or seven languages spoken in the Army which caused considerable command problems. Norman Stone, The Eastern Front 1914-1917, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975) 125-126.

¹⁶⁶It was common for gentlemen to speak French as the 'lingua franca.'

before forwarding to the Ministry of War.¹⁶⁷ Yet again Général de Division Joseph Lechi made a request to the Emperor through the Ministry of War in Italian, for the commutation of a prison sentence of an officer due to ill health.¹⁶⁸

The allied regimental or even division structure within a French Army¹⁶⁹ caused distinct administrative difficulties at the Army and Ministerial level. For example, Napoleon always insisted that allied governments fund their units in French employ through the French Ministries which gave the staff in Paris a headache, but spared the French command in Catalonia these problems. However, "glitches" did occur. If support for the allied formations was not forth coming from their national treasures, it was replaced by French resources. For example, the French Ministry supplied 5,000 muskets¹⁷⁰ to the Westphalian contingent at a cost of 333,426.60 *F*. The Ministry, of

¹⁶⁷SHAT, C(8)30, General Lacomb Saint-Michel, Commander 10e Division Militaire to General Clarke, 16 August 1809; UCN, No. 3086, Decision, April 5, 1809; 3:13.

¹⁶⁸AN, AFIV1157, General Clarke, Rapport à l'Empereur, 4 October 1811; General Lechi to Napoleon ND, Chasseur Joseph Cortone to Napoleon 12 August 1811; Etat de signalement de Joseph Cortone Chasseur de la 1ère compagnie du 4e Bataillon du 15e Léger, deserted 10 September 1808.

¹⁶⁹Unlike separate corps or armies used in the Grande Armée in 1812 [Premier Eugene's IV Corps (Italian)], or the separate Allied Corps and Armies in the second World War.

¹⁷⁰The Westphalian division had in July 1809, 3,910 troops in Catalonia. SHAT C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809. It also had 1,255 troops in its Depot; C(8)30, 2e Division Westphalien, Dépôts Westphalien, Etat des Officiers, anciens soldats et conscrits, 14 August 1809. The whole totaled 5,165 men requiring about 5,500 muskets.

course promptly demanded payment.¹⁷¹ King Jerome Bonaparte at one point refused to reimburse the French Ministry for remounts supplied to his troops serving France.¹⁷²

Occasionally, however, Marshal Macdonald requested through the Minister of War, Imperial permission to pay one of his Catalan contingents, the Compagnie Municipale de Barcelone, on the same footing as French soldiers; not through local contribution, but through the French Treasury (and local contribution).¹⁷³

These, and thousands of other allied transactions imposed a strain on the French administration system, foremost in the Ministries, but in the field armies too. The only real saving grace was the growing sense of regulatory and administrative uniformity of the French and allied armies, on the French model.

Various tactical organizations and procedures caused tactical problems, in the army. For example, the Saxon Army had a unique tactical organization. In the Saxon company and battalion battle line formation files are arranged differently and officers command from different positions. Consequently, tactical evolutions were executed differently which could, in the heat of a battle, cause some confusion.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹UCN, No. 3397, Decision, August 5, 1809.

¹⁷²The Westphalian Division had in July 1809, 78 horses. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809; UCN, No. 3399, Decision, August 5, 1809.

¹⁷³AN, AFIV1160, Bureau de la Solde, Général Clarke, Rapport à l'Empereur, 6 February 1811.

¹⁷⁴George Nafziger, Mariusz Mesolowski and Tom Devoe, Poles and Saxons of the Napoleonic War, (Chicago: The Emperor's Press, 1991)168-172; George Jeffrey, Tactics and Grand Tactics of the Napoleonic War, Ned Zuparico, ed. (Brockton, MA: The Courier Publishing Co., 1982)35-38, 51-53; Philip Haythornthwaite, Napoleon's Line Infantry, Men-At-Arms Series (London: Osprey Publishing, 1983)3-5.

Finally, the one aspect of the multi-national Army of Catalonia which caused severe problems was the varying loyalties of the contingents. The Catalan war waged by the locals with such hatred against the French spared the Germans, and Italians somewhat, and drove a psychological wedge between the army's contingents. The varying political currents after 1813 brought the loyalty of the German contingents into serious question leading to the forced confinement of some battalions. This was as serious a problem as the soldier quality in the Neapolitan contingent earlier in the war.

The structure and composition of this polyglot army then, caused administrative and tactical problems to the French war effort which were manageable between 1807 and 1811. The increasing strain of war and the changes in political fortunes of the Empire, however, lead to the elimination of most of the allied formations in Catalonia by 1813.

CHAPTER III

THE ARMY OF CATALONIA, STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS 1807-1814

§1. Force Structure: The Process.

Force structure is the size, composition and equipping of military units.¹ The Emperor managed it through the Ministry of War, which did the ground work to form units. An example of this administrative process was the formation of the Division Artillery of the Observation Division of the Eastern Pyrénées 1807-1808. Napoleon began advance preparations to form this Division Artillery, arming and provisioning the French frontier fortresses.²

On 6 December 1807, he ordered the Minister of War to form the Division d'Observation des Pyrénées. The 6e Division of the Bureau de l'Artillerie had four companies³ destined to join the Observation Corps of the Gironde. The Bureau rerouted

¹The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Departments of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Publ. No. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1987), 229.

²"Donnez l'ordre qu'au 20 Novembre les places frontières de l'Espagne soient armées. Envoyez-y des approvisionnements pour servir à la garnison..." CN, No. 13343, Napoleon to General Clarke, 11 November 1807, 16:149-150.

³The Artillery available to the Ministry were three companies of the 3e Artillerie a pied and one of the 4e Artillerie a pied. SHAT, Xd 345, Artillerie, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées, 1808, 6e Division, Bureau de l'Artillerie, Rapport fait au Ministère, 14 December 1807.

them to the Eastern Pyrénées. The Ministry assigned to the new division the 1st Company, 6th Train (bis) Battalion,⁴ at Avignon, and recalled three companies of the 3rd Regiment destined for the Observation Division of the Western Pyrénées.

By 15 December, the Eastern Pyrénées Observation Division had one artillery and two train companies.⁵ The Ministry later sent the 11e/1er Artillerie Italien the company of the Train d'Artillerie Italien and the 6e/7e (bis) du Train which arrived in mid-December.⁶

When Napoleon's 23 December order arrived at the Ministry, the chief of the Artillery Bureau sent an extract to the Chief of the 6th Ministerial Division, General Jean-Jacques, Comte de Gassendi (1748-1828).⁷ He sent to the Eastern Pyrénées the 11e/1er Artillerie Italien and a company of the 3e Artillerie à pied.⁸

⁴Ibid, Bureau du personnel, le Général de Division, Chef de la sixième Division, Rapport, 16 December 1807. Note par le Bureau de Mouvement, 15 December 1807. "12 pieces of artillery shall be detached for this Division." Ernest Picard and Louis Tuetey, Unpublished Correspondence of Napoleon I, Tns. Louise Houghton, 3 Vols., (New York: Duffield and Company, 1913), No. 1478, Order, December 6, 1807, 1:719.

⁵These artillery units were the 11e/1er Artillerie Italien (79 men), Italian Artillery Train (75 men and 120 horses) and the 6e/6e (bis) Train (61 men). SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 15 December 1807. UCN, No. 1490, Order, 23 December 1807, 1:723. SHAT, Xd 345, Extrait d'un ordre de S.M. l'Empereur, 23 December 1807. CN, No. 13411, Napoleon to General Clarke, 23 December 1807, 16:211-212.

⁶SHAT, C(8)485, Situation Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 15 December 1807.

⁷SHAT, Xd 345, Artillerie, 3e Division du Ministère de la Guerre, Extrait d'un Ordre de l'Empereur à Général de Division Gassendi, 23 December 1807.

⁸General Gassendi informed General Clarke that he would send a hundred men of the 2e Artillerie à cheval to Perpignan; Ibid.

The division at Perpignan required eighteen cannon, then unavailable at the Perpignan arsenals. The Ministry transferred ten 8 pdr cannon from Valence and twelve 24 pdr howitzers from the Imperial Guard and equipped them with 117 vehicles and 2,000 24 pdr shells.

The train required 80 artillery vehicles and 320 horses, but the Italian Train Company had some of the vehicles and 120 horses. Consequently, the Emperor ordered the 6e/7e Bataillon du Train (bis) with 230 horses to support the division. General Gassendi however noted that the 6e/6e Bataillon du Train (bis) was already at Avignon and used it instead of the 6e/7e (bis) Bataillon.⁹ The next day, the Minister reported to the Emperor the final composition of this "Divarty": the 11e/1er Artillerie à pied Italien a company each of the 3e Artillerie à pied; 2e Artillerie à cheval and Italian Artillery Train; and the 6e/6e (bis) Bataillon du Train.¹⁰

As preparations continued, the Ministry purchased 200 mules¹¹ and reshuffled units to bring the 6e/6e du Train on line. General Gassendi even obtained horses from the 1er/6e (bis) Bataillon du Train marching from Avignon to Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port.¹²

⁹ Ibid, Rapport fait au Ministre 31 December 1807.

¹⁰ Ibid, 6e Division, Bureau l'Artillerie, Ministère de la Guerre, Rapport à l'Empereur January 1808. On January 4, 1808, General Gassendi wrote to General Gerard outlining the switch to the 6e/6e (bis) du Train (at Avignon) for the 6e/7e du Train, the purchase of 1,000 horses and the concentration of this unit at Perpignan on 25 January. Ibid, 6e Division, Bureau de l'Artillerie, Minute, General Gassendi to General Gerard, 4 January 1808.

¹¹ UCN, No. 1495, Decision, January 4, 1808, 3:1.

¹² SHAT, Xd 345, Bureau de l'Artillerie. Minute, General Gassendi to General Gerard, 12 January 1808; Minute, General Gassendi to the Commandant du 6e Bataillon (bis) du Train d'Artillerie, 13 January 1808.

To facilitate these movements, Napoleon ordered artillery and vehicles reshuffled from the arsenal at Fere to Perpignan.¹³ By the end of January, the Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales had at Perpignan 18 cannon, sufficient horses (by 6 February), and vehicles. The 7e/2e Artillerie à cheval and the company of the 3e Artillerie à pied from Aix were also ready to join the division.¹⁴ This staff action took six weeks to complete. Even with the movement errors, this typical action rivaled in efficiency similar actions of the 20th century.

An excellent example of creating units in the Army of Catalonia is Gendarmerie. The Corps d'Armée had a gendarme detachment assigned to its headquarters, whose mission was to serve as guides, escorts, dispatch riders, escort prisoners of war, reconnaissance and maintain order amongst the troops as Force Publique.¹⁵ At the beginning of the Peninsular War, the Ministry of War had not assigned any gendarmerie to the Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales,¹⁶ only a detachment of 32 gendarmes

¹³CN, No. 13440, Napoleon to General Clarke, 9 January 1808, 16:234-235.

¹⁴SHAT, Xd 345, Bureau de l'Artillerie, Rapport à l'Empereur, 29 January 1808.

¹⁵Gendarmerie units serving as Military Police were called force Publique. Thiebault, Manuel Général, 461; Bernard Charron, Ph.D. Dissertation, "La Participation de la Gendarmerie Impériale dans la Guerre d'Espagne". University of Bordeaux, 1972, 45.

¹⁶SHAT, C(8) 485, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 15 December 1807; Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 28 May 1808.

of the Corps d'Élite¹⁷ to General Reille's division under the command of one Captain Cassabianca.¹⁸

The new VII Corps had, by December, a gendarme detachment.¹⁹ During this period, the Gendarmerie d'Élite in Catalonia served as a force publique, escorts, guides or ordonnances (headquarters orderlies) to General Reille.²⁰ Additionally, they helped to guard the line of communications with France by escorting the Paymaster's treasure wagons and prisoners of war and by providing reconnaissance, escorting requisitions and courriers.²¹

The organization and mission of the gendarmarie in Spain remained unchanged through 1809²² until the Ministry of War reorganized it as an independent force in the hands of the corps commanders. By an Imperial Decision of 24 November 1809 and the Ministerial Decision of 23 January 1810, Napoleon created a new gendarmarie.²³

¹⁷This detachment of Gendarmes was part of the Gendarmerie d'Élite to support the corps in the field. Organized in 1803, it had 600 men, commanded by an aide-de-camp of the Emperor. In 1804 it was renamed the Légion d'Élite and organized as a "demi-bataillon" of two companies. With 632 men. The Legion was manned with the best gendarmes of the Gendarmerie de l'Intérieur, which served in Metropolitan France. It was later assigned to the Old Guard, Martin La Gendarmerie Française, 18-19.

¹⁸SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Division Reille, Nd.

¹⁹SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 5 December 1808.

²⁰Lechartier, Services de l'Arrière, 54-55; Thiebault, Manuel Général, 33.

²¹Thiebault, Manuel Général, 460-461; Charron "La Participation de la Gendarmerie Impériale à la Guerre d'Espagne," 28-29.

²²SHAT, C(8)362, VII Corps, Situation, 6 January 1809; Situation, VII Corps, 15 July 1809; Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1809.

²³SHAT, Xd (f)174, Decree, 24 November 1809.

It was a twenty squadron command, organized under the Inspecteur Général de Gendarmerie, Marshal Bon-Adrien-Jeannot Moncey, Duc de Conigliano (1754-1842) and commanded by Général de Brigade Louis-Léopold, Baron Buquet (1768-1835).²⁴ The gendarmerie squadrons were organized with 7 officers and 200 troops, divided into an 80 man cavalry "troop" and 120 man infantry "company." The whole organization had 4,140 men and 1,740 horses.²⁵

In organizing the gendarmerie in Spain, the Ministry of War drew troops from the Gendarmerie de l'Intérieur and the Regimental depots. The nature of their mission necessitated the use of experienced soldiers capable of independent action. Their mission is reflected in their smallest unit, the "brigade" of eight to twelve men²⁶ capable of independent squad missions.

The Ministry ordered various combat regiments to supply men and horses to the new squadrons. Sufficient quality manpower, however, was a problem which the

²⁴Martin, La Gendarmerie Française, 441-442, 445-446.

²⁵See Table 6. Martin, La Gendarmerie Française, 19; Charron, "La Gendarmerie Impériale", 47.

²⁶The brigade à cheval had eight troops and the brigade à pied twelve men. The squadron had each ten brigades à cheval and à pied. Each brigade à cheval had four gendarmes à cheval and four cavalry troops, while the brigades à pied had six men each of gendarmes à pied and infantry soldiers. The twenty squadrons had 200 brigades à cheval with 800 gendarmes and 800 cavalry and the brigades à pied 1,200 gendarmes and 1,200 soldiers. Charron, "La Gendarmerie Impériale", 322-323.

Ministry did not immediately solve. Indeed, as the first sixteen squadrons reached a strength of 150 men, Marshal Berthier sent them, incomplete to Spain.²⁷

This command, however, did not include Catalonia and on 6 June 1810 the Emperor ordered a legion of gendarmes organized at Narbonne under Colonel Jean-Hégésippe le Marchant (1758-1819). Later that month, Marshal Moncey, established its organization with 20 horse and 100 foot brigades or four companies, and each company with five platoons or lieutenances. The whole totaled 751 men. Marshal Moncey and the Ministry of War structured the legion differently from other gendarme units.²⁸ It had reconfigured brigades of six man squads with two veteran gendarmes (one NCO) and four line soldiers.²⁹ The 37 man platoon (lieutenance) with foot and horse could function independently on small scale operations or garrison small outposts.³⁰

The Ministry tailored the gendarmerie effectively to the needs of the VII Corps. It worked so well the Ministry adapted the legion formation to the rest of Spain.³¹ In July

²⁷Ibid, 21, 22, 453. In units then and now, when a higher headquarters orders them to provide men (and horses) to other units they will normally provide their worst troops. For example, when General Duverger inspected 800 horses provided for these gendarme squadrons he found 600 of them poor and passed them to the train d'équipage and obtained others. Martin, La Gendarmerie Française, 20.

²⁸SHAT, X(f)171, Ministère de la Guerre, 2ème Division Bureau de la Gendarmerie Impériale, Chef de Bureau Privé, Rapport fait au Ministre, 21 June 1810.

²⁹Martin, La Gendarmerie Française, 19; Charron, "Gendarmerie Impériale", 322.

³⁰Charron, "Gendarmerie Impériale", 55.

³¹Martin, La Gendarmerie Française, 25.

1810, the Ministry of War adapted its own version of the Legion,³² and absorbed some of the gendarmes posted to Catalonia.³³ Additionally, Napoleon established a Conseil Supérieur d'Administration to organize the Légion de Catalogne at its Narbonne depot.³⁴ Its formation required a coordinated effort of the Inspection Générale de Gendarmerie and the Ministry of War. The Administration de la Guerre was also required to fund the masses and (depot) logistical support.

Once the Emperor ordered the Legion formed Marshal Moncey recommended to General Clarke the personnel to man its organizational staff and the five man Conseil Supérieur d'Administration, under Colonel Lassaux. The Minister habitually rubber stamped these requests, for Marshal Moncey was certainly better acquainted with the qualities of Gendarmerie officers.³⁵ On 2 January, Napoleon again altered the Legion's structure to six companies and 1,400 men, including 160 mounted gendarmes armed with

³²See Table 7. The VII Corps had 75 gendarmes (30 horse and 45 foot) assigned. It would retain 28 for the new legion and disperse the rest between the other corps in Spain and the gendarme units in France. SHAT X(f)171, Chef de Bureau Privé Rapport au Ministre, 21 June 1810.

³³See Table 10. Ibid; SHAT X(f)171, Napoléon, Extrait des Minutes de la Secrétaire d'État, 6 July 1810.

³⁴It had a Masse or unit administrative fund of 74,085.60 F. SHAT X(f)171, Napoléon, Extrait des Minutes, 6 July 1810.

³⁵SHAT X(f)171, Inspection Générale de la Gendarmerie Impériale, Letter No. 22594, Marshal Moncey to General Clarke, 18 July 1810. SHAT X(f)171, Ministère de la Guerre, 2e Division Bureau de la Gendarmerie, Ordre de Division, 9 August 1810; Minute de la Lettre Écrite par le Ministre, to Marshal Moncey, 9 August 1810.

the lance.³⁶ It included two 279 man companies under a chef d'escadron (1st and 2nd) and four companies with 210 men under captains.³⁷ The Conseil organized the Legion according to the requirements of the Emperor's initial order and assembled 724 fully equipped troops at Narbonne.³⁸ Colonel Lassaux assembled 1,935 cavalry and 2,520 infantry from various unit depots and horses from Toulouse, Montpellier and Beziers.³⁹ Interestingly, of the 4,455 troops assembled at Narbonne, only a few were of acceptable quality. This was a continual problem throughout the war. By mid-April the Conseil obtained 1,173 troops with great difficulty.⁴⁰ The standard for admission into the Gendarmerie was very high and many failed to complete depot training. As early as November 1810 the Ministry of War drafted troops to the Legion. For example, General Clarke took eighteen soldiers from the 26e Chasseurs à cheval, and ordered the commander of the 5e Légion de Gendarmerie, Colonel Noireau, to gather and send them

³⁶The Conseil obtained a NCO lance instructor for these cavalry at the Narbonne depot, from the 7e Chevaux Léger. Martin, La Gendarmerie Française, 22. See Table 8; SHAT X(f)171, Ministère de la Guerre, Extrait des Minutes de la Secrétaire d'Etat, 2 January 1811; X(f)171, Ministère de la Guerre, Extrait de l'Ordre de l'Empereur, 6 March 1811.

³⁷SHAT X(f)171, Extrait des Minutes, 2 January 1811.

³⁸The Conseil spent 48,000 F., or 400 F. per soldier in masse funds, SHAT X(f)171, Inspecteur Général de la Gendarmerie Impériale, Marshal Moncey to General Clarke, 11 March 1811.

³⁹He got, for example, 160 men from the Depot at Angers and 220 from the depots at Grenoble and Besançon, Ibid.

⁴⁰The Legion recruited 724 men including 176 gendarmes from Catalonia (75 men were Force Publique), Ibid.

to Narbonne.⁴¹ He acted in coordination with General Bonnard, commander of the 22e Division Militaire.⁴² Similarly, he drew troops from nineteen other regiments through mid-1812.⁴³

In May 1811, the Ministry gathered 85 gendarmes from the company of the Department du Simplon to make up for the deficiency of troops.⁴⁴ Of course, it was a continual uphill fight to procure the best soldiers. The 3rd company, for example, obtained 137 soldiers from thirty regiments,⁴⁵ and the 5th company even drafted recruits.⁴⁶ As the new recruits arrived at the depot they were clothed, equiped, trained, then sent to their field company. Once formed, the companies received their own Conseil d'Administration, which managed the unit.⁴⁷

⁴¹The Minister also informed Marshal Moncey of this action. SHAT X(f)170, Ministère de la Guerre, 2e Division, Bureau de la Gendarmerie, Minute de la Lettre, General Clarke to Colonel Noireau, 26 November 1810; General Clarke to Marshal Moncey, 26 November 1810.

⁴²SHAT X(f)170, 2e Division Militaire, Departement de Marne et Loire, Major Cataut, 26e Chasseurs to General Clarke, 3 December 1810; État Nominal, 26e Chasseurs 4 December 1810; Colonel Noireau to General Clarke, 3 December 1810; General Bonnard, Commander, 22e Division Militaire to General Clarke, 5 December 1810. General Bonnard also drew troops from the 121e and 122e Ligne, General Bonnard to General Clarke, 4 January 1811; General Bonnard to General Clarke, 27 January 1811.

⁴³SHAT X(f)170, General Clarke to Marshal Moncey, 12 March 1812.

⁴⁴AN, AFIV1157, General Clarke to Marshal Moncey, 12 March 1812.

⁴⁵See Table 9, SHAT X(f)171, Procès Verbal d'Organisation de la 3e Compagnie de Gendarmerie de la Légion de Catalogne, 1 April 1811.

⁴⁶SHAT X(f)171, Procès Verbal de l'Organisation de la 5e Compagnie de Gendarmerie de la Légion de Catalogne, 1 April 1811.

⁴⁷Ibid. An excellent unit formation example is the Force Publique, Army of Spain, in 1813. The administrative unit registers or orderly books were kept to manage the

By the end of 1811, the Legion was complete. The Conseil Supérieur established a clothing and equipment supply depot at Perpignan.⁴⁸ In October a Sous-Inspecteur aux revues from the 10e Division Militaire audited its accounts,⁴⁹ and formally disbanded it.⁵⁰ Finally on 12 December 1811, the Emperor decreed the reorganization of all of the gendarmerie in Spain into legions and redesignated the Légion de Catalogne the 6e Légion de Gendarmerie Impériale.⁵¹ This brought the unit formation process to completion. It was a complex and time consuming procedure which occupied a large portion of the French administration.

The command in Catalonia could also structure its own forces. For example, General Gouvion Saint-Cyr organized two Catalan gendarme companies, designated the Compagnies de Miquelets. He paid and administered them like French troops.⁵²

various unit administrative functions. They included the Registres de Délibérations, Caisse, Journal du Quartier-Maître, Materials en double (situations) Mutations et Mouvements (personnel movements) habillement, armement, Actes Civiles and Contrôle Annuel (pay). SHAT X(f)171, Procès Verbal, Force Publique, 23 September 1813.

⁴⁸SHAT X(f)170, Marshal Moncey to General Clarke, 30 August 1811.

⁴⁹SHAT X(f)171, Commission Spéciale Chargée de la Vérification de la Comptabilité des 20 Escadrons de la Gendarmerie d'Espagne to Marshal Moncey, 29 October 1812; Commission Spéciale to Marshal Moncey, 25 October 1812.

⁵⁰See Table 8. SHAT X(f)170, Minute de la Lettre, General Clarke to Marshal Moncey, 7 October 1811; Minute de la Lettre, General Clarke to Directeur Général des Revues, 7 October 1811; Chef de Bureau Privé, Rapport fait au Ministre, 29 September 1811; General Clarke to Marshal Moncey, 3 March 1812.

⁵¹Martin, La Gendarmerie Française, 24-25.

⁵²AN, AFIV1119, Ministère de la Guerre, Bureau de l'Inspection, Général Clarke, Rapport à l'Empereur, 18 March 1812.

Indeed, Marshal Macdonald and General Decaen undertook the difficult task of organizing Catalan gendarmes or Miquelets into a Legion of two battalions and two squadrons, totaling 2,246 men. Marshal Macdonald organized this unit, coordinating with the Ministry of War in the same way as with the 6e Legion. He organized and paid it on the French scale, and placed it in a counterinsurgent and rear area security role.⁵³

Finally, the Commander of the Army of Catalonia could alter the structure of his units temporarily, to meet specific operational requirements. For example, Marshal Macdonald organized a brigade under General Jean-Ernest, Baron de Beuremann (1775-1850) at Hostalrich to escort supplies to Barcelona. The procedure used was quite simple. Macdonald issued orders to various commands to send units to Hostalrich to form the brigade. In this case, Macdonald got two battalions each of the 11e and 67e Ligne, an artillery company and twenty-five chasseurs.⁵⁴

The force structure process was a complex, administrative operation which, as we have seen with the gendarmerie, could take years of labor. In Catalonia, it was quick and efficient enough to form temporary units such as brigades or permanent units like the Catalan Legion which took over a year to form and was never brought up to full strength.

⁵³See Table 10. SHAT X(f)170, Letter, Marshal Macdonald to General Clarke 19 September 1811; Chef de Bureau Privé, Bureau de la Gendarmerie, Rapport fait au Ministre de la Guerre, 14 October 1811; Minute, General Clarke to General Decaen 15 November 1811. General Duhesme formed a compagnie Municipale in Barcelona in 1808 with an unusual structure. It was commanded by a Colonel and had a battalion like staff structure in a company sized unit. See Tables 9-12.

⁵⁴SHAT C(8)129, Letter, Marshal Macdonald to General Clement, 31 June 1810.

2. Concentration and Build Up: The Campaign of 1807-1808.

Napoleon began preparing for the war in Spain in March 1807.⁵⁵ He ordered the Minister of War to transfer French units ostensibly to Poland and Germany, and brought six infantry regiments in the Army of Italy to full war readiness.⁵⁶ He also ordered Brigadier General Bertrand Baron Bessières (1773-1854)⁵⁷ to organize a provisional cavalry regiment from the depots of the Army of Italy.⁵⁸ The Minister of War accelerated troop concentrations for a war with Spain in the summer of 1807 and organized an Italian division in Turin to serve in Catalonia.⁵⁹ He also assembled the Gironde Observation

⁵⁵Napoleon thoroughly planned and prepared for war as early as possible: "I am accustomed to thinking out what I shall do three or four months in advance..." David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966) 145-146.

⁵⁶These six regiments included the 2e Ligne destined for service in Catalonia. The 3rd and 4th battalions of each regiment were to augment the 1st and 2nd battalions to full war footing. Later, the Ministry assigned the 3rd-2nd Italian Line to the Division. UCN, No. 939, Napoleon to General Dejean, March 15, 1807, 1:485-486.

⁵⁷Bertrand, Baron Bessières (1773-1854) was Marshal Bessières' brother. He served in Catalonia 1808-10 as Cavalry Brigade Commander in Lechi's Division (1807). He commanded the cavalry for General Duhesme at the combat at El Rey, 30 June 1808, and for General Saint-Cyr in General Souham's Division. Six, Dictionnaire des Généraux et Amiraux, 1:95-96.

⁵⁸The elements in this cavalry regiment included the 3e Chasseurs and 24e Chasseurs Italiens Royaux making the 1st company; the 15e, 19e and 23e Chasseurs for the 2d company, the 4e and 6e Cuirassiers making the 3d company and the 7e and 8e Cuirassiers for the 4th company.

⁵⁹The Dragons Napoleon, for example, reached Potsdam on 9 July to join the Italian Division. Ibid, No. 1203, Divisions, June 24, 1807, 1:593.

Corps, later called the Army of Portugal,⁶⁰ for the invasion of Portugal.⁶¹ In October, General Clarke expanded this Corps into the Army of the Gironde, and formed a second Gironde Observation Corps, a Cavalry Reserve,⁶² and the "Ocean" Observation Corps in the Western Pyrenees.⁶³

General Clarke continued to secretly arm the Eastern Pyrenees fortresses and concentrate the Italian Division⁶⁴ at Avignon. It had a brigade of four Italian battalions,

⁶⁰Ibid, No. 1240, Decision, August 9, 1807, 1:616; No. 1264, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, August 26, 1807, 1:627. These troops included the Spanish regiment and Lusitanian Dragoons provided by Spain for the Polish Campaign but were never used in Catalonia. No. 1282, Decision, September 7, 1807, 1:636. The Emperor established a series of flying camps at Bayonne, Saint-Lo, Pontivy and Camp Napoleon, readying units of war. No. 1289, Decisions, September 9, 1807, 1:638; No. 1329, Decision, October 6, 1807, 1:660; No. 1340, Decision, October 10, 1807, 1:664; No. 1343, Napoleon to General Clarke, October 12, 1807, 1:665-666.

⁶¹CN, No. 13234, Napoleon to Ministère des Relations Extérieures, 12 October 1807, 16:79; No. 13237, Napoleon to General Clarke, 12 October 1807, 16:80.

⁶²Ibid, No. 13257, Napoleon to General Clarke, 16 October 1807, 16:90-91; No. 13258, Napoleon to Clarke, 16 October 1807, 16:90-91; No. 13259, Napoleon to Clarke, 16 October 1807, 16:92-93; No. 13323, Napoleon to Clarke, 3 November 1807, 16:136-137; UCN, No. 1347, Napoleon to Clarke, October 15, 1807, 1:669; No. 1347, Napoleon to Clarke, October 15, 1807, 1:669; No. 1348, Napoleon to Clarke, October 16, 1807, 1:669-670; No. 1362, Napoleon to Clarke, October 18, 1807, 1:675; No. 1370, Napoleon to Clarke, October 20, 1807, 1:678; No. 1376, Napoleon to Clarke, October 22, 1807, 1:680; No. 1378, Napoleon to Clarke, October 22, 1807, 1:680-681; No. 1388, Decision, nd, 1:683. No. 1389, Napoleon to Clarke, October 25, 1807, 1:683-694; No. 1390, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, October 25, 1807, 1:684; No. 1402, Napoleon to Clarke, October 30, 1807, 1:690; No. 1406, Decision, October 31, 1807, 1:692; No. 1421, Decisions, November 3, 1807, 1:699; No. 1426, Napoleon to General Dejean, November 4, 1807, 1:701; No. 1439, Napoleon to Clarke, November 6, 1807, 1:702.

⁶³CN, No. 13326, Napoleon to General Clarke, 5 November 1807, 16:138-139; No. 13343, Napoleon to General Clarke, 11 November 1807, 16:149-159.

⁶⁴Napoleon wrote to General Clarke to "...accélérez le départ des régiments Napolitains...en route pour Avignon. Donnez des instructions secrètes, et marche les corps de manière que les premières opérations ostensibles ne se fassent pas voir dans ces

a Neapolitan regiment, an Italian cavalry regiment, and General Bessières' cavalry brigade, which included provisional chasseur and cuirassier regiments from Turin.⁶⁵ The whole, thus far, numbered some 6,000 men.⁶⁶ Napoleon awarded its command to the talented and ruthlessly amoral Général de Division Joseph Lechi,⁶⁷ who recently commanded a division in the Army of Naples.⁶⁸

Amidst a flurry of Imperial orders, General Clarke hurried units, horses, supplies and equipment to Avignon⁶⁹ and, in December, assembled the artillery.⁷⁰ Finally

pays avant le 25 Novembre. Ibid, No. 13343, Napoleon to General Clarke, 1 November 1807, 16:149-150.

⁶⁵Ibid, No. 13346, Napoleon to Eugène Napoléon, Vice-Roy of Italy, 11 November 1807, 16:154. UCN, No. 1463, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, November 24, 1807, 1:714.

⁶⁶UCN, No. 1464, Napoleon to General Clarke, November 24, 1807, 1:715.

⁶⁷The Italian General Joseph Lechi (1767-1836) commanded the Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales in 1807 which became the 2nd Division (Italian) in the Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales under General Duhesme. This division was later redesignated the 3rd Division. As Commandant d'armes in Barcelona General Lechi earned the reputation for utter rapacity in funding his troops off the population. Implicated in the murder of a citizen of Barcelona, Marshal Augereau relieved him in 1810. Napoleon refused to court-martial him. Six, Dictionnaire, 1:81-82.

⁶⁸Edward Gachot, La Troisième Campagne d'Italie, (1805-1806), 2d Ed., (Paris: Librairie Plon 1911) 345.

⁶⁹Clarke sent an infantry and Neapolitan chasseur regiment from Grenoble and Chembery and 200 horses. The Minister for War Administration, General Dejean, purchased horses near Avignon. UCN, No. 1465, Napoleon to General Clarke, November 24, 1807, 1:715.

⁷⁰SHAT, Xd 345. 6e Division Bureau de l'Artillerie, Ministère de la Guerre. Division d'Observation des Pyrénées, Rapport fait au Ministre, 14 December 1807.

organized, the division had two infantry, one cavalry brigade, and a division artillery⁷¹ as the Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales. General Clarke concentrated at Perpignan the base for the invasion of Catalonia.⁷²

This method of creating and assembling large forces for a lightning offensive was a hallmark of Napoleonic military administration which few have mastered.⁷³ Two of the instruments which made this possible were the "provisional" and "marching" units.

The provisional regiment was an amalgamated unit created out of disparate parts. For example, the Provisional Cuirassier Regiment was a squadron of four companies, each drawn whole from the fifth squadrons of four cuirassier regiments.⁷⁴ Marching battalions

⁷¹The Division had two brigades of four battalions each, a cavalry brigade of two regiments and artillery of three companies. CN, No. 13411, Napoleon to General Clarke, 23 December 1807, 16:211-212. UCN, No. 1490, Order, December 23, 1807, 1:723. SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées-Orientales, 15 December 1807.

⁷²CN, No. 13413, Napoleon to General Clarke, 23 December 1807, 16:212-214.

⁷³The greatest example of Napoleon's method of creating forces is the build-up prior to the 1813 campaign. Having lost over 500,000 men in Russia, he accomplished a administrative miracle by assembling another 656,000 army based on the remnant of Grande Armée of Russia (50,000). He then called 137,000 conscripts already at their depots and another 80,000 National Guards to form 88 battalions (22 regiments). Napoleon then brought in another 450,000 conscripts using every imaginable administrative trick to scrape manpower up. By mid-1813 the Emperor met his goal, certainly one of the finest military feats of the century. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 866-867; F.M. Kircheisen, Napoleon, trans., H. St. Lawrence, (Reprint, Freeport, Books for Libraries 1972), 602-604; Scott Bowden, Napoleon's Grande Armée of 1813, Armies of the Napoleonic Wars Series, (Chicago, The Emperor's Press, 1990), 22-32, 35-52; F. Loraine Petre, Napoleon's Last Campaign in Germany 1813, (London: John Lane, the Bodley Head, 1912), 10-17; Albert A. Nofi, Napoleon AT War, Selected Writings of F. Loraine Petrie, (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1984), 99-107.

⁷⁴UCN, No. 1463, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, November 24, 1807, 1:715; No. 1464, Napoleon to General Clarke, November 24, 1807, 1:715.

or squadrons, on the other hand, were temporary units formed simply to move troops. When several disparate companies or battalions were assembled, the Emperor ordered them lumped into a marching battalion or regiment placed under an officer and marched to the theater of operations where it dissolved, and the parts linked up with their parent units. One of the three marching battalions of Catalonia, for example, was the 1er Bataillon de Marche composed of three companies each of the 7e Ligne and the 93e Ligne.⁷⁵

As the Minister of War concentrated the division at Perpignan in January 1808,⁷⁶ the Emperor ordered M. de Champagny, Minister of Foreign Relations, to inform the court at Madrid of the presence of General Lechi's division at Perpignan and of its instructions to march on Cadiz (stopping off at Barcelona) to participate in the invasion of Portugal.⁷⁷ Napoleon also ordered General Duhesme, the new commander, to march on 9 February 1808, and gather intelligence on Spanish forces and fortresses on his way

⁷⁵Ibid., No. 2083 Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, July 8, 1808, 2:317. Napoleon's letter to General Clarke of 22 February clearly illustrates the purpose of the marching units:

Issue orders that on the arrival of the marching regiment that was formed at Turin and is going to Catalonia, it shall be dissolved and each detachment join its corps. Order also that the marching squadrons which are going from Piedmont to Catalonia be dissolved on their arrival.

No. 4044, Napoleon to General Clarke, February 22, 1810, 2:467. CN, No. 14168, Napoleon to General Reille, 8 July 1808.

⁷⁶UCN, No. 1495, Decision, January 4, 1808, 2:1.

⁷⁷CN, No. 13495, Napoleon to M. de Champagny, Ministre des Relations Extérieures, January 1808, 16:281.

to Cadiz.⁷⁸ On the 9th, Duhesme marched into Catalonia though the division still lacked an adequate staff and artillery.⁷⁹ On the 20th, Napoleon appointed Marshal Murat Lieutenant General, commanding all the troops in Spain.⁸⁰

Meanwhile, Napoleon ordered a 5,000 man reinforcement in six battalions to Perpignan to build the new Corps⁸¹ which included deserters, conscripts⁸² and "refractory conscripts" from depots.⁸³ In mid-March, he sent another division from Italy under

⁷⁸In his instructions, the Emperor cautioned General Duhesme to maintain a "Draconian" discipline, particularly over his Italian troops: "Il fera fusiller le premier Italien qui manquera à la discipline et la fera observer rigoureusement...", and to report back to France daily on his progress: "Il écrira tous les jours, dès qu'il aura mis le pied en Espagne, pour faire connaître la disposition des esprits, la situation des places fortes et ce qu'il y a devant lui depuis Barcelone jusqu'à l'Ebre." *Ibid*, No. 13496, Napoleon to General Clarke, 28 January 1808, 16:281-282.

⁷⁹The Division staff had no Commissaire des Guerres, Inspecteur aux revues, division artillery commander or a chief of staff, as of December 1807. SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales 15 December 1807, *UCN*, No. 1606, Napoleon to General Clarke, February 13, 1808, 2:55.

⁸⁰"It is my intention that Generals Moncey, Dupont, Duhesme and Merle be under the orders of the Grand Duke of Berg." *UCN*, No. 1633, Napoleon to General Clarke, February 20, 1808, 2:76-77. *CN*, No. 13588, Napoleon to Marshal Murat, Grand Duke of Berg, 20 February 1808, 16:351-352.

⁸¹They included the 1st and 2nd Line and the 3rd-37th Line, (2,800 men) three battalions of the 2nd, 56th, and 93rd Line (2,500 men). *UCN*, No. 1634, Napoleon to General Clarke, February 20, 1808, 2:77.

⁸²This reinforcement included the 2-2 Chasseurs Napolitains. *Ibid*, No. 1700, Decision, March 12, 1808, 2:11. "General Duhesme...proposes to authorize Generals to receive... deserters or conscripts," No. 1728, Decision, March 19, 1808, 2:127.

⁸³These included, for example, 120 men at the depot of Perpignan who went to the 16th Line. *UCN*, No. 1744, Napoleon to General Clarke March 24, 1808, 2:138-139. Conscripts Réfractaires were recaptured deserter conscripts.

General Joseph Chabran (1763-1843) and a staff organization to form the new Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées-Orientales,⁸⁴ nearly completed by May.⁸⁵

⁸⁴UCN, No. 1729, Napoleon to General Clarke, March 19, 1808, 2:128. CN, No. 13721, Napoleon to Marshal Murat, 5 April 1808, 16:476-477. By 1 April, a detachment of Italian Velites attached to Division Lechi was due to reach Avignon on 16 April. UCN, No. 1776, Decision, April 1, 1808, 2:151.

⁸⁵See Tables 12 and 13; Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 1808-1814, 63.

§3. Expansion: The Campaign of 1808.

General Philibert-Guillaume Duhesme (1766-1815), the new Commander of the Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales which numbered 13,253 troops in three divisions, opened the first campaign of the Catalan war by occupying Figueras with one brigade and Barcelona with the rest of his Corps.⁸⁶ The Spanish populace reacted to the revolt of 2 May and exploded in organized resistance throughout Spain while Spanish garrisons throughout the country deserted en masse.⁸⁷ In June, Duhesme began active operations against them, sending General François Xavier Schwartz, (1762-1826), with a brigade to Manresa to put down the revolt and then march on Aragon to support French efforts there.⁸⁸ When General Schwartz's 3,000 troops approached Manresa, swarms of Sometenes beat them back to Barcelona.⁸⁹

Meanwhile, General Joseph Chabran, (1763-1843), opened two other equally unsuccessful expeditions,⁹⁰ while in Upper Catalonia the insurgents cut French

⁸⁶See Table 14; Robert Southey, History of the Peninsular War, (London: John Murray, 1823) 1:160.

⁸⁷Oman, Peninsular War, 1:307-308.

⁸⁸See Table 17. CN, No. 14028 Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 17:241-242; No. 14029, Napoleon to Marshal Murat, 17:242-243; SHAT, C(8)485, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales 28 May 1808; Oman, Peninsular War, 1:308-309.

⁸⁹AN, AFIV 1621 plaq 1, General Duhesme, Résumé des Opérations Militaires, Corps d'Armée des Pyrénées Orientales; Juan Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, (Madrid: Libreria Editorial San Martin, 1972) 2:100-101; Oman, Peninsular War, 1:308; Southey, Peninsular War, 1:357.

⁹⁰G. Laffaille, Mémoires sur la Campagne du Corps d'Armée des Pyrénées Orientales Commandé par le Général Duhesme en 1808, (Paris, Anselin et Pochard, 1826) 37-38; Adolfo Blanch, Historie de la Guerra de la Independencia en el Antiguo Principado (Barcelona: Editorial Frontis, 1968) 61-62. Oman, Peninsular War, 1:313.

communications and blockaded Figueras, even raiding into France as far as Rousillon. The commander of the 10th Military Division called out several thousand National Guards and commandeered reinforcements earmarked for Duhesme to guard the frontier.⁹¹ General Duhesme finally marched into Upper Catalonia with a division to reopen his communications. He even dispersed a mass of insurgents at Mongat six miles from Barcelona and sacked the town.⁹² He cut his way to Gerona and made two haphazard and unsuccessful attempts to capture this well defended fortress,⁹³ before retiring to Barcelona to clear the insurgents from environs of the city.⁹⁴ By July, he found that, as the insurrection spread, his corps was too small to cope with the operational demands placed upon it.

Napoleon's hastily assembled reinforcements were formed into a division, under General Honoré Charles, Comte Reille (1775-1860), and marched into Catalonia in July to besiege Rosas, but intense insurgent activity forced him to abandon the operation.

⁹¹The commander called out six formations for frontier defense including those from the Basses-Pyrénées under Adjudant Commandant Lomer (later General Woullemont), the Hautes Pyrénées under General Viala, Senator Lamartellière's National Guard battalion, formations from Arrière under General Miguel, Pyrénées Orientales under General Ritay and one from Turin. SHAT, C(8)355, Supplément à l'État d'Emplacement de l'Armée d'Espagne, Défense de la Frontière, 15-30 June 1808; C(8)10, Général Martin, Arrête Concernant l'Organisation d'un Bataillon de Gardes Nationales destinés à la Défense de la Frontière, 1 July 1808. AN, AFIV 1605PL2 (III), Supplément à l'Etat d' Emplacement de l'Armée d' Espagne, Défense de la Frontière, 1-16 July 1808.

⁹²Laffaille, Mémoires, 41-43; Oman, Peninsular War, 1:314.

⁹³Oman, Peninsular War, 1:315-317.

⁹⁴Laffaille, Mémoires, 38-41; Oman, Peninsular War, 1:318-319; Maximilien Sebastien, Comte Foy, Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule sous Napoléon, 2d ed., (Paris: Baudouin Frères, 1827) 4:156-159. AN, AFIV 1621 PL1, Duchesme, Résumé des Opérations Militaires.

General Duhesme meanwhile marched to Upper Catalonia with a division against equally intense opposition to besiege Gerona in late July. Duhesme and Reille opened the siege against fierce resistance, only to abandon it due to the Catalan blockade of Barcelona which forced Duhesme's return to Barcelona while Reille returned to Figueras⁹⁵.

In September Duhesme swept the country round Barcelona, dispersing several insurgents camps,⁹⁶ only to have them return to reoccupy their old positions, and tighten the blockade. He now, however, faced a logistical crisis, for the garrison only had six weeks provender.⁹⁷ By October the garrison was living from hand to mouth, and even made several raids on insurgent camps to capture meat to supplement their dwindling rations.⁹⁸ In November Duhesme defeated a major Catalan attack on Barcelona,⁹⁹ but, deeply worried about his ability to hold out, prepared the city for a serious defense. Soon

⁹⁵AN, AFIV 1607, General Duhesme, *Journal des Opérations Militaires de l'Armée des Pyrénées Orientales depuis 15 Juillet jusqu' au 1er Septembre 1808*; Lopez, *Guerra de la Independencia*, 2:308-309; Foy, *Histoire*, 4:169; Napier, *Peninsular War*, 1:82-83.; Oman, *Peninsular War*, 1:321-324; Donald Themas, *Cochrane, Britannia's Last Sea King*, (New York: Viking, 1978) 128-129; Laffaille, *Mémoires*, 117-120.

⁹⁶AN, AFIV 1621PL1, Duhesme, *Résumé des Opérations*; Laffaille, *Mémoires*, 126-130; Oman, *Peninsular War*, 2:38; Lopez, *Guerra de la Independencia*, 2:336; Napier, *Peninsular War*, 2:56.

⁹⁷SHAT, C(8)485, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 28 May 1808; C(8)398, Administration de la Guerre, État du Nombre des Rations allouées chaque grade sur le pied de paix, en Rassemblemens, et sur le pied de Guerre, à dater du 1er Août 1810, 30 June 1810; Laffaille, *Mémoires*, 132-133.

⁹⁸SHAT, C(19)7, Commissaire Ordonnateur Rey to General Lacuée, Ministre Directeur de l'Administration de la guerre, 4 January 1809; AN, AFIV 1621 Plaq 1, Duhesme, *Résumé d'Opérations*; Laffaille, *Mémoires*, 138-140; Oman, *Peninsular War*, 2:38-39.

⁹⁹Laffaille, *Mémoires*, 169-171, 181-187, 191.

after, Lord Thomas Cochrane's British Navy squadron bombarded the city with Congreve rockets, while the insurgents abortively attacked.¹⁰⁰ By December provisions in Barcelona were dwindling, despite aggressive foraging and requisitions. Catalan attacks continued as General Duhesme desperately wrote to the new VII Corps Commander, General Saint-Cyr then besieging Rosas, for immediate succour.¹⁰¹

Since mid-1808, Duhesme's corps proved too small to cope with the war. Barcelona alone absorbed a division for its defense. In Upper Catalonia, the insurgents occupied Gerona and Rosas and infested the Ampurdam. It required another division to maintain French communications. Indeed, the insurgents had cut communications with France, blockaded Figueras, and made several devastating raids into France as far as Roussillon. The Emperor responded by sending more reinforcements in June 1808, to include the reserve troops of the Pyrenees Departments,¹⁰² under General Jean Marie, Baron Ritay (1761-1819). The Minister obtained fresh units to reinforce Duhesme's Corps.¹⁰³ By mid-June, General Lacombe Saint-Michael, Commander of the 10e Division

¹⁰⁰AN, AFIV 1621 Plaq 1, Duhesme, *Résumé des Opérations*; Laffaille, *Mémoires*, 207-212.

¹⁰¹Laffaille, *Mémoires*, 207-212.

¹⁰²The Emperor ordered the Departments of Gers, Haute-Garonne, Aude, Haute and Basses Pyrénées, Pyrénées Orientales, Ariège, Landes, Tarn, Hérault, l'Aveyron, Gard, Lot and Lot-et-Garonne to provide 10,000 conscripts (conscription of 1810) for the crisis developing in the Pyrénées. "These 10,000 men will be formed into 60 companies of 180 men...half...will be mustered in Perpignan, the other half in Bayonne." *UCN* No. 1948, Note, n.d., 2:238.

¹⁰³These units included a battalion from Grenoble, the 32e Léger, 16e Ligne the Valaisan Battalion, 3e-7e Ligne, 2e-93e Ligne, separate companies from the 37e, 56e and 2e Ligne, detachments of the 4e, 7e, 8e Cuirassiers, and 3e, 14e and 24e Chasseurs a cheval. *CN*, No. 14092, *Ordres pour le Major-Général*, 14 June 1808, 17:304-305.

Militaire, assembled these troops ostensibly to defend the French frontier. Napoleon also diverted troops destined for Bayonne to Perpignan,¹⁰⁴ and by July formed two more composite battalions, 1er and 2e Bataillons Provisoire de Perpignan.¹⁰⁵ The whole reinforcement made a 7,000 man division, which the Emperor assigned to General Reille. Napoleon ordered him to raise the blockade of Figueras, revictule it with 200,000 rations of biscuit, and assist in the reduction of Gerona.¹⁰⁶

The commander of the 10e Division Militaire and the Minister of War, meanwhile, worked to defend the French frontier. General Joseph Martin (1753-1815), commander and Prefect of the Department of Pyrénées Orientales, for example, organized a National Guard battalion of 560 men drawn from his communes.¹⁰⁷

General Ritay's initial force included a battalion of the National Guard of the Department of Pyrénées Orientales and a company each of the Réserve des Pyrénées Orientales, Gendarmes and artillery with six cannon; SHAT, C(8)355, Supplément à l'État d'Emplacement de l'Armée d'Espagne, 15-30 June 1808; Foy, Histoire, 4:163-164.

¹⁰⁴Napoleon diverted the 7th and 8th companies of the 3e-5e Légion de Réserve to Perpignan. UCN, No. 2029, Decision, June 21, 1808, 2:276.

¹⁰⁵CN, No. 14150, Napoleon to Berthier, 2 July 1808, 17:345-346; No. 14148, Napoleon to Berthier, 1 July 1808, 17:343-344.

Ordre au général de division Reille...de réunir les régiments de lanciers avec sa cavalerie, tous les bataillons de la réserve de gardes nationales de la Haute-Garonne, des Pyrénées-Orientales, et tâcher de communiquer avec Figueras pour ravitailler cette place et y faire entrer un convoi de biscuit. autoriser a lever un plus grand nombre de gardes nationales en se concertant avec le préfet.

CN, No. 14141, Orders Dictated to Berthier, 29 June 1808, 17:338-339.

¹⁰⁶See Table 15. CN, No. 17151, Napoleon to General Reille, Aide de Camp of the Emperor, 2 July 1808, 17:345-347.

¹⁰⁷SHAT, C(8)10, Général Martin, Arrête Concernant l'organisation d'un Bataillon de Gardes Nationales, destiné à la défense de la frontière, 1 July 1808.

In the first week of July, meanwhile, General Duhesme sent several letters to the Emperor, pleading for immediate assistance and reinforcement, lest Barcelona collapse causing irreparable harm to the French war effort and imperial prestige.¹⁰⁸ Napoleon stressed to General Reille the vital importance of breaking the Catalan blockade of Figueras, capturing Rosas and opening Duhesme's line of communications.¹⁰⁹

Reille's division was a 'hodge podge' of 8,370 troops from dispirate battalions, such as the three bataillons de marche,¹¹⁰ and miscellaneous depot sweepings.¹¹¹ During the first two weeks of July, 4,000 of these troops marched into Catalonia while other troops arrived at Perpignan.¹¹² These reinforcements, however, proved inadequate to

¹⁰⁸General Duhesme wrote to Napoleon in early July. Since French communications between Barcelona and France were cut, Duhesme sent correspondence by sea in boats which slipped out of Barcelona at night to elude the English patrols. These ships landed at Port Vendres or Collioure and the dispatches went from there to Paris. Oman, Peninsular War, 1:319.

¹⁰⁹CN, No. 14168, Napoleon to General Reille, 8 July 1808, 16:357-358.

¹¹⁰These Battalions de Marche were the 1er Bataillon de Marche de Catalogne (includes three companies each of the 7e and 93e de Ligne), 2e Bataillon de Marche de Catalogne (two companies, each 37e Ligne, 2e Ligne and 56e Ligen), and the 3e Bataillon de Marche de Catalogne (two companies, Swiss and 16e de Ligne). These battalions marched from depots to Catalonia and break off separate companies trained recruits to their parents units. See Table 18. UCN, No. 2083, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, Bayonne, July 8, 1808, 2:317.

¹¹¹UCN, No. 2098, Napoleon to General Clarke, July 11, 1808, 2:328.

¹¹²See Table 15. AN, AFIV1605, Plaq 2 (III), Supplément à l'État d'Emplacement de l'Armée d'Espagne, Défense de la Frontière, 6-16 Juillet 1808; Foy, Histoire, 4:165-167. SHAT, C(8)355, Supplément à l'État d'Emplacement de l'Armée d'Espagne, Défense de la Frontière, 15-30 Juin 1808; UCN, No. 2124, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, Bayonne, July 16, 1808, 2:342-343; Oman, Peninsular War, 1:319-321; CN, No. 14172, Napoleon to Berthier, 9 July 1808, 17:360-362; AN, AFIV1607, Letters, Alexandre Berthier to Napoleon, 30 June 1808; Berthier to Napoleon, 2 July 1808, Berthier to Napoleon, 17 July 1808; SHAT, C(8)267, Registre de Correspondance du Général Reille du 4 Juillet

reduce Rosas and Gerona, protect the French frontier, and pacify the province. Indeed, Reille and Duhesme only opened communications briefly during the second siege of Gerona, from 24 July to 17 August 1808.¹¹³

Clearly, larger reinforcements were needed to complete the task. In August the Emperor ordered to Catalonia, an Italian division from Prince Eugene's Army in Northern Italy, and a veteran French division, in all, some 17,000 troops.¹¹⁴ In September, he unveiled his intention to form a new Corps, the (V and later) VII Corps d'Armée d'Espagne under the command of Colonel General Laurent Gouvion Saint-Cyr (1764-1830), who marched into Catalonia in November with three new divisions. These were an Italian division under General Dominique Comte Pino, (10,938 men); a crack French division, under General Joseph, Comte Souham (1760-1837), (9,238 men); and a second French division under General Louis-François-Jean, Baron Chabot (1757-1837), (1,908 men).¹¹⁵ This new VII Corps numbered about 32,000 troops.¹¹⁶

1808 au 13 Mai 1809, General Reille to Berthier 4 July 1808, General Reille to Napoleon 6 July 1808, General Reille to Berthier, 6 July 1808, General Reille to Berthier, 9 July 1808.

¹¹³Oman, Peninsular War, 1:322-325; AN, AFIV1621, Plaq 1, Duhesme, Résumé des Opérations Militaires; William Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula and the South of France from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, (London: Thomas and William Boone, 1862)1:82-83; Foy, Histoire, 4:169; Oman, Peninsular War, 1:321-324.

¹¹⁴CN, No. 14249, Napoléon to Eugène Napoléon, Vice-Roi d'Italie, 10 August 1808, 17:435; UCN, No. 2175, Napoleon to General Clarke, August 16, 1808, 2:373; No. 2181, Napoleon to General Clarke, August 18, 1808, 2:375-376; No. 2185, Decision, n.d. (August 18, 1808), 2:377; No. 2190, Decision, Saint-Cloud, August 18, 1808, 2:380.

¹¹⁵UCN, No. 2291, Napoleon to Berthier, September 14, 1808, 2:454; CN, No. 14342, Napoleon to Berthier, 22 September 1808, 17:523; SHAT, C(8)465, Situation VII Corps, 5 December 1808.

These reinforcements were badly needed for Reille's untrained Gardes Nationales, Tuscan and Swiss bataillons de marche troops were inadequate to stabilize Eastern Spain and by September its ranks were thinned by combat and disease (such as dysentery). Indeed, Reille was in as nearly bad a position as Duhesme blockaded in Barcelona.¹¹⁷

General Gouvion Saint-Cyr marched to Catalonia in November,¹¹⁸ while General Vivres, commander of the Catalan army, meanwhile tightened his blockade of Barcelona¹¹⁹ attacking the city several times until December 1808.¹²⁰ By then, Vivres had tightened the blockade to the point that General Duhesme was in desperate straits, bent under supply difficulties and handling both the exterior defense of the city and its interior security against insurgency.¹²¹ The Royal Navy's Mediterranean squadron under Admiral Thomas Cochrane even participated in the blockade by severely bombarding Barcelona

¹¹⁶CN, No. 14256, Note for the Ministers of War and Military Administration, 17 August 1808, 17:443-444.

¹¹⁷Oman, Peninsular War, 2:38-40. The poor quality of the initial drafts of the Corps d'Observation and Reille's reinforcements in several ways made operations more hazardous, mere numbers being in no way a substitute for quality, well trained and disciplined troops. Reille's drafts melted away to disease and poor discipline.

¹¹⁸UCN, No. 2291, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, September 14, 1808, 2:454.; CN, No. 14342, Napoleon to Berthier, 22 September 1808, 17:523.

¹¹⁹As Vivres drew the knot of the blockade closer, General Duhesme considered abandoning the city and simply standing the blockade in the Citadel and Monjuich but changed his mind when he heard that Gouvion Saint-Cyr had arrived at Perpignan at the head of considerable reinforcements. Oman, Peninsular War, 2:41-42; Laffaille, Mémoires, 171-172.

¹²⁰Laffaille, Mémoires, 157-165, 197-209; AN, AFIV1621, Plaq 1, Duhesme, Résumé des Operations Militaires; Oman, Peninsular War, 2:41-55.

¹²¹Laffaille, Mémoires, 171-172.

with cannon and Congreve rockets on November 8th and 13th.¹²² The hard-pressed General Duhesme sent dispatches to General Gouvion Saint-Cyr, urgently requesting relief.¹²³

General Saint-Cyr's three step task was to conquer Rosas and Gerona, relieve Barcelona, then subdue the rest of Catalonia. In November, he began the one month siege of Rosas.¹²⁴ General Sanson, Commandant of Engineers, masterminded a classical siege against the 3,000 man Catalan garrison, despite attempts to relieve the beleaguered fort by the Commander of Gerona, General Julian Alvarez and Lord Cochrane. On 30 November, General Pino's division unsuccessfully attacked the breach. General Sanson with in days blew a larger breach, forcing the garrison to capitulate.¹²⁵

The siege of Rosas ended the first phase of Saint-Cyr's campaign to subdue Catalonia. There remained the relief of Barcelona, the reduction of Gerona, the

¹²²Ibid., 193-194.

¹²³In one letter to Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Duhesme noted that to get correspondence out of Barcelona he sent six spies over land and by sea in fast boats or provision ships. AN, AFIV1615, General Duhesme to Gouvion Saint-Cyr, 19 November 1808. Belmas, Journaux des Sièges faits ou soutenus par les Français dans la Péninsule de 1807 à 1814, (Paris: Chez Firmin Dedut Frères et Cie, 1836), 2:466; Marshal Berthier to General Gouvion Saint-Cyr, 10 November 1808; Oman, Peninsular War, 2:41.

¹²⁴Ibid., 2:44-50.

¹²⁵Ibid., 2:51-57. Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:438-455; AN, AFIV 1615, VII Corps, Armée de Génie, Général de Division Sanson, Rapport du Siege de Rosas à l'époque de la Reddition de cette citadelle, 5 December 1808. Napier, Peninsula War, 1:395-397, Oman, Peninsular War, 2:48.

destruction of the Catalan armies¹²⁶ and its insurgency, then the slow conquest of the country. The siege of Gerona would, however, stymie his attempt.

¹²⁶Napoleon gave Saint-Cyr four general missions: Succour General Duhesme, supply the magazines of Figueras, subdue the Catalan countryside, and place upon them the burden of war, and subdue the enemy (armies). Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 351.

§ 4. The First Great Crisis: The Campaign of 1809.

General Gouvion Saint-Cyr completed the reduction of Rosas on 6 December 1808,¹²⁷ and only Gerona in Upper Catalonia, and Tortosa, Tarragona, Hostalrich and Lerida remained unconquered in Lower Catalonia. He could not, however, reduce Gerona and conquer Upper Catalonia until he relieved General Duhesme, tightly blockaded in Barcelona¹²⁸

In October, General Duhesme wrote to Marshal Louis Alexandre Berthier (1753-1815) predicting Barcelona's collapse for lack of provisions.¹²⁹ On 19 November 1808, he wrote a final desperate dispatch to General Gouvion Saint-Cyr, bemoaning the difficulties of holding down the canaille de Barcelone ready to revolt at the first opportunity. He stressed that his provisions were critically low and could not hope to

¹²⁷AN, AFIV 1615 Général de Division Sanson, Rapport du Siège de Rosas à l'époque de la Reddition de Cette Citadelle, 5 December 1808. Belmas, Journaux des Sièges faits ou Soutenus par les Français dans la Péninsule, de 1807 à 1814; Rédigés d'après les ordres du Gouvernement, sur les Documents Existant aux Archives de la Guerre et au Dépôt des Fortifications, (Paris:Chez Firmin Didot Frères et Cie, 1836), 2:473-474.

¹²⁸General Duhesme's garrison consisted of a division under General Chabran, a second division under General Lechi (second in command to General Duhesme) a cavalry division under General Bessièrès with two brigades and finally a division artillery under Colonel Fabre. SHAT C(8)485, Situation, VII Corps, 5 December 1808. See Table 21.

¹²⁹On 8 September 1808, General Duhesme wrote to Marshal Berthier stating that he had in the magazines two months supply of grain, and he could only hold out another month without help. On 13 October, he wrote again to Berthier pleading that the garrison was in great want, and he could only hold out until December. Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations de l'Armée de Catalogne en 1808 et 1809 sous le Commandement du Général Gouvion Saint-Cyr ou Matériaux pour servir à l'histoire de la Guerre d'Espagne, (Paris: Chez Anselin et Pochard, 1821), 359. Christiane d'Ainval, Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Soldat de l'An II, Maréchal d'Empire, Réorganisateur de l'Armée, (Paris: Copernic, 1981), 95.

survive without immediate succor.¹³⁰ Duhesme's collapse would be a tremendous blow to French prestige, a loss of 12,000 troops, and a loss of the French foothold in Lower Catalonia. General Saint-Cyr had to save it at all costs.

On 9 December he gathered three divisions, leaving Reille's division to occupy Upper Catalonia.¹³¹ Saint-Cyr sent his artillery and heavy baggage back to Figueras and marched off into the mountains past Gerona. At La Bispal he distributed four days biscuit and fifty cartridges to his troops, and put 150,000 rounds on pack mules. He then burned his transport and plunged back into the mountains on 12 December, on one of the most dangerous and daring marches of the war. Reaching Cardadeau, Saint-Cyr encountered General Redding with 8,000 Catalan troops, opposing his march.¹³² Saint-Cyr attacked on 16 December, and punched through the Catalan line, completely routing them, inflicting 600 casualties, and taking 1,500 prisoners.¹³³

Having scattered Redding's force, he dashed on to relieve Barcelona¹³⁴ on 17 December. He went on to defeat the main Catalan force at the Battle of Molins de

¹³⁰AN, AFIV 1615, Letter, General Duhesme to General Gouvion Saint-Cyr, 19 November 1808.

¹³¹These were the divisions of Generals Chabot (1,344 men), Pino (9,391 men), and Souham (7,427 men), totaling 18,562 men. SHAT, C(8)485, Situation, VII Corps, 5 December 1808.

¹³²Redding's division was part of General Vivres' Army. Oman, Peninsular War, 2:63.

¹³³Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 64-71. Oman Peninsular War, 2:65-68. Napier, Peninsular War, 1:400-401. Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 2:357-362. Christine d'Ainval, Gouvion Saint-Cyr, 96, Arteché, Guerra de la Independencia, 4:275-283.

¹³⁴Oman, Peninsular War, 2:68-69. Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 72-73, 319-321; Laffaille, Mémoires, 223-224.

Rey, 21 December, capturing 1,200 prisoners, twenty five cannon, and some 3,000,000 cartridges.¹³⁵ Saint-Cyr then spent January 1809 clearing the area of insurgents¹³⁶.

In January, the new VII Corps, had six divisions, artillery and engineers totaling 48,518 men and 5,403 horses.¹³⁷ General Saint-Cyr began with it the thankless task of "pacifying" the Lower Catalan countryside, sending flying columns to destroy the insurgent bands and suffering considerable casualties themselves.¹³⁸ This period however, allowed the French and Spanish commands, to regain strength. In mid February, Redding concentrated a division at Igualada for a second offensive. General Saint-Cyr, however, quickly concentrated three French divisions and enveloped the Spanish position, forcing their disordered retreat, and to abandon their magazines.¹³⁹ Redding then concentrated another 12,000 troops¹⁴⁰ in two divisions and measured swords with Saint-Cyr in the

¹³⁵Oman, Peninsular War, 2:70-72; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 3:362-364; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 77-87. Arteche, Guerra de la Independencia, 4:163-171; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 1:268-270.

¹³⁶Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations. Oman, Peninsular War, 2:73-75.

¹³⁷The divisions were General Pino's 1st Division, Souham's 2nd, Chabran's 3rd, Chabot's 4th, Duhesme's garrison of Barcelona, Reille's division (division Allemande). SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 6 January 1809. See Table 16. Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 97-98, 403-404. Oman Peninsular War, 2:76-77.

¹³⁸ SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 6 January 1809. See Table 21. The magazines in Barcelona provided 1,889,325 cartridges. The total consumed from December 1808 to February 1809 was 2,589,325 rounds. Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 97-98, 403-404. Oman Peninsular War, 2:76-77.

¹³⁹Oman, Peninsular War, 2:78-81. Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 108-111; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 3:369, 371-373, 403-404; Arteche, Guerra de la Independencia, 5:186-190.

¹⁴⁰Oman, Peninsular War, 82-89.

Battle of Valls. There, on 25 February, he encountered General Souham's Division, and attacked, pushing the French back. Winning a partial victory, Redding rested his troops, allowing Saint-Cyr with Pino's Italian Division to arrive.¹⁴¹ In a grim battle, Saint-Cyr decisively defeated and scattered the Catalan divisions, killing General Redding, inflicting 3,000 casualties and capturing their cannon and baggage. The French lost about 1,000 men. Following his victory Saint-Cyr pursued the wrecked Catalan army to Tarragona and blockaded the place¹⁴² for a several weeks, and returned to Barcelona.

Though General Saint-Cyr clearly demonstrated French superiority in the field, he was still far from pacifying the country. He had two difficult problems to solve. The first was operational. Two key fortresses, Gerona and Hostalrich still threatened French communications.¹⁴³ The second was logistical. By March 1809 Barcelona was again near starvation and its magazines could not hope to support three active divisions (Pino, Chabot, and Souham) and the division sized garrison. The area around Barcelona was exhausted and Saint-Cyr lacked the land transport to carry the needed supplies. Additionally, the British Mediterranean fleet continued its blockade. It would be May

¹⁴¹The French troops at Valls were Souham's and Pino's divisions totaling 13,300 men. Oman, Peninsular War, 2:84.

¹⁴²*Ibid.*, 2:85-89; Napier, Peninsular War, 1:410-416; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 3:364-374; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 120-131, 409-424.

¹⁴³Camillo Vaciani, Storia delle Campagne e Degli Assedi degl'Italiani in Ispagna dal 1808-1813, 3 vols., (Milano: Paolo Pagnoni, 1845), 2:79-81, 83-85, 88-91; Colonel Juan Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 1810-1814, 5 vols., (Madrid: Editorial San Martin, 1972, 2:369, 371-374; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 97-98, 103-106, 112-114, 117-126; Napier, Peninsular War, 3:89-91.

before a French convoy under Admiral Julien Baron Cosmac-Kerjulien (1761-1825)¹⁴⁴ carrying supplies from Toulon, finally ran the British blockade.¹⁴⁵ Consequently, Saint-Cyr left Barcelona and occupied Vich to relieve the garrison's supply situation.¹⁴⁶

Since Saint-Cyr's arrival at Barcelona, the insurgents had cut his communications with General Reille in Upper Catalonia. To reestablish it, he sent General Lechi's division with some thousand Spanish prisoners to the Ampundam.¹⁴⁷ Though General Saint-Cyr could hold his own in Lower Catalonia, General Reille's task with a single "green" division was nearly futile.¹⁴⁸ By January 1809, it was painfully clear to the Emperor that no further progress in Catalonia's subjugation was possible until Saint-Cyr reduced Gerona, and reestablished French communications.¹⁴⁹ Napoleon began assembling troops for this operation in January, concentrating regiments from Berg, Wurzburg and the Confederation of the Rhine,¹⁵⁰ some 6,000 troops, at Perpignan. In January 1809,

¹⁴⁴Oman, Peninsular War, 3:16; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 159-160.

¹⁴⁵Oman, Peninsular War, 3:16; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 138-139.

¹⁴⁶Oman, Peninsular War, 3:16-17.

¹⁴⁷SHAT, C(8)267, Registre de Correspondance du Général Reille du 4 Juillet 1808 à 13 Mars 1809; Reille to Prince Berthier, 20 December 1808; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:15-18; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 160.

¹⁴⁸CN, No. 14652, Napoleon to Berthier, 4 January 1809, 18:175-176.

¹⁴⁹CN, No. 14652, Napoleon to Berthier, 4 January 1809, 18:175; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:15.

¹⁵⁰CN, No. 14681, Napoleon to Berthier 11 January 1809, 18:195. These units were the Régiment de Wurzburg (1,521 men), Régiment de Berg (1,183 men), 2e Régiment de Berg (1,153 men) and the Bataillon des Princes (767 men) totaling 4,624 men present under arms in mid-May 1809. Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:663. Their effective strength totaled 5,607 by July. SHAT C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, de l'Armée

General Reille received the Division Allemande, under General Pierre, Baron Amey (1768)-1850), and two National Guard battalions.¹⁵¹ The Emperor expected General Reille to do the impossible and begin the siege by 15 February,¹⁵² without Saint-Cyr's assistance, for he was embroiled in Lower Catalonia. Napoleon poured more troops into Catalonia, ordering King Jerome Bonaparte to send a 6,000 man Westphalian Division, under General Annet, Baron Morio de L'Isle (1779-1828).¹⁵³

By mid-spring Napoleon had put thirteen German battalions into Catalonia.¹⁵⁴

General Reille, meanwhile, assembled a large siege train, while Saint-Cyr concentrated

d'Espagne, 1 July 1809.

¹⁵¹The Chasseurs de (la) Montagne de Haute-Garrone ex Pyrénées Orientales. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation VII Corps, 1 July 1809. UCN, No. 2630, Decision, January 7, 1809, 2:605; No. 2669, Napoleon to General Clarke, January 13, 1809, 2:622-623; No. 2696, Napoleon to General Clarke, January 24, 1809, 2:636-637; No. 2756, Decision, February 10, 1809, 2:666. Ibid., No. 2675 Napoleon to General Clarke, January 14, 1809, 2:624-625; No. 2715, Decision, January 16, 1809, 2:645; No. 2776, Decisions, February 13, 1809, 2:704; No. 2830, Napoleon to General Clarke, February 26, 1809, 2:708-709; No. 2845, Decision, March 2, 1809, 2:714. Napoleon ordered, for example, the organization of a new division of German troops, Division Morio and the Regiment de Wurtzburg attached to Division Verdier for the reduction of Gerona. CN, No. 14868, Napoleon to General Clarke, 7 March 1809, 320-322.

¹⁵²CN, No. 14681, Napoleon to Berthier, 11 January 1809.

¹⁵³CN, No. 14686, Napoleon to General Clarke, 12 January 1809, 18:199. Its main depot was posted at Metz. UCN, No. 3086, Decisions, April 5, 1809, 3:13; No. 3096, Decisions, April 5, 1809, 3:18. The Westphalian Division had two brigades of two regiments each; General Borner's 1st Brigade (2nd and 4th Line) and General Och's 2nd Brigade (1st and 3rd Ligne). Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:651; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809.

¹⁵⁴Oman, Peninsular War, 3:15. UCN, No. 3114, Napoleon to General Clarke, April 17, 1809, 3:37; No. 3115, Napoleon to General Clarke, April 17, 1809, 3:27; No. 3188, Decision, May 25, 1809, 3:66. The Minister of War even called up one National Guard cohort, each from the departments Aude and Pyrénées Orientales (the regular garrisons were funneled into the VII Corps). UCN, No. 3108, Decision, April 12, 1809, 3:24.

his four divisions around Vich, continually fighting the insurgents.¹⁵⁵ Saint Cyr then reestablished his communications with Reille.¹⁵⁶

As Saint-Cyr's and Reille's preparations continued, Napoleon waited impatiently for positive results from the operations in Lower Catalonia.¹⁵⁷ He expected a quick payoff from Saint-Cyr's recent victories and impatiently instructed his VII Corps commander to simultaneously besiege Gerona, Tortosa and Tarragona.¹⁵⁸ The intense Catalan resistance and enormous logistical difficulties, however, precluded any swift conclusion to the campaign. The Emperor, unimpressed by these problems, was disappointed by the lack of progress, particularly Saint-Cyr's withdrawal from Tarragona, as he was with Reille's slowness at pacifying the Ampurdan.¹⁵⁹

Napoleon preferred commanders who were fire-eaters capable of doing the impossible, and intensely disliked complainers like Reille or Saint-Cyr. Additionally, Marshal Pierre François Charles Augereau, Duc de Castiglione (1757-1816) apparently

¹⁵⁵Ibid, 3:16-17.

¹⁵⁶Ibid. Vacani, Storia delle Campagne, 2:171-172. Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 157-161. Letter of Gouvion Saint-Cyr to Reille, 12 May 1813, Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:659-660.

¹⁵⁷CN, No. 14955, Napoleon to Marshal Jourdan, Major Général de l'Armée d'Espagne 26 March 1809, 18:391.

¹⁵⁸Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 130: Letter General Gouvion Saint-Cyr to Marshal Berthier, 6 March 1809, 424-429.

¹⁵⁹Napoleon clearly, but mistakenly thought that the VII Corps was capable of completing Catalonia's pacification. Oman, Peninsular War, 3:17.

exploited the Emperor's dissatisfaction with French progress there in order to replace Saint-Cyr as VII Corps commander.¹⁶⁰

In any case, Napoleon decided, and build a new "command team" to conquer Catalonia. In January 1809, he appointed the brilliant engineer General Sanson as chief engineer commander of the siege works at Gerona.¹⁶¹ In May, he decided to replace Gouvion Saint-Cyr with Marshal Augereau.¹⁶² Additionally, he appointed General Jean-Antoine, Comte Verdier (1767-1839) to command the siege.¹⁶³ Marshal Augereau was an "old hand" in Catalonia, having fought there in 1793-1794 and thought he could easily manage the VII Corps, mired in Catalonia. When Napoleon gave him the appointment in mid-May, he went to Perpignan, but suffered a severe attack of gout and remained there, unable to assume command of the VII Corps.¹⁶⁴

General Lechi's division, having got to the Ampurdam, had cut its way back to Vich and Lechi informed Saint-Cyr of, his replacement by Augereau, and of the Marshal's

¹⁶⁰Oman, Peninsular War, 3:17-18.

¹⁶¹CN, No. 14652, Napoleon to Berthier, 4 January 1809, 18:175-176.

¹⁶²UCN, No. 3080, Napoleon to General Clarke, April 5, 1809, 3:11. Scotty Bowden and Charlie Tarbox, Armies on the Danube, 1809, Armies of the Napoleonic Wars Research-Series, (Arlington, Texas: Empire Games Press, 1980), 62; David Chandler, ed., Napoleon's Marshals, (New York: Maxmillan, 1987) 1; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 161.

¹⁶³General Verdier had just recovered from a wound he received while directing the Siege of Saragossa from June to August 1808. He was quite experienced in the management of large sieges. Six, Dictionnaire, 2:540; Raymond Rudurff, War to the Death, the Sieges of Sarragossa 1808-1809, (London, Hamish Hamilton, 1974), 3; Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:1; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 430-432.

¹⁶⁴Oman, Peninsular War, 3:18; CN, No. 15553, Napoleon to Clarke, 18 July 1809, 19:264-265.

gout which would force Saint-Cyr to begin the thankless task of besieging Gerona until Augereau recovered to assume command.¹⁶⁵

General Verdier now replaced General Reille, as commander in Upper Catalonia, and siege commander. As a "Lieutenant General" of the Emperor, he corresponded directly with Paris, rather than through General Saint-Cyr much to the latter's distaste. Verdier demanded from Saint-Cyr strong reinforcements to begin the investment, and threatened not to begin the siege without them.¹⁶⁶ Though vexed by this high-handed insubordination Saint-Cyr, sent Verdier 3,500 of his worst troops from General Lechi's division.¹⁶⁷

By mid-May the VII Corps took on a new operational structure for the siege of Gerona. It fell into three major parts, the Armée d'Observation under the command of General Saint-Cyr, including three infantry divisions totaling 15,732 men and 1,819 horses, Verdier's Armée de Siège with 23,382 men and 1,970 horses and the garrison of Barcelona with 8,408 men.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵Oman, Peninsular War, 3:18.

¹⁶⁶Letter, General Verdier to General Gouvion Saint-Cyr, 15 May 1809, Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:660-662; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:18.

¹⁶⁷General Lechi's Italian Division had two brigades with 5,156 men and 432 horses. Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:651; SHAT C(8)362, VII Corps, Situation, 6 January 1809; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:19. When called upon to make troop sacrifices, commanders often send their less reliable units. Certainly Saint-Cyr, angered by Verdier spitefully, sent his worst troops.

¹⁶⁸SHAT C(8)362, Situation, VIII Corps, 6 January 1809.

In May, prior to his departure, General Reille, and the newly assembled siege force¹⁶⁹ marched on Gerona, while General Lechi's division marched from Vich to support the siege. Both commanders swept the Gerona area of insurgents, and Reille concentrated his 16,200 men at Gerona,¹⁷⁰ while Saint-Cyr covered the operation with his three divisions from Vich.¹⁷¹

On 24 May, General Verdier assumed command of the siege force and invested Gerona with over two divisions,¹⁷² and on 6 June, General Nicolas Antoine, Comte Sanson (1756-1824) opened the attack against Fort Monjuich and some outlying forts supported by a heavy artillery bombardment¹⁷³ which continued for a month, blowing a 35 foot breach into its ramparts. On 7 July, General Verdier ordered an assault with twenty elite Grenadier and Voltigeur companies (2,400 men) under Adjutant Commandant Beuremann¹⁷⁴ which collapsed under a storm of shot. General Verdier rallied his shaken troops and disastrously attacked again, all at a cost of 1,079 casualties, 45% of the

¹⁶⁹SHAT C(8)35, Général Sanson, Rapport Général du Génie sur le Siège de Girone, 20 September 1809.

¹⁷⁰Oman, Peninsular War, 3:15-19.

¹⁷¹These reinforcements included the bulk of Lechi's artillery engineers and a cavalry regiment, leaving him with 3,116 men. Ibid.

¹⁷²The covering force consisted of General Souham's, and Pino's divisions, and the Grande Quartier Général under Adjutant Commandant Devaux. See Table 19; SHAT C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809; Saint-Cyr, Journaux des Opérations, 153, 155-156.

¹⁷³Ibid.

¹⁷⁴Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:503-508; SHAT, C(8)60, Rapport Général du Génie sur le Siège de Girone; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:28-29.

attacking force.¹⁷⁵ The greater loss was to French morale, which was shaken to its very foundations. The hospitals were filled to bursting with wounded and sick (dysentery, malaria and sunstroke) while troops deserted en mass. By mid-September Verdier had 5,120 troops in hospital out of 15,640 (32.9%).¹⁷⁶ These accelerating loss rates had a serious impact upon continued fighting ability of the besieging force.¹⁷⁷

General Saint-Cyr, meanwhile, secured Verdier's rear and systemically destroyed the insurgent strongholds.¹⁷⁸ The insurgents, however, redoubled their efforts, harrassing Verdier's communications.¹⁷⁹ Through July, Verdier continued the attack on Monjuich; and on 2 August launched a second assault, capturing its outworks, blowing in its counterscarp, and gaining a foothold in its gaping breach, to mine it.¹⁸⁰ Finally on 10

¹⁷⁵AN, AFIV 1621 plaq3(I), General Sanson and Taviel to General Clarke, Rapport de l'Artillerie et du Génie, 9 July 1809; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:32; Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 3:681; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 4:287-291; Arteche, Guerra de la Independencia, 7:385-394; Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 244-253.

¹⁷⁶SHAT C(8)362, Situation sur le Siège de Girone, 15 September 1809.

¹⁷⁷AN, AFIV 1621 plaq 3(I), Rapport de l'Artillerie et du Génie, 9 July 1809; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:32; Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:536-537; SHAT C(8)60, Rapport Général du Genie sur le Siège de Girone.

¹⁷⁸Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 156; One of Saint-Cyr's Italian brigades for example captured a Catalan supply convoy of some 1,200 oxen on 7 July, and another insurgent force of 900 men on 10 July. Oman, Peninsular War, 3:30.

¹⁷⁹Oman, Peninsular War, 3:35. General Verdier scored some victories against the insurgents, pushing one force of some 5,000 guerrillas into the mountains in July.

¹⁸⁰General Mariano Alvarez de Castro, Governor of Gerona, fearing the fall of Monjuich unsuccessfully sallied out to save the ill fated fort. AN, AFIV1621 plaq 3(III), Generals Sanson and Taviel to General Clarke, Rapport de l'Artillerie et du Génie 11 August 1809; Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:565-566; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:34.

August, the garrison evacuated the battered fort,¹⁸¹ which the French occupied.¹⁸²

Verdier now turned to attack Gerona proper, and battered four breaches into it by 30 August, as his engineers sapped to its ramparts.¹⁸³ The Catalan Army again tried a counterstroke. The newly appointed Captain-General Blake assembled 20,000 men to relieve Gerona.¹⁸⁴ Opposed by three French divisions, one Catalan division cut its way into Gerona¹⁸⁵ with a 1,100 mule supply convoy, on 1 September and broke out again on the 4th.¹⁸⁶

In mid-September General Verdier assaulted the breaches with 3,000 troops after an intense bombardment only to suffer a second defeat, losing 624 casualties.¹⁸⁷ The

¹⁸¹The retiring garrison blew up a large mine, (46 barrels of powder). AFIV1621 plaq 3(III), Generals Sanson and Taviel, to General Clarke, Rapport de l'Artillerie et du Génie, 12 August 1809; Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:566-571.

¹⁸²Oman, Peninsular War, 3:34.

¹⁸³Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:580-581.

¹⁸⁴Oman, Peninsular War, 3:41-42.

¹⁸⁵General Saint-Cyr provided Divisions Souham and Pino, and Verdier provided his own division, reducing his besieging force to 6,200 men. Ibid.

¹⁸⁶AN, AFIV1621 plaq 3(II), Extrait, Lettre, M. Gault, Inspecteur aux revues de la Division Westphalien, 6 September 1809; SHAT C(8)60, General Sanson, Rapport Général du Génie sur le Siège de Girone, 20 October 1809; Vacinai, Storia della Campagne, 2:273-278; Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:583-593; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:42-45; Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 209-210, 215-219, 235.

¹⁸⁷AN, AFIV1621 plaq 3(III), Generals Sanson and Taviel, Rapport de l'Artillerie et du Génie du 16 Septembre 1809; Rapport, 17 Septembre 1809; Rapport, 18 Septembre 1809; Rapport, 18 Septembre 1809. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Siège de Girone, 15 September 1809; C(8)60, Rapport Général du Génie; AN, AFIV 1621 plaq 3(III), Generals Sanson and Taviel, Rapport de l'Artillerie et du Génie, 20 September 1809; Saint-Cyr,

immediate effect of this check was devastating. The long venomous relations between Verdier and Saint-Cyr completely ruptured,¹⁸⁸ and French morale plummeted, as casualties soared. Of the 18,663 men in his original force Verdier had 9,988 left, (46.5%).¹⁸⁹

General Saint-Cyr meanwhile, spitefully sent a letter to General Clarke laying the attack's failure squarely on Verdier's shoulders,¹⁹⁰ while Verdier too, sent caustic letters to Clarke, the Emperor and, Marshal Augereau, blaming Saint-Cyr's lack of support for the failure. Finally, in complete frustration he invalidated himself (with fever) and threw up his command, returning to France.¹⁹¹ This "desertion" nearly killed French morale, causing some 1,200 soldiers to go sick in hospital by 1 October, abandoning many of the trenches.¹⁹²

Journal des Opérations, 253-256; Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:604-610; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 3:294-299; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 4:287-291; Napier, Peninsula War, 3:45-46; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:47-49; Arteché, Guerra de la Independencia, 7:406-414.

¹⁸⁸Oman, Peninsular War, 3:46; Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:739-742, 750-751. Prior to the assault, General Verdier requested from Saint-Cyr the loan of a brigade to reinforce the assaulting columns, partly because he did not trust to the elan of his nearly worn-out soldiers. Saint-Cyr however left Verdier in the lurch, "every general has his own task; yours is to take Gerona with the resources placed at your disposal." Oman, Peninsular War, 3:46.

¹⁸⁹SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Siège de Girone, 15 September 1809.

¹⁹⁰Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:766-768.

¹⁹¹Ibid, 2:769-771, 797, 798-800. Oman, Peninsular War, 3:49.

¹⁹²This lack of troops allowed a surge of insurgent attacks, e.g. the capture of a French convoy from Bascara. AN, AFIV1621, Unsigned letter to General Saint-Cyr, 15 September 1809.

General Saint-Cyr now took personal command of the siege and reestablished the investment. He concentrated his 16,000 man VII Corps (including 4,000 reinforcements) at Gerona to resume the siege,¹⁹³ and brought in a huge convoy of supplies to feed his nearly starving troops.¹⁹⁴ Soon, however, General Saint-Cyr, disgusted with Marshal Augereau's lack of support, petulantly threw up his command and went on furlough.¹⁹⁵ Marshal Augereau, was forced to leave for Gerona and assume personal command, of the battered VII Corps. His Armée d'Observation had a 26% sick rate and 13,729 men under arms, while the Armée de Siège had 39% sick and 9,103 men in the field.¹⁹⁶

During this period Captain General Blake attempted to force another convoy into Gerona, but Augereau, now fully in command, quickly foiled the attempt.¹⁹⁷ In the face of continued insurgent skirmishing, he resolved to end the siege quickly. He first sent

¹⁹³Oman, Peninsular War, 3:50.

¹⁹⁴Ibid, 3:52-53; Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 264-266. Marshal Augereau meanwhile, took the waters with the Prefect of the Department of Pyrénées Orientales and the commander of the 10e Division Militaire, as he wrote to General Clarke: "j'étais à Moltig, à douze lieues de Perpignan, dans le département des Pyrénées-Orientales, à prendre des gains, afin de détruire le germe de ma maladie", Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:813-815, Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 264.

¹⁹⁵Oman, Peninsular War, 3:53.

¹⁹⁶Augereau found in October another 300-400 sick in each regiment not covered in the hospital statistics. Ibid; Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:618-621; AN, AFIV 1621 plaq 3(III), Letter, Marshal Augereau to General Clarke, 21 October 1809.

¹⁹⁷Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:620-623, 825-827; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:55-56; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 4:349-351. Arteché, Guerre de la Independencia, 421-423; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 2:150-151.

Souham's and Pino's divisions to Hostalrich to destroy General Blake's headquarters, at the end of October.¹⁹⁸

Then, Augereau continued the relentless bombardment of the now desperate city, whose resistance began to crumble. By 10 November, General Albert Louis, Valentine, Baron Taviel (1767-1831), Augereau's artillery commander battered a huge breach into its walls, and on 6 December, Augereau launched a successful attack to capture two outworks and a redoubt.¹⁹⁹

The garrison finally capitulated on 11 December. French losses were terrible, with some 14,000 casualties in the seven month siege. At the beginning of the siege Verdier had 18,663 men and 1,838 horses (22,282 effectives).²⁰⁰ By the end, the Armée de Siège only had 6,348 men under arms with 8,126 in the hospital, a gigantic 58.3% of 15,243.

¹⁹⁸Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:625-627, 827-831; Vaciani, Storia della Campagne, 2:327, 332; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:56-57.

¹⁹⁹AN, AFIV 1621 plaq 3(III), Siège de Girone, Rapport à l'Empereur 27 November 1809; General Rey to General Clarke, 19 November 1809; Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:630-631; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:58; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 4:351.

²⁰⁰SHAT C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809; AN, AFIV 1621 plaq 3(III), Marshal Augereau to General Clarke, 3 December 1809; General Rey to General Clarke, 5 December 1809; Capitulation de la villa de Girone et des Forts, 10 December 1809; AFIV 1621 Rapport à l'Empereur le 12 Decembre 1809; Rapport à Empereur, 18 December 1809; Maréchal Augereau to General Clarke, 14 December 1809; Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:631-634, 636, 643; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:58-60; Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 153, 155-156; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 4:363-367; Arteché, Guerra de la Independencia, 7:454-468.

By 1 January 1810, the VII Corps suffered 5,000 deaths and 16,342 or 36.6% of his 44,552 men in the hospital.²⁰¹

From January to July 1809, the VII Corps underwent structural changes in its divisions. General Souham's division underwent several lateral unit transfers and a 12% increase in manpower.²⁰² General Saint-Cyr broke up Chabran's division, and transferred three of its regiments with Chabran and his staff to Barcelona to form the garrison's 1st Brigade, and divided the rest of this division amongst the corps. By July, the garrison of Barcelona increased its strength from 6,705 men to 8,408 men.²⁰³

This radical change eliminated a 6,000 man division. Administratively, the Corps staff's Bureau Général managed the operational aspect of dissolving Chabran's division, and issuing movement orders to the effected units. The Bureau d'Administration and the Commissaires de guerre coordinated the logistical support, while the Bureaux des Situations et Finances, and the Inspecteurs aux revues managed the strength accounting, and administered and audited the personal and pay of the effected units. When all the preliminary staff work was complete, the movement orders were sent and the action set in motion. General Decaen, commander of the Army of Catalonia in 1813, for example, made artillery material over to General Severoli's division in October. General Jean-Maximilien, Comte Lamarque's (1770-1832) division provided an escort company and

²⁰¹General Souham's division had 30% of its 9,860 men in the hospital (3,275) leaving 5,241 with the colors. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1809; Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810.

²⁰²See Table 17. These were the 7e Ligne, 3e Léger, 93e Ligne and the 3e Provisoire Chasseurs à cheval. SHAT C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809.

²⁰³Ibid.

General Claude, Baron Prost (1764-1834), the artillery commander provided the transport.²⁰⁴

From July to the end of December 1809, there were few changes in the force structure of the VII Corps except for the dissolution of Chabran's division. The Ministry sent in one battalion in November,²⁰⁵ and in December, 2,210 replacements came from the depots of eleven regiments in Catalonia,²⁰⁶ were forwarded in three marching battalions.

²⁰⁴SHAT, C(8)320, Registre de Correspondance pour le mois d'Octobre 1813, No. 1382, [General Decaen] to General Severoli, 4 October 1813. No. 1383 [General Decaen] to General Lamarque, 4 October 1813.

²⁰⁵UCN, No. 3750, Decision, November 10, 1809, 3:333.

²⁰⁶Ibid, No. 3844, Napoleon to General Clarke, December 22, 1809, 3:373-374.

§5. VII Corps into Armée de Catalogne, 1810

Following its tremendous growth in 1809, and subsequent losses during the Siege of Gerona, Marshal Augereau slowly reconstituted and expanded the VII Corps. He also turned his attention to the difficult task of completing the subjugation of Catalonia. In mid-December 1809, he began active operations in Upper Catalonia with Generals Souham and Pino's divisions,²⁰⁷ to clear the insurgents from around Gerona, and his line of communications.²⁰⁸ In January 1810 he marched with two divisions to relieve Barcelona, and even detached one brigade under General Mazzuchelli to besiege Hostalrich, a Catalan fort on the Gerona-Barcelona road.²⁰⁹ For the next five months, General Mazzuchelli, later reinforced by General Severoli's division besieged it by bombardment and starvation. By mid-May the garrison, its provisions exhausted, attempted a daring but unsuccessful break-out and were captured.²¹⁰

²⁰⁷General Souham's division had 5,241 troops under arms and 3,272 men or (35.2%) of its 9,293 men in the hospital. Division Pino had 6,780 troops under arms and 2,655 troops (26.9%) of its 9,860 men in the hospital. These losses were moderate as compared to those of General Verdier's force which had 53% of its effective strength in the hospital. SHAT C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1809; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 4:91-94.

²⁰⁸During this operation, Marshal Augereau issued his "hanging order" in which all insurgents caught under arms would summarily hanged. SHAT C(8)37, Letter, General Souham to Marshal Augereau, 25 December 1809; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:288; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 1808-1814, 4:93-94; Vacani, Storia delle Campagne, 2:384, 386; SHAT C(8)37, Letters, General Souham to Augereau, 26 December 1809; Souham to Augereau, 26 December 1809.

²⁰⁹Oman, Peninsular War, 3:288.

²¹⁰SHAT C(8)40. Chef de Bataillon E. Paris, Rapport du Génie sur les Opérations Relatives au Blocus d'Hostalrich, 23 January 1810; Chef d'Escadron Clément, Journal du Bombardement d'Hostalrich, Rapport du 22 au 23 February 1810, 23 Février 1810; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:298-299; Vacani, Storia delle Campagne, 2:402-412; SHAT, CGM

That January, meanwhile, Augereau relieved Barcelona²¹¹ and set about putting this command in order. He fired General Duhesme, and returned him to France in disgrace for gross corruption and abuse of power.²¹² Returning to Gerona in February, he assembled an enormous supply convoy of over a thousand wagons to haul six months provisions to feed Barcelona, and marched there in mid-March under a huge escort of two Divisions (Severoli, Pino and Rouyer).²¹³ During the uneventful march to Barcelona, General Mazzuchelli's brigade at Hostalrich even assisted in the convoy escort.²¹⁴

General Souham, meanwhile, at Vich with his division (5,692 men) holding down the mountainous regions of Lower Catalonia, took the first shock of the 1810 campaign.

759, 1^o, Anon., *Journal Détaillé des Mouvements de l'Armée Française en Catalogne, Depuis le Mois de Juin 1808, jusqu'en 1810*; Lopez, *Guerra de la Independencia*, 4:113-121.

²¹¹Vacani, *Storia della Campagne*, 2:197-198, 398-400. Lopez, *Guerra de la Independencia*, 5:97-98; Oman, *Peninsular War*, 289-290.

²¹²Marshal Augereau formed a Commission Administratif at Gerona on 27 February 1810 to hear to case of General Duhesme, which included the murder case of one J. Canton in which Duhesme and his police commissioner, Casanova, was involved; and mismanagement of the resources of the country and corruption, in what was one of the great corruption cases of the war. Pierre Conrad, *Napoléon et la Catalogne, 1808-1814*, Vol. 1, *La Captivité de Barcelone, Février 1808-Janvier 1810*, (Paris, Felix Alcan, 1910), 392-395, 398-402, 408-410.

²¹³General Severeli took temporary command of Pino's division, and by May assumed permanent command. SHAT C(8)362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne 31 May 1810. In March 1810, the Emperor granted General Pino six months furlough; *UCN*, No. 4068, Decisions, 4 March 1810, 3:476.

²¹⁴Augereau left General Verdier the task of holding Upper Catalonia with one division (5,514 men). The escort consisted of Division Severoli, 6,309 men, including General Mazzuchelli's brigade, and Division Rouyer with 3,100 men, totaling 9,409. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810; Oman, *Peninsular War*, 3:293; Vacani, *Storia della Campagne*, 2:426-431.

The insurgent commander, General Henry O'Donnell, saw a unique opportunity to destroy this division, while Augereau was occupied with feeding Barcelona, and attacked Vich on 19 February 1810 with 8,000 men. In a shifting battle which lasted two days, General Souham decisively defeated O'Donnell inflicting 1,800 losses.²¹⁵

In March, after resupplying Barcelona, Augereau concentrated three divisions in Lower Catalonia (Divisions Severoli, Augereau and Rouyer) totaling 16,108 men,²¹⁶ in accordance with an Imperial order to support General Suchet's Army of Aragon in the siege of Lerida whose fall would disrupt Catalan communications in Lower Catalonia.²¹⁷ Augereau, however, chafing at so inglorious a role, opened his own campaign, and marched two divisions to Reus to besiege Tarragona, and establish communications with Barcelona.²¹⁸

General O'Donnell meanwhile, spoiled Augereau's projected siege²¹⁹ by attacking the French communications on 30 March, first capturing the French garrison (1½

²¹⁵Arteche, Guerra de la Independencia, 8:258-265. Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 2:426-431; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:292; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 5:100-104. General Souham was severely wounded in the head and relinquished command to Général de Brigade Jean-Pierre baron Augereau (1771-1836), one of Souham's brigade commanders. Six, Dictionnaire, 1:30. In April, General Souham took four months furlough to recover from his wound. UCN, No. 4138, Decision, 28 March 1810, 3:519.

²¹⁶These divisions were General Severoli's 6,309 men, Rouyer's 3,100 men and Augereau's, (later General Bernard-Georges-François, Comte Frère's (1764-1826)), men. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

²¹⁷Napoleon ordered "Retirez-lui [Duc de Castiglione] l'ordre positif de se mettre en communication avec Général Suchet en portant des corps sur Lerida et Tarragona". CN No. 16294, Napoleon to Clarke, 26 February 1810, 20:246.

²¹⁸Oman, Peninsular War, 3:294-295.

²¹⁹Ibid, 3:295.

battalions) at Villafranca, and defeating a French brigade under General Schwartz on 5 April at Manresa forcing him to retreat on Barcelona, harried by Miquelets all the way. On 7 April, Augereau withdrew to Barcelona, abandoning his brief offensive.²²⁰ In April he reinforced Verdier at Gerona, continued the siege of Hostalrich, and consolidated his hold on Upper Catalonia.²²¹ Later that month he returned to Gerona with the huge, empty convoy to gather more supplies to yet again replenish Barcelona's provisions.²²²

Marshal Augereau's whole campaign in Catalonia thus far came to nothing. Napoleon had already replaced two commanders in Catalonia, for a lack of success at conquering the rebellious province, and his third one showed him little or no progress either. Augereau had disobeyed his express orders, attempted his own campaign and failed. He displayed, as far as the Emperor was concerned a signal lack of judgement and serious resolution to fight.

He had not yet begun the reduction of Tarragona, Lerida or Tortosa, let alone the pacification of Lower Catalonia by April 1810. Augereau was certainly slow, mostly due to his overwhelming logistical difficulties. Many complaints had however reached Napoleon's ears concerning Marshal Augereau's operational mismanagement and lack of

²²⁰Ibid, 3:295-296.

²²¹Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 5:180-183; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 2:484-499; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:296.

²²²Oman, Peninsular War, 3:296.

cooperation with the Army of Aragon,²²³ the latter, perhaps from General Suchet's vitriolic pen.²²⁴

By May 1810, Augereau's at best lackluster field performance, his reluctance to support General Suchet, his failure to pacify Catalonia, and his endless command and logistical problems galled Napoleon, who expected a real fire-eater. Augereau's inability to manage his generals added to Napoleon's disappointment. He showed a disgracefully factitious handling of the feud between Generals Gouvion Saint-Cyr and Verdier during the Siege of Gerona,²²⁵ and his own indulging of a long standing hatred for General

²²³Napoleon wrote to the Minister of War:

...write to the Duke of Castiglione that complaints are very abundant between Lerida and Villafranch; that General Suchet lost nothing in his retreat from Valencia, and that he always beat everything before him. I think that the Duke of Castiglione has by this time taken Tarragona and that he is in communication with the Army of Aragon.

UCN, No. 4164, Napoleon to General Clarke, 17 April 1810. 3:531.

²²⁴Richard Humble certainly does not exaggerate when he states that Suchet "could be as factious and bloody minded with headquarters or his fellow army commanders as any of them" and it was certainly within his capability to use the failures of a fellow Marshal to gain more troops as against Macdonald in 1810, or increase the holdings of his "fief" of Aragon: "Suchet tended to hang on to as many troops as he could and to warn off his colleagues from "his" territory like a goldfish patrolling its tank." Humble, Napoleon's Peninsular Marshals, 216-217. Suchet too incurred Napoleon's anger occasionally, as when Marshal Berthier reported a brigand incursion in Navarre in December 1809 and noted "Express to General Suchet my displeasure that he does not have more troops in Navarre." UCN, No. 3862, Decision, 25 December 1809, 3:382.

²²⁵CN, No. 16004, Napoleon to General Clarke, 16 November 1809, 20:35-36; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:15-16; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 161. Letter, Verdier to Saint-Cyr, 15 May 1809, Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 430-432; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:16, 49, 52-53; Letter, Verdier to Saint-Cyr, 13 September 1809, Letter, Saint-Cyr to Verdier (reply), Letter Saint-Cyr to Napoleon, 20 September 1809, Rapport, Saint-Cyr to General Clarke, 20 September 1809, Letter Verdier to Saint-Cyr, 21 September 1809, Letter Verdier to Saint-Cyr, 21 September 1809, Rapport, Verdier to Napoleon, 26 September 1809, Letter, Saint-Cyr to General Clarke, 3 October 1809, Letter, Augereau to General Clarke, 9 October 1809, Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:739-740, 740-743,

Duhesme by beginning a vendetta against Duhesme and General Lechi, soon after his arrival in Catalonia. On 27 February 1810 Augereau informed the Minister of War that he had created an administrative commission, to investigate financial turpitude within the French command.²²⁶ It met on 16-19 March at Barcelona²²⁷ and unearthed the harsh contributions squeezed out of the populace and the most damning of all, the Canton Affair,²²⁸ a murder case over which Augereau sacked Commissaire-Général Casanova, chief of the Barcelona police.²²⁹ He sent Duhesme back to France in disgrace to await the commission's findings and the Emperor's decision on his conduct.²³⁰ General Lechi,

751-752, 765-767, 769-771, 785-788, 791-800, 813-818.

²²⁶SHAT, C(8)42, Letter, Augereau to Clarke, 27 February 1810; Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 389.

²²⁷SHAT, C(8)50, Letter Augereau to Clarke, 9 April 1810; Letter, Augereau to Clarke, 17 April 1810; AN, AFIV1625, Letter, Commission Administrative to Augereau, nd. The Commission consisted of Commissaire des guerres Grobert (president) Chef de Bataillon Touque, Payeur Lehody, Capitaine Pelletier and Administrateur des Domaines Lapasset, Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 390.

²²⁸The Canton Affair was a murder case in which Commissaire-Général Raymond Casanova's Barcelona Police beat to death one Joseph Canton, while attempting to extract information on the whereabouts of a cache of money for contributions; AN, AFIV1625, General Clarke, Rapport à l'Empereur 20 May 1809; F(7)6554, Letter, Commissaire Général de Police of Barcelona, Beaumont-Brivazac to General Savaray, Minister of Police, 30 June 1812; SHAT, C(8)50, General Duhesme to General Clarke, 28 July 1810.

²²⁹Conrad, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 394-395.

²³⁰AN, F(7)6564, Letter, General Duhesme to General Savaray, 30 November 1810; AFIV 1623 Letter, Marshal Berthier to General Duhesme, 26 April 1810; SHAT, C(8)44, Letter, General Clarke to Napoleon 13 March 1810; C(8)42, Letter, Augereau to Clarke, 23 February 1810; Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 395.

also implicated as commander of the garrison of Barcelona, took extended furlough.²³¹ The Commission's verdict surprisingly was favorable to Duhesme, only censuring him on excesses in his private life, and did not implicate him in the Canton Affair.²³² This murder case, however, plagued General Lechi and Commissaire Casanova till the end of the Napoleonic Wars.²³³

Napoleon was deeply disappointed with Augereau for making a public spectacle of his generals, and his scandalous attempt to satisfy a personal grudge against Duhesme. The whole affair showed a want of strength, self restraint and discretion at managing and disciplining his senior officers. He displayed the embarrassing habit of annoying the the Emperor and the Ministry of War with a stream of correspondence discussing his command problems. This whole affair politically embarrassed the Emperor, for which he was unlikely to forgive.²³⁴

Finally, Marshal Augereau hypocritically engaged in peccadillos of his own, as when he applied to the Ministry of War for permission to assign his brother, Général de

²³¹General Lechi took an extended convalescent leave. UCN, No. 4027, Decisions, 15 February 1810, 3:460.

²³²SHAT, C(8)60, Letter, General Clarke to General Duhesme, 26 August 1810; Letter, (response) Duhesme to Clarke, 26 August 1810; Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 398.

²³³AN, AFIV 1157, Ministre de la Guerre, 8e Division, Bureau de la Police Militaire, Général Clarke, Rapport à l'Empereur, 4 October 1811; AFIV 1158, Général Clarke, Rapport à l'Empereur, 19 January 1814.

²³⁴CN, No. 16411, Napoleon to General Clarke, 24 April 1810, 20:308-309.

Brigade Jean Pierre Augereau (1772-1836) as Chief of Staff of the Army of Catalonia. This blatant nepotism earned the Marshal a stinging rebuke from Napoleon.²³⁵

The Emperor had already been seriously disappointed by General Gouvion Saint-Cyr and ordered General Clarke to investigate his operations.²³⁶ He was in no mood to tolerate the same nonsense from a Marshal of France, and showed little patience when he saw Augereau's failures were far worse than Gouvion Saint-Cyr's had ever been. On 24 April 1810, Napoleon sacked Augereau in a blistering order to General Clarke. The Emperor noted his displeasure with Augereau's operations and that his actions were hardly the way to merit either glory or the Imperial esteem.²³⁷ He disgustedly rebuked Augereau

²³⁵Napoleon angrily replied to Augereau's request: "It is contrary to the [sic] principle for a Marshal to have a brother for his Chief of Staff." UCN, No. 2775, Decisions, 3:345. The Marshal instead assigned General Augereau to command a brigade in General Souham's division. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810.

²³⁶Napoleon ordered "il faut me faire un rapport sérieux sur la campagne du Général Gouvion Saint-Cyr en Catalogne". This report was to address four issues: (1) His lack of cooperation with General Suchet and Marshal Mortier, and not invading Valencia; (2) Why he did not attack the insurgents but took the defensive instead, and when he won in the field why he did not exploit his victories; (3) Why his actions, characterized by egoism, compromised the success of the siege of Gerona; and (4) Why he left his Corps without permission on a pretext of illness. Napoleon also ordered the seizure of Saint-Cyr's papers for this investigation. CN, No. 16004, Napoleon to Clarke, 14 November 1809, 20:33-34; No. 15594, Napoleon to Clarke, 29 July 1809; No. 15958, Napoleon to Clarke, 16 October 1809, 20:1-2.

²³⁷Napoleon wrote:

Je n'ai point reconnu le zèle qu'il avait toujours montré pour mon service et pour la gloire de mes armes. Ce n'est qu' en restant dans les capitales éloignées de l'armée que des généraux en chef peuvent acquérir de la gloire et mériter mon estime.

CN, No. 16411, Letter, Napoleon to Clarke, 24 April 1810, 20:308-309.

for his vendetta against General Duhesme²³⁸ his attempt to make his brother Chief of Staff of the Army of Catalonia, and its acting commander during the Marshal's illness.²³⁹ In a justified fury, Napoleon ordered Marshal Macdonald to take command of the Army of Catalonia instantly.²⁴⁰

In the next fortnight, in writing to General Lacuée to congratulate the Ministry of Military Administration on its excellent logistical support to Catalonia, he took another opportunity to lambast Augereau:

I know very well...that if the Marshal who commanded it (Army of Catalonia) had been with the troops instead to remaining twenty leagues in the rear, he would have thrown into the sea the wretched troops who lost his detachments and brought him to...retreat.²⁴¹

This ended Marshal Augereau's command of the Army of Catalonia, and for all practical purposes destroyed his military reputation with Napoleon, who only used him in minor roles to the end of his reign. He chose in Augereau's stead, the newly minted Marshal

²³⁸Napoleon noted to General Clarke:

Après la dénonciation du Maréchal Augereau contre le Général Duhesme, le consul de France et autres individus, il faut demander des renseignements précis, les noms des membres de la commission formée par le Maréchal Augereau, les résultats de l'enquête, les interrogatoires de Général Duhesme et des autres prévenus. Il y avait bien autre chose à faire que de rejouer les Espagnols par cette réaction.

Ibid.

²³⁹"Il vous sera facile de lui faire comprendre que le Maréchal Augereau, cassé et infirme au lieu de commander lui-même ses troupes, les a laissées à son frère, officiers très médiocre..." Ibid.

²⁴⁰"Donnez ordre au Maréchal Macdonald de partir dans le plus court délai pour prendre le commandement de l'armée et le gouvernement de la province". Ibid.

²⁴¹UCN, No. 4215, Napoleon to General Lacuée, 8 May 1810, 3:552.

Etienne-Jacques-Joseph-Alexandre Macdonald, Duc De Tarente (1765-1840), who had just won his baton for breaking the Austrian center at the Battle of Wagram, 6 July 1809.²⁴²

Earlier, on 8 February 1810, the Emperor decreed the promotion of the VII Corps into the restructured Armée de Catalogne, with two new divisions. Its commander would command both the Army and the province as Governor, and would answer directly to Paris instead of Madrid, as a virtual vice royalty.²⁴³

The newly restructured Army of Catalonia had five divisions and the Army services, artillery and engineers. The 1st Division changed its command from General Joseph, Comte Souham (1760-1837)²⁴⁴ to Général Bernard-Georges-François, Comte Frère (1764-1826). It also received considerable troop reinforcements, increasing its strength to 10,655 men.²⁴⁵ The 2nd Division with 8,965 men simply changed hands from General Pino to Severoli.²⁴⁶ The multi-national 3rd Division, under General Verdier, had suffered terribly from the Siege of Gerona and lost 5,458 men or 37.7% of its 9,021 troops. It had four brigades: French, German, Wurtembourg and Neapolitan. In May, Augereau took

²⁴²Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 727-728; Jean Thiry, Wagram, (Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1966), 183-187; Marshal Macdonald, Recollections of Marshal Macdonald, Duke of Tarentum, ed. Camolle Rousset, trans. Stephen Simon, (London: Richard Bentley and Son 1892), 1:342-344; Oman, Penninsular War, 3:299.

²⁴³SHAT, C(8)41, Ministère de la Guerre Marshal Berthier, Extrait du Décret de l'Empereur, 8 February 1810.

²⁴⁴General Souham received a severe head wound at the battle of Vich, and took convalescent leave in France. Oman, Peninsular War, 3:292.

²⁴⁵SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810; Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

²⁴⁶Ibid.

its Neapolitan brigade to form the cadre of the 4th division, under General Pignatelli, with 5,493 men.²⁴⁷ A new 5th Division, under General François Marie, Baron Rouyer (1765-1824) had simply a German/Saxon brigade under General Schwartz with 3,976 men.²⁴⁸ The Garrison of Barcelona under General Lacombe Saint-Michel numbered 6,502 men. As a whole, the Army of Catalonia increased in size by 2,967 men (6.2%) to 47,519.²⁴⁹

By 1 October 1810, the new commander, Marshal Macdonald reorganized it again. He divided the Army into two distinct parts, the Armée Active for field operations and the Armée Territoriale, which occupied the country and garrisoned its fortresses. The field Army had three divisions, the newly formed Brigade d'Avant Garde, and the Army headquarters troops. The Armée Territoriale had two separate commands, Upper and Lower Catalonia. The former was the Division Territoriale and the latter the Garrison of Barcelona and its outlying garrisons.²⁵⁰

Colonel Général Louis, Comte Baraguey d'Hilliers (1764-1833) an old hand at counter-insurgent operations and had just emerged from a successful campaign in the Tyrol, in 1809. 11,212 man Division Territoriale was actually a Corps of two divisions,

²⁴⁷SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810. See Table 17.

²⁴⁸Ibid. Général de Brigade François-Xavier, Comte Schwartz (1762-1826) was a Bavarian officer and an old hand in Catalonia, there since 1807. Six, Dictionnaire Biographique, 2:212; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

²⁴⁹Ibid.

²⁵⁰See Table 18. SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 October 1810.

including those of Generals Joseph, Baron Pèpinville (1765-1811) (7,145 men) and Rouyer (4,266 men). The whole Army of Catalonia, numbered 46,348 troops.²⁵¹

When Marshal Macdonald arrived at Perpignan on 22 May he saw that before he could begin active operations he must take up the laborious task of resupplying Barcelona. Since Augereau sent the last convoy in March, Barcelona had nearly exhausted its provisions and required another massive resupply convoy.²⁵² In June and July 1810, he dispatched two supply convoys, each escorted by at least two divisions, a third one in August, and a fourth in November.²⁵³

He was now ready to begin active operations to support General Suchet's (Army of Aragon) conquest of Lower Catalonia. Personally escorting the third convoy to Barcelona with three divisions,²⁵⁴ totaling 13,000 troops, he left General Baraguey d'Hilliers in command of Upper Catalonia with, the Division Territoriale.

²⁵¹Ibid; Six, Dictionnaire, 1:48-49.

²⁵²SHAT, C(17)9, Régie des Vivres Pain et Liquide Approvisionnement Extraordinaire, 20 January 1809.

²⁵³SHAT, C(8) 335, Register, Marshal Macdonald, Movement Orders, 10, 12, 1810, Continuation of Movement Order, 15 June 1810; C(8) 133, Register, Ordres, 2e Cahier, Marshal Macdonald, Movement Orders, 10, 12, 15, and 16 June 1810, Order of the Day 17 June 1810, Movement Orders, 20, 21, 22, 23, 23 (No. 2), 23 (No. 3), 24, 25, and 25 (No. 2) June 1810; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:311-312.

²⁵⁴SHAT, C(8) 335, Register, Marshal Macdonald to General Frère, 31 July 1810, Macdonald to Ordonnateur en Chef Bourdon, 31 July 1810, Macdonald to Baraguey d'Hilliers 31 July 1810, Macdonald to Pignatelli, 1 August 1810. The escort divisions were those of General Pignatelli (2,154 men); Severoli (3,723 men); Frère (5,639 men). There is also a large headquarters element. The escort totaled 13,000 men. SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 October 1810.

Once he resupplied Barcelona, Macdonald marched to Lerida and conferred with General Suchet, to map out the strategy for the coming campaign. They agreed that the Army of Aragon must undertake the successive sieges of Tarragona and Tortosa in accordance with Napoleon's 27 May order,²⁵⁵ while Macdonald covered Suchet and held the Catalan Army at bay. Macdonald took up covering positions near Lerida (HQ at Cervera) and sent Pignatelli's Division to escort Suchet's siege train. Macdonald then "settled" down to a grinding campaign of counter guerilla operations against the ever active insurgents.²⁵⁶ On 9 September, for example, Macdonald sent Severoli's Division on a foraging expedition. The Sometenes continuously harrassed his march. He fended off repeated attacks, and destroyed the villages along his line at march. He returned ten days later carrying only wounded.²⁵⁷

The insurgents continuously harrassed Macdonald's positions, occasionally destroying a small detachment. The roads were so dangerous that he had to escort every detachment with large bodies of troops. A requisition detachment, for example, needed

²⁵⁵CN, No. 16505, Napoleon to Berthier, 27 May 1810, 20:379.

²⁵⁶Oman, Peninsular War, 3:496; Louis Gabriel Suchet, Memoirs of the War in Spain, from 1808 to 1814, (London: Henry Culburn, 1829) 1:199-206.

²⁵⁷Severoli encountered either deserted villages or fierce resistance. At one river crossing for example, 600 peasants barricaded and defended the bridge which Severoli cleared with a calvary charge. As he advanced, the Italian division looted and burned the deserted villages, whose populations abandoned them on the division's approach. Vaciani, Storia della Campagne, 2:618-620; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:496-497; SHAT, C(8)276, Analyse du Rapport du 1er Septembre 1810, Report, 22 September 1810, No. 4.

an escort of a hundred cavalry,²⁵⁸ a reconnaissance party needed 250 troopers.²⁵⁹ An exasperated Macdonald began to employ the harsh methods of Marshal Augereau, to pacify the country. He burned villages and summarily executed guerrillas caught under arms.²⁶⁰

The worst effect of the insurgent war was on French logistical support. Unable to depend on convoys from Barcelona to feed his corps, they became prisoners of their huge daily supply requirements.²⁶¹ Macdonald eked his supplies out of the nearly exhausted country and shared the dwindling stocks at Lerida, which also supported General Suchet's troops.²⁶² Unable to support his troops near Cervera by September, Macdonald dispersed

²⁵⁸SHAT, C(8)129, CM, Tome I, Mai-Decembre 1810, Letter, Macdonald to Commandant du Quartier Général Ducoudary, 2 September 1810; Order to Commandant Ducoudray, 3 September 1810.

²⁵⁹Ibid, Letter, Macdonald to Adjutant Commandant Guillement, 11 September 1810; Letter, Macdonald to General Frère 19 September 1810.

²⁶⁰General Frère at Cervera for example court martialed and hanged one insurgent, his village was fined 10,000 piastres and 2,000 sacks of grain. Ibid, Macdonald to General Frère, 20 September 1810; Macdonald to Adjutant Commandant Charroy, 21 September 1810; SHAT C(8)276, Analyses, Report No. 16, 23 September 1810; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:496.

²⁶¹Macdonald's corps daily need were about 9,600 kg bread, 3,200 kg meat, 1,200 kg legumes, 3,200 liters of wine, 1,500 kg firewood, 5,500 kg hay and 9,500 kg oats. SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 October 1810; C(8)398, Administration de la Guerre, État du Nombre des rations Allouées à chaque grade sur le pied de guerre à dater du 1er Août 1810, 30 June 1810.

²⁶²Don W. Alexander, Rod of Iron, French Counterinsurgency Policy in Aragon During the Peninsular War, (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc. 1985) 81.

his divisions further afield to facilitate supply.²⁶³ General Florentin, Baron Ficatier, commander of Macdonald's advanced guard brigade, had to get his subsistence from Lerida through the good offices of General Suchet²⁶⁴ who admitted the paucity of the country: "....the plain of Tarragona, [is] so completely exhausted that they [Army of Catalonia] had the greatest...difficulty in subsisting even for a few days."²⁶⁵ By mid-August Macdonald's logistical situation deteriorated so badly that Napoleon ordered supply convoys from France to feed the Army of Catalonia.²⁶⁶

General O'Donnell, with his 6,400 man division added another problem to Macdonald's already full budget of troubles by mounting a destructive raid in Upper Catalonia in September. He attacked General Schwartz's 2,717 man brigade of four battalions of the 5th and 6th Confederation of the Rhine.²⁶⁷ General Schwartz occupied the coast with several small forts including 2,000 troops at La Bispal.²⁶⁸

In a lightning attack on 13 September, O'Donnell attacked several coastal posts simultaneously to include General Schwartz's main body at La Bispal, capturing three

²⁶³SHAT, C(8)129, CM, Macdonald to Colonel Delort, Commander, 24e Dragons, 31 August 1810; Macdonald to General Severoli, 31 August 1810; Macdonald to Ordonnateur en Chef Bourdon, 31 August 1810.

²⁶⁴SHAT, C(8)276, Analysis, Reports Nos. 2 and 3, 22 September 1810.

²⁶⁵Suchet, War in Spain, 1:202-203.

²⁶⁶UCN, No. 4508, Decision, August 16 1810, 3:711.

²⁶⁷The four battalions were the 1st, 2d - 5th and the 1er, 2d - 6th Confederation of the Rhine regiments. SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 October 1810.

²⁶⁸Oman, Peninsular War, 3:498.

German battalions (1,241 men), and the coastal posts of Palamos, Calonja and San Felieu. He captured the garrisons of the last two places whole.²⁶⁹ O'Donnell even captured General Schwartz. This swift stroke destroyed Schwartz's brigade at a cost of only twenty-five casualties. O'Donnell quickly sailed to Tarragona with his prisoners eluding capture.

Marshal Macdonald received news of this disaster two weeks later and though shaken, refused to leave his supportive positions in Lower Catalonia. He did, however, unsuccessfully attack one of O'Donnell's outlying divisions on 18 October.²⁷⁰ General Baraguey d'Hilliers in Upper Catalonia had suffered a terrible loss, and could no longer protect the French communications with Barcelona. Macdonald then had to concentrate his divisions and return to Gerona to escort supplies to Barcelona in November. Baraguey d'Hilliers simply could not manage such an operation now. Once completed in mid-December Macdonald returned to his supporting role to support Suchet.²⁷¹

²⁶⁹SHAT, C(8) 276, Analyses, Reports, No. 6, 14 September 1810; No. 7, 15 September 1810; No. 3, and No. 5, 18 September 1810; No. 12, 20 September 1810; No. 13, 21 September 1810; No. 15, 22 September 1810; and No. 1 and 2, 23 September 1810; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 2:620-623; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:496-499; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 5:342-344; Arteché, Guerra de la Independencia, 9:273-278, 511-558; Carlos Martínez Valverde, La Marina en la Guerra de la Independencia (Madrid: Editoria Nacional, 1974) 133-135, 180.

²⁷⁰Oman, Peninsular War, 3:499-500; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 2:631-633; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 5:344; Napier, Peninsular War, 4:24-25.

²⁷¹Vaciani, Storia della Campagne, 2:642.

§6. Restructure and Reduction of the Armée de Catalogne: The Campaign of 1811

In December 1810, as Marshal Macdonald prepared to support General Suchet's siege of Tortosa,²⁷² the Army of Catalonia continued to expand to 59,232 men and 4,808 horses, reflecting a growth of 21.75%, though only 60% of these troops were in the line.²⁷³

That winter, Macdonald suffered several military disasters. A Catalan force, in December 1810, surprised and cut to pieces a 650 man French cavalry foraging party.²⁷⁴ On 6 January 1811, the Catalan general, Sarsfield inflicted a sharp defeat upon General Polombini's Neapolitan division, near Valls. Polombini attacked the Catalan division but Sarsfield routed the leading Neapolitan Brigade throwing it back onto the oncoming second brigade. Only a timely charge of the 24th Dragoons saved the division from a disaster with a loss of 600 men.²⁷⁵

The Emperor, meanwhile, was displeased with Macdonald's failure to subdue Catalonia, or offer effective support to General Suchet. Consequently, he reassigned most of Lower Catalonia (Lerida, Tortosa and Tarragona) to Suchet after the fall of Tortosa,²⁷⁶

²⁷² Marshal Macdonald supported General Suchet's III Corps with the three divisions, of Generals Frère, Pignatelli, and Pino, and two brigades totaling 16,966 men. SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1810.

²⁷³ *Ibid.* This included 35,645 men and 3,274 horses present under arms; 5,010 men and 1,534 horses detached; 14,907 men in hospital and 3,231 men as prisoners of war.

²⁷⁴ Oman, *Peninsular War*, 4:241.

²⁷⁵ Oman, *Peninsular War*, 4:240-243; Napier, *Peninsula War*, 4:46-47; Vaciani, *Storia della Campagne*, 2:712-713.

²⁷⁶ *CN*, No. 17443, Napoleon to Berthier, 9 March 1811, 21:456.

transferred Macdonald's three divisions of Generals Frere, Pino and Pignatelli, some 20,000 troops to the III Corps, to form a new Army of Aragon. This massive and humiliating force reduction slashed the strength of the Army of Catalonia by 34.9% to 38,797 men.²⁷⁷ Marshal Macdonald swallowed this bitter pill and put a good face on it.²⁷⁸ As Macdonald transferred this large detachment to Suchet, he continued to fight the counterinsurgent war. It was so bad that his 10 March trip to Barcelona required a division sized personal escort (7,700 men).²⁷⁹

This was, however, just a prelude to a catastrophe, which upset the whole strategic balance of the province, set the war effort back nearly a year, and virtually destroyed Marshal Macdonald's command. The Catalan insurgents surprised and captured the

²⁷⁷These three transferred divisions were General Frère's French division with 7,987 men, Pino's Italian division with 10,285 men and Pignatelli's Neapolitan division with 2,163 men. The whole totaled 20,435 men and 1,648 horses. SHAT C(8)370, Situation, Armée de Catalone, 1 December 1810; CN No. 17443, Napoleon to Berthier 9 March 1811, 21:456457.

Marshal Berthier, wrote to General Suchet:

The Emperor has just determined that the Government of Aragon...shall be augmented by the provinces of Tortosa, Lerida, and Tarragona...all the troops forming part of the active Army of Catalonia shall pass immediately to your command.

Suchet, War in Spain, 2:3-4. Oman, Peninsular War, 4:485.

²⁷⁸Maréchal Macdonald, Souvenirs du Maréchal Macdonald, Duc de Tarente, (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1892). 176. Suchet, War in Spain, 2:3; David Chandler, Napoleon's Marshals, (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 238.

²⁷⁹SHAT, C(8)133, Ordres du Jour et de Mouvements, 2ème Cahier, Ordres de Mouvements du mois de Mars 1811, Ordre (Movement) 26 March 1811; Oman, Peninsular War, 4:485-486; Vaciani, Storia della Campagne, 3:37-41.

fortress of Figueras, one of the best fortified posts in Europe, and (with Gerona) was a major nexus of communications.²⁸⁰

In March, Marshal Macdonald divided the Army of Catalonia into two Corps, the 20,000 man Corps d'Armée en Haute-Catalogne under General Baraguey d'Hilliers, who found counter insurgent operations and military governorship in Catalonia far more trying than in the Tyrol where he won his spurs;²⁸¹ and the smaller Barcelona command. The Army still, however, retained its active field and garrison/territorial commands.²⁸² The Corps in Upper Catalonia had one active division, three separate brigades, two Arrondissement commands, artillery and engineers. It also received a new division, under General François-Jean Baptiste, Baron Quesnel du Torpt (1765-1821),²⁸³ not yet arrived, had 7,215 troops.²⁸⁴ The three separate brigades were those of General Clement with 2,617 men, General Simon, Baron Lefèbre (1768-1822) with 1,686 men, and General Charles Dumoulin (1768-1847) with 4,034 men. The whole Corps totaled 15,554 troops.²⁸⁵

²⁸⁰Général de Brigade Guillot's garrison had two battalions 4e-16e Ligne and Bataillon Westphalien totaling 865 troops, and eleven depots with another 1,985. SHAT C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute-Catalogne, 15 March 1811.

²⁸¹Six, Dictionnaire Biographique, 1:48-49; Robert M. Epstein, Prince Eugene At War, 1809, Napoleon's Commanders Series, (Arlington, Tx: Empire Press, 1984), 67-68.

²⁸²SHAT C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute-Catalogne, 15 March 1811.

²⁸³Six, Dictionnaire, 2:338-339.

²⁸⁴See Table 19. SHAT C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute-Catalogne, 15 March 1811.

²⁸⁵Ibid.

The Garrison units included the 1er Arrondissement Territorial at Figueras with 2,850 men, with two battalions of mostly raw depot recruits, under General Florentin, Baron Guillot (1759-1818).²⁸⁶ And the 2e Arrondissement Territorial at Gerona, commanded by Adjutant Commandant Molard had two battalions, and nine regimental depots, totaling 1,405 men.²⁸⁷ Finally, the corps artillery and engineers were distributed amongst the units of the corps.²⁸⁸ This corps had 15,812 men and 731 horses or 78.4% of its strength present under arms, and a total effective corps strength of 20,149 men and 749 horses.²⁸⁹

One of the most remarkable actions of the war, was the fall of Figueras. It had enormous implications on the war effort. Its psychological effect was similar to the fall of Stalingrad on the German high command in 1943. It shook the French command in Catalonia to its foundation and altered both the structure of the Army of Catalonia and its operational scheme for months.

The daring and resourceful Catalan guerrilla leader, Captain Andrés Rovira bribed three Catalan Afrancescados²⁹⁰ employed in the garrison supply section as storekeepers to supply duplicate keys to a postern gate and to the supply magazines. At midnight on

²⁸⁶See Table 19; Ibid.

²⁸⁷Ibid.

²⁸⁸Ibid.

²⁸⁹Ibid.

²⁹⁰An Afrancescado is the Spanish collaboration with the French. Gabriel H. Lovett, Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain, Vol. 2, The Struggle Without and Within (New York University: New York University Press), 555.

9 April 1811 Rovira sent 700 insurgents supported by a regular Catalan division into the main fortress of San Fernando²⁹¹ and captured the garrison in a single surprise stroke, literally in their beds, including the commander, General Guillot. Only an Italian Battalion de Marche quartered in the town of Figueras escaped to Bascara.²⁹² General Baraguey d'Hilliers, apprized of this disaster, reinforced this battalion and sent it back to observe Figueras. By 17 April, he had concentrated 7,000 troops there and invested the fort.²⁹³

When Marshal Macdonald received the news of the catastrophe at Figuras he immediately applied to General Suchet for reinforcements,²⁹⁴ to stiffen the 16,000 men he had in Upper Catalonia. The only immediately available troops were Quesnel's division

²⁹¹The three men were Juan Marquez, Commissaire des Guerres Bouclier's servant, and the brothers Gines and Pedro Pons. Oman, Peninsula War, 4:491-492; Napier, Peninsular War, 3:59-61; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 3:47-50.

²⁹²The reports and correspondence on the Siege of Figueras in the SHAT is quite extensive. These include registers C(7)* 18, No. 11, Correspondance au sujet de la reddition du fort de Figueras du 1er août 1811 au 6 février 1812; C(8) 282, Armée de Catalogne, Etat Major Général, Correspondance Générale, No. 3, 15 February 1811 to 31 July 1811; C(8) 382, Correspondance Générale No. 4, 1 August to 31 August 1811; C(8) 131, CM, Tome III, March 1811 to March 1812; C(8) 132, CM, Tome V, May 1810 to October 1811. Oman, Peninsular War, 4:492-493; David Gates, The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War, (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1986), 301-302; Napier, Peninsular War, 3:221-223; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 3:47-50.

²⁹³Oman, Peninsular War, 4:492-493.

²⁹⁴Macdonald wrote:

the service of the Emperor requires imperatively and without delay, the most speedy succour; otherwise Upper Catalonia is lost. Send me all the troops of Catalonia which have been transferred to you.

Suchet, War in Spain, 2:13-14. General Maurice-Mathieu, governor of Barcelona sent a similar dispatch to the commander at Lerida: "All is lost in Upper Catalonia unless General Suchet sends the troops that have passed under our command to our succour, Suchet, War in Spain, 2:14.

of 12,641 troops, concentrating in the 10e Division Militaire.²⁹⁵ While Baraguey d'Hilliers scrambled to concentrate a besieging force, Rovira threw another 3,000 troops into San Fernando and mounted several raids to keep the French off balance.²⁹⁶ The whole of Upper Catalonia was now abuzz with military activity.

Once Napoleon received news of the sudden fall of the Figueras, he undoubtedly flew into a towering rage but took swift action to lance yet another boil in Spain. He immediately dispatched two new divisions from France. The first division under General Louis Auguste Narchand, Baron de Plauzonne (1774-1812)²⁹⁷ from Provence 4,380 troops.²⁹⁸ The second, the Division de Cerdagne from Lanquedoc was under General Jean-Maximilien, Comte Lamarque (1770-1832) immortalized in Victor Hugo's Les Misérables.²⁹⁹ The reinforcements flowed into Upper Catalonia to retake Figueras.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁵SHAT C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne, 15 March 1811.

²⁹⁶Rovira's troops attacked Olot and Castelfollit capturing 548 troops, the Royal Navy raided Rosas and Palamos and swarms of Sametenes demonstrated against Hostalrich and Gerona. Oman, Peninsular War, 4:492-493; Napier, Peninsula War, 4:61-62. SHAT, C(8) 370, Situations, Corps en Haute-Catalogne, 1 May 1811, 16 May 1811, and 1 June 1811.

²⁹⁷Six, Dictionnaire, 2:318.

²⁹⁸Division Plauzonne had four battalions of the 3e Léger, three battalions of the 11e Léger and a battalion of the 32e Léger. Oman, Peninsular War, 4:642.

²⁹⁹Six, Dictionnaire, 2:42. Henry Lachouque, Jean Tranie and J-C Carmignaini, Napoleon's War in Spain, trans. J.S. Mallender and Lide Beaufort, (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1982) 163.

³⁰⁰Brigade Petit had the 4e-16e Ligne, 1er, 2e, 3e, 4e-67e Ligne, 4e-81e Ligne, and Brigade Lefèbvre had the 4e-8e Léger, 4e-37e Ligne, 1er-Westphalien and 3e-24e Dragons. See Table 29. SHAT C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute-Catalogne, 1 August 1811; Oman, Peninsular War, 4:492-493, 642; CN, No. 17644, Napoleon to General Clarke, 23 April 1811, 22:103; No. 17693, Napoleon to General Clarke, 4 May 1811, 22:142. Division Plauzonne had the 3e Leger, 11e Ligne, 79e Ligne, 67e Ligne and

As reinforcements began to arrive, General Baraguey d'Hilliers opened the siege. The insurgent leader General Campoverde with 9,000 men tried on 20 May to force a 1,200 mule supply column through the French cordon into the fortress, but Baraguey d'Hilliers, however, concentrated, drove off the Catalan raid and captured the whole convoy.³⁰¹ By the end of May the promised divisions poured into Catalonia. Marshal Macdonald also arrived from Barcelona with a few battalions, and General Quesnel sent several more.³⁰² Macdonald then took personal command of the corps and the siege.

The Emperor meanwhile enjoined Macdonald to not only retake Figueras, but continue to assist Suchet's operations in Lower Catalonia.³⁰³ This was clearly an unrealistic expectation for Macdonald simply did not have the strength to accomplish this double task. He did, however, ponderously besiege Figueras establishing complete lines

16e Léger.

³⁰¹Campoverde's initial attack fell on the 3e Léger which retreated into the town of Figueras. Its commander, Colonel Ruffin, cleverly negotiated an involved capitulation negotiation with the Catalan general allowing Baraguey d'Hilliers sufficient time to counter attack. Oman, Peninsular War, 4:494-495; Napier, Peninsula War, 4:62-63; Vaciani, Storia della Campagne, 3:59-60; CN, No. 17715, Napoleon to Berthier, 12 May 1811, 22:154.

³⁰²Macdonald brought the lère, 2e-5e Ligne and Det-102e Ligne. General Quesnel sent battalions of the 3e, 60e, 81e, and 93e Ligne. SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne, 15 March 1811; C(8) 282, Correspondance Générale, No. 3, Macdonald to General Clarke, 25 May 1811, Macdonald to General Beauremann, 28 May 1811; Macdonald to General Taviel, 1 June 1811; and Macdonald to General Quesnel, 1 June 1811.

³⁰³CN, No. 17799, Napoleon to General Clarke, 12 June 1811, 22:231; No. 17811, Napoleon to General Suchet, 14 June 1811, 22:239-240.

of circumvallation³⁰⁴ and contravallation,³⁰⁵ protective structures first used by Julius Caesar at the siege of Alesia in 52 B.C.,³⁰⁶ but not since the War of the Spanish succession. Through June and July Macdonald tightened the investment, hoping to starve the garrison out, and only put batteries within 500 yards of the ramparts. Lacking sufficient artillery, he only blockaded the Figueras despite Napoleon's orders to conduct a vigorous siege.³⁰⁷ Indeed, he had only 44 heavy cannon, though sufficient ammunitions, with 79,699 solid shot, and 89,543 kg of powder.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁴A line of circumvallation is a belt of field works facing outward, about two miles from and encircling the besieged fortress. They are designed to defend the besieging army and its siege works from outside interference. Hector Straith, Treatise on Fortification and Artillery, 7th Ed. (London: Wm H. Allen, 1858) 7; H.L. Scott, Military Dictionary Comprising Definitions and Information on Raising and Keeping Troops; Actual Service, including makeshifts and improved matériel; and Law, Government, Regulation, and Administration relating to Land Forces. (D. Van Norstrand, 1861; reprint New York, Greenwood Press, 1968) 610.

³⁰⁵A line of contravallation is a belt of field works facing inward encircling the besieged fortress to defend the besieging army and its siege works from interference from the besieged garrison. Straith, Treatise on Fortification, 18.

³⁰⁶Etienne Macdonald, Duc de Tarente, Souvenirs, (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1891) 177; Julius Cesar, The Gallic War, trans., H.J. Edwards, The Loeb Classical Library, ed. T.E. Page (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966) 483-487.

³⁰⁷Macdonald, Recollections, 2:187-188.

³⁰⁸Thirty-nine cannon were bronze, and could only tolerate a low rate of fire without drooping of the tubes. John T. Jones, Journals of Sieges Carried on by the Army Under the Duke of Wellington in Spain During the Years 1811 to 1814, Ed. H. D. Jones (London: John Weale, 1846) 1:352. SHAT, C(8)370, Situation Corps d'Armée en Haute-Catalogne, 16 June 1811. Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute-Catalogne, 1 August 1811.

During the blockade, the French troops slowly wasted away to the intense mid-summer heat and malarial fevers amidst the unsanitary conditions of the lines.³⁰⁹ Despite these difficulties, and Napoleon's impatient urging, Macdonald continued his policy of slow starvation. Refusing to open trenches, he reinforced his ever tightening lines. By mid-July his strategy began to pay off, for the Catalan commander, General Martinez, unable to feed his 850 prisoners any longer, released them only keeping General Guillot and the officers as hostages.³¹⁰ Within the next month the Catalan garrison consumed the last provisions and began eating the horses, dogs and even the rats.³¹¹

Once the provisions were exhausted, Martinez led his whole garrison in an unsuccessful attack to break through the French lines. The assault collapsed on the line of circumvallation, and Martinez fell back into San Fernando and remained until he capitulated on 19 August, surrendering his 3,000 man garrison. This not very violent siege took a toll of 1,500 Catalans killed, 1,000 hospitalized and 4,000 French casualties mostly to illness. Macdonald hanged the only one of the original conspirators he caught, Jean Martinez.³¹² Finally, the newly repatriated General Guillot, utterly disgraced, was

³⁰⁹The climate and conditions took a particularly heavy toll on the newly conscripted Gardes Nationaux. Oman, Peninsular War, 4:536-538.

³¹⁰Ibid.

³¹¹Ibid.; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 3:233-239; Napier, Peninsula War, 5:110-111.

³¹²Oman, Peninsular War, 4:538-539; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 3:237-239; Napier, Peninsular War, 5:110-111; SHAT, C(8)283, Armée de Catalogne, Correspondance Générale 1-31 Août 1811, Macdonald to General Lefebvre, 19 August 1811; Macdonald to Commandant Cassabianca, 19 August 1811; Macdonald to General Baraguey d'Hilliers; 19 August 1811; Macdonald to Adjutant Commandant Vigier, 19 August 1811; C(17)* 18, No. 11, Correspondance, various pieces.

tried by Imperial Order at an extraordinary court martial and condemned to death for culpable negligence and stripped of his rank and titles.³¹³

While Macdonald was mired down at Figueras the freshly minted Marshal Suchet invaded the unpacified portions of Lower Catalonia, opened up communications between Barcelona and Macdonald at Figueras, captured the mountain monastery strongpoint of Monteserrat, and cleared the countryside of insurgents.³¹⁴ Suchet's hard won victories were, however, checked by another daring coup of the ever active Catalan insurgents, showing him too, the difficulties that Macdonald suffered under. Captain General Luis Lacy, after levying troops for a new (though incomplete) army, conducted a destructive raid across the French frontier into the Cerdagne in August. Napoleon threw a fit of rage³¹⁵ when he got the news, and turned his displeasure not only on Macdonald but on Suchet too, chiding the new Marshal for not cooperating more fully with Macdonald by covering the siege of Figueras.³¹⁶

The country side was still alive with insurgents, even within a few miles of Macdonald's lines. They raised contributions on nearby towns³¹⁷ and attacked every

³¹³Typically, Napoleon forgave General Guillot, (like he forgave General Dupont for the Balien disaster in 1808) pardoned him, and even restored his rank, titles and gave him another command. AN, AFIV1158, General Clarke, Report, 3 December 1813.

³¹⁴Oman, Peninsular War, 4:530-535, Suchet, War in Spain, 2:109-110; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 3:222; Napier, Peninsular War, 5:103-106

³¹⁵Oman, Peninsular War, 4:539.

³¹⁶CN, No. 18006, Napoleon to Berthier, 22 August 1811, 22:429-430.

³¹⁷SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute-Catalogne, 1 August 1811.

convoy coming from Perpignan.³¹⁸ For example, the captive Catalan garrison of Figueras needed an escort of two brigades, numbering 4,500 troops, in two brigades.³¹⁹

Macdonald restructured the Army of Catalonia for the siege of Figueras. He reorganized the Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne in three parts; an active division, siege brigades, and Arrondissement commands. It centered around four Brigades du Blocus which carried on the siege. It numbered 10,923 troops and 216 horses present under arms. The 1er and 2e Brigades du Blocus under General Louis Marchand de Plauzonne (1774-1812) had 1,908 and 2,191 troops respectively, the 3e Brigade du Blocus under Colonel Jean Martin, Baron Petit (1772-1856) with 2,364 troops, and General Lefebvre's 4e Brigade du Blocus had 1,432 men.³²⁰

General Quesnel's Division Active was the offensive arm and numbered 4,434 troops in two brigades. A separate brigade, the Brigade de Réserve, under General Louis, Baron Garreau (1769-1813) added to the offensive field forces with 1,151 men. The third portion of the Corps was the two Arrondissements Territoriaux, the 1er Arrondissement Territorial at Rosas under Chef de Bataillon Baudy, (620 men), and the 2e

³¹⁸SHAT, C(8)283, Correspondance Générale, Macdonald to General Beuremann, 17 August 1811.

³¹⁹SHAT C(8) 283, Correspondance, Marshal Macdonald to General Lefebvre, 19 August 1811; Macdonald to Chef de Bataillon Casabianca, Commander, 6e Legion de Gendarmerie, 19 August 1811; Macdonald to the Colonel General of Dragoons, 19 August 1811; Macdonald to Adjutant Commandant Vigier, 19 August 1811; C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute-Catalogne, 1 August 1811.

³²⁰SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute-Catalogne, 1 August 1811.

Arrondissement Territorial of Gerona, under Adjutant Commandant Molard, (1,725 men).³²¹ A third Arrondissement Territorial at Figueras was reestablished after its recapture. The Corps totaled, including the Gendarmerie and artillery 25,290 troops (1,442 horses).³²²

As we have seen, Napoleon was greatly displeased with Marshal Macdonald's military performance. In September 1811, this was again brought to the fore when Captain General Lacy delivered a series of daring attacks, including his capture of the island of Medas in the mouth of the Ter River, a raid on Palamos, the levy a heavy contribution on the populace and attacking a large French convoy. In October, he captured Igualada with its 200 man garrison, attacked another French supply convoy, captured Cervera taking 645 French prisoners and the 150 man French garrison at Belpuig. He even cut French communication between Lerida and Barcelona.³²³

³²¹See Table 29, Ibid. One of its battalions was the Chasseurs de Montagne, which Napoleon ordered imprisoned in Gerona and replaced with the 2e Gendarmerie Catalogne à cheval; "mette dans la place de Girone des Gendarmes Catalans après ce qui lui est arrivé à Figueras par la trahison des Catalans", CN, No. 17644, Napoleon to General Clarke, 23 April 1811, 22:103.

³²²18,319 troops (1,178 horses) present under arms; 72.44% of its total effective strength. There were 1,291 detached troops (264 horses) (5.1%) and 4,793 men in hospital or 18.95%. Prisoners of War were General Guillet's troops taken in April and there were 33 troops furloughed. In January 1810 there was 16,342 troops in the hospital out of a total effective strength of 44,552. This rate included the 26,459 troops present under arms making 59.39% of the VII Corps strength. SHAT C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810; C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne, 1 August 1811.

³²³Oman, Peninsular War, 4:540-541; Napier, Peninsular War, 5:276; SHAT C(8)370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 16 September 1811.

Completely dissatisfied with Marshal Macdonald's conduct of the war,³²⁴ Napoleon relieved him and appointed in his place General Charles-Mathieu-Isidore Decaen (1769-1832),³²⁵ recently military governor of the French colonies in India (1801-1810), having returned to France after a futile though heroic attempt to defend them against the English invasion of 1810. He was a talented officer and an old hand at military governorship.

He assumed command of the Army of Catalonia on 20 October 1811, and was immediately confronted with the Catalan raid into the French Cerdagne of the previous August,³²⁶ and all of the humiliating string of defeats Lacy inflicted on the French command there in September and October at Igualada, Cervera and Belpuig. The insurgents continued to harass French movements throughout the province.³²⁷ General Decaen had a nearly impossible task before him. The Army could make little headway in pacifying the province, split between a occupation and field force, and his formidable logistical burden drained his troops, money and time.

³²⁴Napoleon's opinion of Macdonald was: "He was a reliable man, good to command between 15,000 and 20,000 men. Brave but slow and lazy." Chandler, Napoleon's Marshals, lvi. Marshal Macdonald was physically incapable of continued command due to severe gout and fever: "ou bientôt après à la suite de mon accès de goutte, je fus atteint par la fièvre. Hors d'état d'exercer le commandement, je demandai un successeur, qui me fut accordé; je rentrai en France et me rendis à Paris. Je ne pouvais encore marcher qu'à l'aide de deux béquilles." Macdonald, Souvenirs, 179.

³²⁵Six, Dictionnaire, 1:301-303; Napoleon wrote to the Minister of War, "donnez le commandement de l'Armée de Catalogne au Général Decaen", CN, Napoleon to General Clarke, 3 October 1811, Supplement: 152-153.

³²⁶Oman, Peninsular War, 4:539. CN No. 18066, Napoleon to Berthier, 22 August 1811, 22:429-420.

³²⁷Oman, Peninsular War, 4:541; SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 November 1811.

The Emperor was now, after the disasters of 1811, unwilling to support General Decaen's efforts and preferred to "subsidize" Marshal Suchet's successes in Lower Catalonia. He halved the size of the Army of Catalonia. In the face of this reduction, Decaen could barely field a weak division, and could only reinforce a garrison or field force by dangerously reducing other parts of the Army.³²⁸

Captain General Lacy, could now bring more troops to bear than Decaen, placing the French command on the permanent defensive.³²⁹ Naturally, Lacy exploited his tactical advantage and again raided the French Cerdagne on 29 October 1811. He defeated two French National Guard battalions, requisitioned thousands of sheep, and cattle, and levied money contributions from the Pyrenean villages. A furious Napoleon, disappointed yet again in his command in Eastern Spain, levied more National Guards to secure the frontier.³³⁰

By the end of the year, General Decaen occupied his meager forces in holding down the rebellious countryside and staving off Lacy's depredations such as the amphibious landing of Catalan corsairs at Palamos which the French garrison (2e-3e Léger) barely held off until rescued by General Lamarque's Division.³³¹ General Decaen's

³²⁸SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1811.

³²⁹Oman summed the matter up well, "Catalonia could only be held down by garrisoning every village, and if the Army of occupation split itself into garrisons it was helpless." Oman, Peninsular War, 5:93.

³³⁰CN, No. 18531, Napoleon to General Clarke, 29 February 1812, 23:262-263; Napoleon to Berthier, 8 March 1812, 23-296; Oman, Peninsular War, 5:93.

³³¹SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1812.

other endemic worry, was supplying Barcelona, and he sent it a large supply convoy, escorted by Lamarque's Division.³³²

By December 1811, the Army of Catalonia, still recovering from the siege of Figueras, reverted back to the original structure of active and the territorial commands. The active division, Division Lamarque, contained about half of the Army, with some 10,000 troops, and the Arrondissement portion was slightly larger.³³³

The active division had three brigades, with only eight regiments strong enough to take the field. The rest could only be swept together into larger units. Furthermore, 3,975 men (36.3%) were in the hospital, leaving only 5,960 men (54.4%) present under arms.³³⁴

The second half of the Army, the 1er Arrondissement Territorial at Mont-Louis under General Garreau, was a five battalion brigade of 2,595 troops of which only 1,619 were available (62.3%). The second and largest was the 2e Arrondissement Territorial at Figueras. A division level command of General Quesnel, it had, two brigades, totaling 6,448 men, but only had available 49.6% of its strength or 3,201 troops, whereas 42.3% (2,752 men) were in the hospital. The 3e Arrondissement Territorial at Gerona was a brigade sized element commanded by Adjudant Commandant Dumolard with 2,488 men.

³³²Oman, Peninsular War, 5:94.

³³³See Table 20; SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1811.

³³⁴See Table 30; Ibid.

There were 61.4% or 1,526 men of the force were available for operations, and 952 men or 38.2% in the hospital.³³⁵

One of the unique aspects of the Army's organization at this juncture is the centralization of the artillery gendarmerie and engineers at Army level. The artillery had 721 men in the ranks.³³⁶ The engineers had, with 77 men (49.3%) in the ranks, and the 6e Légion de Gendarmerie had 794 men (68.4%) in the ranks.³³⁷

The Army of Catalonia totaled 24,740 men and 1,660 horses, of which 13,900 men (56.1%) were able to take the field. The army had 35.7% of its strength unavailable, including 8,738 men in hospital.³³⁸ Since barely 60% of the army was capable of taking the field, it could not hold its own against the larger Catalan formations or lend any effective support to General Suchet. The Siege of Figueras inflicted grave losses upon the army, and seriously affected its ability to prosecute the war. Napoleon's further force reduction was far more damaging. General Decaen faced a difficult task as the new commander. He "occupied" a rebellious province with insufficient troops and could only look forward to a difficult campaign of 1812.

³³⁵Ibid.

³³⁶Present under arms. Ibid.

³³⁷Ibid.

³³⁸Ibid.

§7. Stabilization and Second Front: The Campaign of 1812

The Army of Catalonia expanded its operational sphere in 1812, for Napoleon incorrectly perceived the imminent collapse of Spanish resistance there as was evidenced by several insurgent defeats.³³⁹ He reinforced the defense of the Pyrénées frontier activating 45,000 National Guards in four Pyrenean departments, and the 10e Division Militaire mobilized eleven (900 man) elite battalions (bataillons d'élite) totaling 10,800 troops.³⁴⁰ This "mobilization" immediately brought nearly two divisions to bear on the Catalan frontier but nothing to the Army of Catalonia.

Napoleon retained two of Decaen's old divisions, (Divisions Polombini and Severoli), in the Army of Aragon³⁴¹ and organized a four division corps under General

³³⁹Napoleon wrote: "...que le Général Decaen est parti pour secourir Barcelone et Pera tout ce qui sera possible..." CN, No. 18267, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 19 November 1811, 23:21-22.

³⁴⁰Napoleon's disposition of these troops were outlined in his letter to General Clarke: Les deux bataillons d'élite des Pyrénées-Orientales seront placés à Mont-Louis et en avant de Perpignan; les deux de l'Ariège, deux de la Haute-Garonne, quatre des quatre départements de 2e Ligne, total huit, seront sous les ordres directs du Sénateur, à Foix, et seront chargés de la défense de l'Ariège et du val d'Aran; les deux bataillons des haute Pyrénées seront placés à Vénasque, dans le val d'Aran et sur tout autre point voisin. Il y aura donc sur cette frontière 6,000 hommes, gardes nationales, armes, 10,000 délite, en tout 16,000, uniquement chargés de la défense des frontières.

CN, No. 18309, Napoleon to General Clarke, 6 December 1811, 23:54-55.

³⁴¹Division Polimbini had 6,000 men and Division Severoli had 5,000 men. The whole formed a Corps of 21,000 men with 1,500 cavalry. CN, No. 18398, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 30 December 1811, 23:134-140.

Reille.³⁴² Napoleon posted this new Corps d'Armée de l'Ebre in Aragon to maintain order in General Suchet's rear, assist General Decaen in provisioning Barcelona and maintain communications with Valencia and Portugal.³⁴³ Finally, he planned to send this corps to reinforce General Decaen's forces to subdue Lower Catalonia.³⁴⁴

These plans generated two changes in the organization of the government, and the structure of the Army of Catalonia. Napoleon divided Catalonia into four departments,³⁴⁵

³⁴²Napoleon outlined the corps mission:

maintenir la tranquillité dans le pays, approvisionner fortement Barcelone...Il maintiendra la communication avec l'Armée de Valence, avec celle de Portugal...avec celle du centre...et protégera Aragon. Il aura pour instruction d'avoir toujours une ou deux divisions placées de manière à appuyer fortement l'Armée de Portugal...

Ibid, 23:136-140.

³⁴³Ibid, 23:139. CN, No. 18267, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 19 November 1811, 23:21-22; No. 18310, Napoleon to General Clarke, 6 December 1811, 23:56; No. 18373, Napoleon to General Clarke, 26 December 1811, 23:110-111; No. 18386, Napoleon to General Lacuée, 29 December 1811, 23:125-129; No. 18424, Napoleon to Vice-Amiral Comte Decrès, Ministre de la Marine, 9 January 1812, 23:162.

³⁴⁴Napoleon ordered, "...réitérez-lui (Général Decaen) les ordres de manoeuvrer de manière à inquiéter par Vich ou Rippol l'ennemi sur Braga, et de se concerter pour cette opération avec le Général Reille..." CN, No. 18531, Napoleon to General Clarke, 29 February 1812, 23:260-263; Oman, Peninsular War, 5:97. "Avec ces quatre divisions, il doit soumettre définitivement toute la Basse-Catalogne, maintenir la tranquillité en Aragon et pouvoir s'occuper de l'organisation de ce pays." CN, No. 18452, Napoleon to Berthier, 25 January 1812, 23:185-186.

³⁴⁵"Vous trouverez ci-joint le décret par lequel la Catalogne est organisée en quatre départements..." Ibid. The Emperor even sent French Intendants to "...mettre de la Régularité dans l'administration." of Catalonia. These administrators, the direct representatives of the Emperor, commanders were obliged to assist them in administration. CN, No. 18502, Napoleon to General Clarke, 18 February 1812, 23:228.

and organized a National Guard division to protect the French frontier to discourage continued Catalan insurgent operations there.³⁴⁶

Headquartered at Toulouse, this division³⁴⁷ drew troops from the (11e Division Militaire) and other frontier units including a regimental cadre of conscrits refractaires,³⁴⁸ and 3,500 conscripts of the premier ban de la garde nationale de la 10e Division Militaire, the Bataillon de Wurtzbourg, and the sweepings from Fort Mont-Louis. It had a provisional cavalry brigade of 1,220 men, artillery and engineers, the whole totaling 9,000 men. This division also had a large admixture of troops drawn from the National Guard Cohorts of the 9e, 10e, and 11e Divisions Militaire. It concentrated at Tarbes, Foix, Mont-Louis, and Toulouse to cover the French frontier.³⁴⁹

From February to July 1812 in Catalonia, General Decaen, enmeshed in the counter-insurgent war was spread far too thin to obey Napoleon's orders and assist

³⁴⁶ "...qui mette une fois pour toutes mes frontières à l'abri des incursions des brigands" CN, No. 18531, Napoleon to General Clarke, 29 February 1812, 23:260-263. In February 1812, the insurgent leader Sarsfield made yet another serious raid into France, Departement de l'Arriège, capturing the town of Foix (19 February) and raising a contribution of 70,000 dollars. Oman, Peninsular War, 5:99. On March 8, Napoleon fired a furious dispatch to Marshal Berthier: "...renouvelez l'ordre au Général Reille de se porter sur Berga et sur la Cerdagne française pour déloger les insurgés. Il n'est que trop vrai qu'ils se nourrissent de France, et qu'ils sont cantonnés à Puycerda, d'où ils ne bougent point." CN, No. 18557, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 8 March 1812, 23:296.

³⁴⁷CN, No. 18351, Napoleon to Clarke, 29 February 1812, 23:260-263.

³⁴⁸Ibid. Conscrits réfractaires or deserted conscripts, when apprehended were thrown into eleven companies; strictly disciplined, given extra drill and partial pay. When not on duty, they worked as laborers on French fortifications. By 1810, these units overflowed and Napoleon organized four Disciplinary Regiments. Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 436.

³⁴⁹Ibid.

General Reille in a new offensive. Decaen had more pressing problems within Catalonia. An insurgent raid into France that February then derailed the Emperor's plans, forcing him to divert Reille's divisions to reinforce the frontier defense.³⁵⁰ Decaen parried Catalan attacks on Mataro and Olot, General Lacy's attempt to poison the Barcelona flour supply on July 12,³⁵¹ the bomb in the powder magazines at Lerida on July 16 and a naval bombardment of Mataro.³⁵²

Unlike the war, the army's force structure stabilized in the first half of 1812. It retained the same general structure as in 1811, with an active field division, three Arrondissements Territorial, and army assets (gendarmerie, artillery, and engineers). Division Lamarque, had 12,503 men. The 1er Arrondissement Territorial at Mont-Louis had 1,119 men, while the 2e Arrondissement Territorial at Figueras and 3e Arrondissement Territorial at Gerona had 6,448 and 2,396 men respectively.³⁵³

Overall, the Army in January 1812 had 30 battalions, six squadrons, artillery and engineers with 17,620 men present under arms, 6,876 men in the hospital, and a total effective strength of 24,906 men and 1,791 horses.³⁵⁴

³⁵⁰CN, No. 18557, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 8 March 1812, 23:276; Oman, Peninsular War, 5:563-564.

³⁵¹AN, AFIV 1158, Bureau de la Police Militaire, Général Clarke Rapport à Empereur, 23 January 1813. Oman, Peninsular War, 5:341.

³⁵²Oman, Peninsular War, 5:564.

³⁵³SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1811; C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1812.

³⁵⁴The Army's overall strength rose by 166 men from 24,740 to 24,906, a mere 0.7%. Its strength present under arms rose 21.1%; (3,720) men from 13,900. Similarly, hospital inmates dropped 21.3%, from 8,737 to 6,876 men. These declines in the numbers of

Within the next six months, General Decaen again restructured his army, along familiar lines. He established the Division de Basse-Catalogne under General David-Maurice-Joseph, Comte Mathieu de Saint Maurice (1768-1833). It included the garrisons of Barcelona, Lerida, and Tarragona. He also formed a new field division, the Division de Sègre, under General Quesnel, out of the old 1er Arrondissement Territorial.³⁵⁵

The long established Division en Haute-Catalogne, under General Lamarque underwent both structural alterations and strength reductions when it absorbed the 2e and 3e Arrondissements Territoriaux, of Figueras and Gerona. The Division had 13,799 men under arms, 2,360 in the hospital and a total effective strength of 16,361 men. Its effective strength actually decreased 23.3% from its previous 21,230 men, though its present under arms troop strength rose 15.8% from 11,704 to 13,799.³⁵⁶

Let us digress momentarily to discuss one phenomenon encountered in the troop strength structure of the Army of Catalonia in 1812, that of a rising "present under arms" strength yet shrinking "effective" strength. The army commander often consolidated his units by evacuating sick, exchanging prisoners of war; recalling detached units and returning depots to France. Proportionally, the effective numbers of troops would decrease, while Marshal Macdonald, for example, merged a battalion of the 7e Ligne

hospital inmates is due not only to discharge of sick and wounded back to their respective units, but to evacuations from the hospitals to France. Leave, always small, rose from seven to nine men and prisoners of war from 84 to 99. Finally, courtmartial fell from seven to none. Ibid.

³⁵⁵The Division de Serge grew 79.9% from 1,119 to 3,809 men present under arms. See Table 31. SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1812; C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 16 July 1812.

³⁵⁶See Table 21. Hospital inmates fell 61.1% from 6,322. Ibid.

Italien into the 5e Ligne Italien,³⁵⁷ raising its present under arms and lowering its total strength.

The Garrison of Barcelona³⁵⁸ (Division de Basse-Catalogne) numbered 7,235 men, Tarragona totaled 2,598 men and Lerida had 4,316 men.³⁵⁹ The division totaled 10,434 men present under arms (73.72%), 14,153 effectives, 1,853 men in the hospital (13.9%), and 14,153 total effectives.³⁶⁰ This was strictly an armée sédentaire and only had troops for occupation, without a standing field force.

General Decaen created for himself a separate Brigade de Reserve under General Clement with 3,796 men and was his army level, field command.³⁶¹ The Army artillery, unlike the other major commands, underwent radical increases both in units and troop strength. Of the twelve artillery units in the army in July, eight were either entirely new regiments or augmented by new companies. It totaled 1,756 men increasing 43.7% from January.³⁶²

³⁵⁷General Clarke submits for the Emperor's approval, the authorization given by Marshal Macdonald to merge in the 5th Italian Line the battalion of the 7th Line. UCN, No. 4897, Decision, December 10, 1810, 3:934; No. 4806 Napoleon to General Clarke, November 11, 1810, 3:882-884.

³⁵⁸General David-Maurice-Joseph, Comte Mathieu de Saint-Maurice puis de la Redorte (1768-1833) is shortened to Maurice-Mathieu. Six, Dictionnaire, 2:169.

³⁵⁹See Table 23, 16 July 1812.

³⁶⁰*Ibid.*

³⁶¹It had 2,977 men and 209 horses present under arms (78.42%), 782 men in the hospital (20.6%). *Ibid.*

³⁶²The Army artillery had 1,603 men present under arms, and 109 in the hospital, a decrease from 199 in January, (45.2%). SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1812; C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 16 July 1812.

The Army of Catalonia totaled in July 1812, 51 battalions and 7 squadrons with 33,792 men (1,723 horses) present under arms; and 5,830 men in the hospital. Its total effective strength was 41,816 men and 1,768 horses; remarkably, there was the considerable 80.1% of its strength present under arms, and only 13.94% in the hospital, illustrating the improvement in the army's readiness by a 10% rise in its present under arms rate since January.³⁶³

In July Lord Wellington initiated an Anglo-Sicilian invasion of Catalonia from Sicily, opening a "Second Front". This was the single greatest threat to the French hold on this contentious province during the war. Earlier that year, the British intercepted a coded message from King Joseph Bonaparte which ordered Marshal Suchet to detach troops from the Army of Aragon to support French forces in La Mancha.³⁶⁴ Wellington responded by coordinating with Lord William Bentinck, commander of the British forces in the Mediterranean, for an invasion of Valencia and Catalonia, to take French pressure off his front in Central Spain. Additionally, reserves in France and Italy were already absorbed by Napoleon's Grand Armée in Russia.³⁶⁵ Lord William Bentinck informed Lord

³⁶³Troops present under arms is 80.1% of the whole while detached were 2.5% hospitalized were 13.94%, furloughed were .218% and prisoners of war were 2.6%. Ibid.

³⁶⁴Sir Charles Oman explained that unbeknownst to Wellington, Marshal Suchet refused to obey this order. It must be remembered that the Imperial Decree of 8 February 1810 made Aragon (and Catalonia) a virtual Vice-Royalty, answerable to Paris, not Madrid. Oman, Peninsular War, 5:341. Like most of the Peninsular Marshals, Suchet was quite independent: "He could be as factious and bloody-minded with headquarters or his fellow Army Commanders as any of them." Richard Humble, Napoleon's Peninsular Marshals, A Reassessment, (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1973) 216.

³⁶⁵Lord Bentinck had another choice for a second front. He could invade Southern Italy, then defended by one division, as King Murat had sent two divisions to Russia. Piers Mackesy, The War in the Mediterranean 1803-1810, (London: Longmans Green and

Wellington on 5 March 1812 that he was prepared to send 10,000 troops against Marshal Suchet if London was averse to an invasion of Corsica.³⁶⁶ A delighted Wellington wrote to the Earl of Liverpool: "...the attack of both Tarragona and Barcelona appears to me...to be the most desirable...the French would move heaven and earth from Aragon and Valencia..."³⁶⁷ He wrote again to Bentinck stressing the importance of this operation. He considered a siege of Barcelona however as impossible. The Anglo-Sicilian invasion force proposed was simply insufficient to defeat the 6,299 man garrison. On the other hand, he could take on Tarragona's 1,039 man garrison with the possibility of success.³⁶⁸

In any case, the Anglo-Sicilian invasion would throw Catalonia and Aragon into disarray, hopefully precipitating the collapse of the French occupation of Valencia. Wellington, in fact, wrote to his brother Henry: "...a diversion of the enemy's force must be created for my operation without which I shall have upon me the Armies of Portugal, the South, the Center and that of Suchet."³⁶⁹ He then coordinated with Bentinck to induce

Co., 1957)369-372; Lt. General Sir Henry Bunbury, Narrative of Military Transactions on the Mediterranean, 1805-1810, (London: Privately Published, 1851) 196-201.

³⁶⁶Oman, Peninsular War, 5:343. Duke of Wellington, The Disptaches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington during his various campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal Spain, the Low Countries and France, from 1799 to 1815, Ed. Gurwood, (London: John Murray, 1838), The Earl of Liverpool to Wellington, 5 March 1812, 8:301.

³⁶⁷Wellington, The Dispatches, Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool, 20 March 1812, 9:554. Wellington did not believe in the actual success of this operation beyond a diversion: "I think it probable, however, that neither will succeed."

³⁶⁸SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 16 July 1812; Wellington, Dispatches, Wellington to Lt. Gen. Lord William Bentinck, 24th March 1812, 9:5-6.

³⁶⁹The Gibraltar garrison provided to Wellington a 45 gun battering train, and the Royal Navy supported the train with four ships. Wellington, Dispatches, Wellington to General Campbell, 10 May 1812, 9:131-132. Wellington to Sir Henry Wellesley, 11th

the Spanish Regency at Cadiz to provide two British led (3,000 man) Spanish divisions, those of Generals Ross at Alicante and Whittingham at Majorca. Additionally, Wellington provided 1,400 Portuguese troops, two foreign regiments and a artillery battering train. Sir Edward Pellew's Mediterranean squadron would lend the necessary naval support.³⁷⁰ Through spring, Wellington, in several letters, pushed London and Sicily to support this expedition.

After three months delay and changes of plans,³⁷¹ Bentinck finalized the invasion plans, and assembled the Anglo-Sicilian Army, a 7,000 man division under General Sir Thomas Maitland.³⁷² Prior to the invasion, Marshal Suchet received warning of a possible landing between Alicante in Valencia and Rosas. To meet this threat, he formed a flying column, and warned General Decaen. Indeed, in July Suchet received a rumour that

April 1812, 9:53-56. Wellington to General Lord Willian Bentinck, 24th March 1812, 9:5-6. Oman, Peninsular War, 5:341, 344-345. Wellington to Lieutenant General Campbell, 10 May 1812, 9:131-132.

³⁷⁰Wellington, Dispatches, Wellington to Sir Henry Wellesley, 11 April 1812, 9:55-56.

³⁷¹Ibid. Wellington to Major General Cook, 5 June 1812, 9:208; Wellington to Lieutenant General Campbell, 5 June 1812, 9:208-210; Wellington to Vice Admiral G. Berkeley, 5 June 1812, 9:210-211; Wellington to Earl Bathurst, 9 July 1812, 9:277-278; Wellington to Bathurst, 14 July 1812, 9:285-287. Oman, Peninsular War, 5:245-246.

³⁷²General Sir Thomas Maitland's Anglo-Sicilian Expeditionary Force had on 25 June 1812, eight battalions, cavalry, engineers and artillery, supported by 200 ships. Oman, Peninsular War, 5:609; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:265; William Henry Dillon, A Narrative of My Professional Adventures (1790-1839) ed. Michael Lewis, Navy Records Society Series, Vol. 97 (London: Navy Records Society 1956) 2:203.

Maitland would invade Upper Catalonia, and marched to counter it, but found nothing and returned to Tarragona.³⁷³

On 31 July, the long anticipated invasion finally came. Maitland's invasion force anchored off Palamos and he conferred with Catalan commanders to decide on the invasion point. Near Palamos, the French had 15,000 men available to oppose a landing. The naval commander, Sir Edward Pellew, noted however that the anchorage was too dangerous to disembark troops in any case. Maitland abandoned Palamos and sailed to Alicante. Arriving on 7 August, he landed with 10,000 men, linking up with General Roche's 4,000 man division.³⁷⁴

The Anglo-Sicilian invasion of Valencia in August 1812 had a profound effect upon Suchet's operations, but was not directly felt in Catalonia until 1813. Indeed, the war slowed in the last half of 1812, as General Decaen engaged only in minor

³⁷³ At Reus Suchet conferred with Decaen. Reacting to poor intelligence was endemic, as confirming it was often impossible. At Tarragona, Suchet inspected its fortifications and reinforced the garrison. Oman, Peninsular War, 5:566-567.

³⁷⁴ Ibid, 5:572-574; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:265; Sir William Dillon, A Narrative of My Professional Adventures, 2:203-211. General Maitland coordinated a secondary operation, sending a Colonel Green into Catalonia to raise an insurgent force to occupy and fortify the abandoned Convent of Montserrat and establish a post at Saint-Denis. General Decaen responded by sending Maurice Mathieu to eject Green's force, besieging him at Saint-Denis and taking it in a day (27 July), forcing Green out. The French immediately marched on Montserrat, reduced it and destroyed its fortifications in early August. When Maurice Mathieu returned to Barcelona, he received news of Maitland's landing. Green's operation worked. Laffaille, Precis des Campagnes de Catalogne, 266-271.

counterinsurgent operations.³⁷⁵ There was consequently no immediate requirement to alter the Army's structure.

By December, the Army decreased its troop strength though its structure remained unchanged. It had the Division de Sègre, the Division en Haute-Catalogne, the Division en Basse Catalogne and the Brigade de Réserve.³⁷⁶ General Quesnel's Division de Sègre received three new types of units, the 29e, 30e and 31e Cohortes, and totaled 4,502 troops.³⁷⁷ General Lamarque's division maintained its previous organization of two active brigades and the two arrondissements of Figueras and Gerona. The active brigades together had 5,493 men, and the Arrondissements, 7,333.³⁷⁸ The Division, on the whole, then had 10,853 troops present under arms and 12,826 effectives. The Division in Lower Catalonia with 12,088 troops remained structurally unchanged, but the 7,291 man garrison

³⁷⁵General Lacy had a considerable logistical problem. To alleviate the wants of his soldiers, he engaged in an illicit trade with the French and allowed Barcelona merchants to move commercial supply columns. Hence, he did not attack either commercial or military supply columns. The Catalan army engaged in only a few actions, including General Eroles' establishment of a base between Lerida and Tarragona (despite a French attack against it from Tarragona) on 27 October. On 2 October, Eroles attacked a French column near Reus, and Lacy attacked Mataro with his whole force (7,000 men). General Manso also defeated 200 French at Molins del Rey. General Decaen countered by marching to Vich and dispersing Lacy's division and occupying the city on 3 November. The French even occupied Reus which was recently evacuated by Lacy and cut the Catalan communications with the British Navy. Eroles now attacked Reus, but its French garrison was promptly rescued by troops sent by Decaen and the garrison at Tortosa. By December, both adversaries engaged only in minor operations. Napier, Peninsular War, 5:351-355.

³⁷⁶SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1812.

³⁷⁷The Division de Sègre had 3,151 men present under arms, and it had 1,319 in the hospital. Ibid.

³⁷⁸Ibid.

of Barcelona had received a reinforcement of five infantry battalions and two cavalry detachments. The garrison of Tarragona had 2,619 men and Lerida had 2,098 troops.³⁷⁹ The Army units included the Brigade de Reserve, with 3,330 men,³⁸⁰ the 6e Légion de Gendarmerie with 1,205 men, the Artillery with 1,654 men and the Engineers with 155 troops.³⁸¹

As a whole, the Army of Catalonia had 33 infantry battalions, two Bataillons Nationaux, three Cohorts, eight foreign regiments, three cavalry squadrons, gendemerie, artillery and engineers. Its total effective strength was 35,680 men which declined 14.7% since July. Its present under arms strength with the colours was 28,757 (80.6%); and hospitalized 5,833 (16.4%).³⁸²

³⁷⁹Ibid.

³⁸⁰Its soldiers with the colours declined from 2,977 to 2,922, a mere 1.9%. There were also reductions in other areas. Hospital inmates declined tremendously from 782 to 408 (47.8%). Ibid.

³⁸¹Ibid.

³⁸²The Army also had 240 detached, 834 as prisoners of war, and 16 on furlough. It decreased in nearly every recorded category since July 1812. Present under arms decreased 14.9%, the detached by 76.70%, furloughs by 82.4%, and prisoners of war by 22.1%. Court-martials disappeared altogether and only hospitalizations increased by a mere 0.1%. Ibid.

§8. Anglo-Sicilian Abcess, The Campaign of 1813

The year opened quietly with only minor counterinsurgent operations,³⁸³ but General Eroles shattered this calm with a brilliant but abortive attempt to capture Tarragona.³⁸⁴ There were also minor attacks against the French throughout Catalonia.³⁸⁵ In February, General Sir John Murray opened the second campaign in Eastern Spain.³⁸⁶ He attacked and defeated Marshal Suchet's Army of Aragon, in the badly muddled Battle of Castala on 13 April. Meanwhile, a 5,000 man Anglo-Sicilian force (Roche's Division) made a dash on the Valencian capital.³⁸⁷

³⁸³SHAT C(8) 371, Situation, Corps d'Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1813; C(8) 324, Registre de Correspondance, General Decaen to M. Mataro, 23 January 1813; General Decaen to General Maurice Mathieu, (No. 3) 24 January 1813; General Decaen to Payeur Général Cochetet, 1 January 1813; Decaen to General Clarke, 1 January 1813; Decaen to Inspecteur aux revues Prisye, 1 January 1813; C(8) 329, Registre des Ordres du Jour, Order of the Day, 17 January 1813. In February, General Decaen even did the hitherto unthinkable in Catalonia. He opened a correspondence with the Spanish staff, on accords in the treatment of prisoners of war and on the imposition of civilized rules of war, which lasted through 1813. C(8) 327, Registre avec l'Etat Major Espagnol, 13 February - 9 November 1813.

³⁸⁴General Bertoletti commanded Tarragonna with 1,270 present under arms. See Table 24. Napier, Peninsula War, 5:446.

³⁸⁵Lafaille, Mémoires, 276.

³⁸⁶Wellington, Dispatches, Wellington to Lieutenant General Sir John Murray, 3 March 1813, 10:161-162.

³⁸⁷Murray barely won the victory at Castala, for his timid generalship nearly spelled disaster. Indeed, his staff forced him to fight. After his victory he refused to pursue the defeated French, and allowed them time to rally and retire, Oman, Peninsular War, 6:283-298; Wellington, Dispatches, Wellington to Lieutenant General Sir John Murray, 16 April 1813, 10:301-302; Michael Glover, The Peninsular War, 1807-1814, a Concise Military History, (London: David and Charles Newton Abbot, 1974), 270-271; David Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, 397-401; Napier, Peninsula War, 5:58-62.

By mid-April, Lord Wellington developed a viable plan of operations for the spring campaign which used the Catalan invasion to support his campaign in Castile.³⁸⁸ On 27 May, buoyed by his Castalla victory, General Murray assembled his 16,000 man expeditionary force with Admiral Hallowell's Naval Armada of 103 ships.³⁸⁹ The Spanish contingent included three "armies" under Generals Copons, Elio and del Parque, totaling 58,957 men.³⁹⁰

Setting his subordinate elements in motion, General Murray sailed for Tarragona.³⁹¹ Arriving at Salou Bay on 2 June, he invested the dilapidated fortress the

³⁸⁸Wellington outlined a four phase plan to General Murray. These were a link-up with the Spanish forces of Generals del Parque and Elio (Second Army); the Anglo-Sicilian forces in Valencia would hold Suchet at bay and the Army of Valencia would attack Suchet if he attempted to relieve Tarragona which was to be besieged by Murray. Simultaneously, General Copon's Catalan forces would hold General Decaen's forces at bay while the Spanish irregular divisions of the Second Army would cut Marshal Suchet's communications with Madrid and the Armée d'Espagne. Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, 397; Oman, Peninsular War, 6:283-284.

³⁸⁹His force included over three divisions, cavalry and artillery and a naval contingent of three line ships, a frigate, nineteen minor vessels and 80 transports. Oman, Peninsular War, 6:762-767; Vaciani, Storia delle Campagna, 3:672.

³⁹⁰Oman, Peninsular War, 6:764-765.

³⁹¹SHAT, C(8)371, Situation Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1813; Napier, Peninsula War, 5:9.

next day.³⁹² On 6 June, Murray opened his siege, as his artillery batteries battered the fortifications, and engineers dug siege works.³⁹³

Marshal Suchet, meanwhile, got news of the invasion on 31 May, and immediately concentrated three divisions (14,000 men), but was, however, unable to advance for the artillery capable roads were blocked and in no state to allow heavy carriage. He could only await General Decaen's arrival.³⁹⁴

General Decaen, meanwhile, set Upper Catalonia abuzz with troop movements and concentrated three brigades from Upper Catalonia, the 1st and 2d Active Brigades and the Division en Cerdagne, making a large division of 7,169 men, and sent the 1st Brigade to march on Barcelona.³⁹⁵ Simultaneously, General Maurice Mathieu, Governor of Barcelona, marched with the recently arrived 1st Active Brigade (2,492 men) on 10 June

³⁹²For a flavor at Murray's landing see August, L. F. Schumann On the Road with Wellington, Ed. trans. A. M. Ludovici, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf) 2-3. General Murray was paralyzed with fear from the beginning of the siege, anticipating the arrival of Marshal Suchet and General Decaen who "would move heaven and earth" to relieve Tarragonna. He calculated that the two French commanders could assemble 25,000 men in just a few days. Oman, Peninsular War, 6:492-495.

³⁹³Oman, Peninsular War, 6:493-499; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:311-312.

³⁹⁴Suchet's force consisted of General Musnier's 1st Division (4,163 men), General Pannetier's Brigade (2,600 men), five cavalry squadrons and artillery. The whole totaled 7,613 men. Oman, Peninsular War, 6:501-503; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:313.

³⁹⁵Oman, Peninsular War, 6:503; SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 30 June 1813.

and one of his own totaling 6,300 men. He drove in the Catalan outposts at Villafranca and halted, hoping to delay the siege of Tarragona.³⁹⁶

Despite the dire French situation in Lower Catalonia, General Decaen had problems of his own. Admiral Sir Edward Pellew conducted a successful demonstration in the Bay of Rosas to deceive Decaen as to the actual location of the invasion with an elaborate invasion display, even disembarking a few hundred Royal Marines (8 June).³⁹⁷

The news of the British Mediterranean fleet's arrival off Rosas led Decaen to believe the Tarragona landing a ruse. Consequently, he remained in Upper Catalonia until 14 June, when he realized that the actual invasion point was Tarragona, and marched with the Division en Cerdagne and 2d Brigade Active to linkup with Maurice Mathieu who, in turn, unsuccessfully marched linkup with Suchet, only to return to Barcelona on 13 June to await General Decaen's arrival.

In the British camp, meanwhile, General Murray was apprehensive that Decaen and Suchet would attack and destroy his beachhead. Both sides in the finest comic opera style were apprehensive of the other, for neither had accurate intelligence. Indeed, the French commanders didn't even know the whereabouts of their fellow commanders. On 9 June, Murray received the heartening news that Suchet and Decaen were still far off.³⁹⁸

³⁹⁶SHAT C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 30 June 1813. General Maurice Mathieu sent off two dispatches telling Decaen that he must come and succour Tarragona immediately, lest the fortress fall. Oman, Peninsular War, 6:504.

³⁹⁷SHAT C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 30 June 1813. This successful deception is reminiscent of the Allied deception against Calais to draw the German forces away from the actual invasion site at Normandy for Operation Overload, June 1944. Ibid, 6:503; Napier, Peninsula War, 5:168-169; Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, 402-404.

³⁹⁸Oman, Peninsular War, 6:507.

As Murray continued his siege, he sent two divisions to reinforce the outlying Catalan divisions; but on the 11th he received news of the French approach and lost his nerve. Despite the fact that Tarragona was ripe for an assault and the French columns still two days off, Murray panicked raised the siege and evacuated, on the 13th despite the arguments of his enraged commanders.³⁹⁹

Meanwhile, Colonel Prévost commanding one of Murray's outlying units captured the fort of San Felipe and held Suchet off. On 14 June the Royal Navy, disembarked General Mackenzie's Division, but reembarked on Suchet's approach.⁴⁰⁰ General Maurice Mathieu then linked up with Suchet and relieved Tarragona. On the 18th, Lord William Bentinck with a naval squadron embarked Prevost's troops, blew up Fort San Felipe and sailed with the rest of the Anglo-Sicilian Expeditionary Force to Alicante. This sorry affair ended in General Murray's court-martial in 1814.⁴⁰¹

During the drama at Tarragona, Napoleon slashed the strength of the Army of Catalonia by another 33% from 35,680 men to 23,925.⁴⁰² His overriding concern was his main front in Germany, and fielding another army after the disaster in Russia.⁴⁰³ He

³⁹⁹Oman, Peninsular War, 6:505, 507-512. Napier, Peninsula War, 5:148-158; Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, 402, 404; Laffaille, Mémoires, 280-283.

⁴⁰⁰Oman, Peninsular War, 6:515; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:315.

⁴⁰¹Laffaile, Mémoires, 282; Oman, Peninsular War, 6:513, 517-522.

⁴⁰²This included a horse reduction from 1,916 to 1,309. SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1812. C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 30 June 1813.

⁴⁰³In January Napoleon fired off letters to General Clarke to begin work on forming a 150,000 man army in four corps, a Corps d'observation de l'Elbe, Corps d'observation d'Italie and two Corps d'observation du Rhin. CN, No. 19425, Napoleon to General

ordered General Clarke to form thirty provisional regiments (régiments provisoires), partly from the fifth battalions of twenty-four regiments in Spain, to stiffen the German and Italian fronts with battle hardened troops. He hoped to assemble 60 battalions and 34 depots totaling 168,000 men, including the twenty two cohorts distributed amongst the Corps d'observation d'Italie, de l'Elbe, du Rhin and the Grande Armée.⁴⁰⁴ The Emperor began this reduction in Catalonia by ordering on 4 January 1813 the 1er Ligne Westphalien and artillery to Cassel, the 3e Ligne de Berg, and a variety of units to France to form cadres. As the year advanced, the Ministry of War accelerated the recall of cadre units to France to receive the conscripts of the class of 1814.⁴⁰⁵

In March 1813, Napoleon recalled officers from Catalonia for his cadres, restructured cavalry squadrons in two or three 125 man companies, and reduced infantry

Clarke, 6 January 1813, 24:370-371; No. 19429, Napoleon to General Clarke, 7 January 1813, 24:373; No. 19431, Napoleon to General Clarke, 7 January 1813, 24:374-375; No. 19433 Napoleon to General Clarke, 7 January 1813, 24:376-377; No. 19437, Napoleon to Berthier, 9 January 1813, 24:378-380; No. 19445, Napoleon to General Clarke, 12 January 1813, 24:385-387; No. 19446, Napoleon to General Clarke, 12 January 1813, 24:387-388; No. 19447, Napoleon to General Clarke, 12 January 1813, 24:388-389; No. 19448, Napoleon to General Clarke, 14 January 1813, 24:390; No. 19459, Napoleon to General Clarke, 15 January 1813, 24:390-395; No. 19452, Napoleon to General Clarke, 16 January 1813, 24:395.

⁴⁰⁴CN, No. 19431, Napoleon to General Clarke, 7 January 1813, 24:374-375; the 1er Corps d'Observation du Rhin, for example had 49 battalions. Of these, there were nine provisional regiments with 18 battalions. No. 19433, Napoleon to Clarke, 7 January 1813, 24:376-377; No. 19445, Napoleon to General Clarke, 12 January 1813, 24:385-387; No. 19431, Napoleon to Clarke, 7 January 1813, 24:374-375; No. 19447, Napoleon to Clarke, 12 January 1813, 24:388-389.

⁴⁰⁵CN, No. 19417, Napoleon to General Clarke, 4 January 1813, 24:365; No. 19669, Napoleon to Clarke, 6 March 1813, 25:34-35.

battalions to 840 men with two per regiment.⁴⁰⁶ In the former case for example, General Decaen's Chief of Staff, General Hamelinaye sent experienced captains in the 5e and 20e Ligne to cadre duty, replacing them with newly promoted officers.⁴⁰⁷

Earlier in January the Grande Armée numbered 266,000 men while the armies in Spain shrank to 303,000.⁴⁰⁸ To stretch his troops even further, Napoleon restructured units, adding a sixth conscript battalion to existing regiments and remanned the remainder.⁴⁰⁹ He even restructured his train regiments to two battalions of four companies each and a depot company.⁴¹⁰

Every man counted and Napoleon tightened administrative procedures to better account for the troops in France which he could send to Germany. General Decaen took the rump of the Division de Sègre, forming the Division en Cerdagne, under General Esprit; while the Ministry of War, recalled the rest of these units.⁴¹¹ General Decaen then

⁴⁰⁶CN, No. 19417, Napoleon to Clarke, 4 January 1813, 24:365; No. 19669, Napoleon to Clarke, 6 March 1813, 25:34-35.

⁴⁰⁷SHAT, C(8)371, Registre de Correspondance, No. 842, General Hamelinaye to Inspecteur aux Revues Prisy, 8 July 1813.

⁴⁰⁸CN, No. 19496, Note Dictée en Conseil des Ministres, 24 January 1813, 24:433-435.

⁴⁰⁹The cadres of the 2nd, 3rd and 6th battalions would fill their units up from the conscripts arriving from France. These regiments would go to the Grand Armée. CN, No. 19432, Napoleon to General Clarke, 23 January 1813, 24:423-425; No. 19500 Napoleon to Eugene Napoleon, Vice-Roi d'Italie, 24 January 1813, 24:437-440.

⁴¹⁰Ibid. No. 19532, Napoleon to General Clarke, 4 February 1813, 24:474-475.

⁴¹¹The rump division took the 102e Ligne and 1er Hussards from the Division de Sègre. The Ministry recalled the 3e-116e Ligne, 29e, 30e and 31e Cohorts. SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1812; C(8)371, Situation, Corps d'Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1813.

reformed the new division with two infantry regiments and a cavalry company, up to 2,281 men.⁴¹²

This division was to defend the French frontier against Catalan incursions and maintain order in the Cerdagne.⁴¹³ Napoleon, also mindful of Catalan depredations, mobilized a National Guard brigade (cohorte) to guard the French Pyrenees.⁴¹⁴ When he withdrew cohortes from Spain for the emergency in Germany,⁴¹⁵ it terribly strained French manpower resources.⁴¹⁶ By June the Division fought one action (27-29 June) against Erole and Rovira's 3,000 insurgents.⁴¹⁷

⁴¹²The division's new units were the 102e Ligne, 143e Ligne, and a company of the 1er Hussards. The Division en Cerdagne's strength present under arms was 2,140 men and 50 horses. Its hospitals were, however, nearly cleared out, reflecting repatriation. Numbers of hospitalized fell 89.3% from 1,318 to 140, Ibid.

⁴¹³CN, No. 19854, Napoleon to General Clarke, 13 April 1813, 25:191.

⁴¹⁴In a letter to General Clarke, after one of the many brigand incursions over the Spanish frontier, Napoleon told him: "Je vous avais mandé de diriger de ce côté une brigade de cohortes de gardes nationales....Les cohortes de gardes nationales ne doivent pas entrer en Espagne, mais seulement garder les frontières." CN, No. 19323, Napoleon to General Clarke, 5 November 1812, 24:300. This is reminiscent of earlier Catalan incursions and their consequent call up of Gardes Nationales in 1808. SHAT, C(8)8 Général Martin, Arrêté Concernant l'Organisation d'un Bataillon de Gardes Nationales, Destiné à la Défense de la Frontière, 1 July 1808. These two battalions were the cohortes of the 1er Ban de la Garde Nationale from the Département des Landes and a battalion of Gardes Nationales d'Elite from Basses-Pyrénées, and would guard the 10e Division Limitrophes de l'Espagne.

⁴¹⁵CN, No. 19400, Napoleon to General Clarke, 26 December 1812, 24:352.

⁴¹⁶The cohortes alone absorbed 17,000 men in reinforcements. CN, No. 19415, Napoleon to General Clarke, 3 January 1813, 24:362. This included the 1er Bataillon de la Garde Nationale de l'Aude. The soldiers and officers in this battalion requested Imperial permission to join the Grand Armée. The Emperor, not passing up such an opportunity approved this request. CN, No. 19486, Decision, 23 January 1813, 24:426.

⁴¹⁷Oman, Peninsular War, 6:

The second major unit of the Army of Catalonia was the Division en Haute Catalogne. Its subordinate commands were the 1er and 2e Brigades Actives, and its garrison commands of Gerona and Figueras, underwent minor changes and decreased a mere 4% to 12,302 men. Its present under arms strength was 11,418, with 1,959 in hospital.⁴¹⁸ The division in Lower Catalonia, too, remained unchanged. On the whole, the Army of Catalonia numbered 22,460 men present under arms, 1,336 in hospital, and 23,925 men total effectives.⁴¹⁹

The second half of 1813 showed itself no less interesting than the first. In June, General Bentinck reorganized his army at Alicante, while Marshal Suchet engaged in active operations defeating a Spanish division at the Battle of Aleira on 13 June.⁴²⁰ Wellington's victory at the Battle of Vitoria on 21 June, which destroyed the French Kingdom of Spain,⁴²¹ galvanized another coalition against Napoleon in Germany⁴²² and

⁴¹⁸See Table 22. SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1812; Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1813; Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 30 June 1813; CN, No. 19416, Napoleon to General Clarke, 4 January 1813, 24:362-365; SHAT C(8) 411, Situation, Place de Gerone, 1 January 1813; Situation, Fort de Figueras, 1 February 1813; Situation, Place de Bascara, 16 February 1813; Situation, Arrondissement de Rosas, 1 June 1813.

⁴¹⁹Ibid.

⁴²⁰Oman, Peninsular War, 7:66-67.

⁴²¹The now dethroned King Joseph wrote to his wife Julie Clary Bonaparte, "I do not think that affairs in Spain can be re-established except by a general peace. I am staying here because the frontier is in danger, but as soon as the first wave of terror wears off and the defense is organized, I shall be useless." A. du Casse, ed. Mémoires et Correspondance Politique et Militaire du Roi Joseph, 14 Vols, 2e Edition, (Paris: Perrotin Librairie-Editeur, 1841) 13:343, Joseph Napoléon to Julie, 1 July 1813, quoted in Michael Glover, The Peninsular War 1807-1814, A Concise Military History, 244.

⁴²²Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, 392.

threw all French occupied Spain into disarray. Indeed, all the French armies except Marshal Suchet's and General Decaen's were concentrated back towards the French frontier, poised to begin the last tragic campaign of the Peninsular War.⁴²³

On the Catalan front proper, General Decaen continued his counterinsurgent war, sending units from one hot spot to another and continuing the relentless logistical 'war' which every commander there had to wage. Throughout July, General Lamarque's troops continually patrolled the Upper Catalan roads to keep them clear of insurgents,⁴²⁴ and small supply convoys absorbed large bodies of troops for escort duty. Decaen sent General Lamarque with his two brigades actives (Beuremann and Petit) to escort a convoy to Barcelona.⁴²⁵ This stripped Upper Catalonia of field units except for General Esprit's brigade. No sooner than Lamarque started off than an insurgent attack in Upper Catalonia brought him rushing back.⁴²⁶ The insurgents were so active that not only did Decaen still need 5,000 troops⁴²⁷ to escort a convoy, but they virtually held the operational initiative and forced the French onto the defensive.

⁴²³Michael Glover, Wellington's Peninsular Victories, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963) 128.

⁴²⁴SHAT C(8) 317, Registre de Correspondance, No. 843, General Decaen to General Beaurmann, 8 July 1813.

⁴²⁵SHAT C(8) 317, No. 916, Decaen to General Lamarque 13 July 1813; No. 917, Decaen to Ordonnateur Boudon 13 July 1813, No. 918, Decaen to Boudon 13 July 1813; No. 919, Decaen to Lamarque, 13 July 1813; No. 920, Decaen to Boundon, 14 July 1813; No. 930, Decaen to Lamarque, 14 July 1813; No. 931, Decaen to General Travost, 10e Division Militaire, 14 July 1813.

⁴²⁶Ibid., No. 922, Decaen to General Esprit, Commander of the Division en Cerdagne, 14 July 1813.

⁴²⁷SHAT C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 30 June 1813.

General Decaen was also heavily engaged in the process of sending troops back to France, to reinforce Napoleon's German front, even before the disaster at Leipzig in October 1813. These troop transfers began in February 1813 and picked up speed as the year progressed.

When Suchet received the news of the catastrophe at Vitoria on 3 July,⁴²⁸ he resolved to abandon Valencia,⁴²⁹ after General Murray abandoned his Tarragona siege works. Suchet threw together a hotchpotch brigade of 2,000 men. Marching on Lower Catalonia, he linked up with a brigade from Maurice Mathieu's garrison of Barcelona and replenished the ammunition supplies of Tarragona. Decaen, now with 8,000 troops searched to strike at the insurgent army, but it too retired when Murray left. On 1 July 1813, Decaen returned to Barcelona. On 2 July he resolved on another offensive against General Copons' force at Vich, which now unbeknownst to the French general, numbered some 8,000 troops. Decaen resolved to attack in two columns, his own of ten battalions, and a 2,000 man brigade under General Lamarque. The columns marched out on 6 July. Decaen had meanwhile learned of the French defeat at Vitoria and decided to break off the offensive and recall his columns already in motion. He halted his own column and sent out triplicate orders to Lamarque to return. Unfortunately, General Lamarque, commanding his second column never received Decaen's message and continued his

⁴²⁸Oman, Peninsular War, 7:68.

⁴²⁹Suchet left garrisons behind at Devia, Pensicola, Saguntum and Morella, in the hope that these posts would facilitate the eventual reconquest at Valencia. Ibid, 7:68-69. Don W. Alexander, Rod of Iron, French Counterinsurgency Policy in Aragon during the Peninsular War, (Wilmington, Delaware, Scholarly Resources Inc.,1985), 220-221. Suchet, War in Spain, 2:323-328.

march against Copons, defeated him in a sharp action on 8 July.⁴³⁰ Copons now counter attacked and he nearly destroyed Lamarque's unsupported brigade at a battle at La Salud before Decaen rescued him from destruction.⁴³¹

Once the news of Decaen's near disaster reached Paris, General Clarke severely reprimanded him for indecision during the Siege of Tarragona and his inability to march to the cannon! In this unfortunate operation, he planned an offensive, called it off and did not inform his subordinates, allowing them to be nearly destroyed. This episode was the "last straw" and destroyed Decaen's little remaining credit with Paris.⁴³²

Marshal Suchet, meanwhile, evacuated Valencia, leaving garrisons behind to hold the province in a last ditch defense.⁴³³ He then assumed "operational control" of the Army of Catalonia and ordered General Decaen to concentrate 10,000 men to assist him in fending off another Anglo-Sicilian invasion of Catalonia. Decaen, however, was hard pressed to find the troops, but managed to get about 8,000 men,⁴³⁴ while Suchet prepared to defend Lower Catalonia.

Lord William Bentinck, meanwhile, prepared for his own offensive. Erroneously informed that Suchet and Decaen evacuated Valencia and most of Lower Catalonia, he

⁴³⁰SHAT, C(8) 317, Registre de Correspondance, No. 843, General Decaen to General Beurnann 8 July 1813; No. 844, Decaen to General (Colonel) Petit, 8 July 1813; No. 852, Decaen to Lamarque 9 July 1813 and No. 889, Decaen to General Esprit, 11 July 1813.

⁴³¹Oman, Peninsular War, 7:70-71. Napier, Peninsula War, 6:46-47.

⁴³²Oman, Peninsular War, 7:71.

⁴³³Ibid, 7:75-58. Napier, Peninsula War, 6:48-49; Alexander, Rod of Iron, 220-223. Suchet, War in Spain, 2:328-334.

⁴³⁴Oman, Peninsular War, 7:78.

planned to besiege Tarragona, Barcelona and Tortosa. Suchet, however, had 15,000 men near Tarragona while Decaen marched with reinforcements. Bentinck advanced on Tarragona and invested it on 30 July. Suchet waited with four divisions on the Llobregat, while General Decaen escorted a convoy of sick, wounded, and refugees from Valencia to Upper Catalonia, and returned to Barcelona escorting a provision convoy.⁴³⁵

Though Bentinck had invested Tarragona, his enormous logistical difficulties and Suchet's presence forced him to postpone landing his siege train until the arrival of reinforcements.⁴³⁶ When Decaen arrived on 14 August, Suchet advanced, forcing Bentinck to raise the investment and retreat. Suchet then evacuated Tarragona, blew up its fortifications, and released General Decaen to return back to Upper Catalonia to disperse the resurgent guerrillas.⁴³⁷

During this period, Suchet remained in his defensive positions with about 57,000 men, determined to hold Catalonia and safeguard the French frontier. The garrisons remaining in Valencia and Lower Catalonia swallowed up 27,000 and another three brigades (about 5,000) were engaged in escorting convoys, leaving 25,000 field troops including Decaen's 8,000.⁴³⁸

⁴³⁵SHAT C(8) 317, Registre, No. 949, Decaen to General Clarke, 20 July 1813; Oman, Peninsular War, 7:78-83.

⁴³⁶Bentinck's lack of land transport was so acute that he required Royal Navy support to supply his Army, while his Spanish units shifted for themselves. Ibid, 7:83-86.

⁴³⁷Ibid, 7:83-87; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:336-337.

⁴³⁸Oman, Peninsular War, 7:87-90; Wellington Dispatches, Wellington to Lord William Bentinck, 4th August 1813, 6:647-648; Wellington to Bentinck, 9th August 1813, 6:666; Wellington to Bentinck, 9th August 1813, 6:666-669; Wellington to Bentinck, 14th August 1813, 6:678-679.

During this "lull," Marshal Nicolas Jean de Dieu Soult, Duc de Dalmatia (1769-1851), newly appointed commander of the Armée d'Espagne,⁴³⁹ and Suchet organized the defense of the Pyrénées. On 10 August, Soult requested that Suchet open an offensive to relieve the pressure on the Army of Spain⁴⁴⁰ which recently suffered a double defeat at the Battle of Sorauren (28 and 30 July).⁴⁴¹ Soult enjoined Suchet to link up with the Army of Spain. The two combined armies, 80,000 strong he argued would then fall on Wellington's flank, forcing him back into the heart of Spain. Marshal Suchet, however, considered the idea unworkable and refused to cooperate, for Lord William Bentinck would certainly advance to the French frontier unchecked by garrisons in Catalonia.⁴⁴²

⁴³⁹CN, No. 20208, Napoleon to Marshal Soult, Commandant en chef des Armées en Espagne, 1 July 1813, 25:447-448.

⁴⁴⁰The Emperor ordered the Armies of Portugal (General Reille) du Centre (General D'Erlon), du Midi (General Gazan) and du Nord, (General Clausel) united under Maréchal Soult as the Armée d'Espagne. CN, No. 20234, Napoleon to Clarke, 6 July 1813, 25:463-464. Napoleon ordered Clarke:

Vous ferez connaître au duc de Dalmatie le décret que j'ai pris pour réorganiser l'armée d'Espagne. Je désire qu'il forme autant de divisions qu'il aura de fois 6,000 hommes: ainsi, s'il réunit 72,000 hommes, ie aura douze divisions.

No. 20236, Napoleon to Clarke, 6 July 1813, 24:465. Commandant Clerc, Campagne du Maréchal Soult dans Les Pyrénées Occidentales en 1813-1814, (Paris: Librairie Militaire de l'Baudoin, 1894), 2:21-22. Oman, Peninsular War, 5:591-596.

⁴⁴¹Clerc, Campagne dans les Pyrénées Occidentales, 45-65. Oman, Peninsular War, 6:587-680.

⁴⁴²Oman, Peninsular War, 7:90-94. Glover, Wellington's Peninsular Victories, 135. Suchet, War in Spain, 2:337-341. Additionally, the reader must understand the personal attitudes of both Marshals. Neither was willing to serve "under" the other. Napoleon correctly titled Soult "the best strategic brain in the Peninsula." His faults were, however, as great as his talents: "Selfishness, jealousy, folie de grandeur, mendacity, avarice, and a strong measure of idleness on occasion." Marshal Suchet also possessed great talent. He was the best administrator in Spain, but he could be impossible to serve with. Richard Humble, Napoleon's Peninsular Marshals, a Reassessment, (New York: Taplinger

In any case, operations in eastern Spain ground on slowly as General Bentinck prepared to launch a third invasion of Catalonia. He discovered that General Decaen had returned to Upper Catalonia, and again thinking the French were abandoning Lower Catalonia, he marched again on Tarragona on 27 August with 22,000 men supported by his Spanish allies and the Royal Navy. He occupied the abandoned fortress and organized its defense while his Catalan allies shadowed Barcelona, blockading Tortosa, Mequinenza and Lerida, and besieging Pensicola and Saguntum. General Cupons, in fact, scored an impressive victory on 10 September at Pallega, only ten miles from Barcelona, when his troops destroyed a French battalion.⁴⁴³

Bentinck was, however, mistaken in his assumption, for Decaen's task was to clear the roads to Gerona to allow the passage of convoys.⁴⁴⁴ In September, Bentinck however continued his advance through Lower Catalonia, repaired and resupplied Tarragona, and occupied Reus, Valls and the Ordal Pass.⁴⁴⁵

Marshal Suchet, hearing of Bentinck's advance, concentrated his 12,000 men at Molins de Rey and recalled Decaen's 10,000 men from Upper Catalonia. He launched a lightning offensive in two columns, converging on Ordal, where on the 13th, he routed an English brigade, and advanced on to Bentinck's positions, while the English General

Publishing Co., 1973), 216-219. Napier, Peninsula War, 5:325-334.

⁴⁴³SHAT C(8) 326, *Registre de Correspondance*, Decaen to Lamarque 12 August 1813; Decaen to Lamarque, 12 August 1813 and Decaen to Maurice Mathieu, 13 August 1813.

⁴⁴⁴Oman, Peninsular War, 7:96-97.

⁴⁴⁵*Ibid*, 7:100-103; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:242-243; Napier, Peninsula War, 5:574-577; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 3:373-374.

retired to Tarragona. There, Bentinck discovered that Sicily had plunged into civil strife. He immediately placed General Sir William Clinton in command and returned.⁴⁴⁶

From July to December 1813, the European military situation continued to drive force structure development. The main front in Germany needed troops, and the defection of Napoleon's German allies forced a radical restructuring of many French commands, and the accelerated withdrawal of troops from Spain.⁴⁴⁷ Soult now defended the western Pyrenees, and Suchet withdrew into Catalonia, the two Marshals, debated campaign plans. Suchet proposed that the Minister of War combine their two armies under his command for the summer campaign. Surprisingly, even Soult assented to it. General Clarke and Soult concurred with the plan, and the Emperor approved it in October. He ordered Suchet to reinforce the garrisons at Barcelona, Figueras and Puycerda, and concentrate his available field force. Napoleon expressed his confidence in Suchet by appointing him Colonel General of the Imperial Guard and awarding him the command of the Army of Catalonia at the end of the year.⁴⁴⁸

The structure of the Army of Catalonia remained essentially unchanged since June 1813, though continued withdrawals reduced its size. The Emperor recalled all of its German units from Catalonia, including the 1er Léger Nassau, and 1er Ligne Wurtzbourg which were disarmed.⁴⁴⁹ The desertion of the Nassau and Frankfort infantry from the

⁴⁴⁶Oman, Peninsular War, 7:103-106; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:343-345.

⁴⁴⁷Von Pivka, Napoleon's German Allies (1), 17.

⁴⁴⁸Suchet, War in Spain, 2:338-339, 350-353; Napier, Peninsula War, 5:325-334.

⁴⁴⁹Oman, Peninsular War, 7:408; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:358; SHAT C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 30 June 1813.

Army of Spain during the Battle of the Nive compelled Napoleon to disarm his German units, and return them to France for fear of further desertion.⁴⁵⁰

In August, Decaen received 4,341 troops which Suchet had borrowed earlier during his operations against the Anglo-Sicilian invasion. It was, however, a short lived though welcome reinforcement, for in the next month the Ministry of War increased troop reductions in Catalonia,⁴⁵¹ including the withdrawal of conscripts from Decaen's regimental depots. These however did not effect the present troop strength, only their future strength by reducing the flow of replacements.⁴⁵²

The Army of Catalonia in November 1813 its last month of independent existence retained its existing organization and increased its manpower despite Ministerial conscript and unit withdrawals. Its effective strength rose 5.1% from 22,460 to 23,662, but hospital admissions ballooned 48.3% (1,336 to 2,583).⁴⁵³

The year brought considerable operational activity. The Anglo-Sicilian Army halfheartedly developed a second Peninsular front and Wellington shattered Joseph Bonaparte's kingdom for good. The Army of Catalonia however weathered the stress of

⁴⁵⁰The Emperor's fears of desertion had some foundation, for Colonel Kruse, who led the 1er Nassau defection at Nive, sent a letter to Colonel Méder, Commander of the 1er Léger Nassau, to defect too. Méder, however, remained loyal and turned the letter over to Suchet. Many German soldiers in the Army of Aragon and Catalonia deserted General Clinton in December 1813. Oman, Peninsular War, 7:408-409.

⁴⁵¹SHAT C(8)411, Situation, l'Armée de Catalogne, 22 August 1813.

⁴⁵²SHAT, C(8) 320, Registre de Correspondance, No. 1438, Decaen to General Lamarque, 10 October 1813; No. 1439, Decaen to General Maurice Mathieu, 10 October 1813; No. 1440, Decaen to General Esprit, 10 October, 1813 and No. 1445, Decaen, Order, 11 October 1813.

⁴⁵³SHAT C(8) 317, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 November 1813.

the year's campaigning with less disastrous loss than the Army of Spain though General Decaen's vacillating operations and near disasters cost him his command in favor of the more successful Marshal Suchet. The Army of Catalonia underwent little structural change except the steady drain of troop units and the subtler siphoning off of replacements coming from the regimental depots. The Army's strength, even with a reduced mission precluded its conduct of field operations and garrison duties. Only the active cooperation of Suchet and Decaen mollified this condition. In the end, only the combination of the Armies of Catalonia and Aragon and the abandonment of Suchet's holdings in Valencia, Aragon and a good portion of Lower Catalonia, allowed for the effective defense of Upper Catalonia and the French frontier.

§9. Last Phase: The Campaign of 1814

In the autumn of 1813, the new commander of the Anglo-Sicilian Army, General Sir William Clinton, positioned his troops near Tarragona while, General Elio, with four divisions of his Second Army besieged Tortosa, Lerida, Saguntum and some smaller French posts. Marshal Suchet's new "combined" Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne occupied the line of the lower Ebro River, with 28,000 troops and held the fortresses of Lower Catalonia. He reasoned that the possession of these posts was essential to the reconquest of Lower Catalonia. In the meantime, they could tie down a considerable body of enemy troops.⁴⁵⁴ Secondly, Suchet would have to justify abandoning them to the Emperor.

On 25 November, Napoleon reacted to Wellington's success in the Pyrenees and the threat to the French frontier by calling on Suchet to withdraw more troops, allowing him to retrieve the garrisons of Lerida, Mequenensa and Tortosa and blow up their fortifications.⁴⁵⁵ Suchet now concentrated two divisions, two separate brigades and three

⁴⁵⁴Oman, Peninsular War, 7:406-407. A good fortress garrisoned with 5,000 men can keep a good portion of the enemy troops otherwise occupied with a blockade/siege instead of on the main front required, using a force of from 15,000 to 25,000 to besiege it. Smaller posts occupied an even larger besieging force. Consequently, the garrisons of Lerida, Tortosa, and Barcelona could occupy several divisions, allowing Suchet to bring more force to bear on the battlefield. Wellington, for example besieged Badajos (garrisoned by 5,000 French) with 12,000 and later 16,000 men. He also besieged St. Sebastian (garrisoned by 3,400) with 11,000. John T. Jones, Journal of the Sieges Carried on by the Army Under the Duke of Wellington in Spain Between the Years 1811 and 1814 with an Account of the Lines of Torres Vedras, (London, High Holborn, 1846), 2:309-311. The fortress' ability to occupy much larger numbers of besieging troops (by at least a factor of two) makes it a potent "economy of force" instrument.

⁴⁵⁵Oman, Peninsular War, 7:407.

cavalry regiments on 2 December to attack General Clinton's Anglo-Sicilian Army, which had retired behind the Ebro.⁴⁵⁶

Napoleon faced his greatest threat on the eastern frontier both in terms of enemy action and allied defections. He withdrew all of Marshal Suchet's German troops⁴⁵⁷ and interned them in response to the defection of the Nassau and Frankfort regiments over to Wellington on 10 December 1813, after the Battle of Nive. Colonel Kruse commander of Soult's Nassau Regiment unsuccessfully, urged Colonel Médor, commander of Suchet's Nassau Regiment to defect en masse with his unit. Some German soldiers did, in fact, desert over to the Anglo-Sicilians, though the unit remained on the whole loyal to Napoleon. In any case, the Emperor withdrew 2,500 German troops from Suchet's forces.⁴⁵⁸

He also ordered Suchet to transfer 120 men from each of his infantry regiments, some 5,000 men, to form cadres for two reserve divisions forming at Nîmes and Montpellier which he sent respectively to man a new Corps d'Armée under the aging

⁴⁵⁶Ibid, 7:407-408. Napier, Peninsula War, 7:482. Suchet did make a dash from his lines to mask a convoy marching to revictual Barcelona. This thankless logistical mission continued until the end of the war.

⁴⁵⁷These included two battalions of the 1er Ligne Nassau, the battalion of the 4e Ligne Westphalien and the Nassau and Westphalian Light Cavalry.

⁴⁵⁸Despite Colonel Medor's loyalty, Napoleon had the 1er Nassau discretely disarmed and interned in a French fortress. Oman, Peninsular War, 7:408; Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, 458. The Emperor ordered the 4e Régiment Étranger back to Antwerp and told General Clarke to arrange to have them disarmed once they arrived and "interned" in the French interior. He ordered the same measures taken with the Régiment de Castille and the units of the Confederation of the Rhine in the Armies of Catalonia and Spain. Once disarmed they were to be sent to the dépôts de prisonniers. CN, No. 20940, Napoleon to General Clarke, 25 November 1813, 26:466; No. 20941, Napoleon to Clarke, 25 November 1813, 26:467; No. 20942, Napoleon to Clarke, 25 November 1813, 26:467.

Marshal Augereau forming at Lyon, and to garrison the fortresses of the eastern Pyrenees. Napoleon also withdrew another 800 veteran troops to form cadres for the Imperial Guard. These transfers cost Suchet about 8,500 men, the equivalent of an entire division.⁴⁵⁹

As the allies closed in on the French frontier with a powerful combined army, Napoleon attempted a political gambit he hoped would quickly end the Peninsular War in order to allow him to concentrate all his forces on the Rhine. He cajoled "King" Ferdinand VII to sign a worthless document, the spurious Treaty of Valençay, declaring a separate peace with Spain in exchange for his release. The Emperor planned a complete military withdrawal from Spain based on this treaty, and ordered Marshal Suchet on 4 January 1814, to abandon all the French fortresses in the Spanish provinces still under French occupation. On 10 January, Suchet received the Imperial order to concentrate an 11,000 man division on the Pyrenees and march to Lyons once the Treaty of Valencay was ratified.⁴⁶⁰ The Spanish Cortez however, refused to ratify the treaty and continued the war.⁴⁶¹

⁴⁵⁹Oman, Peninsular War, 7:408. Napoleon even withdrew three divisions with 14,435 men and 40 cannon from Marshal Soult's Armée d'Espagne in January 1814. Clerc, Campagne de Maréchal Soult, 315-317; Napier, War in the Peninsula, 7:482-483.

⁴⁶⁰Wellington momentarily feared that Copons would treat separately with Suchet and allow the French garrisons in Catalonia to return to Suchet. Suchet, War in Spain, 2:360-362; Oman, Peninsular War, 7:408-410; Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, 451-452; Clerc, Campagne de Maréchal Soult, 309-314.

⁴⁶¹Oman, Peninsular War, 7:411. Napoleon wanted Suchet to concentrate all his cavalry (a division of 2,708 men and 2,881 horses), horse artillery (with 433 men and 131 horses) and some 8,000 infantry. SHAT C(8)372, Situation Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814.

Marshal Suchet even requested permission to abandon his fortresses, except for 2,500 men at Barcelona and 2,000 at Figueras to insure that Copons and Clinton allowed the other French garrisons passage to the frontier.⁴⁶² The Allied passage of the Rhine in December 1813 and the beginning of the 1814 Campaign forced Napoleon to set the treaty aside and strip his other armies to defend France. On 14 January, General Clarke ordered Suchet immediately to send the bulk of his cavalry and an infantry division (8,000 men) back to France by 1 February.⁴⁶³

The new disposition did not allow Suchet to withdraw the French Division (Division Habert) garrisoning Barcelona (7,500 men), and reduced his field forces to 18,000 troops. Unable to continue holding the Llobregat line, however, he retired to Gerona leaving Barcelona (and other French posts) to fend for itself.

On 16 January General Clinton opened an offensive on the Llobregat line after receiving news of Suchet's force reduction. Attacking with only 6,000 men (he kept his British regiments in reserve) and reinforced by General Copons' Catalan Army, Clinton crossed the Llobregat in the face of stiff opposition, but broke off the engagement and withdrew when Suchet reinforced his line with some troops rushed up from Barcelona.

Suchet himself abandoned the Llobregat line and sent one of his brigades under General Pannetier (2nd Division) to Lyons and recognized his army into divisions and a

⁴⁶²Suchet also suggested sending Ferdinand VII to Barcelona to hasten the evacuation. Oman, Peninsular War, 7:411-412; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:364-365.

⁴⁶³Oman, Peninsular War, 412-413.

brigade by spring; a field force of 5,000 men and 10,000 garrisoning the posts in Upper Catalonia.⁴⁶⁴

The war was now winding down, but this was hardly an anticlimatic period. In January another catastrophe struck the French command in Catalonia, which was as devastating as the fall of Figueras in 1811. This was the Juan van Halen plot, which precipitated the capitulation of several French garrisons.

Juan Van Halen was a Flemish born Spanish officer, an Afrancescado, who served in King Joseph Bonaparte's Army since 1809. After Vitoria, he fled to Paris and successfully applied to the Ministry of War for another position on Marshal Suchet's staff. Van Halen, however, not wishing his fortunes to sink with Napoleon's, attempted a spectacular "patriotic" blow for Spain. Using knowledge of the French negotiations for the Treaty of Valençay, he got into secret communication with Baron Eroles, commander of the 1st Spanish Division, and stole the staff seal from Marshal Suchet's portfolio, the cypher and a quantity of "Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne" letterhead paper. He then boldly crossed the French piquets under a cavalry guard as a Parlementaire to Eroles. Quickly betraying his escort to capture, he deserted to Eroles.⁴⁶⁵

With General Eroles' assistance, he sent in phony French spies with forged letterhead dispatches informing the commanders of Tortosa, Lerida, and Monzon, of the Treaty of Valençay, attempting to convince them that the war was over, and they should,

⁴⁶⁴Oman, Peninsular War, 7:413-416; Napier, War in the Peninsula, 7:484-485; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:367-368; SHAT, C(8)271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

⁴⁶⁵Oman, Peninsular War, 7:416-417; Napier, War in the Peninsula, 7:487; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:368.

by the treaty, abandon their posts and march back to France. General Robert at Tortosa suspected a trap and refused. Général de Brigade Jean Baptiste Isidore, Baron Lamarque d'Arrouzat (1762-1834) commanding at Lerida, with an 1,800 man garrison and the Captain commanding 98 man garrison at Monzon fell for the ruse and were captured.⁴⁶⁶

Despite these disasters, Suchet and Napoleon continued to place hope in the Treaty of Valençay, and both tried to use Ferdinand VII as a bargaining chip to allow the French evacuation of Catalonia, and Napoleon sent Ferdinand to Suchet to negotiate the pact.⁴⁶⁷ Suchet made the Spanish monarch sign a pledge to release the captured garrison of Barcelona prior to his release. Ferdinand, however when released on 21 March, repudiated the treaty, killing it.

The French campaign, meanwhile, made great demands on the Grande Armée, and Napoleon, on 1 March 1814 ordered General Clarke to get another 10,000 troops from Suchet and evacuate his Catalan fortresses.⁴⁶⁸ Suchet immediately sent General Beuremann's division to Lyons and evacuated the fortresses in Catalonia except Figueras and Barcelona.⁴⁶⁹ His force as a result of the successive cuts fell in strength from five

⁴⁶⁶Oman, Peninsular War, 7:418-420; Napier, War in the Peninsula, 7:490-493.

⁴⁶⁷Napoleon wrote to General Clarke:

Laissez carte blanche au duc d'Albufera qu'il démolisse Barcelone ou garde ce qui lui conviendra....si le roi Ferdinand veut aller à Barcelone qu'il parte incognito. On lui remettra les places fortes moyennant le renvoi des garnisons françaises.

CN, No. 21213, Napoleon to Clarke, 8 February 1814, 27:135.

⁴⁶⁸CN, No. 21403, Napoleon to Clarke, 1 March 1814, 27:272-273.

⁴⁶⁹Oman, Peninsular War, 7:424; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:490; SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814.

infantry, one cavalry division, a separate brigade and garrisons (43,799 men) to one division, a reserve brigade and garrisons (19,315 men). Suchet also had to man the new III and IV Reserve Divisions forming at Nîmes and Montpellier providing 19 regimental depots and 6,400 troops.⁴⁷⁰

Suchet now took command of the 9th and 10th Military Divisions in March and pushed his line of communications through Perpignan-Narbonne-Beziers to evacuate Catalonia, repair the fortifications of Béziers, and Narbonne (Suchet's rear headquarters) and prepare the defense of Perpignan.⁴⁷¹ His main problem was, however, manpower, for by March, his army only numbered 19,000 men, and he needed more troops. Consequently, he ordered the garrisons of the 10th Military Division to squeeze 4,000 men out for the field.⁴⁷² Lord Wellington, meanwhile, ordered General Clinton to break up the Anglo-Sicilian Army as a now useless front but, only at the end of hostilities, for Suchet had not fully evacuated Catalonia.⁴⁷³ Another thunderbolt struck when Wellington

⁴⁷⁰SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814; Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814. He prepared Figueras for defense and determined to holding a line to both cover the French frontier and provide a base to recover the French fortresses remaining in Catalonia. Suchet, War in Spain, 2:382-383.

⁴⁷¹Suchet, War in Spain, 2:383, 388-391, 479.

⁴⁷²The former plan never worked, for the war ended. Suchet, however, did reopen negotiations with Soult to combine both their armies. Ibid, 2:393-397. Suchet's strength, according to his Memoirs, was 11,327 men and is low. Ibid, 2:393. According to the Situations of 1 April 1814, Suchet's strength present under arms was 16,166 active troops. SHAT, C(8)372, Armée d'Espagne, Situation, 1 April 1814.

⁴⁷³Wellington, Dispatches, Wellington to Lieutenant General Clinton, 4th March 1814, 7:343-344; Wellington to Clinton, 4th March 1814, 7:344; Wellington to Clinton, 8 March 1814, 7:360; Oman, Peninsular War, 7:429-430.

defeated Soult at the Battle of Toulouse on 10 April, inducing him to apply to Marshal Suchet for assistance,⁴⁷⁴ who sent 3,000 troops.⁴⁷⁵

Suchet now evacuated Upper Catalonia with his steadily shrinking army to defend the line of the Pyrenees. On 16 April, however, he received the dispatches declaring the fall of Paris on 30 March, the Emperor's abdication on 31 March and the restoration of the Bourbon Monarchy and a new king, Louis XVIII. The Marshal held a council of war and advised his generals of the Emperor's fall, and sent to Paris his allegiance to the royal government.⁴⁷⁶

With Napoleon's collapse, Wellington accepted an armistice, and Suchet set about the task of repatriating the French garrisons and prisoners in Catalonia. On 19 April, Marshal Berthier and the new Minister of War, General Pierre, Comte Dupont de l'Étang (1765-1840),⁴⁷⁷ dispatched news of the final armistice, and Suchet communicated this to Soult and Wellington and concluded his own armistice with General Copons while ordering the governors of Barcelona, Tortosa and Saguntum to evacuate the fortresses. General Habert, for example, did so on 28 May and arrived at Perpignan on 3 June.⁴⁷⁸

⁴⁷⁴Suchet, War in Spain, 2:399.

⁴⁷⁵Ibid, 2:393-395.

⁴⁷⁶Ibid, 2:397.

⁴⁷⁷General Dupont, (1765-1840) a rising star, defeated at Bailen in 1809 nicknamed "Le Capitulard" and disgraced by Napoleon.

⁴⁷⁸SHAT, C(8)271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:403-406.

As the war drew to a close, Marshal Suchet went to Toulouse with his commanders and presented himself to the Royal representative, the Duc d'Angoulême.⁴⁷⁹ Returning to Narbonne with the Duke, Suchet took command of his new Armée des Pyrénées combined with the Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne as the Armée du Sud on 4 May. By early June, the garrisons of Barcelona, Tortosa, Pensicola, and Saguntum reached the French frontier, and General Copons allowed the repatriation of 20,000 French prisoners.⁴⁸⁰

During the last period of General Decaen's command, as the war lurched to its end and the French armies slowly came apart at the seams, there were no grand operations. Certainly, Decaen lacked the troops and the credit with Paris to stand a failure. Decaen's task was to stave off a disaster and keep the Army of Catalonia running until Suchet replaced him. This was itself no mean task.

From September to November, 1813, General Decaen kept General Lamarque on the go as he had the only two disposable field brigades left in the army. General Esprit's Division en Cerdagne was tied to guarding the French frontier with a mere 2,448 troops. General Lamarque's division of 4,771 men, divided into two brigades under Generals Beuremann (2,155) and Petit (2,556) was the only disposable field force. The rest of

⁴⁷⁹Louis de Bourbon, Duc d'Angoulême (1775-1844) was the nephew to Louis XVIII was the Royal Representative who landed in France in 1814 to bring the populace over to the Bourbon cause.

⁴⁸⁰Suchet, War in Spain, 2:403-406.

Decaen's army of 18,933 men⁴⁸¹ were tied up in the physical occupation of French strong points.

On 23 August, Decaen sent Lamarque on one of the many interminable supply convoys to Barcelona.⁴⁸² On the conclusion of this all too necessary task, Decaen requested from Marshal Suchet⁴⁸³ the services of General Severoli's Italian Division to occupy St. Celoni on the main Barcelona - Gerona Road and cover the return trip of Lamarque's convoy. Decaen was in no position to risk another near disaster at La Salud. He coordinated this simple operation with the same care that Augereau and Macdonald lavished upon their huge convoys of 1810. He carefully supervised every movement, every position taken, and the actions of every commander until the conclusion of the convoy on 7 September.⁴⁸⁴ He sent some twenty-seven dispatches to complete this operation, undoubtedly keeping his staff working furiously and his dispatch riders and

⁴⁸¹SHAT C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 November 1813.

⁴⁸²SHAT C(8) 326, Registre de Correspondance, Decaen to Lamarque 18 August 1813; Decaen to Maurice Mathieu, 19 August 1813; Decaen to Lamarque, 22 August 1813; Decaen to Lamarque, 23 August 1813; Decaen to Maurice Mathieu, 23 August 1813; Decaen to Ordonnateur Raymond, 23 and 24 August 1813; Decaen to Lamarque, 24 August 1813.

⁴⁸³SHAT C(8) 326, General Decaen to Marshal Suchet, 19 August 1813; Decaen to General Severoli, 24 August 1813; Decaen to Maurice Mathieu, 24 August 1813; Decaen to Lamarque, (two letters) 24 and 25 August 1813.

⁴⁸⁴SHAT C(8) 326, General Decaen to General Severoli, 3 September 1813; Decaen to General Petit, 3 September 1813; Decaen to General Petit, 3 September 1813; Decaen to Severoli, 3 September 1813; Decaen to Petit, 3 September 1813; Decaen to Severoli, 4 September 1813; Decaen to General Ordonneau, 5 September 1813; Decaen to Severoli, 5 September 1813.

escorts forever in the saddle.⁴⁸⁵ The operation was entirely uneventful, and Lamarque returned with a convoy of 1,000 sick while Severoli and General Beuremann's brigade cleared the main road of ever present insurgents.⁴⁸⁶

General Decaen had virtually given up on gaining the strategic or tactical initiative in Catalonia. The direction of the war was in Marshal Suchet's hands, and he contented himself with the management of local operations and to cooperating with Suchet in fighting the Anglo-Sicilian threat as best he could with his two disposable brigades.⁴⁸⁷ October 1813 was exactly the same. His minuscule field force was totally occupied in convoys⁴⁸⁸ and cleaning insurgents off the line of communications.⁴⁸⁹

General Decaen was fully immersed in the administration of his army, particularly the handling of its internal security.⁴⁹⁰ He was also in contact with the Catalan Staff

⁴⁸⁵SHAT C(8) 326, Decaen to M. Dubois (dispatch rider) 12e Hussards, 5 September 1813; and Decaen to Severoli, 6 September 1813.

⁴⁸⁶SHAT C(8) 326, Decaen to Ordonnateur en Chef Bourdon, 7 September 1813; Decaen to General Beuremann, 7 September 1813; Decaen to Lamarque, 7 September 1813; Decaen to Severoli, 7 September 1813.

⁴⁸⁷SHAT C(8) 326. Decaen to General Hamelinaye, Chief of Staff, 14 September 1813; Decaen to General Nicolas, 14 and 15 September 1813; Decaen to General Beuremann 17 September 1813; Decaen to Severoli, 15 September 1813; and Decaen to Suchet, 15 September 1813.

⁴⁸⁸SHAT C(8) 320, Registre de Correspondance, No. 1357, Decaen to General Petit, 1 October 1813.

⁴⁸⁹SHAT C(8) 320, No. 1367, Decaen to General Gudin, (Army of Aragon), 3 October 1813.

⁴⁹⁰SHAT C(8) 320, No. 1388, Decaen to General Nogues, 5 October 1813; No. 1392, Decaen to Lamarque 5 October 1813; No. 1394, Decaen to Colonel Casabianca, Commander 6e Légion de Gendarmerie, 5 October 1813; and No. 1375, Decaen to Casabianca, 3 October 1813.

conducting unique negotiations on the treatment of prisoners, and the civilized conduct of the war and treatment of the inhabitants.⁴⁹¹ The regular administrative work of the army absorbed the rest of his time.⁴⁹² By November, when Marshal Suchet took command of his army and made him a mere 'disposable' general officer on the staff,⁴⁹³ Decaen virtually ceased all but the most minor operations, such as small convoys, escorting dispatch riders, as the hussar escort for a courier to Barcelona,⁴⁹⁴ or the establishment of security on the Pyrenees frontiers.⁴⁹⁵ Logistics still took center stage and Decaen assiduously managed these operations with his Commissaire-Ordonnateur.⁴⁹⁶ Generally, the Army of Catalonia, no longer an independent force, its commander now

⁴⁹¹SHAT C(8) 320, No. 1358 and 1359, Decaen to General Nogues, (2 letters) 1 October 1813; No. 1361, Decaen to General Pallmerol, Commander of Figueras, 2 October 1813; No. 1365, Decaen to General Clarke, 3 October 1813; No. 1386 and 1401, Decaen to General Clarke, 5 October 1813; SHAT C(8) 327, Registre de Correspondance avec l'Etat major Espagnol; No. 28, Decaen to Adjudant General Cabanes 2 October 1813; No. 29 and 30 Decaen to Cabanes, 8 October 1813; No. 31, Decaen to Cabanes, 21 October 1813; No. 32, Decaen to Cabanes, 25 October 1813; and No. 32, Decaen to Cabanes, 28 October 1813.

⁴⁹²Register C(8) 317 and 320 are replete with a mass of administrative correspondence on every internal issue of the Army of Catalonia.

⁴⁹³SHAT C(8) 372, Tableau de l'organisation des Armées d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 December 1813.

⁴⁹⁴SHAT C(8) 320, No. 1419, Decaen to General Severoli, 7 October 1813; No. 1420 Decaen to Chef de Bataillon Voisin, Commandant d'armes à Hostalrich, 7 October 1813; and No. 1421 Decaen to Lamarque, 8 October 1813.

⁴⁹⁵SHAT C(8) 320, No. 1425, Decaen to Lamarque, 9 October 1813.

⁴⁹⁶SHAT C(8) 320, No. 1432, Decaen to Ordonnateur Bourdon 9 October 1813; No. 1492, Decaen to Lamarque, 22 October 1813; No. 1493, Commissaire des guerres Bérard, 22 October 1813; and No. 1494, Decaen to Bourdon, 22 October 1813.

a mere subordinate to Marshal Suchet, quietly passed to Suchet's command in November 1813.

This period, from October 1813 to May 1814 was one of radical force structure changes in the Army of Catalonia. It lost its independence in October and its structural integrity in December, becoming part of the Army of Aragon and Catalonia which later combined with the Army of the Pyrenees. As we have seen, General Decaen's "lackluster" performance during the invasion of Catalonia in June 1813, and his near disaster at La Salud destroyed his already poor credit with the Emperor, who virtually relieved him of command in November 1813.⁴⁹⁷

Marshal Suchet, meanwhile, assumed command of his combined army to defend the eastern Pyrenees. Although he received a net increase in troop strength by December, and requested new conscripts,⁴⁹⁸ this was offset in the loss of two divisions, and the internment of his German troops as a result of the defection at the Battle of Nive. In this

⁴⁹⁷Oman, Peninsular War, 7:73-74; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:350-353. General Clark's letters to Marshal Suchet in September and October discuss the Armies of Aragon and Catalonia, without reference to General Decaen. The Ministre clearly saw Suchet as commander of both armies. "Informed as you are by the letters of the Marshal Duke of Dalmatia, on the side assigned in his plans to the Armies of Aragon and Catalonia..." General Clarke to Marshal Suchet, 13th September 1813, Ibid, 2:447. Also, in a 2 October letter, General Clarke states: "...your excellency introduces the new organization of the armies of Aragon and Catalonia..." General Clarke, Duke of Feltre to Marshal Suchet, 2nd October 1813, Ibid, 2:447-448.

⁴⁹⁸Ibid, 2:447-448. SHAT, C(8)372, Tableau de l'Organisation des Armées d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 December 1813.

way, Suchet lost the 1,822 troops of the 1er Léger Nassau, and the 387 men of the 1er-1er de Ligne Wurtzbourg and later another 1,100 men of the 6e Légion de Gendarmerie.⁴⁹⁹

After September 1813, the Emperor accelerated troop withdrawals from Spain. On the 28th, for example, he took 21 cavalry squandrons from Soult.⁵⁰⁰ By November he needed 500,000 more troops to replace the losses in Germany, and he ordered the Directeur de la Conscription to draft 690,000 men. He planned to form four 100,000 man reserve armies at Bordeaux, Turin, Metz, and Anvers, two Armies of the Pyrenees and Italy of 25,000 men each and the Grande Armée itself would absorb 275,000 men.⁵⁰¹ The Minister of War meanwhile continued feeding troops to the two reserve divisions forming at Nîmes and Montpellier by recalling more troops in November from Suchet's Army.

On 16 November, the Emperor made yet deeper cuts into Suchet's army to form an Armée de Réserve du Côté des Pyrénées, under Marshal Moncey, from the cadres of ten regiments, two of which would come from the Army of Aragon and Catalonia. The Ministry drew experienced junior officers and non-commissioned officers to form the 6th battalions to form new unit. The Minister sent ten cadres to Toulouse and ten to

⁴⁹⁹SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 November 1813; Oman, Peninsular War, 7:408-409; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:358. Napoleon considered the foreign regiments dangerous and in a note dictated to Pierre Bruno Count Daru (1767-1829) divided them into the following classes: Swiss, foreign regiments/battalions, Illyrien regiments, Croation, Spanish, Portuguese, Grand Duchy of Berg and finally, the lease reliable, the Baden Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau units in the Armée de Catalogne. Napoleon ordered a roster of the posts where these German units were assigned and a list of the number of fusils they had. He also ordered Suchet to disarm the German soldiers. CN, No. 20893, Note Dictée au Comte Daru, 15 November 1813, 26:427-428.

⁵⁰⁰CN, No. 20657, Napoleon to General Clarke, 29 September 1813, 26:263-264; No. 20866, Napoleon to General Clarke, 6 November 1813, 26:410-411.

⁵⁰¹CN, No. 20874, Napoleon to General Clarke, 10 November 1813, 26:414-416.

Perpignan to form two 11,600 man divisions, the Pyrénées Occidentales and Pyrénées Orientales. Once in place, the cadres would receive 1,500 conscripts each, drawn from the Pyrénées departments totaling 30,000 men. The armies of Catalonia and Aragon contributed 400 men for each of these cadre battalions, and clothed, equipped and armed the other 1,100 men. The Armies of Aragon and Catalonia would also reroute 16,000 of their conscripts into these reserve divisions. Additionally, there was 128,000 other men to form 40 battalions in four divisions, destined for the Armée de Réserve.⁵⁰²

By December 1813, Marshal Suchet completed the amalgamation of the two Armies into the Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne. It included seven divisions and a separate brigade.⁵⁰³ Its garrisons in Catalonia were the strategic foothold in the province and were divided into three groups. First, Upper Catalonia including the Arrondissements of Figueras and Gerona; second, Lower Catalonia had the Arrondissement of Barcelona and third the posts of Aragon. The whole combined army and garrisons had 56,484 troops.⁵⁰⁴

⁵⁰²CN, No. 20898, Napoleon to Clarke, 16 November 1813, 26:431-432; No. 20901, Napoleon to M. Melzi, Duc de Lodi, Chancelier du Royaume d'Italie, 16 November 1813, 26:434; No. 20904, Napoleon to Clarke, 17 November 1813, 26:435; No. 20906, Napoleon to Clarke, 17 November 1813, 26:437-438; No. 20907, Napoleon to Clarke, 17 November 1813, 26:438-439; No. 20908, Napoleon to Clarke, 17 November 1813, 26:439-440; No. 20912, Napoleon to Clarke, 18 November 1813, 26:441-443; No. 20914, Napoleon to Clarke, 26:443-444; No. 20915, Napoleon to Clarke, 18 November 1813, 16:444-445. In 1814, the Reserve Division at Nîmes was sent to Marshal Augereau's Armée des Rhône at Lyons. Six, *Dictionnaire*, 1:28-30. CN, No. 21055, Ordres à donner par le Major Général, 1 January 1814, 27:1-3. The second reserve division was never completely formed, and sent to garrison Mont Louis, Perpignan and other frontier posts in the 10e Division Militaire. Oman, *Peninsular War*, 7:409; CN, No. 20941, Napoleon to Clarke, 25 November 1813, 26:467.

⁵⁰³SHAT, C(8)371, Tableau de l'Organisation des Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne 1 December 1813.

⁵⁰⁴Ibid.

The major force structure change at the end of 1813 was the Imperial withdrawal of Division Severoli to defend Italy from the Austrian invasion (3,185 troops), Suchet's Nassau and Westphalien troops, his cavalry replacements, and the bulk of the 6e Légion de Gendarmerie to France.⁵⁰⁵ He also ordered Suchet to consolidate and recall his scattered garrisons, saving 10,000 men.⁵⁰⁶ To complete this reorganization, Suchet appointed a new staff headed by his old Chief of Staff, General Cyr, Baron Saint-Cyr Nougues (1774-1892), replacing all of General Decaen's staff with his own.⁵⁰⁷ The Emperor reassigned General Decaen to command the fortress of Hellevoetsluis in Holland.⁵⁰⁸

The new Army of Aragon and Catalonia had five infantry divisions; the Brigade de Cerdagne, a cavalry division, the arrondissement commands of Figueras, Gerona, La Bispal, and Lower Catalonia; and the combat service commands. This new organization in Suchet's army, particularly of his divisions reflected a restructuring of the whole French army. Infantry divisions were no longer organized in the loose manner of the past, but were restructured with two brigades of two (four battalions) regiments, and artillery

⁵⁰⁵CN, No. 20942, Napoleon to Clarke, 25 November 1813, 26:467-468.

⁵⁰⁶Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814.

⁵⁰⁸CN, No. 20159, Napoleon to Clarke, 3 December 1813, 26:485. *Ibid.*, No. 20981, Napoleon to General Lebrun, Duc de Plaisance, Gouverneur d'Anvers, 7 December 1813, 24:494-495; No. 20982, Napoleon to Berthier, 8 December 1813, 26: 495; No. 20983, Napoleon to Vice-Amiral Decres, Ministre de la Marine, 8 December 1813, 26: 495; No. 20984, Napoleon to Decres, 8 December 1813, 26:495-496; No. 20985, Note Paris, 8 December 1813, 26:496.

numbering about 10,000 troops.⁵⁰⁹ This standardization allowed Napoleon to make the most of increasingly scarce manpower and it eased the administrative tasks of organization, command and control.

By 1814, the manpower stresses forced another downsizing of the French divisions, but they retained their new standardized structure.⁵¹⁰ The Emperor not only restructured the French infantry divisions in Spain along these standardized lines, but did so with Suchet's cavalry, dividing it into divisions with two brigades of six squadrons each, as reflected in the Grande Armée and the Armée d'Espagne⁵¹¹

The 1st Infantry Division had 4,281 troops and was organized strictly from troops of the Army of Aragon. Similarly, the 2nd Infantry Division issued from the Army of Aragon with 5,496 men.⁵¹² The 3rd Infantry Division, on the other hand, was an amalgam of units from both the Armies of Aragon and Catalonia, and had 3,439 men.⁵¹³ The 4th Division of 2,577 men, under General Louis, Baron Ordonneau (1770-1855), an old hand

⁵⁰⁹Scott Bowden, Napoleon's Grande Armée of 1813, Armies of the Napoleonic Wars Research Series, (Chicago: The Emperor's Press, 1990) 241-282.

⁵¹⁰Jean Tranié and J.C. Carmignani, Napoléon: 1814, La Campagne de France, (Paris: Pygmalion, 1989) 290-291. The Grande Armée retained this structure through 1815. Scott Bowden, Armies at Waterloo, (Arlington: Empire Games Press, 1983) 85-134.

⁵¹¹Tranie and Carmignani, Napoléon 1814, 294; SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armée d'Espagne, 1 April 1814.

⁵¹²See Tables 23 and 24. This division had 3,828 present under arms, 871 detached and 797 in hospital. The 2d Brigade also transferred out the 81er Ligne to Marshal Soult. Ibid.

⁵¹³See Table 23. The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd divisions had 3,751, 3,828 and 2,946 present under arms. SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, l'Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814.

in Catalonia who served as General Duhesme's Chief of Staff in 1808,⁵¹⁴ was made entirely of units of the old Army of Catalonia. Suchet, however, split this division in half. He assigned the 1st Brigade to the garrison of Barcelona, and retained the 2nd Brigade for the field.⁵¹⁵ General Lamarque's 5th Division was also drawn entirely from the Army of Catalonia with 4,836 men.⁵¹⁶ Suchet still retained a separate brigade in the Cerdagne, under General Esprit de la Tour, with 1,886 men.⁵¹⁷ He centralized his cavalry into one Cavalry Division with 3,439 men and 3,399 horses.⁵¹⁸

The garrisons were divided between the two commands of Upper and Lower Catalonia, both under General Pierre-Joseph, Baron Harbert (1773-1823), Governor of Barcelona. These garrisons were largely composed of formations of the Army of Catalonia.⁵¹⁹ The Arrondissement of Gerona with its small posts numbered with 2,971 men and the Garrison of Barcelona with 7,652 troops.⁵²⁰

⁵¹⁴SHAT, C(8) 485, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 29 May 1808.

⁵¹⁵The 2e Brigade totaled 2,203 men present under arms, C(8)372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814.

⁵¹⁶The 5th Division had 4,278 men present under arms. Ibid.

⁵¹⁷The Brigade had 1,714 men present under arms. Ibid.

⁵¹⁸The Division totaled 2,708 men and 2,881 horses present under arms. Ibid.

⁵¹⁹This does not include the outlying posts of Tarragona, Tortosa, and Lerida which were traditionally garrisoned from the assets of the Armée d'Aragon. Ibid.

⁵²⁰SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814; C(8)411, Situation, Fort de Gironne, 1 January 1814; Situation, Fort de Figueras 315, January 1814.

The Gendarmerie Impériale was completely gutted with the withdrawal of the 6e Légion. The ambulance companies or Compagnies d'infirmeries d'hopitaux remained,⁵²¹ along with the equipage and pack mule units, with 1,376 men, 1,180 horses, 702 mules and 166 vehicles.⁵²² The engineers and artillery were the two portions of the Army that expanded in both unit and troop strength in this time of drastic cuts. Suchet divided them between field and garrison commands. In the artillery in particular, the Army of Aragon added seventeen new units, and an artillery park, the whole totaling 874 men and 1,275 horses.⁵²³ Suchet's combined army then underwent a complete structural change. The Army had in fact an overall growth of 40% in manpower to 43,799 men (37,594 present under arms).

In January 1814, the Emperor continued to reduce Suchet's army as he feverishly prepared for the defense of France, sending some men and material to the aged Marshal Augereau's Corps d'Armée at Lyon,⁵²⁴ which included the new 20,000 man Réserve de Genève, drawn from the regimental depots of the 7th, 8th, and 9th Divisions Militaires. The Army of Lyon would be composed of the Réserve de Genève, battalions from the

⁵²¹Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 284; Francois Percy, Journal des Campagnes du Baron Percy, Chirurgien en Chef de la Grande Armée (1754-1825), 3d Ed., (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1904) 440-441. SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814.

⁵²²AN, AFIV 1184, Situation des Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires et Brigades de Mulets de Bât, (à loger) attachés aux Armées d'Espagne, d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 16 Décembre 1813 au 1 Janvier 1814. SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814.

⁵²³SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814.

⁵²⁴See Tables 24 and 27. CN, No. 21055, Ordres à donner par le Major Général, 1 January 1814, 27:1-2; No. 21086, Napoleon to Clarke, 11 January 1814, 27:25.

Grande Armée (or the Armée d'Alexandrie), Division de Réserve de Nîmes, Gardes Nationaux, a division from the Army of Catalonia, and four reserve divisions from Nîmes, Bourdeaux, Toulouse and Montpellier.⁵²⁵ As the conscript army gathered at Lyon in January, Napoleon stiffened it with one of Suchet's divisions.⁵²⁶ On 4 January, Napoleon sent Suchet a "warning order" to evacuate Catalonia, while he continued to concentrate Suchet's cavalry and horse artillery and half of his infantry to reinforce Augereau's Army if the hoped for (but stillborn) Treaty of Valençay were ratified.⁵²⁷

Napoleon planned every detail informing the reserve divisions and the Armée de Lyon, including extending Marshal Augereau's authority to organize a National Guard in the 15e and 21e Divisions Militaires.⁵²⁸ As the days passed, Napoleon became increasingly aware, to his chagrin, that there were insufficient veteran troops to spread between four fronts, and he reiterated his order to Suchet to send a division,⁵²⁹ and more from Soult.⁵³⁰ He ordered General Clarke to "Press the Duc d'Albufera to send more

⁵²⁵CN, No. 21100, Ordres, 15 January 1814, 27:40-42.

⁵²⁶CN, No. 21097, Napoleon to Clarke, 14 January 1814, 27:38-39; No. 21100, Ordres, 15 January 1814, 27:40-41.

⁵²⁷Oman, Peninsular War, 7:411-412.

⁵²⁸CN, No. 21114, Notes, 18 January 1814, 27:53-54.

⁵²⁹Napoleon also ordered Marshal Soult to send 10 to 12,000 troops in three letters. Soult answered these orders protesting his lack of troops, particularly the 4,000 cavalry the Emperor wanted. Ibid, No. 21121, Napoleon to Clarke, 22 January 1814, 27:60-61; No. 21132, Napoleon to Clarke, 24 January 1814, 27:70.

⁵³⁰Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 958-960. F. Loraine Petre, Napoleon at Bay, 1814, (London: John Lane the Bodley Head, 1914), 19-25.

troops to Lyon".⁵³¹ By the first week of February, when the expected reinforcements had not arrived,⁵³² Napoleon lost his patience and railed at Marshal Suchet's unresponsiveness to his orders at so critical a time, and personally blamed Suchet for the tardiness of desperately needed reinforcements.⁵³³

Marshal Suchet, did in fact, very slowly form the required division under General Claude, Comte de Valdotte Pannetier (1769-1843), with 8,051 infantry and 2,132 cavalry. This forced him to abandon his outlying posts around Barcelona, only retaining the city itself.⁵³⁴ By 1 March, Napoleon demanded yet another 10,000 man division from Suchet for the Army of Lyon.⁵³⁵

On 7 March, a chastened Marshal Suchet sent a division of 9,661 men under General Beuremann to Lyon, abandoned all the posts in Upper Catalonia, and blew up

⁵³¹Napoleon also gave terse orders to Augereau to rally 7 or 8,000 men in the Dauphiné or Genève to place a division on the enemy flanks. *Ibid.*, No. 21162, Napoleon to General Clarke, 31 January 1814, 27:95-97.

⁵³²*Ibid.*, No. 21180, Napoleon to Berthier, 5 February 1814, 27:111; No. 21181, Napoleon to Berthier, 5 February 1814, 27:111.

⁵³³*Ibid.*, No. 21213, Napoleon to Clarke, 8 February 1814, 27:135.

⁵³⁴Oman, *Peninsular War*, 7:412.

⁵³⁵Napoleon still harbored hopes in this letter of a favorable result to the Treaty of Valencay. *CN*, No. 21403, Napoleon to Clarke, 1 March 1814, 27:264-265. Marshal Berthier relayed Napoleon's orders to Suchet on 1 March 1814: "The Emperor's orders are that you send off...a second column of 10,000 infantry en poste in the direction of Lyons." Suchet, *War in Spain*, 2:473; Oman, *Peninsular War*, 7:424.

their fortifications. He retained Figueras, a vital key to the French frontier defense. In this way he amassed another 14,000 men.⁵³⁶

Though Napoleon's strength reductions were severe, Suchet did have access to two new reserve divisions. The III Division de Réserve des Pyrénées at Montpellier (1,648 troops) and the IV Division de Réserve des Pyrénées at Nîmes (4,752 men), formed from Suchet's own depots.⁵³⁷ These reinforcements unfortunately never reached a state of field readiness. Suchet placed Figueras in a state of defense and planned to hold this "line" to cover the French frontier, and hopefully recover some of the remaining Catalan garrisons.⁵³⁸ He took command of parts of the 9e and 10e Divisions Militaires to support his armies, and arranged his line of communications through Perpignan-Narbonne-Béziers in order to evacuate Catalonia. He put Béziers and Narbonne in a state of defense, reconnoitered the Pyrénées for defensive positions, and paid personal attention to the defense of Perpignan.⁵³⁹

In March 1814, his combined army numbered 11,327 men under arms.⁵⁴⁰ To make-up his chronic troop shortage, he ordered General Louis, Baron Robert (1772-1831),

⁵³⁶Oman, Peninsular War, 7:424; CN, No. 21403, Napoleon to Clarke, 1 March 1814, 17:264-266.

⁵³⁷Suchet, War in Spain, 2:382; SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, 4e Division de Réserve des Pyrénées, 30 May 1814.

⁵³⁸Suchet, War in Spain, 2:383, 479.

⁵³⁹*Ibid.*, 2:388-391.

⁵⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 2:393.

governor of the 5,000 strong garrison of Tortosa,⁵⁴¹ to make a lighting march to Barcelona and linkup with General Habert. From there, General Habert would march with the combined garrisons totaling 12,000 men to Upper Catalonia. Peace, however, caught up with this project and ended before General Habert could effect it.⁵⁴² Suchet could also reduce the size of the eight garrisons in the 10e Division Militaire, currently numbering 11,350 troops, down to 7,200 men and free 4,000 men for the field.⁵⁴³ In these desperate days, Napoleon again became quickly dissatisfied with Marshal Augereau and proposed to General Clarke on 14 March to send Suchet to Lyon in Augereau's stead and to send General Decaen back to the Pyrenees.⁵⁴⁴

In early spring, Marshal Suchet faithfully (and under the circumstances quite in character) corresponded with Soult over cooperation between two armies yet tarried over sending his army to the Western Pyrenees. The Battle of Toulouse on 10 April in which Wellington defeated the French, compelled Soult to urge Suchet to join him in fighting

⁵⁴¹Suchet's garrisons of Saguntum, Denia, Pensicola and Morella had 2,000 men but were so widely dispersed it would be nearly impossible under existing conditions to concentrate them. *Ibid.*, 2:389-390.

⁵⁴²Letter, Suchet to General Habert, Governor of Barcelona, 31st March 1814: "...you are called upon to act a brilliant part, and to save the garrison of Tortosa, which would proceed to join you at Barcelona...The success of this enterprise...would restore to Emperor a column of 12,000 experienced troops..." *Ibid.*, 2:390-391, 483.

⁵⁴³Letter General Clarke to Marshal Suchet, 28th March 1814. General Clarke concurred with Marshal Suchet's request to reinforce the logistical support to eight fortresses in the 10e Divison Militaire and would coordinate with General Lacuée to order the Commissaire de Guerre to support them. *Ibid.*, 2:389, 482.

⁵⁴⁴CN, No. 21482, Napoleon to General Clarke, 14 March 1814, 27:313-314.

the English,⁵⁴⁵ but Marshal Suchet replied that he was unable to link up but would send 3,000 men instead while he evacuated Catalonia.⁵⁴⁶

As Suchet finally set about evacuating Catalonia in March, Napoleon sent to the ex-King Joseph Bonaparte, now Lieutenant Général of the Emperor, new dispositions for 10,000 of Suchet's remaining troops, including sending 5 or 6,000 to Dordogne, and the cavalry to the Loire. He put the Pyrenees under General Decaen, and gave Suchet a new command, the Armée de la Garonne.⁵⁴⁷

On 1 March 1814, the army was headquartered at Narbonne, and consisted of three divisions and a reserve, supported by two cavalry regiments, artillery and support troops. The 1st Infantry Division at Narbonne under General Lamarque (6,732), General Habert's 2nd Division garrisoning Barcelona (8,163), the Reserve of the army under General Jean, Baron Mesclop (1775-1844) at Montpellier had (4,062 men), the Division de Commandant des Pyrénées Orientales under the command of General Paris (4,129) at Perpignan, and finally. The Cavalry Division under General Jean Baptiste, Baron Meyer (1770-1860) had (1,443 men and 1,541 horses). The services remained intact with 4,128 men.⁵⁴⁸ All told, the Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne had 22 battalions and 6 squadrons, with 19,315 men and 3,305 horses.⁵⁴⁹

⁵⁴⁵Suchet, War in Spain, 2:394-399.

⁵⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 2:393-394.

⁵⁴⁷CN, No. 21504, Napoleon to King Joseph, 17 March 1814, 27:326-327.

⁵⁴⁸See Table 25. SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814.

⁵⁴⁹*Ibid.*

By March 1814, operations in Catalonia had ground to a halt. Suchet received news of the fall of Paris, Napoleon's abdication, and the restoration of Louis XVIII. He called a "council of war" and informed his generals, then dispatched his allegiance to the new Royal government at Paris. Lord Wellington, meanwhile, agreed to an armistice, and Suchet set about the task of repatriating both the French garrisons in Catalonia and French prisoners of war. Marshal Berthier and the new Minister of War, General Dupont, then sent Suchet news of the final armistice concluded at Paris, who in turn, informed Marshal Soult and Wellington. Suchet sent General Lamarque to conclude an armistice with General Copons in Catalonia, and sent an officer to Barcelona, Tortosa and Sanguntum with news of the armistice and ordered the governors of those cities to relinquish their posts.⁵⁵⁰

The last military events of the war took place at Barcelona. When General Habert received news of the fall of Napoleon on 20 April, he reviewed his troops and had them swear their allegiance to Napoleon. On the 24th, Habert received news of the armistice and evacuated Barcelona on 28 May. His division arrived at Perpignan on 3 June.⁵⁵¹

At the end of the war, Marshal Suchet took command of the new combined Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne and the Armée des Pyrénées, called the Armée du Sud, headquartered at Toulouse. He set about assisting Wellington in embarking the British Army for its return trip to England and evacuated the occupied districts of the 11e Division Militaire. Finally, he demobilized the Armée du Sud by discharging unnecessary

⁵⁵⁰Suchet, War in Spain, 2:398-401.

⁵⁵¹SHAT, C(8)271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

officers, soldiers and army employees and dispersing the Army's remains amongst French fortresses. Once Suchet dissolved the Army, King Louis XVIII summoned him to take a seat in the Chamber of Peers.⁵⁵² By early June, the remaining French garrisons (Barcelona, Pensicola, Sanguntum and Tortosa) in Catalonia passed into France. Also, 20,000 French prisoners of war (from Lerida, Mequinenza and Monzon) were repatriated to France and disbanded.

The force structure of the Army of Catalonia had as we have seen underwent several phases through the tumultuous war years and was guided by the necessities of Imperial and local strategy as well as in turn driving the war for French commanders. From the very beginning of the war, the sheer weight of events dictated the Army's size and structure. From December 1807 to the autumn of 1808 General Duhesme, given the mission of occupying and subdividing Catalonia with some 15,000 troops found the available force quite insufficient to meet his task, lost the strategic initiative in the conduct of his operations, and required immediate reinforcements which Napoleon sent in a division under General Reille, who found Upper Catalonia as hard as a nut to crack as Duhesme found. He too was thrown back into the defensive. Under the circumstances neither could mold a force of the correct strength and mix to achieve Napoleon's strategic and tactical aims. They were forced to field as many troops as possible as quickly as possible, ready or not.

It was only under General Gouvion Saint-Cyr that the VII Corps had the strength to take the initiative in the siege of Rosas, relief of Barcelona and offensive in Lower

⁵⁵²Suchet, War in Spain, 2:403-406.

Catalonia. The Corps was of sufficient size to take and hold the initiative through the siege of Gerona. This traumatic operation decimated the Corps, only worsened by the lack of a steady flow of reinforcements and materials to reconstitute shattered units.

Continuing Imperial demands in 1810 and 1811 robbed Marshals Augereau and Macdonald of both the operational initiative and the opportunity of consolidating their rear area and pacify the country. Additionally, there was little time and no reinforcements to build the Army of Catalonia up to a strength commensurate with its task. Napoleon rarely appreciated the extent of Catalan resistance and held them consistently in contempt, as evidenced by his heavy use of green and foreign troops of questionable quality, such as raw Neapolitan troops. Additionally, he demanded rapid and complete conquest of the province which was impossible with the existing force divided between garrison and field "armies". He pushed his commanders in Catalonia hard for results, particularly since Marshal Suchet obtained stunning successes in Aragon and Lower Catalonia, despite the lack of available force. The thunderbolt catastrophes of 1810-1811 ended the commands of Augereau and Macdonald, but only in the case of the Siege of Figueras did the Army receive substantial reinforcements. During General Decaen's "watch" the same problems persisted for he too had to split his reduced Army in half while he dealt with the overwhelming difficulties of the Anglo-Sicilian invasion. Again, he never had either the operational initiative or the force to gain it. Only Marshal Suchet's combined Armies despite the continuous force reduction of 1813-1814 could hold their own. The great innovation of course was the streamlining of his divisions into a two brigade organization which eased the problem somewhat, but only the winding down of the war relieved the operational and consequently structural demands on the Army of Aragon and Catalonia.

CHAPTER IV

LOGISTICS

§1 The Logistical Structure.

In the Army of Catalonia the logistical and administrative office was the Intendance.¹ This administrative apparatus was virtually, a second army composed of civil and semi-militarized personnel. It had six subservices, vivres pain (bread supply) occasionally called vivres pain et liquids, responsible for the supply of all foodstuffs (except meats), vivres viande (meat supply) which managed fresh and preserved meats, fourrages (forage supply) to feed the army's animals, chauffage (fuel) for lighting and heat, habillement (clothing) for clothing and equipment supply, transportation, and hospitals.²

The Intendance managed every area of corps and division administration, except the pay and financial accountability of the army, which fell under the purview of the

¹Pierre-Antoine-Noël-Bruno, Comte Daru (1767-1829) Served as Intendant-Général of the Grande Armée 1806-1809 and in 1813 as Directeur de l'Administration de la Grande Armée. H. de la Barre De Nanteuil, Le Comte Daru ou l'Administration Militaire Sous la Révolution et l'Empire (Paris: J. Peytronnet et Cie. 1966) 19; Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arrière, 45; Thiebault, Manuel Général 531-532.

²Is one of the logistical ancillary services managed in the Intendance, contrary to Elting's opinion. Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 553.

Paymasters and Inspection aux revues.³ It took responsibility for the supply, movement, medical service and often, funding of the army.⁴

The Army or Corps Intendance⁵ was headed by a Commissaire-Ordonnateur, as Ordonnateur en chef who fell directly under the Chief of Staff. He had an extensive staff of Commissaires des guerres to support the headquarters, a Commissaire des guerres Ordonnaires (first class) to manage medical services, another to manage subsistence, and one of the second class to head the convalescent depots, calvary depots, transport parks and finally, one to organize and administer the lines of communications.⁶

The Ordonnateur's staff then is an infrastructure for the logistical support and administration of the army. It resembled a separate command within the army, under the the Chief of Staff.⁷ This work is supplemented by a Commissaire des guerres attached

³Lechartier, Le Services de l'Arrière, 76-77.

⁴Prior to 1799 the Intendance controlled the whole of army's administrations, to include pay, audited accountability for masses (unit funds), supply, the workings of the étapes or supply lines and, convoys and transport, the medical service and the distribution of supplies (food, fuel, forrage and clothing), management of military establishments, (e.g. prisons, magazines, etc.) and verification of legal expenses, such as pay. Thiebault, Manuel Général, 534-535. After 1800, the First Consul established the Inspection aux Revues to manage monetary accountability for every type of expense throughout the army.

⁵Intendant Général M. Denniée, of the Armée d'Espagne for example was assisted by a personal staff of one Commissaire des guerres, as acting Ordonnateur and four Adjoint (assistant) Commissaires des guerres. The Intendant Général's 'second in command', Commissaire Ordonnateur en Chef Mathieu-Faviers also had a staff of one Commissaire des guerres and three assistants. SHAT, C (8) 398, Administration Générale de l'Armée d'Espagne, 15 December 1809.

⁶Thiebault, Manuel Général, 537.

⁷Colonel Furse discusses such a support staff for an army, under a General of Communications, answering to the Chief of Staff or Commanding General. This officer, like the Ordonnateur was charged with the handling of administrative services. Furse,

to the military government to facilitate the logistical support from the country.⁸ The Intendance staff then possessed an array of personnel including including inspecteurs (inspectors), requisseurs (administrative manager), commises (clerks), gardes magasins (store keepers) of various types and other employees, including secretaries, locally hired supply workers, domestics, contractors, and so forth.⁹ A Commissaire-Ordinaire headed the division Intendance, with a staff of assistants, such as inspectors, managers, clerks, storekeepers, etc.¹⁰

The Corps Ordonnateur en chef organizes the rear/logistical services by determining supply and transport resources of the country and organizing them for military use.¹¹ During active operations, he directs the logistical operations of the headquarters and division Commissaire des guerres,¹² specifically in obtaining food and forage and as necessary, and organize the étape or line of communications under a

Lines of Communication, 24-32.

⁸Thiebault, Manuel Général, 537.

⁹Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 553.

¹⁰Elting correctly maintains that the Commis was more than a clerk. He supervised supply distribution and the collection of contributions. Ibid., 553, 725.

¹¹To ensure the equitable distribution of supplies the Ordonnateur will publish a feuille or sheet noting the composition, variety, and number of rations each soldier is allowed. Thiebault, Manuel Général, 538. For example, the Intendant Général of the Army of Portugal in July 1810 issued a Règlement pour le Service des Étapes et Convois Militaires in which he laid out for the 'benefit' of local Portuguese authorities who would support the French advance. This document established the number and type of rations allowed each member of the army by grade and the composition (weight) of each ration. SHAT X (s) 114, Intendant General Lambert, Armée de Portugal, Règlement pour Le Service des Étapes et Convois Militaires, 1 July, 1810.

¹²Thiebault, Manuel Général, 539-540.

separate Commissaire des guerres to include the magazines, a convoy/transport system and hospital.¹³ The logistical support for the advancing army was often based on the road network, and divisions would draw their support along their route out to a distance determined by the Commissaire des guerres.¹⁴

The Commissaire des guerres established supply centers and magazines in occupied towns and fortresses, accumulating provision dumps, transport animals and hospitals. He also used them as points to requisition supplies off the country.¹⁵ In Catalonia, the étape or supply line was from Perpignan to Barcelona and Rosas, Figueras, Gerona, Hostalrich, became logistical nexi, an integral part of the occupation.¹⁶

The Ordonnateur, like every high level staff administrator, was awash in staff actions, paper, meetings and conferences. He regularly worked with the Ministries, the Army or Corps command and the staff.¹⁷ He continuously inspected his local contract manufacturers (such as bakeries), and magazines to review the performance of his

¹³Ibid., 540-541.

¹⁴During the Eylau Campaign of 1806-07, Intendant General Daru drew out separate areas for corps support determined by the road network, which served as logistical boundaries. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 525, 529.

¹⁵Thiebault, Manuel Général, 540-541.

¹⁶The duties of managing one of these magazines was quite extensive, spanning every area of supply and material transportation and required continual consultation with the Ordonnateur and subordinate Commissaire des guerres with their respective Chief of Staffs and continual visits and inspections of their HQs, divisions, magazines, hospital vehicle parks and provision distribution points, to assure the efficient operation of the logistical machine. Ibid., 542-545.

¹⁷Ibid., 542-543.

personnel.¹⁸ He also looked into the hospitals to inspect their administrative functioning and the transport parks to see to their continuous readiness.¹⁹

The nightmare administrative paper load of the Ordonnateur was hardly less than the Chief of Staff, and he must have been chained to his office,²⁰ receiving masses of correspondence from the Ministry of Military Administration in Paris, other ministerial and Imperial directives, orders and instructions for the conduct of the logistical service. Similarly, he obtained specific direction from the commander through the Chief of Staff, while to the latter he submitted a monthly situation report²¹ of provisions to include the

¹⁸Ibid., 544-545.

¹⁹The Ordonnateur inspected the military hospitals carefully, for they would turn into pigsties very quickly. He inspected the patient admissions, records, verified the expenditure of medical and other supplies, reviewed the work of personnel and treatment of patients. Ibid., 545.

²⁰Colonel, Lord Edward Cecil, A minister in the Egyptian Government at the turn of the twentieth century described arriving in his Cairo office after a mid morning meeting: "I find my outer office crowded with a growling mob of officials waiting to see me. Before I can attend to them, however, there are between twenty and thirty letters to sign." Edward Cecil The Leisure of an Egyptian Official, 2d Ed. (London: Hadder and Stroughton, Ltd., 1921) 70.

²¹This report is divided into seven sections, including one general section, summarizing all areas of supply, five sections discussing individual supply areas and observations. Thiebault, Manuel Général 546.

consumption, rationing and supply of food, fuel and forrage.²² This is the basic report in which the Ordonnateurs established supply requirements.

Often these reports took on various forms, such as regular staff Situations, administrative services reports or supply reports. For example, Commissaire des guerres Grobert on the Corps logistical staff submitted to Ordonnateur en Chef Rey a Rapport sur les Services Administratifs of Barcelona on 23 January 1810. This document outlined the quantities of foodstuffs, clothing, funds and the status of the hospital.²³ Ordonnateur en Chef Rey in turn submitted these reports to the Ministre Directeur. In August 1809, he drew up a Rapport sur la Situation du 7e Corps which discussed the unit strength and the administrative services, transportation,²⁴ hospitals, clothing and equipment, and subsistence supplies.²⁵ Similarly, he drew up reports to the Minister Director.²⁶

²²This is a seven section report, including a general section summarizing all areas of supply, five sections discussing individual areas of supply and a seventh section of observations. The vivres-pain section discusses grain, flour, breads, biscuit, dried legumes (and other vegetables) and salt. The vivres-liquides section discusses wine, brandy, and vinegar. The vivres-viande section covers fresh (on the hoof) and preserved meat (e.g. salt lard). Chauffage et Lumière discusses firewood, coal, peat, and other combustibles and candles. Fourrages covers fodder, (grains, hay, and straw). Thiebault, Manuel Général, 546.

²³SHAT C (8) 40, Commissaire des guerres Grobert, Rapport Sur les Services Administratifs de la Place de Barcelone, 26 January 1810.

²⁴This included the regular train battalions, mule bigades, and the auxiliary transport.

²⁵SHAT, C (8) 40, Ordonnateur en chef Rey, Rapport sur la Situation du 7e Corps, 5 September 1809.

²⁶SHAT, C(19) 7, VII Corps, No. 353, Ordonnateur en chef Rey, to General Dejean, 4 January, 1809. In 1812, the Commissaire-Ordonnateur of Lower Catalonia, Commissaire des guerres Raymondson submitted such a report to the Ministry's Bureau of Provisions with a series of fourteen sub-reports on provisions, transport, clothing, fuels, hospitals, etc. SHAT, C(19) 7, Armée de Catalogne, Bureau des Vivres, No. 163,

The Ordonnateur en chef worked closely with every portion of the staff to assure efficient administration and logistical support. These included the Inspecteur aux revues for personal status, the Paymaster General to obtain funds, the Director of Posts for communications support, and with the local authorities to coordinate supply requisitions.²⁷

The most important single responsibility of the Ordonnateur and his subordinates in the divisions was their fiduciary responsibility for the enormous sums of money expended in paying for the logistical and administrative support of the army.²⁸ The Ordonnateur places this task under the charge of a Commissaire des guerres who established accounts for the various logistical and administrative activities. He was authorized by the Ordonnateur to pay for contract services, to agents or regisseurs²⁹ of the Ministry for Military Administration, and special expenses.³⁰

Funding came from special Ministerial credits³¹ through the Payeur (Treasury) or locally procured contributions from the Receveur, the officer who received funds for an Army. Finally, these funds are accounted for directly through the Ministries.³² When services or supplies are delivered, the Ordonnateur pays them by Mandat de paiement or

Commissaire des guerres Raymondon to Minister Directeur Lacuee, 10 June 1812.

²⁷Thiebault, Manuel Général, 546.

²⁸Ibid., 547.

²⁹Manager or administration of Ministerial affairs e.g. vivres-viande, etc.

³⁰Ibid.

³¹Credits Speciaux, Ibid.

³²Ibid.

payment request off of his Ministerial credit account. The recipient presents this document with his invoice and the Marché or request for material, to the Paymaster for payment. Funds not expended are returned to the Ministry as de fonds libres for commitment to other expenses.³³

The two Ministries of War and Military Administration, have separate financial functions. The former managed Ministerial pay and unit material expenditures, such as artillery and engineer equipment,³⁴ through the Division de la Surveillance de l'Administration des Recettes et Depenses des Armées en Espagne.³⁵ Similarly, the Ministry of Military Administration managed logistical, and administrative funding.³⁶

The divisional Commissaire des guerres had sizable funding accounts. Commissaire des guerres Mongenot at Barcelona had 700,465 F. in credits for 1814 alone.³⁷ At Figueras, for example, Commissaire des guerres Leamont³⁸ received a special shipment of 120,000 kg of salt meat for 230,000 F., which Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon provided by contract and paid for through the Ministry of Military Administration.³⁹

³³Ibid.

³⁴SHAT C (8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

³⁵SHAT C (19) 7, Ministère de la Guerre, Division de la Surveillance de l'Administration des Recettes et Depenses des Armées Imperiales en Espagne, General Maurice Mathieu to Marshal Suchet, 26 September 1813.

³⁶The Ministry of Military Administration had eight huge accounts.

³⁷SHAT, C (8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

³⁸SHAT C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1812.

³⁹SHAT C (19) 9, No. 1527, Bureau des Vivres, M. Légere, Rapport au Ministre Directeur de l'Administration de la Guerre, 10 November 1813.

The Commissaire Ordonnateurs performed a variety of non-logistical duties too. In the division, they served as a substitute Sous-Inspecteur aux revues,⁴⁰ initiated (by procès-verbal) audits on Receveurs and Paymasters or requested reimbursement for combat losses.⁴¹ These varied administrative duties were codified in the law of 28 Nivose an III.⁴²

The Ordonnateurs and Commissaires had an extensive staffs. Including assistants (Commissaires adjoints provisoires),⁴³ logistical services employees, such as substance, clothing, and transport employees, who formed separate staff subsections,⁴⁴ a medical and hospital staff (physicians, surgeons, pharmacists, and their employees), and civilian service employees, such as the entrepreneurs or contractors.⁴⁵ The military contractors were bound by the terms of their contract or Marché to provide quality goods or services. The

⁴⁰Ibid; In 1809, for example Napoleon approved the distribution of 6,500 F. in extra pay to thirty-two Commissaires des guerres who doubled as Sous-Inspecteurs aux revues. UCN No. 3514 Decision, August 29 1809. 3:214.

⁴¹One Colonel Dulong, 31e Ligne lost all his equipment in action, and the Emperor granted him a 1,200 F. indemnity to replace it. UCN, No. 3701, Decisions 25 October 1809, 3:299.

⁴²Thiebault, Manuel Général, 549-552.

⁴³Ibid., 563.

⁴⁴Ibid., 569-573.

⁴⁵Ibid., 575-576, For example Joseph Reynaud et Cie supplied salt meat to the Army of Catalonia through the Ministry in 1812. SHAT C (19) 9, Reynaud et Cie. and Ordonnateur en Chef Bourdon, Marché Pour la Fourniture de 1,200 Quintaux métriques de viande salée destinés pour l'Approvisionnement du Siège du Fort de Figueras, 13 October 1813. In 1810 M. F.B. Boyer Fonfrère transported food to Barcelona by sea in a contract with the Ministry. SHAT, C (19) 8, F.B. Boyer Fonfrère to General Lacuée, 2 October 1810.

commissaire insures its fulfillment and on completion, allows payment by Procès-Verbal from the Paymaster.⁴⁶

Other types of employees in the army's logistical tail include Vivandiers and Cantiniers or civilian suttlers (often soldier wives) attached to the regiments or staffs, to purvey food or liquid refreshment.⁴⁷ Boulangers, bouchers, touchers were (bakers, butchers and drovers) specially hired to the supply sections of the Intendance,⁴⁸ and other hired workers included tailors, laundry workers (blanchisseuses), cobblers, harness makers, wheel wrights, and rope makers, etc. Skilled and unskilled employees were hired at every level, but in the staff, these and all other workers were hired by the Intendance.⁴⁹

Intendance personnel, like supply personnel today, were not averse to feathering their own nest. They habitually had the best billets and food. Line troops vilified them as cowards and thieves. The Vivres pain or 'riz-pain-sel' personnel were known as 'chancres' or the 'leprosy of the army.'⁵⁰ Forage personnel habitually supplied poor or shortweight fodder, and vivres-viande employees often traded their good cattle to farmers for poor or sickly ones for a neat profit. They often declined requisitioning livestock from rich farms for a bribe while quickly taking a poor peasant's only cow. Lazy, they often allowed cattle to starve rather than feed them. Cowardice was one of their main

⁴⁶Theibault, Manuel Général, 575-756.

⁴⁷Ibid., 578-580, Lechartier, Services de l'Arrière, 52.

⁴⁸Thiebault, Manuel Général 580-581, Lechartier, Services de l'Arrière, 52.

⁴⁹Thiebault, Manuel Général, 581-582.

⁵⁰Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 555.

virtues. If combat got too close or during a defeat or hasty retreat, Intendance men could be relied on to save their skins and their booty.⁵¹

Although throughout the French Army, line troops universally jeered and cursed them there were many who were capable and honest. Good commanders however, like Marshal Davout and the Emperor hunted dishonest Intendance personnel 'like rats.'⁵² The hastily assembled Corps in Catalonia 1808, had few Intendance personnel,⁵³ and these were often poorly qualified.

Army contractors were an even greater source of trouble. Loyal only to their profits, they never scrupled to cheat the government, never ready to render goods or services correctly. They were particularly unwilling to deliver near combat areas, and would readily abandon supplies on the first whiff of danger. Only additional money could induce them to risk their property, profits or skins.⁵⁴ Contractors had the equipment and a staff of employees, and administrators to manage movements.⁵⁵ They could also serve in the administration of the Intendance, (Régie) like army civilian employees, on fixed pay or with additional pay (Régie Interessee) for efficient service.⁵⁶

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid., 556.

⁵³ Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 41-42; SHAT, C (8) 485, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 1 April, 1809.

⁵⁴Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 559; SHAT, C(19) 8 Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 27 October 1810.

⁵⁵Similarly, the Compagnie Breidt provided horses and drivers, while the government provided vehicles, Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 558.

⁵⁶Ibid.

In many ways the Intendance was the backbone of the Army of Catalonia as throughout the Grande Armée, providing logistical and administrative support, and yet was its Achilles heel. Its sheer scale and the complexity of its task was its root problem, compounded by the enormously difficult operations in a theater dominated by savage insurgent warfare. Indeed, after 1809, they never held the initiative in the war, a distinction which only General Gouvion Saint-Cyr held. The continued defensive posture, the poverty of the country and the sheer destructiveness of the war posed nearly insurmountable logistical problems on the Intendance, which it struggled heroically to solve, and managed to hold its own only with considerable Imperial assistance.

§2. Subsistence.

The heart of Intendance work was procuring subsistence; the most difficult and consistently critical task of Napoleonic logisticians. Of the five Intendance services, four were subsistence, vivres-pain or vivres-pain et liquides, vivres-viande, fourrages, and chauffage.⁵⁷ These services were discrete organizations with their own personnel, mission and authority. Often, however, they came together in a combined service, called the Services Réunis. The Armée d'Espagne had under the overall direction of the Intendant Général; the Directeur Général des Services Réunis or in his stead, the directors or Régisseurs of each of the services, of vivres-pain, vivres-viande, and fourrages/chauffage. The Corps had four subsistence services in its services réunis, each headed by a Directeur Principal or Agent en chef, under the overall direction of the Ordonnateur en chef. Occasionally the Corps services réunis was headed by an Inspecteur Principal des services réunis. The division had four services headed by a Contrôleur or Inspecteur, under the authority of the Commissaire des guerres.⁵⁸ The service heads managed subsistence

⁵⁷Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 553. General Thiebault called them vivres-pain, légumes et sel; vivres-viande, and fourrages bois et lumières, lumping chauffage and fourrage together, as division and corps had to do occasionally for lack of personnel. Thiebault, Manuel Général 569.

⁵⁸Thiebault, Manuel Général, 570; Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arrière, 77; At the GQG of the Armée d'Espagne at Madrid a Régisseur (and assistant) headed the services-réunis de subsistances-générales, who in turn fell under a Commissaire Ordonnateur and assistants. SHAT C(8) 398, Armée d'Espagne, Personnel, Administration Générale de l'Armée d'Espagne, 15 December 1809. SHAT C(8) 398 État du Nombre des Rations, 30 June 1810.

procurement and distribution, formed a supply reserve, magazines, and managed their transport.⁵⁹

In the division, the Inspecteur had under his control three (or four) gardes-magasins to head each subservice, assisted by clerks, aides-gardes magasins and specialized employees, (butchers, bakers, etc.) These workers were organized into 'brigades' of three men and a leader (brigadier).

The garrison of Barcelona, for example, had a large service. In 1814, it was headed by a Directeur, assisted by an Inspecteur, with a clerk (commis). The vivres-pain section had thirty-seven employees, including the Garde-Magasin Principale (chief) and his two assistants (Garde-Magasin Principale and Garde-Magasin Ordinaire), six aide-gardes-magasins, and twenty-seven sous-employées (bakers, millers, etc.) headed by a brigadier principal. Vivres-viande service had five members, a Garde-parc (chief), aide-garde parc (brigadier) and three employees. Finally, the fourrage (and chauffage) had three members, headed by a Garde Magasin des fourrages and assisted by two aides.⁶⁰

Duties were divided in two. The Inspecteur and the service heads managed subsistence administration, such as food weight/measure, distribution, receiving supplies and he assured a orderly operation.⁶¹ The actual conduct of operations fell to the garde magasin. The Ministre-Directeur d'Administration de Guerre commissioned Inspecteurs and Directeurs, and during a campaign, the Intendant, Commissaire-Ordonnateur en chef

⁵⁹Thiebault, Manuel Général, 570.

⁶⁰SHAT C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

⁶¹Thiebault, Manuel Général, 571.

or Ordonnateurs Ordinaires could hire them as needed.⁶² There were dangers however in employing locals. For example, several locally hired storekeepers at Figueras were recruited by the Catalan insurgents to give up the fortress postern gate key that led to its capture in April 1811.⁶³

The line soldiers uniformly despised the subsistence personnel for their corruption. Forrage personnel consistently short weighted fodder, vivres-viande men provided bad meat, and many throughout the service were roundly crooked, and many a commander has beaten them for their corruption or inefficiency. Often gardes magasins lived in better quarters than regimental commanders and ate well while soldiers starved.⁶⁴

The vivres-pain et liquides service managed grain, flour, breads, and small rations (petits-vivres riz et légumes secs), such as lentils, rice, salt, and the liquids (vinegar, wine, and brandy).⁶⁵ Breads were the largest part of a soldier's diet and there were two varieties issued to the French Army, bread and biscuit, or hard tack/ammunition bread. The former was made of wheat or rye, but the French soldier preferred wheat bread, and white when

⁶²Commanders could hire local employees for field service. Ibid.

⁶³Oman, Peninsular War, 4:491.

⁶⁴Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 555. Deputy Assistant Commissary-General August Schaumann of the British Army described the billet of an Asst. Quartermaster General at Salamanca in 1808: "This officer was most comfortably installed beside a brasero in a magnificent room, and was reading a book, while at his side there stood a bottle of wine and a dish of roast chestnuts." Schaumann's billet on the contrary was in the garret of a house stuffed with troops. August Schaumann, On the Road with Wellington The Diary of a War Commissary in the Peninsular Campaigns. ed. and Trans. by Anthony Ludouici (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1925), 77.

⁶⁵Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 554.

possible⁶⁶ and baked in oblong or round loaves. Biscuit was squared to ease packing. Either local bakeries or military bakers in army ovens could manufacture bread. The baker brigadier actually baked while others kneaded, and provided fuel. A standard army oven could be built by a crew of eight masons in fourteen hours and could bake 500 rations of bread or biscuit per load and as much as six loads per day.⁶⁷ Manutentions or groups of ovens could provide huge quantities of bread, as in Barcelona which produced as much as 35,000 rations of bread per day.⁶⁸ They provided in a week, for example, 231,278 rations of bread and 15,900 rations of biscuit between 21 and 27 May 1814.⁶⁹ It would take fourteen ovens to bake this 173,458.5 kg of bread and 8,745 kg of biscuit.⁷⁰ The vivres-pain personnel managed raw grain, including wheat maize (froment

⁶⁶The urban populations of France particularly Paris universally preferred white bread or the 'bis blanc' loaf, while the French provincial could only obtain inferior whites or bread of other grains, such as rye, barley or maslin. Steven L. Kaplan, Provisioning Paris, Merchants and Millers in the Grain and Flour Trade during the Eighteenth Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984) 44. In Paris 1810, anticipation of a poor harvest made the Empire anxious over the price and quality of bread. Indeed, there was a real fear of rioting over the lack of food and of white bread in particular. Maurice Guerrini, Napoleon and Paris: Thirty Years of History, trans. and ed., Margery Weiner (London: Cassell, 1970) 249-251. Part of the crisis was caused by the shipment of vast amounts of bread to the Grande Armée; Etienne-Denis Pasquier, The Memories of Chancellor Pasquier 1767-1815, trans. Douglas Garman (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1968) 117. Furse, Lines of Communications, 284.

⁶⁷Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 554.

⁶⁸SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus; Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 554.

⁶⁹SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

⁷⁰The ration size for bread both for the units and in the hospitals was 7.5 hectograms (750 gms) and 5.5 hg. for biscuit. During the period in question the ovens produced 224,314 rations (168,235.5 kg) of regular bread, 6,964 rations (5,223 kg) of higher grade hospital bread, and 15,900 rations 8,745 kg) of biscuit. Ibid.

d'Espagne), rye, barley, or the available bread grain. Varieties of flours included course milled and sifted flours, the former were ground unsifted flours (brutes), coarse ground whole flour called "two stroke" (coarse, 10%) flour, of wheat (froment), rye, wheat/rye (metéil), and maize meal. The sifted flours (blutes), coarse and fine (15% fine and 20% very fine). Bran (son) served as bread filler and animal fodder as needed. Breads themselves were of two or sometimes three varieties, separated by weight and quality. These included ordinary ration bread, called ammunition bread or pain de munition, was made of 10% often mixed flours, intended for the soldiery. Ordinary bread or pain ordinaire, made of 15% milled and sifted wheat (or mostly wheat) flour, was for officers. The finest white bread of 20% sifted wheat flour was for hospitals, pain d'hôpital.⁷¹ The fourth bread was biscuit.

Napoleon always tried to issue white or part white (bis blanc) to his armies, and rye or meteil breads were used when nothing else was available. The garrison of Barcelona in 1814 for example used five types of flour. There were three coarse (10%) flours (brutes): wheat (brutes froment), a wheat and metail blend called melange and maslin, called metéil; or mixed wheat and rye.⁷² The service also managed the other staple foods, such as rice, dried legumes, peas and beans, and salt. The liquid rations

⁷¹AN, AFiv 1176, General Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 22 September 1813; SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

⁷²SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

included oil for cooking, usually olive oil, vinegar to purify drinking water,⁷³ wine, and brandy.⁷⁴

Vivres-viande managed meat supplies of either fresh on the hoof or preserved and included oxen (bullock) cattle, pigs and sheep. Preserved meat and their by products, included salt beef, pork and lard.⁷⁵

Fourrages provided fodder, including grain (oats, rye or barley), hay, straw and bran. It unfortunately required excessive transport. A day's fodder ration for 2,500 horses needed twenty-five wagons. Consequently, the logisticians depended upon the unsure transport of contractors, forcing field units to feed their horses on anything they could procure locally, such as roof thatch straw, green grain, twigs, etc.⁷⁶ Finally, Chauffage included fuels, like firewood, peat or coal, and candles for light. This service was used mostly in garrison and was always procured off the land.⁷⁷

⁷³Vinegar was extensively used in Frederick the Great's Prussian Army to allay thirst and purify water. Jay Luvaas, Ed., Tns., Frederick the Great on the Art of War, (New York: Free Press 1966) 108. Vinegar was also used to prevent scurvy, Erna Risch, Supplying Washington's Army, Special Studies Series, Maurice Matloff General Edition (Washington D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981) 190-191.

⁷⁴Spirituous liquors, or eau de vie.

⁷⁵Daniel A. Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, The Navy Records Society Services Vol. 120, (London: The Navy Records Society, 1977) 413-414.

⁷⁶Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 554.

⁷⁷Ibid., 559; Lechatier, Les Services de l'Arrière, 84-85; Thiebault, Manuel Général, 570; SHAT C(19) 9, LS No. 163, Commissaire des guerres Raymondon to General Lacuée 10 June 1812, Rapport Mensuel des Divers Services Administratifs, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

The services procured other foodstuffs locally, such as vegetables, beans, fish, mutton, etc. In Lower Catalonia, the main crop was olives, fruit, citris, rye and wheat, while in Upper Catalonia the crops included rye, maize, and rice. The major livestock animal was sheep, providing both wool and meat.⁷⁸ There was also oxen and cattle, some poor vineyards, and French beans and millet.⁷⁹ In addition to these products Catalonia produced fish, which became a military ration in the costal garrisons like Barcelona.⁸⁰

There were two methods used to subsist the Army of Catalonia; supply off the land by requisition and through formal supply lines from France and magazines.⁸¹ The determining factor in this system is availability of provender, the difficulties of movement, the road network, and the tactical problem of insurgent attacks of supply columns.⁸²

The first step in determining how to supply the army was to ascertain the resources of the country. For the Army of Catalonia to live off of the country at the height of its strength of about 50,000 troops and 5,000 horses,⁸³ it needed a population density of about 3,000 per 25 square miles (120 people/sq. mile) and about 200 square

⁷⁸Herr, The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain, Map II.

⁷⁹Arthur Young, Travels During the Years 1787, 1788, and 1789 (London: Bury St. Edmonds 1794, Facsimile reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1970) 307, 310

⁸⁰SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

⁸¹Armies often used both methods depending upon the availability of supplies; O. Espanet, Notes on the Supply of an Army During Active Operations, Tns. H.F. Kendall and Henry G. Sharpe (Kansas City: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Co. 1899) 31.

⁸²C. E. Caldwell, Small Wars, Their Principles and Practices (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office Facsimile reprint, East Andsey: EP Publishing LTD., 1976) 57-58.

⁸³SHAT C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1810.

miles of subsistence space to survive completely off the land.⁸⁴ A reconnaissance of the country would determine these resources.⁸⁵ This was only completed by Marshal Augereau in early 1810 when an Administrative Commission investigated the resources of the country.⁸⁶ Earlier, Generals Duhesme and Saint-Cyr relied on the provisions of the magazines of the 8e, 10e, and 11e Divisions militaire⁸⁷ and the remaining supplies in Catalan magazines. The countryside, however, was incapable of supporting the French corps.⁸⁸ From the beginning of the war the French supply services based their support on the convoy/magazine system.⁸⁹ The base or main magazines, such as Perpignan in France were those for the transshipping of supplies.⁹⁰ The intermediate or theater magazines included Figueras, Barcelona, Rosas, Gerona, and the advanced dumps included the small garrison magazines, like Palamos, Hostalrich, Bascara, etc.⁹¹ Additionally the field

⁸⁴Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed., trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) 332-333.

⁸⁵SHAT, C(8) 35, Reconnaissance de la Côte de la Méditerranée depuis Calella jusqu' à Lescala et Roses 25 February 1810.

⁸⁶See Section 3; SHAT, C(8) 42 Arrêté pour la création d'une Commission Administrative Provisoire du Gouvernement de Catalogne, 27 February 1810; Thiebault, Manuel Général, 96-97 Models A-F.

⁸⁷AN, AFiv 1174 Administration de la Guerre, 1er Section Bureau des Vivres, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 18 May 1808; Rapport, 3 August 1808.

⁸⁸AN, AFiv 1174, Administration de Guerre, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 21 April 1809; Rapport, 3 May 1809.

⁸⁹Furse, Lines of Communication, 265.

⁹⁰AN, AFiv 1174, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur 3 Aout 1808.

⁹¹Bascara near the frontier was one such post which served as a road station which units, convoys, etc. passed through. For example, such a convoy passed through on its

divisions could stockpile supplies in temporary magazines. General Sevoroli, for example, stockpiled supplies temporarily in a house within a village that provided requisition supplies.⁹²

The large magazines like Barcelona or Figueras had provisions for normal consumption, and siege or reserve stores. General Duhesme had reserve stores in the Citadel and Monjuich enough to last several weeks, as of January 1809.⁹³ Figueras, a transshipment point for supplies exiting France (over land) had at any one time a large store of garrison and siege provisions. In January 1814, its garrison held enough provisions to last its 1,740 men garrison over a year.⁹⁴

The most important aspect of subsistence supply was its enormous accounting burden. The Intendance had a system of inventories, accounts, and journals to allow efficient accounting of supply stocks, receipts, expenditures and funds.⁹⁵ The

way to Figueras on 2 December 1812 and another to Gerona on 30 November 1812. SHAT, C(8) 411, Situation, Garrison de Bascara, 1-15 December 1812. Similarly, Hostalrich served such a purpose C (8) 411, Situation, Garnison du Fort et la Ville d'Hostalrich, 15 March 1811.

⁹²SHAT, C(8) 276, Analyses de Lettres et de Rapports, Report, 23 December 1810. Suchet, War in Spain, 2:11-12. Schumann, On the Road with Wellington, 8-11.

⁹³SHAT, C (8) 276, Analyses de Lettres et de Rapports, Report No. 10, 22 September 1810; C(19) 9, Viande Salé sur l'approvisionnement de Figueras 16 April 1811.

⁹⁴SHAT, C(19) 9, Place de Figueras, Inventaire des divers effects, service de l'approvisionnement. Nd (1814). Meat supplies were low and would last 81 days. SHAT C(8) 372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814. Another case was Pensicola under General Suchet. In 1813, this small post was fully provisioned with enough stores to last a brigade some six months. SHAT, C(18) 370, Situation des Magasins d'approvisionnement du Siège du Fort de Pensicola, 15 April 1813.

⁹⁵SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

Commissaire, whether with an active division or installation, discussed the status of provisions daily with the Chief of Staff to whom he reports each morning and fortnightly with a statement of logistical services, provision consumption and the contents of magazines. He also continually inspected services to assure the quality of the supplies and the efficiency of service and administration.⁹⁶

The Commissaires accounted for funds to the Ordonnateur on états or bordereau noting receipts and expenses. These funds were approved by the Commander or Ordonnateur from money contributions, ministerial fonds libres, or bugitary credits approved by the Emperor.⁹⁷

Administratively, subsistence supply was a complex and time consuming process. In October 1813, for example, Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon requested from the Ministry approval and credit to purchase 1,200 metric quintals⁹⁸ of salt meat as siege provender for

⁹⁶Thiebault, Manuel Général, 543-544.

⁹⁷Ibid., 547-548.

⁹⁸The Quintal (qx) is a measure of weight which signifies a hundred-weight (cwt) in any scale of weight, e.g. metric, avoirdupois, marc, etc. The quintal most often used here, and by French logisticians, is the metric quintal or metric hundred weight. The French metric quintal (qx metric) equals 100 kg. or 220.49 pounds avoirdupois. The Barcelona (or Catalan) quintal, which the French logisticians occasionally used (qx/C) equals 91.94 lbs. avoirdupois or 41.70 kg (four arrobas). The Spanish quintal (of four Castillian arrobas) equaled 101.43 lbs. avoirdupois or 46.00 kg. There is no evidence that the logisticians of the Army of Catalonia used this latter unit of measure. The other type of quintal which French logisticians in Catalonia occasionally used was the quintal marc, including the French, Spanish or Catalan quintal marc. The marc is a metallic weight equal to eight onces and is similar to the Troy system of metallic weight measurement. it is used as a commercial weight measure. The French marc is a measure of weight equal to eight onces of 30.594 grams (472.19 grains) or 244.75 grams. The French quintal marc (qx marc) equals 24.475 kg. The Catalan quintal marc (qx marc/C) quintal marc (qx marc/S) equals 23.005 kg. Doursther, Dictionnaire Universel, 247-250, 457-461; Zupko, French Weights and Measures, 103, 154-155.

Figueras. Ordonnateur Bourdon applied to the Ministry to initiate a contract to supply the meat,⁹⁹ then negotiated contract with Joseph Reynaud and Company at Lyon for 500 qx of salt beef and 700 qx of salt pork. The contract specified the quality standards and the conditions of the transaction.¹⁰⁰ There were six shipments from Perpignan of 200 qx each, scheduled to begin on 15 November, while payment was made between 1-15 January 1814.¹⁰¹

In the regiments, the French ration consisted of bread, biscuit, fresh or salt meat, seven ounces of salt lard, once ounce of rice, two of dried vegetables and half ounce of salt. The liquid ration was half a pint of wine or beer, two ounces (.1 pint) of brandy and 3½ oz. (.2 pint) of vinegar.¹⁰²

The unit quartermasters went to centralized division or installation distribution points and drew about three days ration which included six days ration of biscuit during

⁹⁹Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon also wanted to distribute 1,315 quintals of fresh meat. SHAT, C(19) 9, Letter No. 4253, Bourdon to Cessac, 24 October 1813.

¹⁰⁰The contract specified; high quality meat, packed in quality salt and brine. Packed weight of beef was set at 300 kg/barrel and pork at 50 kg/barrel. The barrels of good quality with two iron hoops (stays), and capable of holding 100 quintals. SHAT, C(19) 9, Approvisionnement du Figueras. Marche pour la Fourniture de 1200 Quintaux metriques de viande salée destinee pour l'approvisionnement du siège du fort de Figueras, 16 October 1813.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²The liquid rations were calculated at one liter per four men of wine, one liter of brandy for sixteen men and a liter of vinegar for eight men. See Table 26 for metric ration. SHAT, C(8) 398, État du Nombre des Rations, 30 June 1810.

active operations.¹⁰³ He distributed it to the companies and in turn to the fifteen man mess squads or ordinaire under a corporal. Each took turns at company mess duty. Its equipment included a camp kettle (marmite), large canteen (bidon), several mess tins (gamelles), and a hatchet. Ordonnaire members took turns as company cooks or experienced soldiers were assigned the duty permanently.¹⁰⁴ Stationed in the unit rear with the domestics, they established a 'cookhouse' in some barn or shed, or in good weather, in the open. Gathering the rations, he made a soup for a noon meal consisting of meat, vegetables with some biscuit or pain de soupe dissolved to thicken the boullion, with bread and wine to wash it down. The evening meal usually had some vegetable, such as the ubiquitous potato, bread, and wine.¹⁰⁵

To make the soup, the cook gathered water¹⁰⁶ in the canteen and mixed it with meat, vegetables, and biscuit. Occasionally, salt lard was used as a flavoring or drippings

¹⁰³During General Saint-Cyr's perilous march to Cardadeau after the siege of Rosas in December 1808, he distributed four days biscuit to his troops. Oman, Peninsular War, 2:60. Napoleon restricted the amount of rations carried in the trains to seven days biscuit. Chandler, Campaigns of Napoleon, 366.

¹⁰⁴Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 580.

¹⁰⁵*Ibid.*, 575-577.

¹⁰⁶There is the humorous story told by Capitaine Elzear Blaze. In bivouac he found dead mice boiling away in the soup kettle which the cook had accidentally put in the morning soup when he gathered water from a vat on some German farm used to kill mice, which were floating there. When the cook scooped up the water he got some mice, too. Blaze ordered him to dump the soup and begin afresh, but the cook begged to be allowed to retain it for when the soldiers awoke and found the soup not ready he'd get fifty kicks. Blaze had mercy on him and allowed him to retain the soup which turned out much to the liking of the troops though flavored with mice. Elzear Blaze, Recollections of an Officer of Napoleon's Army, Tns. E. Jules Meras, (New York: Sturgis and Walton, 1911) 25-27.

to sop up in bread or biscuit. The cook ladled the soup into the gamelles, each of which served five to eight soldiers. Often the meat was fished out and served separately with the soup to each soldier with bread. Each man ate a spoonful of soup from the communal gamelle and with the communal spoon in turn until finished.¹⁰⁷

In French garrisons, the unit messed on the peace rates and used a mess fund from soldiers pay (25 c/man) and a government gratuity (15 c/man) and firewood.¹⁰⁸ In theater, however, garrisons were on war rations though they undoubtedly got to enjoy them both better prepared and in better surroundings. These rations included two types of breads including pain de munition made of $\frac{3}{4}$ wheat and $\frac{1}{4}$ rye and often baked in a ring for easy carrying, and biscuit (pain biscuit) made of the same ingredient but baked longer to evaporate all its moisture, giving the tell tale hardness associated with hardtack.¹⁰⁹ The pain de soupe, like crackers, is crumbled and dissolved in soup.¹¹⁰ Meats included fresh and salt meats. At Barcelona, for example, the Commissaire des guerres occasionally added dried or salted fish to the ration.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 579-580. Only the Imperial Guard had mess bowls and spoons for each soldier.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 576. Sargent Coignet of the Imperial Guard was charged with the NCO boarding house near Paris (BEQ) and managed the mess with a fund of 45.70 F. per day, including white bread (8.10 F.), wine (8.10 F.), and crockery (3.00 F.). He even got an additional 21.20 F. to purchase provisions in Paris. The Conseil d'Administration put at his disposal a carriage, four special duty soldiers, a chief cook, and several assistants. Coignet, The Narrative of Captain Coignet, 199.

¹⁰⁹Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 576-577.

¹¹⁰Ibid., 577; Billings, Hardtack and Coffee, 113-114.

¹¹¹SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

Units and solders obtained their rations by distribution, forrage, theft, or purchase. The troops in Catalonia often foraged, but only in groups, to avoid being ambushed. One method was simple theft which commanders often allowed on a small scale, but when soldiers went over the boundary to marauding that they faced severe disciplinary action.¹¹²

¹¹²Several soldiers of the 4e Léger were court-martialed in 1811 and imprisoned at Perpignan. SHAT, C(8) 282, Armée de Catalogne, État-Major Général, Registre de Correspondance Générale du 15 Février 1811 au 31 Juillet 1811, No. 3, Marshal Macdonald to the Colonel of the 4e Léger, 20 June 1811. Similarly, pillage was court martialed. SHAT C(8) 129, CM, Marshal Macdonald to General Amey, Governor of Gerona, 25 June 1810.

§3. Subsistence: The Big Picture.

The French forces in Catalonia required enormous daily quantities of food and drink. A French ration weighed 1.87 kg¹¹³ and units required 2.5% over and above their total troop strength. The Army required in 1807, 16.7 tons per day, at its height, in 1810, 125.5 tons; and by the end of the war 40.9 tons.¹¹⁴ These quantities were only partly available off the land and this source steadily decreased as the war dragged on, with the consequent destruction of Catalan agriculture. As we shall see the only way to feed the Army was by requisition from France.

At the beginning of the occupation, the Spanish Captain General supplied the Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales.¹¹⁵ The Emperor even wanted to feed the Pyrénées fortresses out of Spain too. This would prove futile as the French troops exhausted the poor Catalan countryside, and these same fortresses ultimately had to feed the Army in Catalonia. In May 1808, the Pyrénées fortresses of the 8e, 9e, 10e, and 11e Division Militaire held 48,751.61 metric quintals (qx) of grain (7,520,259 rations of bread). Of this, the 10e Division Militaire had 15,017.51 qx (2,283,807 rations).¹¹⁶

¹¹³SHAT, C(8) 398, État du Nombre des Rations, 30 June 1810 and Doursther, Dictionnaire Universel, 168, 398.

¹¹⁴See Table 27.

¹¹⁵SHAT, C(19) 7, VII Corps, No. 353, Ordonnateur en chef Rey to General Dejean, 4 January 1809.

¹¹⁶Perpignan had 10,985.39 qx (1,668,957 rtn); Carcassone had 951.74 qx (144,778 rtn); Achs had 1,217.99 qx (187,782 rtn) and Toulouse had 1,862.39 qx (282,290 rtn). AN, AFiv 1174, Administration de la Guerre, 1er Section. Bureau des Vivres, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 18 May 1808.

When the war expanded after June 1808, General Reille's division, reinforcing Duhesme's Corps, found little on the barren landscapes of Upper Catalonia. Only France could support it with the required 12,034 rations per day for his 11,725 troops.¹¹⁷ General Gouvion Saint-Cyr, for example, requested for Figueras, 360,000 rations of biscuit enough to last 2,000 men six months and another 100,000 rations for five Pyrénées fortresses. He then requested another 200,000 rations for his own troops.¹¹⁸

Unfortunately, French dependence on the Catalan military abruptly ended on 1 July 1808, when the insurrection interrupted this source of supply. For Barcelona, General Duhesme ordered procurement for both daily needs and a siege supply, and used regular and contract requisition through the Junta of Barcelona. This, however, worked poorly because of a lack of ready cash.¹¹⁹ The garrison magazines were by years end nearly empty, holding only a few days of provisions,¹²⁰ and the troops consumed it as fast as procured. Barcelona needed a large infusion of supplies from France. As early as May

¹¹⁷SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Division du Général Reille, 1 April 1809.

¹¹⁸The fortress supplies were 30,000 rations each for Mont Louis and Bellegrade, 10,000 each for Fort des Bains and Fort de la Gande, and 20,000 for Ville Franche. AN, AFiv 1174, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 3 August 1808.

¹¹⁹Current production in the 10e Divisoin Militaire was 300,000 rtn of biscuit. SHAT, C(19) 7, No. 353, Ordonnateur en Chef Rey to General Dejean, 4 January 1809.

¹²⁰Ibid. Garde Régie Générale, Approvisionnements de Réserve, Place de Barcelone, Garde Magasin Billet, Situation de Magasins Militaires de la Citadelle et du Fort Mont Jouy, 1 January 1809; Garde Magasin Billet, Situation et Mouvements en Matiers 5 January 1809; Billet, Situation et Mouvements, 20 January 1809; Billet, Situation des Magasins Militaires, 20 January 1809.

1808, Perpignan had sent 148,409 rations, and on 2 December 1808 Port Vendre had sent 19,932 rations and later 141.95 qx of provisions.¹²¹

In the field, General Gouvion Saint-Cyr had the same problems that Duhesme had in Barcelona, and similarly tried to supply his divisions through local authorities. During his famous December march from Rosas to Barcelona there was nothing obtainable locally and Saint-Cyr's divisions ate only what they brought.¹²² He too, went to contract requisitioning, and obtained from Barcelona, two contractors, who procured 500 qx of rice for 35,820 F.¹²³ Barcelona also obtained, through one of its few successful requisitions from outlying towns, 2,132 qx of grain, 400 qx of flour, and 120 qx of legumes. Additionally, French ships brought several thousand quintals of grain, flour, and lentils through the corsair blockade.¹²⁴

In Upper Catalonia the results were the same but General Reille could at least gain the bulk of his provender from France by land convoy,¹²⁵ though they occasionally obtained a supply windfall off the land. Near Figueras, for example, many of the olive

¹²¹Ibid.

¹²²SHAT, C(19) 7, VII Corps, No. 280, Ordonnateur Rey to General Dejean, 29 November 1808, and No. 38, 27 December 1808.

¹²³SHAT, C(19) 17, VII Corps No. 555, Ordonnateur Rey to General Dejean, 16 April 1809; Barcelona, Jacques de Vincenza, Procès Verbal, Rice Provision nd.; Ordonnateur Rey and M. Vincenza, Marché, 11 April 1809; M Vincenza, Facture des Denrées, 15 April 1809.

¹²⁴This shipment included 1,251 sacks of grain, 287 sacks of flour, 340 sacks of legumes, and 3,000 qx of oats. AN, AFiv 1174, General Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 21 April 1809.

¹²⁵SHAT, C(8) 267, Registre de Correspondance du Général Reille. See various letters.

growers abandoned their groves, which Gouvion Saint-Cyr captured, obtaining 13,770 liters of oil.¹²⁶

In mid-1809 the war shifted to Upper Catalonia with the Siege of Gerona. The resulting troop concentrations required continual resupply from France. General Verdier, siege commander at Gerona, requested from General Dejean 20,000 rations of food per day to support his troops,¹²⁷ which strained the Departments of the 10e Division Militaire. The VII Corps Ordonnateur en Chef, Ordonnateur Rey, requested 10,000 qx marc of flour, a requisition of 7,000 qx of grain and 1,200 oxen (40 oxen/day). General Dejean tried to get these supplies, and, in fact, dispatched the flour immediately. He could not, however, get the other grain but strained to supply the meat, and all at the enormous cost of 395,750 F.¹²⁸

Perpignan was drained nearly dry by the VII Corps' continuous requisitions. On 30 November only 182,585 rations of bread remained in its storehouses. Up to January 1810, it received another 1,021,400 rations, only to lose 420,000 rations to the VII Corps earlier in December 1809. By January 1810, Perpignan had only 783,985 rations.¹²⁹

¹²⁶AN, AFiv 1174, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 3 May 1809.

¹²⁷He requested too, from the Ordonnateur of the 10e Division Militaire, 200,000 rations each of flour, meat, and rice, 100,000 rations of brandy and 10,000 decaliters of oats. AN, AFiv 1174, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 13 June 1809.

¹²⁸The 10,000 qx of flour cost 200,000 F. and the cost 1,200 bullock 195,750 F. AN, AFiv 1174, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 14 October 1809.

¹²⁹AN, AFiv 1174, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur 13 December 1809; Directeur Général des Vivres de la Guerre, Bureau Particulaire, No. 1319, Conseiller d'État to General Dejean 12 December 1809; SHAT C(8) 34, VII Corps, No. 1262, Ordonnateur en Chef Rey to Marshal Augereau, 11 December 1809; No. 1260, Rey to Augereau, 11 December 1809.

The year 1810 was an even tighter one for the Army of Catalonia. Napoleon threw Marshal Augereau's new Army onto the mercy of a barren countryside in an attempt to make his outlying "Vice Royal" commands logistically independent and less of a burden on France. The attempt, however, failed. On 28 February 1810, three weeks after the Imperial Decree creating Catalonia as a "Vice-Royalty,"¹³⁰ General Lacuée the new Minister Director of Military Administration informed Napoleon that the areas of Catalonia occupied by the French Army were utterly exhausted, and there was no choice but to continue provisioning the army from France. General Lacuée, therefore, requested that Napoleon relax the logistical rules of the 8 February Decree, and authorize the provisioning from France at the expense of the military chest of the Army of Catalonia, paying from the salary funds of Augereau's soldiers. Unfortunately, the Army of Catalonia was as strapped of money as it was of food.¹³¹ Within weeks Augereau ordered a new shipment of 5,000 qx of flour sent to Barcelona, which General Lacuée authorized.¹³² Since 1808, then, the 10e Division Militaire had provided to the Army of Catalonia 9,480,928 kg of provisions¹³³ at a cost of 4,530,168.98 F.¹³⁴

¹³⁰SHAT, C(8) 41, Imperial, Decree, 8 February 1810; Archives des Affaires Étrangères, Correspondance Diplomatique, Vol. 672, Decree, 8 February 1810.

¹³¹AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 28 February 1810.

¹³²AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 14 March 1810.

¹³³This included 982,364 kg of biscuits, 70,622 kg of bread, 459,477 kg of grain, 4,564,143 kg of flour, 131,026 kg of rice, 3,434 kg of legumes, 25,573 kg of salt (1,664 kg of candles), 92,384 liters of brandy, 7,923 liters of vinegar, 5,588 (2,344,364 kg) oxen, 2,593 (782,391 kg) of cattle and 5,464 (115,869 kg) sheep. AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 14 March 1810; Général Lacuée, *État Indicatif (1er) des Denrées Versées de la 10e Division Militaire, (2e) de la Dépense Resultant des ces Versement*; March 1810.

The enormous costs required extraordinary funds. The Imperial Budget of 1810 admitted the need and allowed for Catalonia a subsistence expenditure of 750,000 F. Unpaid expenses, however, were 3,393,382 F., leaving a cost overrun of 2,643,382 F. General Lacuée, therefore, requested to float a 2,000,000 F. draft off of the Funds de Réserve to pay these expenses.¹³⁵ The Army of Catalonia, however, seemed absolutely ravenous, and only a fortnight later, Marshal Augereau requisitioned yet another 6,000 qx of grain, 350 wagons to haul it, 1,200 oxen and 2,300,000 F. in extra money for June 1810.¹³⁶

Augereau's head logistician Ordonnateur en Chef Rey meanwhile tore his hair out over the continued provisioning of Barcelona,¹³⁷ the misconduct of a Commissaire des guerres in the Pyrénées-Orientales,¹³⁸ and dozens of other problems. On 9 June, Marshal Macdonald the new commander replaced Rey, who had covered himself in glory for the zealous management of the army's logistics. He was set the task of accomplishing the impossible and had just about managed it. Macdonald praised him in his order of the day

¹³⁴The costs include for biscuits 286,996.16 F., bread for 16,953.47 F., rice for 84,689.95 F., legumes for 1,315.14 F., salt for 7,912.62 F., candles for 2,828.80 F., brandy for 44,349.26 F., vinegar for 1,915.47 F., meat for 2,063,919.48 F., and a food shipment to Barcelona on 15 February 1810 worth 255,694.04 F., Ibid.

¹³⁵The Fonds de Réserve held 4,306,000 F. AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, April 1810.

¹³⁶AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur 16 May 1810.

¹³⁷SHAT, C(8) 129, CM, Tome I, Macdonald to Rey, 24 May 1810; Macdonald to the Maritime Prefect of Toulon, 24 May 1810.

¹³⁸Commissaire des guerres Catalogne. SHAT, C(8) 129, Macdonald to General Lacuée, 24 May 1810.

"...the Marshal bore witness of his satisfaction of Ordonnateur Rey for his zeal and activity in managing the different services of the Army".¹³⁹ Rey's replacement was the equally competent and active Ordonnateur en Chef, Bourdon. Thrown into the fray, Bourdon's first task was to manage the huge convoys to Barcelona in addition to the thousand bee stings of normal operations.

When Marshal Macdonald took command of the Army of Catalonia, he made every attempt to increase the efficiency and justice of requisitions. On 2 June 1810, less than a week after his arrival, he issued an Order of the Day, which established conditions for drawing requisitions. It specified that all of the country's resources were at the Army's disposal, but Macdonald resolved to take them in a way that would lessen the damage to the country and the misery of the populace.¹⁴⁰

This Order of the Day centralized the requisition process. Only Intendance officers could requisition provender, and the Commissaire-Ordonnateur maintained a register of these transactions.¹⁴¹ This, prohibited units from requisitioning on their own authority. He put teeth into this order by allowing communities to complain to the local

¹³⁹SHAT, C(8) 133, CM, Tome III, Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements, 2e Cahier, Order of the Day, 9 June 1810.

¹⁴⁰Ibid., Ordre du Jour, Arrêté, 1 June 1810; Titre 2, Réquisitions, 2 June 1810.

¹⁴¹This Reconnaissance reveals these resources on a étendue des Terres, Classement des terres, Produits territoriaux, et Moyens de communications, isolating types of supply, their quality and value. Ibid., Thiebault, Manuel Général, Model C.

military governor or commander any abuse, and the authorities would court martial and shoot any soldier guilty of disobeying as a pillager.¹⁴²

During Macdonald's campaign to support General Suchet's siege operations in Lower Catalonia, he was forced to fend for himself, for Suchet's magazines were only large enough to support the Army of Aragon.¹⁴³ Macdonald's divisions occupied cantonments near the Ebro with its headquarters at Cervera. These divisions fanned out on continual requisition missions. On 27 August, for example, General Severoli's division got 22 oxen, six hogs, eight mutton, and 7,000 qx of grain, and 1,000 qx of oats.¹⁴⁴ In September his foragers got another 2,000 qx of grain.¹⁴⁵ Simultaneously, a convoy with 1,559 qx of grain arrived.¹⁴⁶ In fact, the overwhelming preoccupation of Macdonald's divisions over and above covering Suchet was procuring sufficient food and drink for the troops.

The other preoccupation was how to pay for it. From the beginning of Macdonald's command the inability to pay for supplies out of contribution funds was undoubtedly as much of a shock to him as it was a pain to the Emperor. The lack of ready cash forced Macdonald to pinch pennies to a degree he never dreamed of. Freight

¹⁴²The Chief of Staff had audit authority. SHAT, C(8) 133, Ordre du Jour, Réquisitions, 2 June 1810.

¹⁴³Suchet, War in Spain, 1:203-207.

¹⁴⁴SHAT, C(8) 276, Analyses de Rapports, Rapport no. 9 and 10, 22 September 1810. Simultaneously Suchet's Intendance got 20,000 qx of grain. Rapport Nos. 1 and 2, 23 September 1810.

¹⁴⁵Ibid., Report No. 2, 23 September 1810.

¹⁴⁶Ibid., Report No. 5, 23 September 1810.

costs for hauling grain, at 70 centimes per month, per quintal, or $\frac{4}{5}$ centime per ration. Costs of distributing rations at $3\frac{1}{2}$ centimes per ration, butchering 135,000 rations of meat at $\frac{3}{4}$ centimes per ration (1,017 F.), and freight to haul 180,000 rations of forrage at 2 centimes per ration;¹⁴⁷ or contacting meat procurement for 21 centimes per ration.¹⁴⁸

The Ordonnateur en chef was also weighted down in the unavoidable details of the service. In August 1810, for example, he became embroiled in a complaint of General Severoli on the Intendance short weighing of rations at Barcelona and the resulting monetary indemnity owed to the troops en lieu of missed rations.¹⁴⁹ Elsewhere, the overworked Bourdon was faced with substandard rations issued to the hospital at Lerida, and so forth.¹⁵⁰ Amidst this welter of problems, Macdonald and Bourdon were forever faced with the Sisyphean task of supplying the army from France. By June 1810, a month into his command, Macdonald was utterly resigned to France as his logistical lifeline.

¹⁴⁷SHAT, C(8) 278, Rapports, 1810, No. 6, 30 June 1810.

¹⁴⁸SHAT, C(19) 7, Bureau de Particular, 1er Section, Administration de la Guerre, LS, General Lacuée to General Clarke, 21 June 1810.

¹⁴⁹Marshal Macdonald paid the division double indemnity for one day. SHAT, C(8) 129, CM, Tome I, Macdonald to Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon, 13 August 1810. Other mundane problems which occupied Bourdon included the issue of using an Sous-Inspecteur aux revues as a Commissaire des guerres, Macdonald to Bourdon, 19 August 1810. If a ration item is not distributed the soldier receives a cash indemnity.

¹⁵⁰Ibid., LS, Macdonald to Bourdon, 1 September 1810.

In mid-June then, he requested three months of siege rations for six of his fortresses, for 520,000 F. Barcelona for example, needed 2,850,000 rations of flour and 216,000 rations of oats.¹⁵¹ The hospitals also required resupply at a cost of 213,440 F.¹⁵²

The 47,000 man¹⁵³ army consumed in May 1,395,000 rations and needed 1,457,000 rations per month (8,150 qx) not including 1,477,580 rations of meat.¹⁵⁴ The Army only possessed a few days provisions in the magazines and needed this new provisioning or starve.¹⁵⁵ Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon applied to General Lacuée for yet another month's provisions and the long suffering Lacuée applied to the Emperor, as on 4 July to supply Catalonia for July and August.¹⁵⁶ Napoleon must have been frustrated too, over supporting the Army of Catalonia as it seemingly sat doing little other than eat.

General Lacuée's frustrations must have been overwhelming, caught between Bourdon's demands and Napoleon's limits to fulfilling them. On 8 July, he adapted new

¹⁵¹Barcelona had 8,000 men and 600 horses. The other fortresses included Figueras (4,000 men/500 horses); Rosas (400 men/50 horses); Las Medas (20 men); Gerona (3,200 men/500 horses) and Hostalaich (1,000 men). AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 13 June 1810.

¹⁵²Ibid.

¹⁵³The 31 May strength was 47,519 men and 3,469 horses. SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

¹⁵⁴These figures include an overage of 72,000 rations expended in May and an overage of 82,580 rations in the request. SHAT, C(18) 7, LS, General Lacuée to General Clarke, 21 June 1810.

¹⁵⁵By 31 May the Army had a good supply of flour, 1,488,800 kg. However, they only had 15,381 rations of biscuits, 13,380 liters (53,520 rations) of wine and 628 animals, about twelve days supply. SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

¹⁵⁶AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 4 July 1810.

measures to manage the services of the Army of Catalonia hoping to break its costly logistical deadlock. He granted Bourdon's present provision request of one month supply,¹⁵⁷ but insisted on Macdonald expanding his area of operation to Taragonna so as to exploit local supplies. Taking a leaf out of Napoleon's book, he insisted that only by continued offensive operations can the Army of Catalonia assure its supplies.¹⁵⁸ He insisted too, on squeezing the occupied area of available resources all the harder. He demanded that Bourdon ruthlessly requisition from the Ampurdam, wine, vinegar and olive oil, which if not abundant was sufficient.¹⁵⁹ General Lacuée made similar provisions for forage, and provided sufficient regular transport.¹⁶⁰

Funding was a particularly difficult problem. The French Empire had already paid 1,287,798 F. for equipage and Intendance pay alone for 1808-1809. General Lacuée suggested that Marshal Macdonald would do well to exploit untapped financial resources of the province. He must try harder to make war pay for war.¹⁶¹ The contribution system was, however, a failure from the beginning of the war due to over exploitation and

¹⁵⁷This included 66,000 qx marc of flour, 3,132 qx of rice 5,890,000 rations of meat, 40 qx of salt, 193,000 liters of brandy, and 2,00 liters of vinegar. AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 9 July 1810, LS (copy), General Lacuée to Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon, 8 July 1810; LS (copy), Lacuée to Ordonnateur of the 10e Division Militaire, 8 July 1810.

¹⁵⁸Ibid.

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

¹⁶⁰Other areas of supply discussed were clothing and hospital administration. Ibid.

¹⁶¹Ibid.

mismanagement in 1808 and expanding the range of contributions by military operations would still not pay off.¹⁶²

By September, the situation had not improved. Macdonald was still caught in the toils of the grinding guerilla war and logistical costs mounted which could only be paid in the long run by France. By mid-1810 there was for the Army of Catalonia 8,290,000 F. in available funds of which 4,473,841.83 F. was for subsistence alone.¹⁶³ Still, the army remained in its old positions, holding down the country and unable to strike into Lower Catalonia. The only good news was the safe arrival of provision ships at Barcelona in September and October carrying 16,435 quintals marc of supplies (and 1,678 liters of wine).¹⁶⁴

General Lacuée's well considered plan for it depended upon Macdonald's ability to undertake offensive operations to conquer Lower Catalonia, a task now left to Suchet, and restricting Macdonald to only a supporting role. Logistically then, the Army of Catalonia was, in January 1811, in no better position to support itself than the year before.

The years 1811 and 1812 brought the same disappointments and the fall of Macdonald from his command. Prior to the disastrous capture of Figueras by the insurgents and the siege to retake the place, the 24,000 French troops in Upper Catalonia

¹⁶²Conard, Napoléon et de Catalogne, 221-236, 340-341, 246-282, 453; AN, AFiv 1621, Plaq 1, Resumé des Operations Militaires, Corps d'Armée des Pyrénées Orientales; Laffaille Memoirs, 124.

¹⁶³This included in bakery 1,380,000 F.; meat 1,276,000.00 F.; rice and legume 145,334.73 F.; forrage 720,000 F.; transport 782,000 F.; and administration, 170,507.10 F. AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 5 September 1810.

¹⁶⁴AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapports à l'Empereur, 15 November 1810 and 17 November 1810; C(19) 8, Lacuée to Clarke, 21 June 1810.

were supplied exclusively from the 10e Division Militaire. Dry food alone amounted to 30,430 qx, and the total cost for food, drink, and forage was 464,518 F. for seven month's provision.¹⁶⁵ General Baraquey d'Hillier's Corps in Upper Catalonia virtually lived from hand to mouth, despite the provisions brought from France, for its 20,149 troops only held about three to seven days provisions¹⁶⁶ and remained precarious through the rest of 1811. It too, depended almost entirely on France,¹⁶⁷ over the next two years. The rest of the Army of Catalonia was in exactly the same position, holding about three days provision.¹⁶⁸

The provisioning of Barcelona through the war was a high priority task for General Lacuée and Napoleon and they knew that the Army of Catalonia alone was

¹⁶⁵This required 28,000 qx of flour, 790 qx rice, 790 qx of legumes, 850 qx of salt, 156,500 liters of brandy, 252,000 liters of vinegar and 542,500 decaliters of oats. AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 30 April 1811.

¹⁶⁶Provisions on hand included 8,365 kg of grain, 658,592 kg of flour, 74,884 rations of biscuits, 34,593 rations of rice, 11,412 kg of legumes and 18,615 kg of salt. It also had 396 meat animals, 15,660.8 kg of salt meat, 25,322 liters of brandy, 6,236 liters of vinegar and 80,614 decaliters of oats. SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne, 15 March 1811.

¹⁶⁷In August, at the end of the Figueras siege the 25,290 man/1,442 horse Corps had 14,673 kg of meat, 189,202 kg of flour, 41,242 kg of biscuits, 23,525 kg of rice, 136 kg of legumes, 12,722 kg of salt, 19,946 rations of bread, 17,018 liters of brandy, 20,894 liters of wine, 31,241 liters of vinegar, 44 kg of oil, 213 oxen, 50 cattle, 1,116 kg candles, 27,222 kg of hay, 80,026 kg straw, 3,329 decaliters of oats, and 784 decaliters of bran. SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne, 1 August 1811.

¹⁶⁸SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1811 and 1 January 1812.

incapable of supporting the city. In January 1811 several French land and sea convoys supplied Barcelona with 16,186 qx of provisions, 200 oxen, and 12,578 liters of brandy.¹⁶⁹

Napoleon was determined to hold Barcelona and supplied it with a will, through 1811. In November, three naval convoys evaded the corsairs and land convoys pushed through the guerillas and brought 15,000 qx of provisions; enough for six months.¹⁷⁰ Napoleon was, however, tiring of this costly logistical battle for a fortress which was a sink hole for one of his divisions. More than once he resolved but never executed a plan to blow up its fortifications, reinforce the citadel and Fort Monjuich leaving only a brigade as garrison. In any case, Napoleon continued to support Catalonia through the war, as expenditures mounted. The eighteen months of 1810-11 cost 1,023,918 F.,¹⁷¹ out of a Peninsular logistical budget of 12,290,000 F.¹⁷² When he replaced Marshal Macdonald with General Decaen, the situation remained completely unchanged to 1814.

¹⁶⁹SHAT, C(19) 8, Ministerial Note, 10 January 1811; Imperial Orders to resupply Barcelona, nd.

¹⁷⁰This included 10,000 qx of grain, 1,250 qx of rice, 2,000 qx of salt, 50,000 dl of oats, oxen and even 600,000 F. in cash to defray garrison expenses. SHAT, C(19) 8, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 29 December 1811; AN, AFiv 1176, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, January 1813.

¹⁷¹Monthly consumption of the Army was 4,000 qx of flour, 216 qx of rice, 120 qx of salt, 720 oxen, 50,000 dl of oats, 22,500 l. of brandy and 36,000 l. of vinegar. In this period the Army obtained from France 104,620 rations of biscuits, 70,410 qx of flour, 2,060 qx of rice 566 qx of salt, 849,580 dl of oats, 12,671 head of beef and mutton, 20,296 liters of wine, 135,591 liters of brandy, and 19,395 liters of vinegar. AN, AFiv 1175, General Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 3 July 1811.

¹⁷²Ibid., LS, Lacuée to Napoleon, nd.

In January 1813 Barcelona received another of its many re-provisionings of 18,750 qx of grain, 2,475 qx of preserved meat, 56,250 liters of brandy and 240,000 dl of oats.¹⁷³ The French treasury would expend 700,000 F. on grain for Barcelona alone for 1812¹⁷⁴ out of the enormous provisioning of the Army at 18,000,000 F.¹⁷⁵ The figures for 1813 were staggering too. Napoleon spent 7,393,612.91 F. in the first six months of 1813 on a new approved annual budget of 8,000,000 F.¹⁷⁶ There seemed no end in sight but at least Napoleon had resigned himself to the fact that he could not make war feed war in eastern Spain.

Feeding the Army of Catalonia strained the French Pyrénées districts to the breaking point. The Ordonnateur of the 10e Division Militaire requisitioned 15,200 qx of grain at the enormous cost of 599,692.50 F.¹⁷⁷ reflecting its scarcity and excessive requisitioning by the Army of Catalonia. The exhaustion of French departments is indexed in the difficulty of supplying the Catalan fortresses and the French Pyrénées fortresses with siege provisions in late 1813 and 1814. Napoleon supplied Perpignan with 70 days provisions, Mont Louis with a month's provender, Bellegarde with 40 days, Collioure with 20 days and the Chateau de Lourdes with 60 days provision. The cost of

¹⁷³AN, AFiv 1176, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 26 January 1813.

¹⁷⁴AN, AFiv 1176, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 9 April 1813.

¹⁷⁵AN, AFiv 1176, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 21 April 1813.

¹⁷⁶AN, AFiv 1176, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 16 June 1813 and 13 August 1813.

¹⁷⁷See Table 28, AN, AFiv 1176, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 12 August 1813.

this last ditch project was 278,177.96 F.¹⁷⁸ The second index of these difficulties was Marshal Suchet's order to stop baking three varieties of bread for the Army. He allowed two, the best white for hospitals and pain de munition.¹⁷⁹ The abandonment of the 15% pain ordinaire for officers reflected the growing scarcity of provisions and the need to economize.

The Army of Catalonia was, through its history, an enormous drain in subsistence and money from France. The poverty of the country, the competing logistical demands of the opposed armies and the sheer ferocity of the insurgent war restricted French movements to areas picked clean of provender. This forced its dependency, since 1808, on France for provision, which France could ill afford. These demands slowly stripped the areas of the French Pyrénées of provender over the years, raising the prices of existing supplies and dislocating the local economy. Additionally, the lack of monetary contributions collected by the French threw the cost of provisions onto the French Treasury, dislocating the French economy.

Napoleon and General Lacuée made a great, though unsuccessful, attempt to hold back the provisioning of the Army of Catalonia at Treasury expense by forcing Marshal Macdonald into the field, and onto fresh resources. The difficulties of supporting Barcelona, the lack of troops, the requirements of holding down the country and the more

¹⁷⁸These garrisons had the following strengths: Perpignan 3,500 men/100 horses, Mont Louis, 2,500 men, Bellegande 1,000 men, Collioure, 2,000 men, and Chateau de Lourdes 300 men. AN, AFiv 1176, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 3 September 1813.

¹⁷⁹AN, AFiv 1176, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 22 September 1813.

than occasional military disasters which plagued the French Command there from 1810 to 1813 virtually hamstrung the attempt, prohibiting extensive operations afield. The Army of Catalonia remained then a burden on France. Napoleon admitted this fact by placing this Army on the budget and there it remained until 1814.

§4. The Worms Eye View: Vivres-Viande.

The second of the Intendance sections, vivres-viande, was responsible for the supply of fresh (on the hoof) and preserved meat and salt lard, by purchase, and requisition.¹⁸⁰ At the Corps and Army level this branch of the Intendance was part of the Services Réunis, or Subsistance Générale, managed by one of the three Régisseurs généraux in the Army headquarters under the Intendant Général.¹⁸¹ The Armée d'Espagne for example had two Régisseurs généraux des services généraux.¹⁸² In the Corps d'Armée a Directeur Principal or Agents en Chef managed the Service Réunis as a Commissaire-Ordonnateur or Commissaire des guerres under the overall control of the Corps Ordonnateur en chef.¹⁸³ The VII Corps and Army of Catalonia used a Commissaire-Ordonnateur adjoint as Directeur Principal to manage subsistence.¹⁸⁴

In the divisions the service was divided into its three separate Régies, under a Commissaire des guerres adjoint. The Régie des vivres-viande is headed by an Inspecteur or Controller, assisted by a Chef de Parc or Garde Parc. The vivres-viande personnel

¹⁸⁰Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 554; Thiebault, Manuel Général, 546.

¹⁸¹Thiebault, Manuel Général, 570.

¹⁸²SHAT, C(8) 398, Armée d'Espagne, Personnel, Administration Générale de l'Armée d'Espagne, 15 December 1809; Administration Générale de l'Armée d'Espagne, 1 January 1810; Armée d'Espagne, Personnel, Bureau d'Opérations Militaires, LS, Intendant Général Dennée to General Clarke, 19 February 1810; Administration Generale de l'Armée d'Espagne, Etat, 1 November 1810.

¹⁸³Thiebault, Manuel Général, 570.

¹⁸⁴SHAT, C(8) 398, Administration Générale de l'Armée d'Espagne, 15 December 1809, 1 January 1810, and 1 November 1810.

(sous-employees) are organized into four man brigades, lead by a brigadier. These personnel were of three types, butchers (bouchers), drovers (touchers) and yard keepers (romainiers).¹⁸⁵

The garrison of Barcelona, under General Habert in 1814 had as head of the subsistence services Commissaire des guerres adjoint Roullon, chief of Administration Militaire, and assistant to garrison Commissaire des guerres Mongenot. The garrison Régie des vivres-viande had five men, headed by a Garde-Parc, and assisted by an Aide Garde-Parc with three sous-employees des vivres-viande.¹⁸⁶

The Corps and division possessed animal parks or Parcs de bétail. The Ministry Instruction of 21 February 1795 specified that one bullock or ox provided 1,000 rations of fresh meat. The conventional military wisdom, however, dictated a rate of 800 rations per bullock, 600 per cow, 60 rations per sheep, and 60 rations per hog.¹⁸⁷ The meat requirements of the Army of Catalonia varied with its strength through the war from 2,028 kg of beef and 1,623 kg of pork per day to a maximum of 15,229 kg of beef and

¹⁸⁵Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arrière, 83: 86; SHAT, C(8) 398, État du Nombre des Rations, 30 June 1810.

¹⁸⁶SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. The Emperor even militarized the Régie des vivres-viande in the Imperial Guard, manning it with soldiers. Its staff consisted of one Sergeant-Major, two Sergeant Park (yard) keepers (romainiers), one corporal and ten Butchers, and cow herders. Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arrière, 87.

¹⁸⁷SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus; Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arrière, 83.

12,183 kg of pork.¹⁸⁸ The actual meat ration was .25 kg of fresh or salt beef, or mutton¹⁸⁹ or .2 kg of salt pork or lard.¹⁹⁰

The preserved meats, that is, salt beef and salt pork were made by heavy salting (pickling), and packed in barrels. When the oxen was slaughtered, the butchers hung it up to cool for 24 hours. Once cooled they cut up the carcass into twenty-six, four pound pieces per every hundred weight of meat. The pieces of meat were rubbed in salt and stowed into bins with salt between the layers of meat, for five or six days. At the end of this time the meat was removed from the bins, again rubbed with salt, packed into barrels laced with salt and allowed to drain through their bung for 24 hours. A pickle of brine water was then added to fill the cask.¹⁹¹ The barrel was then bunged up and sealed. The barrel head was then marked "B" for beef, number of pieces in the cask, and the first two letters of the place and month of making it.¹⁹²

Barrels of salt beef and pork weigh in the French Army about 100 kg and had a shelf life of three years. Another item was salt lard, or rendered pork fat cut in 'planks' or slabs and packed in 100 kg barrels of salt and brine. One of the odd preserved meats was salt fish, available in Catalan seaports. The garrison of Barcelona used salt fish

¹⁸⁸See Table 29.

¹⁸⁹Mutton was a favored meat in the Peninsula because of its abundance, and it was always eaten fresh. SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

¹⁹⁰SHAT, C(8) 398, État du Nombre des Rations, 30 June 1810.

¹⁹¹Baugh, Naval Administration 1715-1750, 413.

¹⁹²For example, salt beef packed in Portsmouth in June with 63 pieces of meat with a total net weight of 300 lbs. is marked "B 63 PO JU". Ibid. 413-414.

(herring) and Cod (Morue et Poisson salé) as a meat substitute. The ration was .25 kg.¹⁹³ Salted or pickled herring is made by gutting, and washing in sea water, then salting, and packing the fish in wooden barrels of salt and brine water like sardines. Salt cod was made by splitting and salting the fish for five days, then exposing them to the sun, stacked, sweated, cleaned, resalted, and packed.¹⁹⁴

The work of the Intendance was arduous, regardless of its compensations. Deputy Assistant Commissary Schumann of the British Army described some of his work, from four a.m. to eleven p.m.: "The whole day long I had to bake in the sun, reckon up and calculate, weigh and measure, keep accounts and order fresh supplies."¹⁹⁵ Late at night, by the twinkle of far off watch fires he groped back to his peasant billet with its "two million fleas"¹⁹⁶ to sup on a soup of marrow bones, roast beef and grog.¹⁹⁷

The management of bullock gave Schumann no end of trouble, and his drovers and 'Gardes Parcs' were not up to the job:

¹⁹³SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

¹⁹⁴C. L. Cutting, "Fish Preservation," in A History of Technology, ed. Charles Singer, E. J. Holmyard, A. R. Hall and Trevor I. Williams, Volume IV, The Industrial Revolution c. 1750 to c. 1850. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1958) 45-46.

¹⁹⁵Schumann described his other supply duties:

"Supplies had arrived so plentifully from the provision ships lying in the harbour, that a veritable mountain of salt fish, oats, hay, straw, ship's biscuit, rum and wine had accumulated in one of the large barns of the farm; and on the following morning at four o'clock the headquarters of seven regiments were already standing at the door. . ."

Schumann, On the Road with Wellington, 35.

¹⁹⁶Ibid.

¹⁹⁷Ibid.

My wild bullocks, which we killed for meat, also caused me great anxiety; for although they were shut up in a garden surrounded by a wall five feet high, they nevertheless used sometimes to jump this height like stags, and charging into the bivouacs, would send the tents, the huts, the sentry boxes and camp kettles all flying; or they would escape into the open country, or, after being surrounded by me and my men, supported by the military, would be shot at and killed at the end of a regular hunt.¹⁹⁸

When the time to slaughter bullock came, Schumann and his butchers were sweating under a broiling sun covered in flies to do their work. At ten a.m. daily they slaughtered twenty bullock. At their supply depot near Paco d'Arcus Portugal in 1808, they slaughtered, by hand, 600 bullock in two months:

Every day at ten o'clock I had twenty bullocks killed - and their blood and entrails, which soon became putrid in the great heat, created the most appalling stench, not to mention the clouds of blow flies, which were so thick that every surface was black with them. In the end, I had pits dug in which I buried this offal. The Portuguese butchers. . . used a small instrument, which was half concealed by the hand, and had a blade not larger than a penknife into a wooden knob. With this, they approached the bullock in a coaxing manner, stroking him the while, and feeling for a slight depression in the back of the neck behind the torus and between the horns; then they would plunge their spike into this depression, and the bullock would drop to the ground as if struck with apoplexy; and in most cases would hardly stir a limb again.¹⁹⁹

This was precisely the grind the French vivres-viande men encountered. The evidence of their backbreaking labor, like grain porters, those human beasts who hauled the 100 kg sacks of grain or flour, lay in some of the equipment used in butchering and distributing meat animals. In January and February 1812, Commissaire de guerres

¹⁹⁸Ibid., 36.

¹⁹⁹Ibid., 37-38.

Leamont at Figueras purchased service equipment including eight huge steelyards or balance scales capable of handling from 400 kg. to 1,015 kg. at a cost of 2,355.00 F., gauges and wool (80.00 F.) or lashing rope.²⁰⁰ These heavy instruments were to weigh the carcasses prior to butchering and distribution.

Meat was, in Catalonia, a difficult commodity to procure. At Barcelona it was, by early 1809, nearly impossible to obtain and limited to the hospitals. The garrison magazine had only 100 qx of lard and 21.59 qx of salt meat in January. The Commissaire-Ordonnateur stopped distributing meat in July 1808 and paying the soldiers one Real de Vellon indemnity en lieu of the ration, from the Barcelona Junta.²⁰¹ In Upper Catalonia, General Reille's division had in April 1809, 176 oxen and 45 sheep,²⁰² or 143,500 rations of meat. General Reille too, found it impossible to procure meat off the country and requested that the 10e Division Militaire provide it. General Verdier, besieging Gerona in mid-1809, also demanded 200,000 rations.²⁰³ The whole VII Corps

²⁰⁰SHAT, C(19) 9, 10e Division Militaire, Bureau de Vivres, LS, No. 140, Ordonnateur Duitrass to General Lacuée, 19 January 1812; Commissaire des guerres, de Pyrénées Orientales Jean Baptiste Angles and Contractor Joseph Vial, Process Verbal, 31 December 1811; LS, No. 268, Ordonnateur Duitrass to General Lacuée, 11 February 1812; and Régie Générale des Services Réunis Section des Vivres et Liquides, Figueras, Commissaire des guerres Leamont, Procès Verbal, 29 January 1812.

²⁰¹The Real de Vellon is a Spanish coin worth 23.93 centimes. Doursther, Dictionnaire Universel, 324; SHAT, C(19) 7, VII Corps, No. 353, Ordonnateur en Chef Rey to General Lacuée, 4 January 1809; Régie Général, Approvisionnement de Reserve, Garde Magasin Billet, Situation des Magasins Militaires de la Citadelle et du Mont-Jouy, 1 January 1809; Situation, Magasins, 20 January 1809.

²⁰²At 800 rations of meat per ox this was 140,800 rations and sheep were 60 rations making 2,700 rations. SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Division Reille, 1 April 1809.

²⁰³AN, AFiv 1174, 1er Section, Bureau des Vivres, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 13 June 1809.

only had 355 animals by July.²⁰⁴ The besieging Corps absorbed the bulk of the inadequate meat resources in Catalonia forcing Ordonnateur en Chef Rey to cancel rations and pay the soldiers one Real in lieu and draw as much as possible off France.²⁰⁵

In October 1809, the repeated requests from Ordonnateur en chef Rey for meat from the 10e Divison Militaire got the attention of Minister-Directeur, General Dejean. Clearly, Catalonia was, one year into the war, nearly exhausted of meat animals. Marshal Augereau, ostensible Corps commander taking the waters at Perpignan for gout, echoed Rey's pleas. General Dejean requested from Napoleon a provision of 1,200 oxen at 195,750 F. to provide the corps with 40 ox or 30,000 rations per day.²⁰⁶

This infusion of oxen would only provide 30 days rations, and at its end the VII Corps was again living hand to mouth. In December it only had 135 oxen (108,000 rations) enough to last its 44,269 troops two days.²⁰⁷ In 1810, Marshal Augereau, renewed the pleas for assistance from Paris. In February, however, Napoleon's Decree making the VII Corps into the Army of Catalonia and an independent "Vice Royalty" threw it onto its own resources.²⁰⁸ This, naturally, was logistically unsustainable and Marshal Augereau resumed his requests for assistance only to get a chilly reception from an Emperor who unrealistically insisted that this army support itself. The Minster

²⁰⁴SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809.

²⁰⁵SHAT, C(19) 7, Ordonnateur en Chef Rey, Rapport sur le Situation du VII Corps, 5 September 1809.

²⁰⁶AN, AFiv 1174, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 14 October 1809.

²⁰⁷SHAT, C(8) 362 Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1809.

²⁰⁸SHAT, C(8) 41, Imperial, Decree, 8 February 1810.

Director, now General Lacuée, however, fully grasped Augereau's predicament and pleaded his case to Napoleon to resume logistical support. He argued that Catalonia simply had no meat animals due to its poverty and to insurgent depredations, and requested that France provide meat rations to the Army of Catalonia off of its Catalan funds.²⁰⁹

Napoleon's trepidations at supporting the Army of Catalonia off of France were understandable, if unrealistic, in the light of the meat provisions provided from 1808 to January 1810. These included 5,588 oxen, 2,593 cattle, and 5,464 sheep, amounting to 9,226,410 rations of beef and 305,852 rations of mutton.²¹⁰ The cost of these provisions was 2,063,919.48 F., over nearly two years.²¹¹ By May 1810, the provision debt of 2,300,000 F. came due on the Army of Catalonia, but Marshal Augereau could not pay, for money was as hard to come by as meat.²¹²

The whole army required 1,477,580 rations per month. Since it was impossible to provide this much meat off France, let alone Catalonia, General Lacuée enacted greater efficiencies in the distribution system which currently wasted 82,580 rations a month. He

²⁰⁹AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 28 February 1810.

²¹⁰This equaled 2,344,365 kg of ox, 782,391 kg of (cattle) beef and 115,869 kg of mutton. The beef ration included 7,038,048 rations of ox and 2,188,362 of beef. AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur 14 March 1810 and Général Lacuée, État Indicatif, (1er) des Denrées versées de la 10e Division Militaire, March 1810.

²¹¹Ibid.

²¹²Pierre Conard's discussion in Napoléon et la Catalogne is authoritative on the problems of financing the improvised government, which he maintained was a fruitless effort. Barcelona received only 491,983,999 F. in 1808. Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 453-454.

proposed to Napoleon (against Augereau's advice) contracting out the meat procurement service. Contractors would provide the animals and drive them to Perpignan. The Intendance would oversee convoys, slaughtering and unit distribution to reduce loss of animals and meat wastage.²¹³ Every ration was as precious as gold. In January 1810, for example, there were only 144 cattle with the VII Corps, a mere 144,000 rations if stretched at 1,000 rtn./animal. This was enough for three days for the Corps' 44,552 troops.²¹⁴ Augereau went to half rations in May and supplemented meat with rice to stretch the existing supply of 628 cattle and 385 qx of salt meat.

Supplies were even drying up in the Pyrénées. In August only 20,000 rations reached Perpignan,²¹⁵ and by October it only had 89 oxen, 28 cattle, 1,107 sheep, and 26 hogs provided 95,980 rations, a mere 6% of their monthly requirement. General Lacuée meanwhile made an enormous effort and provided to the Army of Catalonia another 5,890,000 rations of meat as 5,890 oxen,²¹⁶ over four months provisions, by stripping portions of the French countryside.

²¹³The great convoys to Barcelona in 1810 provided considerable provisions to the garrison but at enormous cost to the French government. In June, a convoy brought 400 oxen (400,000 rations) able to feed the garrison for well over a month. SHAT, C(19) 8, Bureau des Vivres, No. 50, General Lacuée to Napoleon, 21 June 1810.

²¹⁴SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810.

²¹⁵AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 9 July 1810.

²¹⁶The provision included 5,490,000 rations for the Army and 400,000 rations for French fortresses in Catalonia. AN, AFiv 1175, Letter, (copy) General Lacuée to Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon, 8 July 1810; Letter (copy) General Lacuée to the Ordonnateur of the 10e Divison Militaire, 8 July 1810.

If the supply of meat was now uncontrollable by either Ordonnateur en Chef Bourdon or General Lacuée, so was its cost. The Ministry budgeted 300,000 F. for meat expenses, but it incurred 2,220,019.90 F. in debt in 1810 for 8,300 oxen from France. The French Treasury had to pick up the bill and only paid 1,276,000 F.²¹⁷ The Army of Catalonia was incapable of paying such a huge sum, for its 9,840 head of beef in 1810. The next year was quite the same. Marshal Macdonald's troops only got 2,831 head, up to July 1811, some 1.6 million rations, a two month supply.²¹⁸

The 10e Division Militaire in the last six months of 1812 gave a windfall of meat and provided 4,929,971 rations of meat to the Army of Catalonia. This included 3,352 oxen, 1,259 cattle and 407 sheep, or 26,739 rations per day. This huge provision drained these departments nearly dry, and they would be unable to provide meat on such a scale again.²¹⁹

At the end of 1811, General Decaen began to stock his fortresses with masses of preserved meat, as a siege provision. Regardless of the problems of this type of provision, it was a preferred siege ration because it requires little maintenance. Unlike meat on the hoof, it did not require feeding at a rate of five or six times that of a man in gross weight, veterinary service, or slaughtering.

²¹⁷AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 5 September 1810.

²¹⁸AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 3 July 1811. In December 1811 Barcelona received in a huge convoy, 500 oxen; SHAT, C(19) 8, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 29 December 1811.

²¹⁹The weight of these meat rations amounted to 1,515,811 kg of ox meat, 430,659 kg of beef and 13,377 kg of mutton, totaling 5,020 animals, and 1,962,847 kg of meat. SHAT, C(19) 10, 10e Division Militaire, Bureau des Vivres, No. 128 Commissaire des guerres Duitraus to General Lacuée, 21 January 1813.

Commissaire des guerres Beraud at Figueras ordered from Perpignan a huge supply of meat including 109 barrels of salt beef (10,824 kg.), 82 barrels of salt pork (11,733.5 kg.) and six vehicle loads of 1,198 planches of salt lard (8,415 kg.).²²⁰ In January, the garrison also got from Perpignan 270 qx of salt meat for 45,650 F.²²¹ This was quite expensive and reflected the scarcity of this commodity on the market.²²²

The Intendance continued to procure at an almost frenetic pace to maintain existing stocks, frequently depleted by the garrison and by the thousands of troops in transit which drew off Figueras each month. In June 1812, for example, Commissaire des guerre Beraud got another 21 barrels of salt pork, 2,005.5 kg.²²³

²²⁰SHAT, C(19) 9, Commissaire des guerres Beraud and Garde Magasin Glouteau, Section des vivres - pain et liquides, Procès Verbal, 16 December 1811; Procès Verbal, 16 December 1811; Procès Verbal, 19 December 1811; Procès Verbal, 19 December 1811; Procès Verbal, 21 December 1811; Procès Verbal, 28 December 1811.

²²¹This included 100 qx of salt beef for 15,000 F. (150 F/qx), 90 qx of salt lard in planches for 16,650 F (185 F/qx) and 80 qx of salt pork for 14,000 F (175 F/qx). SHAT, C(19) 9, Bureau des Vivres, No. 44, Chef de Bureau Légère, Rapport au Ministre Directeur 8 January 1812; 10e Division Militaire, Bureau des Vivres, No. 5073, Commissaire des guerres Duitrass to General Lacuée, 20 November 1811; Commissaire des guerres Beraud, Procès Verbal, 16 November 1811.

²²²Salt beef at 1.50 F/kg was nearly twice that of the same commodity at Danzig at the beginning of its siege in January 1813 which was 0.86 F/kg. Salt pork went for 1.75 F/kg, and it was 0.64 F/kg at Danzig. Land was 1.80 F/kg and at Danzig 0.75 F/kg. These comparative prices show the dearth of meat supplies in France. Jacques David Martin de Campredon Defense de Dantzic en 1813, Journal de Siège Journal personnel et Notes du Général de Division de Campredon Commandant le Génie du Xe Corps, Lettres Diverses, Ed. Charles Auriol, (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1888) 297; Doursther, Dictionnaire Universel, 219.

²²³This is net weight. Gross weight was 3,608 kg. Salt, brine and the barrel was 44.4% of the weight shipped item. It would take three wagons to haul this meat. SHAT, C(19) 9, LS, No. 986, Commissaire des guerres Duitrass to General Lacuée, 10 June 1812; Commissaire des guerres Beraud, Bordereau des Versemens 1 June 1812; Régie Générale des Services Réunis Section des Vivres-Pain et Liquides, Place de Perpignan,

At the very end of the war, January 1814, the Intendance continued to provision Figueras with all manner of provender in preparation for a siege as Marshal Suchet would soon withdraw to the French frontier. This included 1,200 qx of salt meat (500 qx of salt beef and 700 qx of salt lard) provided by contract from Reynaud et Cie., of Lyon at an even higher price of 230,000 F.²²⁴

Ordonnateur en chef Bondurand ordered in March 1814 a huge provision convoy carrying 978,527.6 kg of food and 86,739 liters of liquids including 42,856.3 kg of salt meat, over a half million rations of food, enough to last the 1,181 man²²⁵ garrison over a year.²²⁶

As the war entered its last phase in 1813 the supply of fresh meat on the hoof nearly collapsed and Intendance officers made greater use of salt meat and paid meat indemnities. In January 1813 the Ministry sent to Barcelona 1,650 qx metric of salt beef

Commissaire des and Garde Magasin Beraud Glouteau, Proces Verbal, 25 May 1812; Commissaire des guerre Beraud, Bordereau des Recettes, 1 June 1812; Commissaire des guerres Beraud, and Garde Magasin Glouteau Proces Verbal, 24 May 1812.

²²⁴The price for the salt beef was 183 F/qx (1.83/kg) and increase of 18% and for salt lard 196 F/qx (1.93/kg) and increase of 5.6%. SHAT, C(19) 9, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Vivres, No. 1527, Chef de Bureau Légere, Rapport au Ministre-Directeur, 10 November 1813; No. 1527, Draft; LS, No. 4253, Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon to General Lacuée 24, October 1813; and Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon and M. Reynard, Reynard et Cie., Marché pour la Fourniture de 1,200 quintaux métriques de viande salée destinee pour l'approvisionnement de siege du Fort de Figueras, 16 October 1813.

²²⁵SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814.

²²⁶SHAT, C(19) 9, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Vivres, L. No. 3439 Ordonnateur en chef Bondurand to General Lacuée, 24 March 1814; General Palmoral, Commandant of Figueras, Proces Verbal de Verification, 1 March 1814.

and 825 qx of salt lard, and its total meat expenditure was 2,837,681.01 F. for the first six months of 1813.²²⁷

The situation in providing this item of supply then was always precarious. Nearly impossible to obtain in Catalonia, the Army was thrown back on France again to supply this provender, and to pay for it out of the French Treasury.²²⁸ The Ordonnateurs en chefs in the Army of Catalonia made manful attempts to keep the troops provisioned, fighting the inefficiency of their own staffs, assailed by the ravages of the war and with their hand perpetually out to a very sympathetic General Lacuée who did everything in his power to assist the French High command in Catalonia, often in the face of an Emperor who expected the impossible and for someone else to pay for it.

If the Ordonnateur en chef had difficulties with the Army of Catalonia, his subordinate Commissaire-Ordonnateur managing the oft blockaded Barcelona faced near impossibilities. In June 1812, the Barcelona Park had 142 oxen and 46 cattle just received from the Army Park at Gerona, and only two oxen were captured from the country.²²⁹

General Maurice-Mathieu, the Governor of Barcelona, and his Commissaire-Ordonnateur, G. Raymondon made every effort to stretch existing supplies as far as possible for they could not be sure of a steady supply. One innovation was to establish

²²⁷AN, AFiv 1176, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 27 January 1813.

²²⁸AN, AFiv 1176, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 16 June 1813.

²²⁹SHAT, C(19) 9, No. 163, Commissaire des guerre Raymondon to General Lacuée, 10 June 1812; Rapport Mensuel, 10 June 1812.

a meat distribution schedule. In May, for example, fresh meat was distributed on fifteen days, salt meat and a cash indemnity distributed on eight days each.²³⁰

The Barcelona Commissaire-Ordonnateur, like General Lacuée, made use of a contractor (Sieur Closas) to provide fresh meat to the garrison for 32 centimes per eight once (marc) ration.²³¹ In October 1813, the garrison had 171 oxen, 156 cattle and 1,936 sheep,²³² and 877,760 rations of meat.²³³ Through the year the Barcelona garrison received 1,095,000 kg of fresh meat at a cost of 1,314,000 F. This was a huge quantity of fresh meat, but the salt beef was so poor, rusty, or rotten that it was unhealthy for the troops. General Maurice-Mathieu insisted on using fresh meat as much as possible.²³⁴

At the beginning of 1814, as the Army of Aragon and Catalonia retired, leaving Barcelona under blockade, the provision convoys ended. On 2 February General Habert the new Governor and Commissaire des guerres Mongenot²³⁵ requisitioned through the contractor, M. Closas, all of the available animals in and around the city. These included

²³⁰Ibid.

²³¹Ibid.

²³²SHAT, C(19) 9, Bureau des Vivres, No. 4479, Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon to General Lacuée, 2 November 1813, G. Raymondon; État de Situation des Magasins de la Ville et Forts de Barcelone, 21 October 1813.

²³³SHAT, C(19) 9, G. Raymondon, Réduction en Rations, 20 October 1813.

²³⁴Ration price was 30 centimes, for a 12,000 man garrison. General Lacuée assured Napoleon of the need for this expenditure and of the health reasons to use salt beef as little as possible. AN, AFiv 1176, Letter, General Lacuée to Napoleon January 1813; Bureau des Vivres, Letter, Commissaire des guerres Monbenôit, 24 January 1813; Budget de Barcelone pour l'Exercice 1813.

²³⁵This staff consisted of a Gard Parc, Aide-Garde Parc and three Sous-Employés, SHAT, C(8) 371, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

1,145 sheep, 364 horses and two cattle, building the Park to 47 oxen, 38 cattle, and 1,744 sheep. Expenditures were in the first ten days of February and a rough ten day average was 18 oxen, four cattle, and 257 sheep. The magazines also had 32,712 kg of salt beef, 108,204 kg of salt lard and 75,892 kg of salt or dried fish. Expenditures of these commodities were low, at 3,815 kg of beef, 1,542 kg lard, and 5,792 kg of fish. The most popular was preserved flesh, and certainly one of the most unusual and better tasting items in the French military diet.²³⁶

The magazines, because of the commander's discipline slowly decreased through May 1814. On 27 May, days before the French evacuation, the Park had eight oxen, 19 cattle and 856 horses.²³⁷ Of the preserved meats, only 41,692 kg of beef, 99,847 kg of lard, and 52,662 kg of fish²³⁸ undoubtedly, the garrison Ordonnateur purchased through M. Closas.

Total expenditure of preserved meat was 180,378 rations of salt beef, 11,376 rations of pork (lard) and 102,275 rations of salt fish.²³⁹ Fresh meat distribution was 383,041 rations at a cost of 147,391.37 F.²⁴⁰ The garrison also owed a debt of 237,000

²³⁶Ibid.

²³⁷The 856 horses were garrison animals and would be used for food in a last extremity. Ibid.

²³⁸Ibid.

²³⁹Ibid.

²⁴⁰Ibid.

F. to M. Closas at the beginning of the blockade,²⁴¹ and on the evacuation in June 1814 owed 105,913.32 F.²⁴² Even during the stress of the collapse of the Empire, a blockade and the evacuation of that city, debts had to be and were paid as far as the military chest would allow.

The administration of meat supply was a somewhat convoluted system, and was, like other logistical areas, laden with paperwork, and designed to manage both supplies and costs. Everything that came into the supply pipeline was scrupulously accounted for at every level from the Ministry of Military Administration down to the Garde Parcs or Gardes Magasins. This required coordination by these various agencies of no mean degree.

In September 1811, Commissaire des guerres, Jean Baptiste Béraud, the Army of Catalonia Commissaire at Perpignan, sent a convoy of 408 oxen and cattle to Barcelona. He received these animals at the army park there from the Commissaire des guerres of the 10e Division Militaire, Commissaire des guerres Duitrass in four shipments. Béraud inventoried, examined, and receipted them on a procès verbal. In December he ordered them convoyed to Barcelona with other supplies, after arranging for the escort, etc. with the Chief of Staff and Ordonnateur en chef of the Army of Catalonia.²⁴³

²⁴¹SHAT, C(19) 9, Bureau des Vivres, No. 1368, LS, Ordonnateur en chef Bonodurand to General Lacuée, 22 December 1813.

²⁴²SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

²⁴³SHAT, C(19) 7, 10e Division Militaire, Bureau des Vivres, No. 185, Commissaire des guerres Duitaus to General Lacuée, 25 January 1812; Armée de Catalogne, Vivres Viande, Commissaire des Guerres Béraud, Procès Verbal de Vente, 29 December 1811.

Prior to shipment, three oxen and four cattle had died. he inventoried and shipped the other 401 (306 oxen and 102 cattle) animals. He then set to work on his mass of resulting paper. He drew up a procès verbal for the convoy, with his receiving documents of 27, 28, 29 August and 5 September, for the animals. The Procès Verbal de Vente accounted for the 408 beef and the loss of seven, explaining their loss, the disposition of carcasses, and their cost of 1,267 F.²⁴⁴

Béraud then obtained the fund authorization from the Receveur Général de la Catalogne (M. Coquibert) at Perpignan to write off the debt from contribution funds held by the Receveur Général. He wrote a letter to Payeur/Receveur, Julin, to authorize the release of the money on a Recette Générale des Contributions, which Commissaire Béraud sent to Commissaire Duitas to pay²⁴⁵ for the dead beef.

The two Commissaires now completed their reports, requesting approval of the dispositions taken. M. Beraud reported to Acting Ordonnateur en chef Blanchard who reported the action to the Ministry.²⁴⁶ M. Duitas too, reported the action directly to the Ministry as senior Intendance officer in the 10e Division Militaire.²⁴⁷ At the Ministry, the

²⁴⁴SHAT, C(19) 7, Commissaire des guerres Béraud, Procès Verbal de Vente, 27 December 1811.

²⁴⁵Release funds from Receveur Julin.

²⁴⁶SHAT, C(19) 7, Army of Catalonia, LS, No. 3413, Ordonnateur Blanchard to General Lacuée, 27 January 1812.

²⁴⁷SHAT, C(19) 7, 10e Division Militaire, LS, No. 185, Commissaire Duitass to General Lacuée, 25 January 1812 and No. 520, Commissaire Duitass to General Lacuée, 25 March 1812.

head of the Bureau des Vivres assembled these documents and drew up a complete report to General Lacuée requesting approval which he duly gave.²⁴⁸

At Barcelona the same actions occurred, Ordonnateur Raymondon and his Garde Parc received and inventoried the 401 beef under the oversight of officers of the garrison, a veterinary and the Comité charge de la Surveillance which inspected and approved the shipment. The appropriate correspondence and procès verbal are drawn up and forwarded through the Ordonnateur en chef to the Ministry.

Contract meat procurement is similarly complex in procedure. In November 1813, the Army purchased 1,200 qx of salt meat from Sieur Joseph Reynaud et Cie., of Lyon. Ordonnateur en chef Bondurand "let" the contract or Marché to provide the merchandise under very stringent specifications. The 700 qx of salt pork (or lard), for example, were 50 kg of pigs without heads, feet and gutted then cut up and packed in brine; the barrel itself was carefully specified as to construction.²⁴⁹

Once received, army Commissaire des guerres Jean Baptiste Béraud, would in twenty-four hours process payment papers for 230,000 F. off of the funds of the Army of Catalonia, but in case of a loss of goods, these will be paid off of the Administration de la Guerre on application of the Ordonnateur en chef. The payment is guaranteed by 1 March 1814 to the sum of 74,158.22 F.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁸SHAT, C(19) 7, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Vivres, Rapport au Ministre-Directeur.

²⁴⁹SHAT, C(19) 9, Joseph Reynaud and Ordonnateur en Chef Bourden, Marché pour le Fourniture de 1,200 quintaux métriques de viande salé destiné pour l'approvisionnement de siège du Fort Figueras, 16 October 1813.

²⁵⁰Ibid.

At Perpignan the action was processed, interestingly enough, not by the Section des vivres-viande but by Garde Magasin Glouteau of the Section des vivres-pain et liquides. He completed the procès verbal²⁵¹ after inventorying the delivery of the salt meat in the presence of the installation Commissaire des guerres or the Inspecteur des Services réunis²⁵² who verified the transaction. The Army Commissaire then completes the Bordereau des Versemens,²⁵³ recording the procès verbal to purchase the meat. Once the goods are received and inventoried, they are inspected by a Comité de Surveillance to assure their quality and, if passed, the Garde Magasin will complete a second procès verbal of receipt of the meat,²⁵⁴ and the Commissaire des guerre, in turn, completes a Bordereau de Recette²⁵⁵ to complete the transaction.

When convoyed to Figueras, Commissaire des guerres Catalogne and Garde Magasin de Reserve de siège et des vivres Onfroy²⁵⁶ completed a similar transaction. The enormous task of supporting the Army of Catalonia was one which the Ministry of Military Administration in Paris accomplished with great difficulty, and often against Napoleon's

²⁵¹This is Commissaire des guerres Angles. SHAT, C(19) 9, Commissaire des guerres Béraud and Garde Magasin Glouteau, Procès Verbal, 26 May 1812.

²⁵²Ibid.

²⁵³SHAT, C(19) 9, Service-Réunis des Vivres Commissaire des guerres Béraud, Bordereau des Versemens, 1 June 1812.

²⁵⁴SHAT, C(19) 9, Régie Générale Section des Vivres-pain et liquides, Garde Magasin and Comité de surveillance, Procès Verbal, 24 May 1812.

²⁵⁵SHAT, C(19) 9, Service-Réunis des vivres, Commissaire des guerres Béraud, Bordereau des Recettes, 1 June 1812.

²⁵⁶SHAT, C(8) 411, Situation, Fort de Figueras, 1 June 1812.

opposition. The Emperor seemingly did not grasp the logistical difficulties involved. Certainly, he miscalculated the intensity of Catalan resistance more than once and overestimated the ability of his army to pacify the province. Logistically, however, Napoleon had two overriding concerns: one, money and the other, command attitude.

In the first case, the French budget, indeed the French economy, was incapable of absorbing the enormous cost of Napoleon's armies. Hence, his continued use of contributions to make "war feed war," with a subsistence cost of 8,700,000 F. per year and pay accounting for a cost of over 33,300,000 F. per annum by 1810.²⁵⁷ The garrison of Barcelona alone had a budget of 1,022,221.60 F. from September 1813 to June 1814.²⁵⁸ This amounted to .13% of the French war budget of 816,000,000 F.²⁵⁹

France simply could not pay these huge sums across the whole of the military establishment. Consequently, Napoleon demanded that his commanders use contributions. In 1808, Catalonia only yielded 405,079.99 F. and afterwards not even this amount.²⁶⁰ The Peninsular War alone cost 70 million a year as military expenditures ballooned from 460 million Francs in 1807 to 816 million in 1813.²⁶¹ The economic realities forced

²⁵⁷SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1810; Lacroix and Dupieux, Le Napoléon, 165.

²⁵⁸SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

²⁵⁹Lacroix and Dupieux, Le Napoléon, 14.

²⁶⁰Conard, Napoléon et de Catalogne, 453.

²⁶¹Lacroix and Dupieux, Le Napoléon, 165; Louis Bergeron, France Under Napoleon, trans. R. R. Palmer (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1981) 38-40; L. de Lanza de Laborie, Paris Sous Napoléon, Vol. II, Administration, Grands Travaux. (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1905) 62-64; C. B. A. Behrens, Society, Government and the Enlightenment, The Experiences of Eighteenth Century France and Prussia, (London: Thames and Hudson,

Napoleon to save every centime he could, and make economies wherever possible. He was reluctant to open the purse-strings for fear of breaking his budget and borrowing, or worse, having recourse to paper money. Hence, in Catalonia he had because the logistical difficulties of the command to expand financial subsidies to this perpetually strapped army.

The second aspect of Napoleon's policy is his "command attitude." He certainly recalled his command of the Army of Italy in 1796-97 when it was in a similar logistical difficulty as the Army of Catalonia. The only solution was offensive movement which not only defeated the enemy, but in moving over fresh ground the army could continue to live off the land. Additionally, Napoleon certainly preferred aggressive commanders capable of attacking. . .attacking. . .attacking. It was only these men who were capable of solving their logistical problems. He was clearly disappointed in the whole series of commanders in Catalonia on this score except Gouvion-Saint-Cyr. This was the philosophy behind General Lacuée's policy to force Marshal Macdonald into the field. Unfortunately, the strategic realities of the Catalan war were not fully appreciated by the Emperor. Macdonald needed more and better troops to accomplish this task. In any case, this seems to have been the rationale behind Napoleon's policy towards logistically supporting the Army of Catalonia. He certainly miscalculated the nature of the war and Catalan resistance also, doing the war effort there an ultimate disservice.

§5. Protecting the Force: Ration Quality Control

One of the vital tasks in provisioning the Army of Catalonia was assuring the quality of its rations. During the difficulties and uncertainties of a campaign, food preservation and a high quality supply is of the utmost importance, for illness from bad food is very destructive to morale and the physical health of the troops. Adequate, healthy rations is a perennial concern with commanders.²⁶²

Meat was a sensitive food stuff, whether preserved or fresh, but particularly fresh. Beef on the hoof is subject to various illnesses which make their meat unfit for consumption. It consequently required inspection before distribution. This task in the Grande Armée fell to veterinarians and surgeons. If the animal sickens, the Vivres-Viande Gardes Parcs call in the military Artiste-Vetérinaire who examined and diagnosed the illness to determine fitness for consumption, and if necessary, quarantined and numbered them "W6" for sick with an animal number. If an animal died the veterinarian examined the carcass for cause of death then condemns or passes it for consumption.²⁶³ This procedure implies a type of ante and post mortem inspection system to determine irregularities before and after slaughter.²⁶⁴

During the Catalan war the problem of a wholesome meat supply was of great importance, all the way up to the Ministry. When procured the animals were undoubtedly

²⁶²Furse, Lines of Communication, 279.

²⁶³SHAT, C(19) 7, Division Quesnel, Pertes de Bestaux, 1811.

²⁶⁴George C. Dunham, Military Preventative Medicine, 3d Ed. (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1940) 438-450.

inspected for illness or injury that would require their rejection as food. If it took ill in the Parks they were quarantined pending veterinary treatment. When a beast died, an Artiste-Veterinaire conducted a post mortem to find the cause of death, and whether the meat was fit for consumption, and either condemn the carcass or allow its distribution to the troops.²⁶⁵ When this occurred the division or installation Commissaire des guerres reported by procès verbal to the Ordonnateur en chef who forwards it in turn to the Minister of War for Military Administration, explaining the circumstances of the death and requests to write the cost off on the government or require a negligent man to pay for it.²⁶⁶

Hostalrich, that isolated fortress and communications point between Barcelona and Gerona, had in 1811 its communications cut with all of the major French garrisons. Trapped thus, a bovine epidemic crackled through the Park killing 18 bullock and 24 cattle, and with them, 17,988.5 kg of meat.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁵SHAT, C(19) 7, Division Quesnel, Pertes de Bestiaux 1811, Bureau des Vivres, No. 554, Acting Ordonnateur in Chef Blanchard to General Lacuée, 31 July 1811; Armée en Haute-Catalogne, Division Quesnel, Vivres-Viande, Commissaire des guerres Roullon, Procès Verbal 29 May 1811; Certification of Distribution, Général de Bridgade Palmorale, 2 June 1811; Ministère de l'Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Vivres, No. 1258, Chef de Bureau Légère, Rapport au Ministre-Directeur, 23 September 1811; Leter, No. 8732 General Lacuée to Ordonnateur Blanchard, 29 September 1811.

²⁶⁶Ibid., Letter, No. 7698, Acting Ordonnateur Blanchard to General Lacuée, 11 October 1811; Commissaire des Guerres Fain, Division Quesnel, Procès Verbal, 8 October 1811; Ministère de l'Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Vivres, No. 1427, Chef de Bureau Légère, Rapport au Ministre Directeur 24 October 1811; Letter, No. 3105, General Lacuée to Ordonnateur Blanchard, 31 October 1811.

²⁶⁷In December 1811 the Army of Catalonia had 24,740 troops. SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1811. See Table 30 Oman, Peninsular War, 4:540-541.

When the contagion appeared, it was probably passed to the 49 animal Park by an admixture into the main heard of hogs from a convoy to Barcelona which bivouacked at Hostalrich on their way. The disease was assumed to have passed from the hogs to the Park infecting them with Rinderpest,²⁶⁸ judging from the virulence and lethality of the epidemic.

When it appeared in early September, Commissaire des guerres Muguet, the garrison chief intendance officer obtained from Ordonnateur Bourdon the assistance of the Army Headquarters veterinarian, Artiste-Veterinarian Joseph Solignac.²⁶⁹ The tactical situation, however, only allowed him to arrive in October. That month seventeen bullock and sixteen cattle died of Rinderpest and a group of military, Intendance and medical officers condemned the carcasses. Commissaire des guerres Muguet submitted seven procès verbal to Ordonnateur Blanchard reporting the epidemic,²⁷⁰ who in turn reported

²⁶⁸Rinderpest or Cattle Plague is an acute febrile (fever producing) viral bovine disease. It is highly contagious and fatal. Its symptoms include sudden onset, croupous (severe cough), inflammation of the digestive tract, inflammation and erosion of mucous membranes of the mouth and bloody diarrhea. Infected animals transmit Rinderpest by contamination of food and water with urine, feces, saliva, eye and nasal secretions, and direct animal contact. Mortality varies from 25% -100%. It is highly epidemic and a epizootic infection will spread like wild fire. U. S. Army, Tm 3-216, Biological Warfare, 86-87.

²⁶⁹M. Bourdon was Ordonnateur en Chef of the Army of Catalonia and Commissaire des guerres Blanchard the Ordonnateur of Upper Catalonia. SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1811.

²⁷⁰This team consisted of eight men including the Commander of Hostalrich, Chef de Battalion Voysin; Captain Lebel, 4e/16e Artillerie à pied; Captain Borianne and Lieutenant Colin, 102e Ligne; Surgeon-Aide-Major Durant in charge of the garrison military hospital; Maréchal des logis Norris-Torrents; Hostalrich Garde Parc Herpin and Commissaire des guerres Felix Muguet. This board was joined by Artiste-Veterinaire Solignac in October. SHAT, C(19) 7, Armée de Catalogne, Place de Hostalrich Mort et Maladie des Bestiaux 1811-1812. Armée de Haute-Catalogne, Place Hostalrich Section

to the Ministry.²⁷¹ General Lacuée ordered the Intendance to redouble its efforts to prevent similar contagion in the parks.²⁷²

In the meantime, Veterinary Solignac arrived on the scene and examined every remaining bullock and cow in the Park. He discovered classic Rinderpest symptoms, such as inflamed intestinal tract, bloody feces, and foul urine. While he was there another eight bullock and three cattle died. Post Mortems revealed gangrene infection too. Solignac condemned the carcasses confirming the garrison board's findings, which he reported²⁷³ to M. Blanchard and the Ministry.²⁷⁴ Finally, the Veterinarian introduced a treatment for the remaining beasts, with positive results.²⁷⁵ General Lacuée wrote this enormous loss to the government as unavoidable.²⁷⁶

des Vivres-Viande, Procès Verbaux A, B, C, D, E, F, and G.

²⁷¹Ibid., Bureau des Vivres, No. 1009, LS, Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon to General Lacuée, 21 September 1811.

²⁷²Ibid., Administration de Guerre, Bureau des Vivres, No. 2910, L, Chef de Bureau Légère to General Lacuée and Margin Note Order, General Lacuée to Légère, 16 October 1811. Once Commissaire-Ordonnateur Blanchard to Muguet's Procès Verbaux, he reported to the Ministry to write off the loss.

²⁷³Ibid., Place de Figueras, Armée de Catalogne, Report, Artiste-Veterinaire Solignac to Ordonnateurs Bourdon and Blanchard, nd.

²⁷⁴Ibid., Procès Verbal, H, October 1811; Bureau des Vivres, No. 8030, LS, Ordonnateur Blanchard to General Lacuée, 15 October 1811.

²⁷⁵Ibid., Report, Solignac to Bourdon and Blanchard, nd.

²⁷⁶Ibid., No. 1562, Chef de Bureau Légère, Rapport au Minstre-Directeur, 15 November 1811; No. 1562, Draft Rapport, 8 November 1811, and No. 3355, Draft Letter, General Lacuée to Commissaire-Ordonnateur Blanchard, 22 November 1811.

This Rinderpest epidemic at Hostalrich was one of the most severe supply disasters of the war. In one blow the Army of Catalonia lost 42 head of beef and 37,705 rations of meat, enough to supply one days ration to the whole Army of Catalonia. The loss was particularly hard felt due to the scarcity of meat in Catalonia, for the Army rarely had possession of over 300 head.

Handling meat on the hoof in convoys could be a difficult matter, particularly for inattentive Intendance officers. On 29 May 1811, General Quesnel's division escorted a supply convoy from Figueras to Barcelona including a herd of beef.²⁷⁷ Adjoint Commissaire des guerres Roullon of Division Quesnel assigned two of his Vivres-Viande employees to accompany the bullock convoy. En route, one bullock died of exhaustion and troops of the 29e Chasseurs à cheval obtained written permission from the convoy commander Général de Brigade Palmoral to cut up and distribute the meat.²⁷⁸

The two Intendance employees were not present with the convoy at the time. They were off 'fiddling' in dereliction of duty and never knew of the bullock's death. This meat distribution was strictly illegal (without a post mortem). Once the loss was discovered during the inventory at Barcelona, Commissaire des guerres Roullon²⁷⁹ charged the two miscreants with dereliction of duty and requested that they repay the loss to the

²⁷⁷Often bullock, cattle or oxen in convoys hauled vehicles laden with supplies making the animals do double duty as transport beasts and meat on the hoof. Schaumann, On the Road with Wellington, 8-9.

²⁷⁸SHAT, C(19) 7, Division Quesnel, Pertes de Bestiaux, 1811 Armée en Haute-Catalogne, Division Quesnel, Vivres-Viande, Procès Verbal, Général de Brigade Palmoral, Note, 2 June 1811; Commissaire des guerres Roullon, Procès Verbal, 2 June 1811.

²⁷⁹Ibid., Process Verbal, Sieurs Merci and Vendier, Report 2 June 1811.

government.²⁸⁰ The Ministry held the two employees liable both for dereliction and possibly endangering the health of soldiers.²⁸¹

Under such circumstances units will leap on the windfall of a fresh meat. The action of the troopers of the 29e Chasseurs was not at all unusual. Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General August Schumann told of a huge bullock herd for the British Army managed by drovers and university students from Salamanca, who threw their lot in with the British Army, fearing the French.

The students, running behind the animals desperately tried to drive the slow oxen, "with their black gowns flying in the air".²⁸² Soon they reached a stone road crossing a marsh topped with beautiful green grass. This misled the hungry bullocks which went to graze, and they sank into the mud, fore legs first and hind quarters in the air. Others were just the opposite. The students panicked and fled while Schumann accosted a passing infantry division for help:

but the men laughed in our faces, and drawing their knives, proceeded to cut from the haunches of those beasts whose hindquarters were uppermost in the marsh, large steaks and fillets of beef, whereat, the poor, martyred creatures which had their heads sticking in the mud began to bellow fiercely like miredrums. At length I could no longer endure the harrowing sight. . . I spurred my horse and road hastily away. . .²⁸³

²⁸⁰Ibid., Commissaire des guerres Roullon, Procès Verbal, 2 June 1811.

²⁸¹Ibid., Bureau des Vivres, No. 5554, Ordonnateur Blanchard to General Lacuée, 31 July 1811; Administration de la guerre, Bureau du Vivres No. 1258, Chef de Bureau Légère, Rapport au Ministre-Directeur, 23 September 1811; No. 1258 Draft Report; No. 2732, Letter, General Lacuée to Ordonnateur Blanchard, 29 September 1811.

²⁸²Schumann, On the Road with Wellington, 100.

²⁸³Ibid., 101.

Most of the losses of animals to disease were routine, as to both type of sickness and administrative procedures to deal with it. Anthrax, it seems, was the most prevalent disease effecting the cattle of the Army of Catalonia.²⁸⁴ There were, however, bovine epidemics which laid waste to French meat herds.

At the beginning of September 1811, only days after the fall of Figueras after a bloody five month siege, the above noted bovine epidemic broke out at the Army Park at Hostalrich. There were set procedures for the Intendance to manage these cases. The interesting fact is, however, that these procedures and the documentation for them became uniform and standardized. The use of systematized procedures and standardized documentation was due in the French Army to the Emperor's desire to efficiently use existing funds, where the source and extent of funding may be in question. Uniformity in material and administration does, in fact, save money and time. Additionally, these 'industrial' trends in this and all military administration becomes a necessary aspect of mass armies where the size and vast number of problems which commanders must continuously confront and solve threaten to overwhelm them. The systemization of procedures renders the most complex problems easier because it simplifies them. The systemized procedures used in Intendance quality control is but one example of the burgeoning industrialization of Napoleonic military force.

²⁸⁴SHAT, C(19) 7, Place de Figueras, Vivres-Viande, Commissaire des guerres Léamont, Procès Verbal, 30 October 1811; C (19) 9, Parc de Port Moulin, Pertes des Bestiaux, 11 August 1811; Oman, Peninsular War, 7:539, Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 3:239, 258.

§6 **Transportation**

Through the eighteenth century, French armies moved their huge baggage trains with requisitioned vehicles. Successive regulations since 1718 regulated the type and amount of transport allowed for units, the staff and for officers.²⁸⁵ The enormous trail of followers nevertheless required an enormous transportation organization which otherwise immobilized the army. This 'system', of course, produced a disorganized mass of transport of various origins under the authority of various and often competing agencies.²⁸⁶

The Ministry of War made every effort to alleviate this by reducing or at least limiting the burden of baggage. Between 1690 and 1757 it issued seven unsuccessful Ordonnances to reduce this.²⁸⁷ The Army continually procured its transport by contract, purchase, and requisition, and steadily increasing the burden..²⁸⁸

The War of the First Coalition required an expanded transport system, which the Legislative Assembly achieved when it issued the Code des Charrois et des Services Réunis or law of requisitions which set requisition rates, but continued to use contract

²⁸⁵ A. Pernot, Aperçu Historique sur le Service des Transports Militaires, (Paris: Henri Charles - Lavauzelle, 1984) 66-67.

²⁸⁶ Thomas Carlyle, History of Frederick II of Prussia. Called Frederick the Great (New York: Publisher's Plate Printing Co. Nd) 3:103 and Richard Glover, Peninsular Preparation, The Reform of the British Army 1795-1809, (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1970) 257-258.

²⁸⁷ The contract transport drivers never went near combat and were always willing to abandon their charge at the first whiff of gunpowder. Kenneth, French Armies in the Seven Years War, 122-123.

²⁸⁸ Pernot, Transports Militaires, 73, 75-77.

transport service.²⁸⁹ It assigned a Commissaire des guerres to each army to manage the service des charrois.²⁹⁰ By 1793 the Ministry of War had established a complete transport administration.²⁹¹ In 1794 the Committee of Public Safety built on the service by ordering the construction of 6,000 wagons, and the manufacture of 12,000 harness. It also assembled a three member Military Transport Commission, and vehicle parks.²⁹²

In 1796, General Bonaparte, impressed with the need of a good transport service organized a pack mule division, to haul rations, forage, and artillery.²⁹³ For the Egyptian campaign, he used both naval and land transport, in tandem, which would also be used in Catalonia.²⁹⁴ During the Empire, the French transport system underwent its most radical changes as Napoleon, realizing the many faults in a system alternately dependent on requisition and contract. Between 1803 and 1807 he created three transport

²⁸⁹Pernot, Transports Militaires, 80-81; Arthur Chuquet Les Guerres de la Révolution, Vol. 1, La Première Invasion Prussienne (11 Août - 2 Septembre 1792) 4e Ed. (Paris: Plon-Nourrit et Cie., nd) 87; Maurice K. Wise, Requisition in France and Italy, The Treatment of National Property and Services, (New York: Columbia University Press: 1944) 9. Code des charrois et des Services réunis, (Paris: Imprimerie du département de la guerre, 1792) 79-80, 85.

²⁹⁰Pernot, Transports Militaires, 82-83; Code des Charrois, 23.

²⁹¹Auguste Herlaut, Le Colonel Bouchotte, Ministre de la Guerre en l'An II, (Paris: LeGrairie Poisson, {1946}) 58-62.

²⁹²Penot, Transports Militaires, 87-88; Code des Charrois, 114.

²⁹³CN, No. 116, Napoleon to Berthier, 4 April, 1796, 1:122-123, No. 120, Order of the Day, 5 April 1796, 1:124; No. 124, Napoleon to Berthier, 7 April 1796, 1:126-127. Pernot, Transports Militaires, 97-98.

²⁹⁴CN, No. 2707, Order, 27 June 1798, 4:180-181. General Baraguey d'Hilliers, commanded the Flotilla. Pernot, Transports Militaires, 99.

organizations; the Artillery, Engineer, and the Transport Trains or Trains des Équipages (26 March 1807).²⁹⁵

The regulation of 5 February 1803 provided for two types of military transport, the transports à la suite and the transports auxiliaires. The former, also called convois à la suite, is the baggage transport for units and headquarters, including all the staff paraphernalia, such as its administrative papers. A second variety of transport à la suite, is the transports directs or convois directs. This is the regular transport, either contract or in regular military transport units at the disposal of the Army commander to haul the necessaries of war.²⁹⁶ The second major type of transport is the transports auxiliares or équipages auxiliares, the requisitioned transport used to complete various transport tasks and to make up for any lack in regular transport.²⁹⁷ It may be requisitioned directly off the populace or on a requisition contract.

This Corps transport system had its own administration and requisitioned its vehicles; and organized them into brigades under the Commissaire-Ordonnateur. First used in 1805, the Commissaires-Ordonnateurs organized the brigades from requisitioned equipment and men, forcibly conscripted, who were extremely prone to desertion.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁵Ibid., 106; Lechatier, Services de l'Arrière, 186-188; CN, No. 12078, Order, 18 March 1807, 14: 469; No. 12, 178, Napoleon to General Dejean, 25, March 1807, 14:542-543; Georges Courget, "L'Arme du Train de l'Empire à nos Jours (1807-1878)", Revue Historique des Armées No. 3 (special) Le Trains, p. 9.

²⁹⁶Pernot, Transports Militaires, 109-110.

²⁹⁷Ibid., 110.

²⁹⁸Ibid., 111; AN, AFiv 1183, Bureau des Étapes et Équipages, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 7 June 1809.

Additionally Napoleon employed contract transport service provided by Compagnie Breidt. The French requisitioned 4,000 vehicles for this campaign.²⁹⁹ The 1806-07 campaign brought a turning point to the French transport service. To supplement the regimental equipage, the Corps held one vehicle per regiment in its command, under the Commissaire des guerres, constituting a parc des vivres to revictual its units. Compagnie Breidt meanwhile hauled the bulk of supplies for the Army.³⁰⁰

The Corps trains then consisted of two types of transport. First, the équipage regular, including ambulances and vehicles to haul the required two days rations. Finally the Corps held requisition and other vehicles from Compagnie Breidt attached to the headquarters.³⁰¹ There is one final variety of regular equipage attached to the Corps headquarters, that of the Treasury; the Paymasters' money wagons to carry funds, and administrative papers.³⁰²

Prior to the Prussian war Napoleon went about procuring an enormous number of transport vehicles in France and established transport relays from Châlons and Soissons, to the Plaine.³⁰³ The Transport system fell into disorder,³⁰⁴ and Napoleon quickly restored

²⁹⁹CN, No. 9225, Napoleon to Prince Eugene Beauharnais 16 September 1805, 11: 207-210; Pernot, Transports Militaires, 114.

³⁰⁰Lerchartier, Les Services de l'Arrière, 93-100.

³⁰¹Ibid., 100-101.

³⁰²Ibid., 103.

³⁰³Pernot, Transports Militaires, 118-124. Napoleon calculated that each battalion had 2,000 rations hauled by two Caissons (Calvary had one Caisson for 1,000 rations). To support his army of 210,000 men. Napoleon had 500 vehicles, 2,600 horses, and 1,500 transport troops, from Compagnie Breidt. CN, No. 10758, Napoleon to Berthier, 10 September 1806, 13: 163-164.

order and reorganized the service. After Tilsit, Intendant Général Daru wrote to Napoleon strongly encouraging the creation of an army equipage train, for Breidt Cie. was insufficient to see the army through a military disaster.³⁰⁵ The Emperor's Conseil d'Administration began work on organizing military transport battalions at a cost of over a million francs. Lacking this money, Napoleon made do with Breidt Cie. Another major transport problem, however, raised its head, in the depreciation of Breidt rolling stock, which in the last three months of 1806 virtually ruined French transport.³⁰⁶

By Spring 1807, Napoleon came to the conclusion that contract transport was ipso facto incapable of handling the severe transport demands of the Grande Armée, and the Breidt Cie. in particular, was deficient. The Inspectors, brigade captains and conductors were also culpable in the earlier collapse of the transport system through negligence and outright cowardice in the field, and Napoleon jailed a number of them.³⁰⁷

On the wreck of the old service, Napoleon established a new military transport system, modeled on the artillery trains.³⁰⁸ He decreed on 25 March 1807 the creation of eight Battalions de Train des Equipages under the Intendance, and administered like the

³⁰⁴Pernot, Transports Militaires, 131.

³⁰⁵Lechartier, Services de l'Arrière, 184; Pernot Transports Militaire, 134.

³⁰⁶Lechartier, Services de l'Arrière, 184-187; Pernot Transports Militaire, 119, 124, 130; CN No. 12178, Napoleon to General Dejean, 26 March 1807, 14: 542-543; No. 12078, Order, 18 March 1807, 14:469.

³⁰⁷CN, No. 12078, Order, 18 March 1807, 14:469.

³⁰⁸Lechartier, Services de l'Arrière, 188-189.

artillery train.³⁰⁹ An agent with the rank of captain commanded a battalion. The companies had 93 men, 161 horses, and 36 vehicles, and artillery forge for maintenance, exchange vehicle, tools, and so forth.³¹⁰

³⁰⁹Ibid., 189; Couget, "L'Arme du Train de l'Empire," 11.

³¹⁰The standard artillery campaign forge is a two or four wheeled vehicle. It had a flat bed with an iron fire box at one end and a large bellows at the other end and boxes for tools and coal. Terrence Wise, Artillery Equipments of the Napoleonic Wars, Men at Arms Series, Ed. Martin Windrow, (London: Sprey Publishing, 1979) 11-12. Louis de Toussard, American Artillerist's Companion or Elements of Artillery Treating of All Kinds of Firearms in Detail and of the Formation, Object, and Service of the Flying or Horse Artillery, Preceded by an Introductory Dissertation on Cannon, West Point Military Library, Ed. T. E. Griess, J. Luvaas, (Philadelphia: C and A Conrad and Co. 1809, reprint New York: Greenwood Press 1969) 2:453-454; Pernot, Transports Militaires, 150.

The Corps Transport System in Catalonia

The Corps logistical transport system is a large and complex organization of land and sea transport. The former included the regular equipage, or regular transport units, and the auxiliary transport that is the headquarters, unit and requisition transport.³¹¹

Adequate auxiliary transport was always hard to come by in Catalonia. The guerrillas consistently interfered with requisitions and the populace took away their horses and vehicles. Transport was scarce in this poor country in any case. In December 1808, the VII Corps had 200 farm wagons, 600 draft horses and 408 pack mules. By July 1809 this transport supply was decimated and Ordonnateur en chef Rey noted its scarcity.³¹² This was an intractable situation for the French Intendance through the war. In August 1809, Corps auxiliary transport was organized into eight brigades of 104 men, 52 pack mules, 220 draft horses, and 133 requisition vehicles (85 were French).³¹³ Rey correctly noted that this was insufficient for Corps requirements but could get nothing more off the

³¹¹There were five types of unit transport, the small ration train, officer baggage, administrative baggage, ambulance and heavy regimental transport trains (equipment, clothing, etc.). SHAT, X(s) 76, *Projet de Décret Impérial Relatif aux Transports directs et à la suite des Troupes*, 1 April 1806; Lechartier, *Les Services à l'Arrière*, 102-103. In June 1810, Marshal McDonald used general officer pack mules to haul supplies. SHAT, C(8) 133, *Armée de Catalogne, Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements*, Order of the Day, 23 June 1810.

³¹²SHAT, C(8) 362, *Situation*, VII Corps, 1 July 1809.

³¹³SHAT, C(19) 7, *Ordonnateur en Chef Rey, Rapport des Situations*, VII Corps, 5 September 1809.

land.³¹⁴ Rey consequently applied to the Ministry of Military Administration for additional support, then to the Ordonnateur of the 10e Division Militaire for the requisitioned transport of French Departments, to haul 10,000 qx of flour waiting at Perpignan for lack of transport. He required an additional 152 wagons, 303 horses and 207 mules.³¹⁵

By 1810 the Auxiliary transport had deteriorated to near non-existence, jeopardizing supply movements. The only bright spot was that some French fortresses in Catalonia (like Figueras) were assembling vehicles.³¹⁶ The situation continued to deteriorate as Marshal Augereau desperately attempted to assemble sufficient transport to haul a gigantic cache of supplies from Perpignan to Barcelona.³¹⁷

Naturally, the French Departmental Prefects bitterly complained of such requisitions. The Minister Director, General Dejean, ignored them and ordered the requisition. He did realize that this would strip the 10e Division Militaire of available transport but the VII Corps' need was overwhelming.³¹⁸

³¹⁴Ordonnateur Rey noted that the Catalan conductors (drivers) deserted at the earliest moment leaving their horses and vehicles on the road. Their meager pay to was a contributing factor in desertion. Ibid.

³¹⁵Ibid.

³¹⁶SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation VII Corps, 1 January 1810.

³¹⁷AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 30 May 1809.

³¹⁸AN, AFiv 1183, Bureau des Étapes et Équipages, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 4 October 1809.

This situation deteriorated into the first of several transport crises, as Marshal Augereau found to his chagrin. In January 1810, he had accumulated 14,000 qx of supplies at Perpignan and found his transport totally inadequate. He needed 100 wagons, and could requisition them for the exorbitant price of 6.00 F. per quintal of freight per day or for a wagon carrying twelve quintals of freight for 72.00 F./day. The Corps deducted 59.00 F. to offset pay and provisions. Total cost was 60,000 F. per month. Fortunately, Marshal Augereau's difficulties were in part alleviated by the transfer of two train battalions from Germany.³¹⁹

The cost of providing auxiliary transport to the Army of Catalonia for 1808 and 1809 amounted to 578,262 F., of which only 98,100 F. was paid. It was madness to expect the Army of Catalonia to pay it. General Lacuée, therefore, urged the Emperor to continue his support and even send another train battalion,³²⁰ for the present stock of requisitioned vehicles were worn out or destroyed in action. Marshal Augereau had to make up the loss with artillery caissons. The Army only had 80 vehicles, barely the horses to pull them, and six mule brigades. Even the infusion of regular equipage did not replace previous losses. Consequently, General Lacuée requisitioned 350 French country wagons from the Pyrénées Departments.³²¹

³¹⁹Total cost was 216,000 F. per month. AN, AFiv 1183, Bureau des Étapes et Équipages, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 24 January 1810.

³²⁰SHAT C(8) 41, Napoleon, Decree, 8 February 1810; AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur 14 March 1810.

³²¹AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur 15 May 1810; AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 27 June 1810; SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

Marshal Macdonald, when he took command found himself saddled with the same intractable transport problem exacerbated by a terrific logistical burden. By June 1810, the auxiliary equipage was exhausted and the army desperately needed reinforcement. General Lacuée again came to the rescue by requisitioning 328 pack mules and 154 muleteers from the Pyrénées Departments, over the howls of the Prefects.³²² General Lacuée, however, fully grasped the need to send a huge convoy of 10,270 qx of supplies to Barcelona. This, however, did not reduce the exasperation of the peasantry "robbed" by repeated requisitions and dragooned into service as muleteers.³²³ In the face of yet another requisition, the Prefect of the Pyrénées Orientales bitterly complained about the utter lack of transport, and urged the Ministry and Ordonnateur at Perpignan to understand that the locals were very disinclined to serve as army drivers only to suffer the dangers of Catalan insurgent attack. The possibility of being butchered on the road was hardly an incentive, particularly since the round trip from Perpignan to Barcelona took fifteen days. It was impossible to obtain the necessary 2,054 vehicles to haul this provender. General Lacuée therefore asked for another requisition of 600 pack mules, which by the beginning of 1811 would form a pack mule battalion.³²⁴

In 1811, General Baraguey d'Hilliers' Corps in Upper Catalonia had at its disposal a reduced regular transport and an almost non-existent auxiliary transport, particularly for

³²²AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 25 July 1810; Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 12 October 1810.

³²³The peasants habitually hid their livestock and vehicles.

³²⁴AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 21 October 1810; Rapport à l'Empereur, 30 January 1811.

the Siege of Figueras. The corps commander in fact limited his transport to hauling siege materials.³²⁵ General Quesnel du Torpt commanding a small division reinforcing his Corps, for example, was almost unable to move for lack of organic auxiliary transport, which was all but impossible to obtain off the land.³²⁶ By the end of the siege there was only about forty vehicles left in the auxiliary transport park.³²⁷ By this time too the Ministry of Military Administration reverted to the old contract system reminiscent of Briedt Cie. prior to 1807. Formed at Perpignan, a transport company hauled supplies into Catalonia and evacuated the sick and wounded.³²⁸

General Decaen, taking command of the Army in September 1811 exploited the private contract transport because his auxiliary transport park nearly ceased to exist.³²⁹ The Army did, however, receive a reinforcement of fifty-two requisitioned country wagons from the Ampurdam in November 1811.³³⁰ In Barcelona meanwhile, transport there had too reverted to contract work for precisely the same reasons. The Entrepreneur, M. Closas, provided a park of eight vehicles for the service of the garrison at a rate of 1,656 F. per month (6.90 F. per vehicle, per day).³³¹ His eight wagons (carrying 30 qx

³²⁵SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne, 16 June 1811.

³²⁶AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée Rapport à l'Empereur 24 April 1811.

³²⁷SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 16 September 1811.

³²⁸SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 October 1811.

³²⁹SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 November 1811.

³³⁰SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 16 November 1811.

³³¹Ration weight laid out by the contract were for a single ration of firewood two livres, bread one livre, rice five onces, legumes two onces, and meat eight onces. The

marc each)³³² were unfortunately not up to the task and he provided another three wagons.³³³

The Regular Equipage

The regular transport consisted of the formal military vehicle and pack mule units. When Napoleon formed them to replace the contract service of Briedt Company on 26 March 1807, he organized them into battalions of five companies. The battalion staff had a Captain, commanding, assisted by a Lieutenant (adjoint), Sous-Lieutenant Quarter Master and several specialist soldiers. The companies had a Sous-Lieutenant commanding assisted by a Maréchal des Logis Chef, 80 men, 34 transport caissons, forage wagon, forge and 159 horses.³³⁴

The battalions were placed under the authority of the Corps Ordonnateur who set the overall transportation mission, while an Inspectorate oversaw service administration.³³⁵

Battalion Conseils d'Administration were like that of an artillery train battalion and the

whole ration weighed 3 livres, 15 onces per man, per day. The Catalan livre equals 1½ marc (12 onces) or .400 kg. The Catalan once equals .033 kg, (33.33 gm). SHAT, C(19) 7, No. 163, Raymondson, Rapport Mensuel, 10 June 1812; Doursther, Dictionnaire Universel, 218, 221, 368.

³³²Thirty quintals marc equals 750 kg., one quintal marc equals 25 kg. Doursther, Dictionnaire Universel, 250; SHAT, C(19) 9, Bureau des Vivres, No. 163, Commissaire des guerres Raymondson à Général Lacuée, Rapport Mensuel, 10 June 1812.

³³³These vehicles included a one horse wagon at 8.00 F./day, a two horse wagon at 16.00 F./day and a three horse wagon at 24.00 F./day. SHAT, C(19) 9, No. 163, Raymondson, Rapport Mensuel 10 June 1812.

³³⁴Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arrière, 189.

³³⁵AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 30 May 1809.

Ordonnateur presided over it. The depots too, were organized around the battalion where recruits are obtained and equipped, and horses, vehicles, and equipment were maintained. In May 1808 there were several train depots, including the ones at Pau and Bayonne were for the armies in Spain.³³⁶ The new battalions were equipped with the rickety vehicles that belonged to Breidt Company and Gayde Company, the old contractors, but in 1807-08 the Intendant Général of the Grande Armée ordered the manufacture of 1,149 wagons with harness, and the procurement of over 5,000 horses.³³⁷

The VII corps received four pack mule brigades in May 1809³³⁸ in response to the extraordinary difficulty of procuring auxiliary transport from the very beginning of the war. In Upper Catalonia, General Reille's division, using auxiliary transport, sustained tremendous losses in insurgent attacks,³³⁹ and it became increasingly difficult to procure it. Ordonnateur en chef Rey noted this trend in the Ampurdam, that the dwindling transport was barely adequate and losses were not replacable.³⁴⁰

³³⁶Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arrière, 195.

³³⁷Lechartier, Les Services de l'Arrière, 195-196.

³³⁸AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 30 May 1809.

³³⁹General Reille's correspondence is replete with examples of attacks on his convoys. SHAT, C(8) 267, Registre de Correspondance du Général Reille 4 July 1808 au 13 Mai 1809.

³⁴⁰SHAT, C(19) 7, Ordonnateur en Chef Rey, Rapport et Situation de VII Corps, 5 August 1809.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Military Administration reorganized, streamlined and increased the equipage battalions, and pack mule brigades.³⁴¹ The new transport company would be under the command of a Lieutenant with a staff of two Maréchaux des logis, one fourrier (farrier) and two brigadiers. The company had 80 soldiers, 160 horses, and 36 vehicles.³⁴²

In October 1809, the available VII Corps transport, straining under the burden of the siege of Gerona could only muster 48 vehicles, 297 horses, and 201 pack mules.³⁴³ This was clearly insufficient to manage its huge requirements and General Dejean ordered for Ordonnateur Rey, a requisition of 152 vehicles, 303 draft horses and 207 pack mules from the seven Pyrénées Departments.³⁴⁴ Prefects complained but Dejean ignored them for the VII Corps was in dire straits.

By January 1810 the crisis deepened in the aftermath of the siege of Gerona. General Dejean's only alternative was to hire transport for 72.00 F./day and noted to Napoleon that it would be more cost effective to assign an equipage battalion to the VII Corps. He suggested transferring to the VII Corps the 2nd, 5th, or 12th Battalions

³⁴¹AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 30 May 1809.

³⁴²AN, AFiv 1184, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 7 June 1809.

³⁴³This is down from 200 farm wagons, 600 horses, and 408 pack mules at the end of 1808. AN, AFiv 1183, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 4 October 1809.

³⁴⁴Ibid.

currently in Germany.³⁴⁵ This was particularly important as the VII Corps had already spent 578,262 F. on requisitioned transport from France in 1808-09.³⁴⁶

Napoleon took the advice of General Dejean and his successor General Lacuée and in April 1810 ordered the 2e and 5e Bataillons du Train des Équipages to Catalonia. The 2nd Battalion had 412 men, 632 horses, and 144 vehicles, and the 5th Battalion had 405 men, 595 horses, and 142 vehicles.³⁴⁷ These battalions would march from Commercy to Perpignan by company through August 1810.³⁴⁸

This was quite a slow movement considering the difficulties of the Army of Catalonia. Indeed, General Lacuée was enraged at Major-Inspecteur-Général Theuerin then residing at Paris under the pretext of illness for not attending to his work, allowing this transfer to proceed at a snail's pace. General Lacuée promptly reported this to Napoleon in no uncertain terms and disciplined the Inspecteur.³⁴⁹

Once they arrived in Catalonia, however, Marshals Augereau and Macdonald encountered considerable problems. The 2nd Battalion retired to Perpignan to refit, after four months of grueling service on the execrable and guerilla infested Catalan roads that

³⁴⁵Ibid.

³⁴⁶The Government paid off 98,110 F., leaving an outstanding debt of 480,152 F. AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 14 March 1810.

³⁴⁷See Table 31. AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaire, Situation, 15 August 1810.

³⁴⁸See Table 31. AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur 27 June 1810; Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 5 September 1810; UCN, No. 4165, Napoleon to General Clarke 17 April 1810, 3:531.

³⁴⁹AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur 5 September 1810.

nearly destroyed it. By October, men and animals were utterly exhausted, the battalion numbering only 294 men. The Ordonnateur of the 10e Division Militaire made a horse requisition from the Department of Arriège and recovered horses scattered on its march to Catalonia from Toulouse to Perpignan. General Lacuée finally withdrew the 2nd Battalion to Carcassonne to rest and refit.³⁵⁰

Marshal Macdonald, however, desperately needed this battalion to haul the large quantities of supplies to Barcelona, and to otherwise support his operations in Lower Catalonia. General Lacuée echoed these concerns when he wrote to Napoleon of the extraordinary difficulties of the Army of Catalonia. He noted that the drivers and vehicles hired (or dragooned) from the French Pyrénées districts were nearly impossible to find due to the dangers of service in Catalonia. They showed particular repugnance at having to drive vehicles along the Catalan roads, with the danger of death behind every tree. The roads themselves were in such a state of disrepair that they beat the wagons to pieces. Finally, the 10,270 qx at Perpignan required 2,054 vehicles to haul it. This necessitated both the recall of the 2nd Battalion and the request to requisition 600 pack mules.³⁵¹

By November 1810, the situation was somewhat alleviated with the arrival of the 5th Battalion which was near full strength.³⁵² This did not, however, solve Macdonald's transport problems, for revictualing Barcelona absorbed all the regular equipage. Even

³⁵⁰AN, AFiv 1183, Bureau des Étapes et Équipages, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 12 October 1812. UCN, No. 4729, Napoleon to General Lacuée 18 October 1810, 3:838.

³⁵¹AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 21 October 1810.

³⁵²AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur 14 October 1810.

the 5th Battalion was wearing out. It had lost 69 wagons and 50 pack mules in Upper Catalonia and desperately requested the 600 mules.³⁵³

On 24 October Napoleon decided to withdraw the 2nd Battalion from Catalonia altogether, despite Marshal Macdonald's transport problems.³⁵⁴ General Baraguey d'Hilliers screamed over this loss, complaining to the Ministry that it was impossible to haul supplies to Gerona and that operations in Upper Catalonia would probably collapse without it.³⁵⁵

To compound this problem, insurgent activity virtually brought convoys to Barcelona to a halt by October 1810.³⁵⁶ In 1811, the transport problem became so acute that any serious military setback would virtually paralyse the Army of Catalonia. The fall of Figueras was a disaster which did exactly that. The siege absorbed all the available regular transport, actually halting the movements of reinforcements coming to the aid of the Army at Catalonia. General Quesnel's division ground to a halt at Puycerda and could neither march nor feed itself without adequate transport and there was none to be had in

³⁵³General Lacuée had noted in his report that he had just received another desperate letter from General Baraguey d'Hilliers. AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 21 November 1810; General Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 30 January 1811.

³⁵⁴AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 28 November 1810.

³⁵⁵AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 5 December 1810.

³⁵⁶Oman, Peninsular War, 3:498-500.

his area.³⁵⁷ Neither were more provisions from Perpignan obtainable without an immediate infusion of transport.

By June the ravages of the siege had taken its toll on the 5th Battalion. Only its 1st and 2nd companies were operational,³⁵⁸ with 20 vehicles capable of hauling 240 metric quintals.³⁵⁹ The 3rd and 4th companies were in Figueras at the time of its fall in April and were captured with a loss of 33 wagons.³⁶⁰ This was considerable drop from its January strength of 120 vehicles.³⁶¹ As early as April, the now withdrawn 2d Battalion had meanwhile begun to recall the 200 horses it left behind in Catalonia, stripping Macdonald's Army of yet another all too scarce resource and drawing troops from the 9th and 12th Battalions to build a new six company 2nd Battalion.³⁶²

³⁵⁷General Baraguey d' Hilliers requested two pack mule companies from a light transport battalion at Carcassonne with 92 pack mules each. AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 24 April 1811.

³⁵⁸SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne, 16 June 1811. The countryside in Upper Catalonia was virtually exhausted.

³⁵⁹AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires Situation, 15 April 1811; AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 20 November 1811.

³⁶⁰AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 15 January, 1811.

³⁶¹The 5th Battalion numbered in April 405 men, 256 horses, 547 harness, and 181 wagons in April. See Table 32. AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 1 June 1811 and 15 April 1811.

³⁶²Horses sold for 360.00 F. each. The Battalion required 1,227 horses but only required 352 for actual purchase, totaling 126,720 F. Of course it took 200 from Catalonia. AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 9 April 1811. The whole Battalion would have by July 1811 788 men, 1,227 horses, 1,008 sets of harness, and 252 vehicles. AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 24 July 1811.

By August the decimated 5th Battalion's only assistance came from two companies of the 5th (bis) Battalion du Mulets de Bât,³⁶³ and seven requisition vehicles, a few horses, and pack mules, through 1811.³⁶⁴ Napoleon continued to withdraw support from the Army of Catalonia, regardless of its difficulties. In July 1811 they ordered two Departments of the 10e Division Militaire to send 75 draft horses and 90 pack mules to the Army of Spain,³⁶⁵ adding, from Marshal Macdonald's and General Baraguey d'Hilliers' viewpoint, insult to injury.

In November, Napoleon ordered the 5e (bis) Battalion du Mulets de Bât and the 5e (ppl) Bataillon du Train des Équipages Militaires to merge into a single battalion. This would help re-equip the now combat ineffective 5e (ppl) Bataillon with only 21 vehicles and not a single horse. The battalion would expand to six companies with 800 men, 376 draft horses and harness (plus 90 saddle horses), 84 vehicles, and 600 pack mules with harness.³⁶⁶

This new and more flexible battalion served the remainder of the war in Catalonia. When the Armies of Aragon and Catalonia combined in late 1813, it had the 5th and 11th

³⁶³SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d' Armée en Haute Catalogne, 1 August 1811; AN, AFiv 1184 Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 1 June 1811.

³⁶⁴SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 15 September 1811; Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 October 1811; Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 16 November 1811; Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1811. SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 November 1811.

³⁶⁵The new concentration at Bayonne amounted to 742 horses, 1,350 pack mules, 364 sets of harness, and 1,088 troops. The 11e Division Militaire even had a vehicle park with 81 Caissons. AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur 24 July 1811.

³⁶⁶Animals would cost 219,300 F. with 418 horses at 450 F. and 60 mules at 520 F. each. AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 20 November 1811.

Train Battalions nearly at full strength in January 1814. Together they had 1,328 men, 850 horses, 166 wagons and 247 pack mules.³⁶⁷

The end of the war, Marshal Suchet's retirement to the French frontier and the invasion of France forced Napoleon to do a massive withdrawal of these transport assets from the Army of Aragon and Catalonia, till they were a mere shadow of their former strength numbering 244 men and 155 horses in January and 94 men and 122 horses by May 1814.³⁶⁸

Pack Mule Transportation

Catalonia was one of the most forbidding areas of Spain to haul goods. It's road were execrable and there was only one main good road from Perpignan to Barcelona.³⁶⁹ This demanded light transportation and the mule answered the charge. The Spanish regularly used them to haul commercial goods and there were 250,000 mules in Spain by 1797.³⁷⁰

³⁶⁷Complete strength would be 1,376 men, 1,118 horses, 600 mules, and 144 vehicles. The 5e Battalion numbered 943 men out of 991, had 407 horses out of 447, 247 pack mules out of 500 and 85 vehicles. AN, AFiv 1184 Situation des Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires et Brigades de Mulets de Bât, 1 January 1814. See Table 31.

³⁶⁸See Table 31, SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, l'Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814; Situation, l'Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814.

³⁶⁹Oman, Peninsular War, 1:303-305.

³⁷⁰Herr, The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain, 130; Young, Travels, 2:311. Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th - 18th Century, Vol. 1, The Structures of Everyday Life, Tns, Sian Reynolds. (New York: Harper & Row, Perennial Library; 1981) 341-342.

Wellington used them throughout the war,³⁷¹ able to haul 200 lbs. per animal,³⁷² and had some 4,000 mules in the army,³⁷³ purchased for £18 - £25.³⁷⁴ The French command too, used pack mule transport from the beginning of the war.³⁷⁵ General Reille used them extensively during his operations in Upper Catalonia in the latter half of 1808,³⁷⁶ particularly to support General Duhesme's abortive second siege of Gerona.³⁷⁷

General Gouvion Saint-Cyr made particularly good use of pack mules during his daring mountain march to relieve Barcelona after the fall of Rosas in December 1808, with which to haul his reserve ammunition (150,000 rds).³⁷⁸ Since 1808, the Ministry

³⁷¹Wellington, Dispatches, General Order, 8 August 1808, 3:57-58; General Order, 13 August 1808, 3:73; General Order, 1 June 1809, 3:267; The adjutant General to Lt. Colonel Arentschildt, 1st Hussans, 19 G. L. 16 June 1809, 3: 299; General Order, 19 June 1809, 3:307.

³⁷²Ibid., Wellington To Commissary General, J. Murray, 30 June 1801; General Order, 4 July 1809, 3:343-344.

³⁷³Ibid., Wellington to the British Ambassador to the Court of Spain, 8 August 1809.

³⁷⁴Ibid., Wellington to Commissary General J. Murray, 7 September 1809; 3:481-482; Wellington to Vice Admiral G. Berkeley, 23 September 1809, 3:518; Wellington to G. Berkeley, 28 September, 1809, 3:527; General Order, (AGO), 13 December 1809, 3:645; Wellington to Vice Admiral G. Berkeley, 22 January 1810, 3:690; Wellington to Lieutenant General Hill, 5 March 1810, 3:765; Wellington to the British Army Commander in Chief, 28 September, 1809, 3:528-530; Wellington to Brigadier General R. Craufund, 29 September 1809, 3:530-531.

³⁷⁵SHAT, Anon., Journal Détaillé des Mouvements de l'Armée Française en Catalogne, Depuis le Mois de Juin 1808, jusqu'en 1810, 7.

³⁷⁶SHAT C(8) 267, Registre de Corresondance du Général Reille, Reille to Marshal Berthier, 13 July 1808; Reille to Berthier, 27 July 1808.

³⁷⁷Ibid., Reille to Berthier, 4 August 1808.

³⁷⁸Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations, 56; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 3:354-356; Oman, Peninsular War, 2:60-61; Belmas, Journaux des Sieges, 2:445-449;

requisitioned from the French Pyrénées Departments, pack mules (mulets de bât) for the transport of the VII Corps.³⁷⁹

The Ministry organized them into brigades 'auxiliary' to the regular train units.³⁸⁰ Initially there were ten pack mule brigades each with 54 conductors and 102 mules, totalling 540 conductors and 1,020 mules. He strongly recommended that these units use conscripts at .50 F./diem as opposed to 1.50/diem, a 66% savings on a 8,100 F./month pay expenditure as opposed to 24,300 F./month.³⁸¹

General Dejean expectedly recommended to Napoleon the purchase of the 1,020 pack mules at 280 F. each for 285,600 F. instead of hiring for 61,200 F./month which would pay for them in a little over four months.³⁸² The mules came from the Pyrénées Departments and the Brigades du Bât would consist of an officer, seven non-commissioned officers, 70 soldiers, a trumpeter, harness maker, two farriers, 120 pack

Vacani, Storia, 1:249-250 and 2:256-257; Arteché y Moro, Guerra de la Independencia, 4:257-260.

³⁷⁹AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Étapes, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 8 February 1809.

³⁸⁰AN, AFiv 1183, Inspection des Brigades de Mulets de Bât, Inspecteur Bandesson to Ministre Directeur Général Dejean, 12 January 1809; Inspecteur Bandesson, Rapport, 9 January 1809.

³⁸¹This was a daily wage of 270 F. to 810 F. AN, AFiv 1183 Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Étapes, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 8 February 1809. An initial report by Inspecteur Bandesson, investigating this case strongly recommended the purchase of the required 600 mules at 250 F. a head at 150,000 F. (reimbursed to the Departments) as opposed to hiring them at 730 F./annum, totaling 438,000 F. for these mules.

³⁸²The yearly hire rate for these mules was 734,400 F. to hire. Ibid.

mules and nine saddle horses.³⁸³ These brigades were to be under the operational control of the train battalions, though they were separate units.³⁸⁴ Napoleon, however, declined to organize these pack mule units, in favor of a separate unit and the train battalions would only provide administrative support, such as pay, clothing, weapons, masses, discipline, and service administration.³⁸⁵ These units were finally organized in early 1809 into nineteen brigades, of which twelve were assigned to Spain and four, the 16e, 17e, 18e, and 19e Brigades de Mulets de Bât to the VII Corps in May 1809 totaling 173 men and 337 pack mules³⁸⁶ averaging 43 men and 84 mules.³⁸⁷

By August the brigades only had 116 men and 205 mules between³⁸⁸ showing a manpower loss of 33% and mules of 40%. From 1810 to 1811 the attrition continued with frightening rapidity due to enemy action, wear and tear and cannibalizing of men and mules by the two Bataillons du Train to replace their own losses.³⁸⁹

³⁸³See Table 35; Ibid., Minute de Décret Impérial, Projet de Décret portant Création of Organization de Compagnies de Mulets de Bât, nd, (8 February 1809).

³⁸⁴AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 30 May 1809. AN, AFiv 1183, Minute de Decret Imperial.

³⁸⁵Ibid.

³⁸⁶See Table 36, AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation 30 May 1809.

³⁸⁷See Table 34; Ibid.

³⁸⁸See Table 34; SHAT, C(8) 362, VII Corps, Rapport de la Situation, Mouvements et Emplacement du Corps d' Armée pendant le Mois d'Août 1809, Ordonnateur en Chef Rey, 5 September 1809.

³⁸⁹See Table 34, AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillon du Train des Équipages Militaire, Situation 15 June 1810. AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaire, Situation, 15 April 1811.

mules and nine saddle horses.³⁸³ These brigades were to be under the operational control of the train battalions, though they were separate units.³⁸⁴ Napoleon, however, declined to organize these pack mule units, in favor of a separate unit and the train battalions would only provide administrative support, such as pay, clothing, weapons, masses, discipline, and service administration.³⁸⁵ These units were finally organized in early 1809 into nineteen brigades, of which twelve were assigned to Spain and four, the 16e, 17e, 18e, and 19e Brigades de Mulets de Bât to the VII Corps in May 1809 totaling 173 men and 337 pack mules³⁸⁶ averaging 43 men and 84 mules.³⁸⁷

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³⁸³See Table 35; Ibid., Minute de Décret Impérial, Projet de Décret portant Création de Organization de Compagnies de Mulets de Bât, nd, (8 February 1809).

³⁸⁴AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 30 May 1809. AN, AFiv 1183, Minute de Decret Imperial.

³⁸⁵Ibid.

³⁸⁶See Table 36, AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation 30 May 1809.

³⁸⁷See Table 34; Ibid.

³⁸⁸See Table 34; SHAT, C(8) 362, VII Corps, Rapport de la Situation, Mouvements et Emplacement du Corps d' Armée pendant le Mois d'Août 1809, Ordonnateur en Chef Rey, 5 September 1809.

³⁸⁹See Table 34, AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillon du Train des Équipages Militaire, Situation 15 June 1810. AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaire, Situation, 15 April 1811.

These strength shortfalls particularly in mules was due to the enormous expenditures for transportation in Spain.³⁹⁰ The expenses for purchasing remounts were enormous. The Ministry of Military Administration from 1808 to March 1809 already bought 31,709 horses, and Napoleon was disinclined to continue at this level of purchases.³⁹¹ An added expense then was the purchase of additional pack mules for the decimated brigades VII Corps, which had by October 1809 only 201 mules.³⁹² General Dejean consequently requested of the Emperor to purchase 207 pack mules from the Pyrénées Departments³⁹³ to bring the Corps transport back up to operational strength. Even General Clarke requested the purchase of 400 draft mules for Spain but Napoleon stubbornly refused to purchase them.³⁹⁴

³⁹⁰AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre Bureau des Étapes, Convois, Transports d'Équipages militaires, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur 14 March 1810.

³⁹¹AN, AFiv 1181, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau de Forages et Remontes, Chef de Bureau Beaumet, État de l'Effectif en Hommes et en Chevaux au 1er Août 1808; 13 August 1808; Chef de Bureau de Forages et Remontés, Beaumet, État de l'Effectif en Chevaux de Troupe, 14 March 1809.

³⁹²The VII Corps also had 600 draft horses and 200 farm vehicles which attributed down to 297 horses and 48 vehicles. AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Étapes et Équipages, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 4 October 1809.

³⁹³Including 152 vehicles and 303 horses. Ibid.

³⁹⁴AN, AFiv 1183, Bureau des Etapes et Équipages, Général Dejean, Rapport à l'Empereur, 24 January 1810. Napoleon writes to General Clarke: "I shall buy no mules this year; I have had expenses enough." UCN, No. 3951, Decision, 21 January 1810, 3:421-422. No. 4023, Extract from Minutes of the Session of the Council of War Administration held by His Majesty, 14 February 1810; 3:458.

In the Army of Catalonia the mule brigades continued to decrease from 337 to 126, while manpower fell from 173 to 120 muleteers.³⁹⁵ These dire losses would destroy them. General Lacuée consequently requested the purchase of 250 horses or mules for the Army of Catalonia. Napoleon again refused on the grounds that "The War Administration should have in Poitou more [mules] than it knows what to do with."³⁹⁶ This was particularly true since there was a recently purchased shipment of 1,600 mules at Potiers for the Army of Spain.³⁹⁷

This administrative 'wrangle' between General Lacuée and Napoleon was of no help to the Army at Catalonia. Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon, clearly saw that this was an exercise in futility, and he took the bull by the horns and requisitioned from five Pyrénées Departments in the 9e, 10e, and 11e Divisions Militaires³⁹⁸ 154 muleteers and 328 pack mules to make up previous losses.³⁹⁹ The Prefects complained to General

³⁹⁵AN, AFiv 1183, Bataillon du Train, Situation, 15 June 1810. See Table 34.

³⁹⁶UCN, No. 4242, Decision, 19 May 1810, 3:572. Quite a stinging rebuke from Napoleon.

³⁹⁷General Lacuée requested Napoleon's authorization for the harness purchased for these mules. He forwarded this action informally and requested that Napoleon overlook this. The Emperor replied: "This visa must be supplemented by an equivalent bill it is important not to omit so necessary a formality, especially when so large a number of mules is in question."

UCN, No. 4433, Decision 19 July 1810, 3:661-662.

³⁹⁸Jones, The Longman Companion to the French Revolution, 224-229.

³⁹⁹See Table 34; This was in fact a feat on Ordonnateur Boudons part for mules and muleteers were always scarce in the French Pyrenees, as the English Traveler Henry Swinburne found on his way from Perpignan to Barcelona in 1775: "There was such a scarcity of mules that we were forced to comply with . . . exorbitant demands . . . for ten horses. . ." Henry Swinburne, Travels Through Spain in the Years 1775 and 1776; in which several monuments of Roman and Mourish architecture are illustrated by accurate

Lacuée that the supply of mules and muleteers was exhausted and that to squeeze more men and animals out of them would severely injure agriculture, already in dire need of transport. Since harvest was near, their loss would be doubly crippling. Additionally, the Prefects chaffed at receiving such requisition orders from an army Ordonnateur, for they were Imperial Prefects and answered to the French Ministries and the Emperor, not to army commands. In any case, General Lacuée looked favorably on Ordonnateur Bourdon's requisition action and requested Napoleon's approval.⁴⁰⁰ Requisitions from France were particularly necessary since they were nearly impossible in Catalonia,⁴⁰¹ due to over requisitioning by both adversaries.⁴⁰² The VII Corps auxiliary transport, for example, obtained off of the land one auxiliary brigade with 42 draft mules.⁴⁰³

horses. . ." Henry Swinburne, Travels Through Spain in the Years 1775 and 1776; in which several monuments of Roman and Mourish architecture are illustrated by accurate drawings on the spot, 2d. Ed, 2 vols. (London: P. Elmsly, 1787) 1:4.

⁴⁰⁰AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Étapes, Transports, Convois et Équipages Militaires, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 25 July 1810.

⁴⁰¹AN, AFiv 1183, VII Corps, Letter No. 1232, Ordonnateur en Chef Rey to Marshal Augereau, 3 December 1809.

⁴⁰²SHAT, C(8) 35, Ministère de la Guerre, Bureau du Génie, Général Clarke, Rapport à l'Empereur, 29 October 1809; Armée d'Espagne, 7e Corps, Siège de Gironne, Rapport Général du Génie sur le Siège de Gironne, Général Comte Sanson, 20 September 1809; AN, AFiv 1621 Plaq 3 (III), Armée d'Espagne, Siège de Gironne, Rapport de l'Artillerie et du Génie, 1 September, 1809, General Taviel and Chef de Bataillon Paris, Rapport, 4 September 1809; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Opérations de l'Armée de Catalogne, 224-226, 241-244; Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 2:583-589, 594-595, Général Verdier, Rapport à Général Clarke, 3 September 1809, 718-722; Oman, Peninsular War, 3:42-45; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 4:284-286. O. Espanet, Notes on the Supply of an Army During Active Operations, Tns., H.F. Kendall and H.G. Sharpe (Kansas City, MO: Hudson-Kimberly Publishing Co. 1899) 100.

⁴⁰³SHAT, C(8) 362, VII Corps, Ordonnateur en Chef Rey, Rapport sur la Situation du 7e Corps d'Armée d'Espagne, 5 September 1809.

By late 1810, the mule and muleteer shortage became critical, particularly as Marshal Macdonald needed to haul 10,270 metric quintals of provender from Perpignan to Barcelona. The French voituriers⁴⁰⁴ (carters) from the Pyrénées Orientales refused to haul freight into Catalonia for fear of insurgent attack, for any price. Indeed, the Prefect stated that it was impossible to hire any who would not abandon their vehicles after the first days of the march, taking the horses back to France; even if sufficient numbers were obtainable. He noted that the ravages of the insurgents in the French Cerdagne were infamous, where they murdered, looted, and terrorized the country.⁴⁰⁵

To enable Marshal Macdonald to haul these supplies Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon requested that General Lacuée purchase 600 pack mules without which they could not haul critical supplies to Barcelona.⁴⁰⁶ General Lacuée reported his urgent request to Napoleon thrice,⁴⁰⁷ but the Emperor held firm on his prohibition to buy mules. General Lacuée it seems, could go no further with the Emperor.

When the convoy arrived at Figueres, General Baraguey d'Hilliers, wrote two dispatches to General Lacuée, stating that he could move no further. It was impossible to hire mules or muleteers from Perpignan. Furthermore the lack of good fodder,

⁴⁰⁴A voiturier is a wagoner, driver, carter or carrier who hauls freight. Swinburne, Travels 1:4.

⁴⁰⁵AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Étapes et Équipages, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 21 October 1810.

⁴⁰⁶Ibid.

⁴⁰⁷AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Étapes et Équipages, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 28 October 1810; Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 21 November 1810.

exhaustion, and sickness had decimated his two equipage battalions. There were only 50 pack mules left which could stand field service, and they could only haul 50 quintals.⁴⁰⁸ Finally, the condition of the late autumn roads was a nightmare.⁴⁰⁹ He correctly held that the only resources to haul these supplies under these near impossible circumstances was the requested 600 pack mules. General Lacuée was so adamant in his report to Napoleon, that he wrote a post script quoting two very desperate dispatches from Baraguey d'Hilliers, arguing for the fourth and fifth times the absolute necessity for more mules.⁴¹⁰

Under the weighty arguments of Generals Lacuée and Baraguey d'Hilliers⁴¹¹ Napoleon acquiesced to the purchase of the pack mules, in January 1811, a full year since General Lacuée began requesting them. He purchased 500 at Carcassonne for delivery on 1 April 1811 and the other hundred for delivery on 15 April.

On delivery, General Lacuée drafted muleteers and formed a new battalion. The dangers of Catalonia were well known throughout the Pyrénées and the temptation to

⁴⁰⁸The two Equipage battalions only mustered 69 horsed wagons. Ibid.

⁴⁰⁹Swinburne, Travels, 1:4; AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur 21 November 1810.

⁴¹⁰Ibid.

⁴¹¹General Comte Baraguey d'Hilliers had a sterling reputation from his successful conduct of the counterinsurgent operations in the Tyrol against Andraes Hofer had gained him an excellent reputation with Napoleon; Six, Dictionnaire, 1:49; F. Gunther Eyck, Loyal Rebels, Andreas Hofer and the Tyrolean uprising of 1809 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986) 75.

desert with mules in hand must have been near overwhelming. This demanded the strictest discipline, rapid and orderly movements and the most efficient administration.⁴¹²

This new Bataillon Léger des Équipages Militaires was composed of a battalion headquarters staff, six companies and a depot, the whole with ten officers, 56 noncommissioned officers, 306 soldier muleteers, eighteen workers, 68 saddle horses and 552 pack mules, or 92 mules per company (390 men and 620 animals).⁴¹³ The depot, built on the single battalion regiment model was specially geared as a veterinary 'hospital'⁴¹⁴ and depot, a maintenance depot for the repair and maintenance of harness and equipment and the center for unit administration.⁴¹⁵ General Lacuée recommended to the Emperor special personnel arrangements due to the unique circumstances of the Catalan theater. The battalion officers and NCOs should come from the French train battalions. The 5e Bataillon des Equipages had a overage in personnel due to earlier losses, and Lacuée ordered these men obtained by conscription from mule districts (Pyrénées). Finally, he had the mule battalion partly integrated into the 5e battalion des Équipages for unit administration maintenance.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹²General Lacuée states "que ce mode assure plus de surveillance, plus d'ordre plus de célérité dans les mouvements, plus de régularité et d'économie dans l'Administration." AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Étapes et Équipages, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 30 January 1811.

⁴¹³See Table 34; Ibid.

⁴¹⁴This was not a centralized veterinary hospital as with the AEF in WWI, Louis Merillat and Delwin Campbell, Veterinary Military History of the United States, (Kansas City, MO: The Harver-Glover Laboratories, 1935) 2:799-801, 807-809, 812-823.

⁴¹⁵AN, AFiv 1183 Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 30 January 1811.

⁴¹⁶Ibid.

The mules were quite expensive. The 58 horses cost 360 F. each or 24,480 F. while its 552 mules cost 550 F. each at 303,500 F.⁴¹⁷ Napoleon had already spent an enormous sum on remount horses. In June 1811 Napoleon had purchased 16,162 cavalry and artillery remounts⁴¹⁸ for 7,272,900 F. The thirteen transportation battalions by 1811 had 4,686 horses⁴¹⁹ at a value of 2,108,700 F. and the fifteen pack mule brigades (1810) had 1,158 mules⁴²⁰ at an invested value of 602,160 F. This expenditure of some ten million francs of which some eight million is annual expense amounted to 1.3% of the French war budget.⁴²¹ There is no wonder that Napoleon was reticent at further purchases unless the desperation of the requirement demanded them, as in Catalonia 1810-11 for which the Ministry formed a whole battalion at great but justifiable cost.

In April 1811 the four original Pack Mule Brigades (16e, 17e, 18e, 19e) continued their rapid decay from brutal overuse and exhaustion to 80 men and 77 mules, a total loss of 53.8% from 1809 in men and for mules of 77.2%.⁴²² The Pack Mule Battalion had not been completely organized by April when Marshal Macdonald befell a catastrophe with

⁴¹⁷AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée Rapport à l'Empereur 30 January 1811 and Administration de la Guerre, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 9 April 1811.

⁴¹⁸AN, AFiv 1181, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau de Remontes et Forages, Situation des Remounts, 20 June 1811.

⁴¹⁹AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 15 January 1811.

⁴²⁰AN, AFiv 1183, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation 15 June 1810.

⁴²¹Figure calculated on the budget of 1811; Lacroix and Dupreux *Le Napoléon*, 165.

⁴²²See Tables 34, 35 and 36; AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 15 April 1811; and Situation, 30 May 1809.

the sudden capture of Figueres on 9 April 1811.⁴²³ This disaster forced Napoleon to reinforce Baraquey d'Hilliers Corps in Upper Catalonia with General Plauzonnet's, and rush in General Quesnel du Trupt's Division de la Cerdagne already assigned to Catalonia,⁴²⁴ and provide two companies of the Pack Mule Battalion, which he had organized with such pain and care, was essential to the operations of the Army of Catalonia temporarily to move the division into the theater.⁴²⁵

The organization of the Bataillon Léger des Équipages Militaires, called the 5e Bataillon (bis) du Train des Équipages Militaires certainly alleviated some of Marshal Macdonald's and General Decaen's transport problems, but it and the other units had meanwhile continued to suffer great losses requiring replacements and remounts, particularly with mules for the regular transport battalions being refitted into the 11e Division Militaire, requiring 600 horses and 1,350 mules from the 10e, 11e, 12e, 20e, and 21e Divisions Militaire.⁴²⁶

⁴²³Guillot's garrison was 1,593 men in March 1811. SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne, 15 March 1811; Oman, Peninsular War, 4:491-494.

⁴²⁴CN, No. 17644 Napoleon to General Clarke, 23 April 1811, 22:103; No. 17665, Napoleon to General Clarke, 23 April 1811, 22:103; No. 17665, Napoleon to General Clarke, 28 April 1811, 22:118.

⁴²⁵SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne 15 March 1811. The division's battalions were scattered on the Pyrénées frontier of the Pyrénées Orientales. AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 24 April 1811.

⁴²⁶See Table 32. AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Étapes, Convois, Transports et Équipages Militaires Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 24 July 1811.

§7. The Convoy System and Catalan Insurgency

The hallmark of the Peninsular War was its ruthless insurgent operations. In Catalonia these took on a more vicious and regularized form. The Catalan military force was divided into two: the regular army and the insurgents. The regular Catalan army was grafted off of the old royal army, specifically the five regiments, of Estramadura, Ultonia, Borbon, Colonel Wimpfen's Swiss and the Spanish and Walloon Guards, about 6,000 troops.⁴²⁷ At the beginning of the rebellion in June 1808, these units went over to the insurgents, to form the cadre of the insurgent or Catalan Army. The mercenary units however embraced the insurgents with particular trepidation. Wimpfen's Swiss Regiment, the Spanish and Walloon Guards and a cavalry regiment in Barcelona remained loyal to the Catalan Captain General, Lieutenant General Count Ezpeleta, who was by treaty allied to the French corps commander occupying Barcelona, General Duhesme.⁴²⁸

Soon after the beginning of the insurrection in May, 1808, Spanish troops began to desert in small bodies. General Duhesme, uneasy about a possible organized uprising in Barcelona backed by the army, delighted at the desertions and turned a blind eye to them, even when the Borbon Regiment deserted in toto, "with trumpets blaring and flags flying".⁴²⁹ These deserters scattered throughout Catalonia, Aragon and Valencia to join

⁴²⁷Oman, Peninsular War, 1:303; Napier, Peninsula War, 1:90.

⁴²⁸Oman, Peninsular War, 1:303-307, Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 44-45.

⁴²⁹AN, AFiv 1621, Plaq 1, General Duhesme, Résumé des Opérations Militaires, Corps d'Armée des Pyrénées Orientales; Guillaume-Philibert Duhesme, Mémoires de Duhesme, de Vaughan, de D. Maria Ric, et de Contreras; Collection Complimentaire des Memoires Relatifs à La Révolution Française, Tome III, (Paris: Chez G. L. Michaud, 1823) 15-19; Oman, Peninsular War, 1:307-308; Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 75-76, 136

newly forming insurgent bands and intact units formed the nucleus of the provincial army.⁴³⁰ In July, General Vivres, Captain General of the Balearic Isles, sent his garrison of eight regiments, about 10,000 men, to Spain under General Del Palacio. Some 5,000 of these went to Catalonia.⁴³¹

By July, the "period of patriotic anarchy"⁴³² ended as regular military units congealed into an army under General Del Palacio, elected the new Captain General of Catalonia by the non-Provincial Junta.⁴³³ The other portion of the Catalan forces were the insurgents which rose virtually overnight in a patriotic frenzy to combat the French, and nowhere was the insurgent movement so ferocious or successful as in Catalonia. Even General Clarke, Minister of War, remarked to Napoleon on the intensity of Spanish resistance.⁴³⁴

The Catalan insurgent movement was composed of two groups, the Miquelets and Sometenes. The Miquelets were a levé en masse of the military age males first used by

Laffaille, Memoires 24-26; and Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 2:98-100.

⁴³⁰Oman, Peninsular War, 1:308.

⁴³¹These regiments were the Regiments of Grenada, Soria, Bourbon, Swiss Regiment of Beschard, Light Infantry of Barcelona, No. 2, Light Infantry of Aragon No. 2, Militia Battalion of Majorca, 6th Hussans (Husares Españoles) and Artillery. Oman, Peninsular War 1:323-324.

⁴³²Oman, Peninsular War, 322.

⁴³³Oman, Peninsular War, 1:327; Arteché, Guerra de la Independencia, 2:622.

⁴³⁴General Clarke said "On peut regarder en général tous les habitants de ces provinces comme autant d'ennemis du nom français." AN, AFiv 1618, LS, General Clarke to Napoleon, 20 June 1809; Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 101.

Phillipe V during the war of the Spanish Succession.⁴³⁵ They were called out in battalions called Tercios of 1,000 men and formed light infantry, cavalry and auxiliary artillery. They were also brigaded with line troops as companies in a single regiment⁴³⁶ The second insurgent groups was the Sometenes, or local militia, which turned out when the Someten or Toscan sounded. They served with distinction in the Peninsular campaigns of 1793-95. Catalonia then more than any other Spanish province was prepared, if anything by temperament to offer ruthless resistance to the French invasion.⁴³⁷

The Catalan commanders, regular and irregular, were not drawn from the irregular ranks,⁴³⁸ but from the regular army. General Vivres, Governor of the Balearic Isles, became the first Captain-General of Catalonia. Aged and incompetent, he masterminded the first blockade of Barcelona and the defeat at Cardadeau. His best field commander was the talented but inexperienced and unlucky, General Theodore Reding, lately the commander of the 1st Division at Baylen. An excellent field commander, he commanded at the Battle of Cardadeau and was killed at Valls in 1809.

The commander of Gerona during its long resistance of three sieges was General Mariano Alvarez de Castro. He is arguably the best single commander of the war, and certainly one of the two best. He was a veteran of the war of 1793-95 and commander of the Citadel of Barcelona when General Duhesme took it by ruse in 1808. Personally

⁴³⁵They are named after the Catalan Condottiere Miquelot de Prats's light infantry called Almogavares, which was renamed Miquelets. Oman, Peninsular War, 1:306.

⁴³⁶Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 102-103.

⁴³⁷Oman, Peninsular War, 1:306.

⁴³⁸Like Francesco Espoz y Mina or the Empiconado.

he was a "severe, taciturn man of a puritan state of mind."⁴³⁹ He took extraordinary care to assure the viable defense of Gerona and conducted it with a discipline sorely missed at Sarragossa, and an élan and skill that stymied Generals Duhesme, Gouvion Saint-Cyr and Verdier for months and held down one and a half corps. Even his enemy, General Fournas, admitted, "His soul was great, able to make any sacrifice, full of admirable constancy. . ."⁴⁴⁰

One regiment of the garrison at Gerona, the Ultonia Regiment or the Regiment of Ulster, filled with Irish and some English "Wild Geese" gave to the resistance several Irish commanders of note. Among these were General Henry O'Donnel, the best guerilla leader of the Catalan war. Henry O'Donnel was a bold, sagacious and energetic commander, and possessed the greatest native talent of any commander of the war. He grasped the nature and essential uses of insurgent forces and also understood that it was only with regular forces that they could win the war.⁴⁴¹ His northern raid which destroyed an entire French brigade after a dangerous march around superior French forces was as daring and successful as Saint-Cyr's action at Cardadeau. This action in September 1810 virtually ruined Macdonald's operations in Lower Catalonia.⁴⁴²

Lesser lights included General Rovira, the captor of Figueras in 1811, General Sarsfield, a wheelhorse of the insurgent movement, and General Luis Lacy, the hated but

⁴³⁹Oman, Peninsular War, 2:22.

⁴⁴⁰Artech, Guerra de la Independencia, 5:458.

⁴⁴¹Oman, Peninsular War, 3:317. Wild Geese were the Irish Jacobites who went over to the continent on the abdication of James II in 1688 and later.

⁴⁴²Ibid., 3:496-500.

ever active Captain-General, who dominated the war after 1812, and masterminded several terrorist coups including the poisoning of the Barcelona garrison and the infernal machine which blew in the fortifications at Lerida. Finally there was Baron Eroles who made destructive raids into France across the Pyrénées and the regular/insurgent leaders Don Juan Claros and Baron Milans who continuously attacked the French, keeping them forever off balance. The insurgent operations in Catalonia took on a size and ferocity which even by 20th Century standards are astounding, and the insurgents displayed a characteristic aggressiveness and talent from the very beginning of the war.

On 4 June 1808, General Duhesme sent the untalented and ever unlucky Général de Brigade Francois-Xavier, Baron Schwartz (1762-1826) commander of his 2nd Cavalry Brigade, with a brigade,⁴⁴³ on a punitive expedition to Manresa to punish the rebellion there, levy a fine of 750,000 F. and destroy its powder mill. He would then move on to Lerida and subdue and garrison that town, then march on to Sarragossa.⁴⁴⁴ An impossibly tall order in reality.

General Schwartz left Barcelona on 4 June, and at the Bruch pass on the road to Manresa, he met serious opposition on 6 June. A body of several hundred Sometenes barred his way but Schwartz took a battalion pushed them aside and went on, to Manresa,

⁴⁴³Schwartz's brigade consisted of 3e-2e Swiss (580 men) 1er, 2e-1er Ligne Napolitaine, (1,944), 1er-1er Velties Italian (519) and 3e Prov. Cuirassiers (204) the whole five battalions and squadron totaled 3,247 men. Oman, Peninsular War, 1:304 and Arteché, Guerra de la Independencia, 2:86.

⁴⁴⁴AN, AFiv 1621, Plaq 1, Résumé des Opérations Militaires; Oman, Peninsular War, 1:310; Laffaille Mémoires, 27; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 2:101; Arteché, Guerra de la Independencia, 2:85; CN, No. 14028, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 30 May 1808, 17:241-242, No. 14029, Napoleon to Marshal Murat, 30 May 1808, 17:242-244.

as the Sometenes retreated towards Manresa receiving reinforcements from other insurgents and regulars. The insurgents barred the route again. General Schwartz threw out his tirailleurs beginning a furious fire fight. Soon, more Catalan reinforcements arrived and joined the fray. His Neapolitan infantry, some of the worst in Europe made no headway, then wavered, on the verge of collapse. He abandoned the expedition, a mere 12 miles from Manresa and decided to return to Barcelona.

Schwartz withdrew, forming his brigade into a huge square reminiscent of Napoleon's, at the Battle of the Pyramids. He put his cavalry and artillery in the center and began a laborious retreat to Barcelona, covered by his tirailleurs and harassed the whole way by clouds of Sometenes. Having marched six miles, the village Esparraguera lay in their path, barricaded by armed inhabitants, who opened a hot, small arms fire on the front of the square. Schwartz's troops, already demoralized by the galling Sometene attacks began to waver, and break ranks. To prevent a disaster he broke his square in two and went round the sides of the village. On the far side of the village his troops were completely disordered and fled headlong into Martonrel to regroup, then back to Barcelona.⁴⁴⁵

⁴⁴⁵AN, AFiv 1621, Plaq 1, Général Duhesme, Résumé des Opérations Militaires; SHAT C(8) 10, Résumé; Duhesme, Mémoires, 12; Oman, Peninsular War, 1:310-311; Arteché, Guerra de la Independencia, 2:85-95; Napier, Peninsular War, 1:47-48; Laffaille, Memoires, 28-29; Général Foy, Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule sous Napoléon (Paris: Baudouin Freres, 1827) 4:141-142; Vacani, Storia delle Campagne, 1:374-376; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 2:101-102; Francisco Xavier Cabanes, Historia de las Operaciones del Exército de Catalona de la Guerra de Usurpation, Campana Primera, (Barcelona 1815), 24-26; David Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, A History of the Peninsular War, New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1986) 59; Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 75-79.

This initial action, was indicative of the scale of the irregular war in Catalonia. It was also ferociously brutal, as General Reille found to his chagrin in the Ampurdan in 1808. His reinforcing division of 8,370 troops⁴⁴⁶ began arriving piecemeal in July. If many of Duhesme's troops were poor, Reille's were completely green with only a sprinkling of good men.

Reille got to witness the insurgent war at its worst in the latter half of 1808. He entered Catalonia at the head of 1,600 troops. He swept aside some Sometenes, and dashed on to Figueras.⁴⁴⁷ He went on to Rosas, defended by Don Juan Claros, at the head of a guerilla band. This intrepid leader was a retired Captain who called the peasantry to arms in Upper Catalonia. Claros' band fought Reille's attack off and the French retired as a British ship hove to and began to land marines to stiffen the defense. Reille cut his way back to Figueras pursued the whole way by Sometenes which inflicted some 200 casualties on the French.⁴⁴⁸

The Sometene bands in Upper Catalonia kept up a continuous ruthless guerilla war against Reille regularly operating by the hundreds and often by the thousands. They

⁴⁴⁶This division included the 113e Ligne (Tuscan) (1,300), Garde National, Pyrénées-Orientales (560) 1er Bataillon Provisoire de Perpignan (840), 2e Bataillon Provisoire (840) Mixed battalion of troops from the 16e and 32e Ligne and 2e Suisse (1,100); Mixed battalion of the 7e and 93e Ligne (840); Mixed battalion of the 2e, 56e, and 37e Ligne (840); 5e Légion de Reserve, Grenoble (500) Bataillon Valaisien (Valais) (1,800); Two squadrons, Tuscan Dragons (250); Two Escadrons de Marche (300); 4e Artillerie à pied, and 2e Artillerie à cheval (200) Oman, Peninsular War, 1:320; CN, No. 14092, Order, 14 June 1808, 17:304-305; No. 14150, Napoleon to Berthier, 2 July 1808, 17: 345-346; No. 14151, Napoleon to Reille, 2 July 1808, 17:346-347; No. 14168, Napoleon to Reille, 8 July 1808, 17:357-358.

⁴⁴⁷Oman, Peninsular War, 1:321 and Foy, Guerre, 4:165-166.

⁴⁴⁸Oman, Peninsular War, 1:321.

harassed his outposts day and night, butchered his stragglers, and his supply lines were prey to continual attack. His conscripts, scrapped together and thrown into Catalonia were utterly unprepared for this type of war.⁴⁴⁹

A lucrative target for insurgent attack then was Reille's supply columns. Attacks were so frequent that Reille was obliged to use one or more battalions to escort his convoys. On 10 July, for example, a band of 600 'brigands' (to use Reille's word) attacked a subsistence convoy escorted by the Bataillon Valaisien and two Battalions de March. The band, composed of mountain smugglers fell on the column and its 1,200 odd man escort but was beaten off with a few casualties.⁴⁵⁰ That same day, another band of a thousand insurgents attacked a convoy of 200 sick, returning to France, escorted by a battalion of the 32e Léger. The insurgents captured the convoy, beat off the escort, and slaughtered the sick.⁴⁵¹

These were the same scenes that one young conscript Louis Gille described at Manzanares, in Andalusia, a country crawling with guerilla bands, butchering isolated soldiers, massacring hospitals, etc. He wrote of the dismembered corpses, and men thrown live into cauldrons of burning oil after horrible mutilations. Captain Charles Francois told of how the insurgents tore out the nails and cut off the eyelids of one captured officer then sawed him in half and fed the remains to the hogs.⁴⁵² Francois wrote:

⁴⁴⁹Oman, Peninsular War, 2:41.

⁴⁵⁰SHAT, C(8) 367, Registre de Correspondence du Général Reille, Letter, Reille to Berthier, 16 July 1808.

⁴⁵¹Ibid., Letter, Reille to Berthier, 27 July 1808.

⁴⁵²Rudorff, War to the Death, 102.

I have seen. . . officers and men, even women, cut open from the groin to the stomach, and the breasts cut off, other with their private parts cut off and placed in the mouth, others burned alive up to the shoulders, their parts in their mouths, others hanging from the feet in chimneys, their heads burned; finally at Valdepeñas, I have seen fifty-three men buried up to the shoulders around a house serving as a hospital where 400 men were massacred, cut into pieces and thrown into the streets and courtyards. . . Brave General René. . . was sawn in half in front of his wife after seeing her dishonored, after which the child was cut in two before its mother who was then sawn in half like her husband.⁴⁵³

These are scenes of barbaric horror that only Francisco Goya could capture in The Disasters of War. One anonymous staff officer noted in his journal that a sixty wagon convoy escorted by four bataillons de marche, of green conscripts fresh from the depots, barely withstood a bold insurgent attack on 25 July.⁴⁵⁴

The insurgent bands were so bold that they frequently attacked across the Pyrénées into France terrorizing the populace. In June and July 1808, repeated attacks by insurgent bands, particularly that of Don Juan Claros induced Napoleon to dispatch reinforcements to defend the frontier. These included the columns from the Basses Pyrénées, Haute Pyrénées, Arriège, Pyrénées Orientales, and Turin.⁴⁵⁵ These were levies of the National Guard and other available troops thrown together for this emergency, which were finally formed into Division Reille.⁴⁵⁶ In July, for example, General Martin, Prefect of the

⁴⁵³Ibid., 103.

⁴⁵⁴SHAT, Anon., Journal Détaillé.

⁴⁵⁵SHAT, C(8) 355, Supplément à l'État d'Emplacement de l'Armée d'Espagne, Défense de la Frontière, nd.

⁴⁵⁶AN, AFiv 1607, Supplément à l'État d'Emplacement de l'Armée d'Espagne, Défense de la Frontière, nd.

Pyrénées-Orientales ordered the formation of a 560 man Bataillon de Gardes Nationalux levied from the arrondissements and towns of his department.⁴⁵⁷

The insurgents raided into France practically till the end of the war, taking levies of money, food, and transport from French peasants. Baron Eroles commanding a division was one of the more daring Catalan commanders. In November 1811 he embarrassed General Decaen, freshly arrived in Catalonia replacing Marshal Macdonald. Eroles raided the French Cerdagne with 3,000 troops defeating two National Guard battalions near Puigcerda and levied a requisition of thousands of sheep and cattle and a heavy money contribution from the populace. Napoleon was furious and ordered a huge levy of National Guards in the 10e and 11e Divisions Militaire to stem this threat.⁴⁵⁸

This then was the nature of the insurgent war in Catalonia. Together with aggressive regular forces they kept the Army of Catalonia continuously occupied with holding down the country. The French were barely able to undertake any significant offensive operations for lack of adequate force and extraordinary logistical difficulties. The insurgents then played a prominent part in virtually hamstringing the French

⁴⁵⁷SHAT C(8) 10, Général, Préfet Martin, Arrêté Concernant l'Organisation d'un Bataillon de Gardes Nationaux, destiné à la défense de la frontière. 1 July 1808.

⁴⁵⁸Napoleon said: ". . j'ai jugé convenable de réunir dans la 10e Division Militaire une division de Reserve composée d'infanterie, de cavalerie et d'artillerie, qui mette une fois pour toutes mes frontières à abri des incursions des brigands." CN, No. 18531, Napoleon to General Clarke, 29 February 1812, 23:260-261. On 8 March the Emperor wrote again to General Clarke: ". . renouvelez l'ordre au général Reille de se porter sur Berga et sur la Cerdagne française pour déloger les insurgés. Il n'est que trop vrai qu'ils se nourrissent de France, et qu'ils sont cantonnés à Puycerda, d'où ils ne bougent point." CN, No. 18557, Napoleon to Berthier, 8 March 1812, 23:296; Oman, Peninsular War, 5:93.

occupation. It would be in the logistical arena that we would see the insurgent movement do the most damage. In Catalonia the army lived on convoys, particularly in Barcelona whose division sized garrison required far more than the local countryside could provide. The distinguishing feature of the convoy system in Catalonia was insurgent activity which was so severe and ruthless that any convoy required a brigade and often more to get it through the inevitable gauntlet of guerillas.

Even Commanding Generals needed heavy escorts for their movements,⁴⁵⁹ for in Catalonia he was a lucrative target. The Guide company was simply insufficient to deal with brigade or division level insurgent attacks, as Marshal Macdonald found to his dismay. By March 1811, Napoleon was quite pleased with Suchet's recent reduction of Tortosa and just as displeased with Marshal Macdonald's troublesome and unproductive operations. He consequently stripped the three districts of Lerida, Tarragona and Tortosa from Macdonald and awarded them to Suchet. He also ordered Macdonald to surrender three full divisions to Suchet,⁴⁶⁰ including General Frère's crack French division, General Pino's Italian/French division and General Pignatelli's Neapolitan division, totaling 12,670 men (1,782 horses) with the colors, (effectives numbered 22,858 men and 2,091 horses).⁴⁶¹

⁴⁵⁹Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 92-93; Thiebault, Manuel Général, 504.

⁴⁶⁰CN, No. 17443, Napoleon to Berthier, 9 March 1811, 21:456-458; Oman, Peninsular War, 4:485; Vacani Storia della Campagane, 3:32-33; Suchet, War in Spain, 2:3-10.

⁴⁶¹General Frère's division had two brigades (Lorency and Ficatier) and 4,987 men, 715 horses present under arms (7,897 men, 927 horses effectives) General Pino's Division had three brigades (Fontane, Palombini and Eugene) and 5,577 men, 577 horses present (10,285 men, 701 horses effectives) and General Pignatelli's Division had one brigade (Ferrio) and 2,106 men, 490 horses present (4,676 men, 463 horses effectives). SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1810.

Suchet's III Corps became the Army of Aragon with 43,000 troops. Napoleon ordered Suchet to reduce Tarragona and Macdonald, with his much smaller force, to undertake secondary though independent operations, that is, to occupy Cardona, Berga, and Urzel in Upper Catalonia and to capture the Monastery of Montserrat. Napoleon did, however, send Macdonald another division, under General Quesnel, due to arrive later that spring.⁴⁶² Marshal Macdonald now had to return to Barcelona, and required an adequate escort capable of cutting its way through the gauntlet of insurgents. His normal headquarters element was not a Guides Company which normally undertook the task of the Commanding General's bodyguard but an entire brigade. The Troupes Attachees au Grand Quartier Général consisted of three battalions of the 16e Léger and a detachment of Gendarmes totaling 2,048 troops.⁴⁶³

A brigade was, however, scarcely enough to get Macdonald to Barcelona alive. Consequently, the Marshal got the loan of two divisions of 7,000 infantry and 700 cavalry and marched on 30 March 1811 via Manresa to avoid any major engagements. Still, this column had to cut its way through a thick line of Sometenes and General Sarsfield's regular Catalan troops. These clouds of insurgents clung to Macdonald's flanks, harassing them the whole way to Manresa. Macdonald stormed and burned the barricaded town and marched on to Barcelona, in a grueling three day march which cost him 600 casualties, fighting the whole way. When the exhausted column reached Sabadel on the River

⁴⁶²CN, No. 17448, Napoleon to General Clarke, 10 March 1810, 21:459-460; Macdonald, Recollections 2:17; Laffaille, Mémoires, 251-253; Oman, Peninsular War, 4:485; Napier, Peninsular War, 3:220.

⁴⁶³SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1810.

Llobregnt, Macdonald went on to Barcelona with only his personal escort brigade while the escort column cut its way painfully back to Lerida on 9 April. A smaller escort would have been cut to pieces. This was the difficulty which faced the French commanders in Catalonia in the simplest movements.⁴⁶⁴

When Macdonald took command of the Army of Catalonia in June 1810, he found, like Augereau before him, that his first task was a logistical one. Barcelona in particular required revictualing or would starve. One must keep in mind that the storehouses there not only supplied the garrison, but troops going through Barcelona for operations in Lower Catalonia. Consequently, it required revictualing more often. Augereau had in February brought to the city a huge convoy from Gerona escorted by 8,000 men in fresh reinforcements from France. It took over a month to assemble the convoy and Augereau only marched in March.⁴⁶⁵

On 13 March he left Gerona with some thousand wagons filled with a huge load of flour, and other supplies carried by pack mules, carriages, caissons and a conglomeration of other vehicles.⁴⁶⁶ The convoy was probably fifteen miles long. Marshal Augereau personally marched with the escort which included General Severoli's

⁴⁶⁴Oman, Peninsular War, 4:486; Napier, Peninsular War, 3:220.

⁴⁶⁵Oman, Peninsular War, 3:291; CN No. 16272, Napoleon to General Clarke, 19 February 1810; 20:232; No. 16275, Napoleon to General Clarke, 21 February 1810, 20:233-234. No. 16276, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 21 February 1810, 20:234-235; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 5:104-106.

⁴⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 3:293. The road from Gerona to Barcelona is quite a good one, particularly south of Gerona. It was certainly the best high-road in Catalonia and was capable of handling the huge convoy. SHAT, Anon., *Journal Détaillé des Mouvements de l'Armée Française en Catalogne*.

(Pino) Italian division and General Rouyer's German division, totaling 16,103 men.⁴⁶⁷

General Pierre Augereau, with Souham's French division marched on a parallel route with the main column, passing the still unconquered fortress of Hostalrich under blockade by General Mazzuchelli's brigade.⁴⁶⁸ This Italian brigade rejoined Division Severoli and left a mixed brigade under Colonel Devaux to continue the blockade while the main body went on to Barcelona.⁴⁶⁹ In early April, Marshal Augereau returned to Gerona with this convoy, mostly of empty vehicles and a huge quantity of confiscated property, escorted by Augereau's (Souham) French Division.⁴⁷⁰

Marshal Macdonald, when he took command immediately saw the necessity of throwing more provisions into Barcelona. From June to August 1810, he sent three huge

⁴⁶⁷General Frère's division was 6,693 men (961 horses) under arms, Division Severoli was 6,309 men (457 horses) and Division Rouyer had 3,100 men (116 horses) the whole force totaling 16,103 troops and 1,534 horses; SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

⁴⁶⁸Oman, Peninsular War, 3:293; Vacani, Storia della Campagne, 2:213-215; Arteché, Guerra de la Independencia, 8:272-273; SHAT, C(8) 42, Chef d'Escadron d'Artillerie Clement, Blocus d'Hostalrich, Journal du Bombardement, 17-20 February, Rapport, 21-22 February 1810, Rapport, 22-23 February 1810; LS, Chef d'Escadron Clement to General Taviel, 22 February, LS, Clement to Marshal Augereau, 23 February 1810; Armée de Catalogne, Sous-Chef d'Etat-Major, Colonel Lelong, Ordre du Jour, 28 February. Armée de Catalogne, Commandant de Génie, Chef de Bataillon Paris, Rapport du Génie sur les Opérations relatives au Blocus d'Ostalaich [sic], 23 January 1810.

⁴⁶⁹Oman, Peninsular War, 3:295; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 5:104-106.

⁴⁷⁰Up to 1810 the convoys to Barcelona were much smaller affairs. In 1808, General Reille's division often detached troops to escort them, and his correspondence with Marshal Berthier is replete with small convoy missions, such as the one in Upper Catalonia escorted by the Valaisan Bataillon in July 1808. Oman, Peninsular War, 3:297-298; Arteché, Guerra de la Independencia, 8:203, 282-283; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 5:112-113; Laffaille, Mémoires, 244; SHAT, C(8) 267, Registre, de Correspondence du Général Reille, L, General Reille to Marshal Berthier, 16 July 1808; C(8) 485, Situation, VII Corps, 5 December 1808.

convoys into the city. In June the provender which Augereau sent was nearly exhausted, and he sent a second convoy in July⁴⁷¹ escorted by Frère's and Pino's divisions.⁴⁷² The Army of Catalonia also needed to victual other garrisons and commands besides Barcelona. These convoys too needed considerable escorts. In fact the intense Catalan insurgent activity forced Macdonald to use overwhelming force to complete the simplest and smallest logistical missions. For all practical purposes it robbed the French Marshal of the strategic initiative. He was so compelled to fritter away his forces on often huge escorts, that this mission denied him the force necessary to undertake consistent offensive operations.

On 3 July, for example, Macdonald ordered General Amey, commanding the Westphalian brigade in General Verdier's division (Upper Catalonia), to escort a convoy to the small French garrison at Bagnoles carrying 2,400 rations of bread.⁴⁷³ A 892 man brigade, or four battalions were needed to haul about 40 carts! This was the harsh reality of the Catalan War. In July too, Macdonald sent a second huge convoy to Barcelona. Heavily escorted it stretched for miles along the Gerona-Barcelona high road. The increased activity of the Royal Navy and Spanish corsairs along the coast made water

⁴⁷¹Oman, Penninsular War, 3:311.

⁴⁷²Ibid., 3:312; SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

⁴⁷³SHAT, C(8) 129, CM, L, Marshal Macdonald to General Amey, 3 July 1810. These 2,400 rations weighed 1,800 kg (at .75 kg/rtn.) or 18 quintals. This convoy must have been composed of local ox carts like the Portuguese two-wheeled carts. They must have carried no more than five quintals or about a 1,000 lbs. This required about 40 carts, a tiny convoy that required a whole brigade of four battalions, the Infanterie Légère Westphalien, 2e Ligne Westphalien, 3e Ligne Westphalien, and 4e Ligne Westphalien, totaling 892 men. SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

transport all but impossible. Macdonald was consequently boxed into the corner of a second and third over land convoy (in August, escorted by three divisions) much to Napoleon's disappointment.⁴⁷⁴

The first of Macdonald's convoys, that of June, was a model for these huge operations, and showed the remarkable efficiency of Macdonald's staff in putting them together. Marshal Macdonald's tactical method of getting one through was to use overwhelming force deployed in the bataillon carré formation, invented by Napoleon.⁴⁷⁵ Macdonald used four divisions and two brigades for this convoy operation. One whole division would serve as the advanced guard, in brigade elements, while another division took up the convoy flanks. A brigade actually escorted the convoy and another brigade brought up the rear.⁴⁷⁶ Macdonald undertook this operation quite systematically. He planned the convoy for 11 June and concentrated four divisions and two brigades, with the mass of vehicles and animals, setting all Upper Catalonia abuzz with military movements.

⁴⁷⁴Oman, Peninsular War, 3:312, 494-495..

⁴⁷⁵Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 154-155; Petrie and Nofi, ed., Napoleon at War, 28-29; A.F. Becke, Napoleon and Waterloo, The Emperor's Campaign with the Armée du Nord, 1815, A Strategical Study, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., Ltd., 1914) 1:160-161.

⁴⁷⁶Like Napoleon's use of the heavy advanced guard that is any of his Corps d'Armée, Macdonald used a large force roughly half of his troops for this task. It was capable of not only guarding the front of the main body but of sweeping small forces off the field and seriously engaging large ones to allow the convoy to punch through its way. Clausewitz on the contrary used the smaller 18th Century advanced guard which can only guard an advancing front or movement. It was a generation behind the Napoleonic System. Marshal Macdonald took a leaf from Napoleon's book and used a smaller scale carré in a very interesting adaption. Clausewitz, On War, 302-311.

The order of battle of the operation included the whole of the French command in Upper Catalonia, that is the bulk of General Frère's division (Brigade Salm) with 4,600 troops (leaving Brigade Lorenez behind with some 2,100 troops), General Guillot's with 5,514 men, Pignatelli's division of 3,732 troops, Rouyer's division of 3,100 troops, Severoli's division with 6,309 men and the headquarters detachment of 1,049 men.⁴⁷⁷ This convoy then would use 24,594 troops or 89.1% of his disposable force of 27,919, to haul supplies leaving a mere 3,325 troops to occupy Upper Catalonia. Indeed those in hospital (8,769 men) far outstripped the rear forces!

The initial phase of this operation began on 1 June 1810. It was the convoy concentration. Macdonald ordered escort and combat units to jumping off positions⁴⁷⁸ such as General Frère's division ordered from La Bisbal to Gerona⁴⁷⁹ and General Rouyer's division in support.⁴⁸⁰

Marshal Macdonald also ordered Ordonnateur en chef Bourdon to concentrate a herd of 400 bullock at the Park at Gerona,⁴⁸¹ and the commander of the 4e-3e Ligne to guard the herd.⁴⁸² Macdonald then placed the Bataillon Valaisien at the Ordonnateur's

⁴⁷⁷See Appendix 37. SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

⁴⁷⁸SHAT, C(8) 335, Registre de Correspondance, Ordre de Mouvement, 1 June 1810.

⁴⁷⁹Ibid., Macdonald to General Frère, 4 June 1810.

⁴⁸⁰Ibid., Macdonald to General Rouyer, 5 June 1810; Macdonald to Chef de Bataillon Blanch, Battalion Valaisien, 6 June 1810.

⁴⁸¹Ibid., Macdonald to Ordonnateur en Chef Bourdon, 6 June 1810.

⁴⁸²Ibid., Macdonald to Commander, 4e-3e Ligne, 7 June 1810; Macdonald to Bourdon, 7 June 1810.

disposal.⁴⁸³ The Marshal also began to assemble the troops attached to his headquarters, including the 3e Léger, 3e Provisoire Cuirassiers,⁴⁸⁴ and the Gendarmerie, totaling 1,049 men.⁴⁸⁵

Marshal Macdonald and General Guilleminot, his Chief of Staff, then set about organizing the second phase of this huge operation, the security of Upper Catalonia, which would be stripped of troops by the movement to Barcelona. On 8 June, Macdonald ordered General Frère to split his 6,699 man division in two for this operation. The larger half, General Jean Baptiste Salm's (1755-1811) brigade, of 4,000 infantry and 500 cavalry under Frère's personal command was slated for escort duty. The smaller (2,009 men) half under General Guillaume de Latrille, Baron Lorencez (1772-1855) to establish a series of coast-artillery posts to guard against invasion.⁴⁸⁶ The escort would, after receiving four days rations, take its pack mules, ambulance (but leaving its heavy baggage), and march to Hostalrich on 10 June on the main Gerona - Barcelona high road.⁴⁸⁷ Macdonald ordered General Pignatelli, commanding the 3,732 man Neapolitan Division⁴⁸⁸ to march

⁴⁸³Ibid., Macdonald to Commander, Bataillon Valaisien, 6 June 1810.

⁴⁸⁴Ibid., Macdonald to Colonel Giery, Commander, 3e Provisoire Cuirassiers, 7 June 1810.

⁴⁸⁵The headquarters attachment included 3e Léger, 849 men, 3e Provisoire Cuirassiers, 139 men, and 118 horses, and the Gendarmerie Impériale, 61 men, 23 horses. SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

⁴⁸⁶Division Frère had 6,699 men and 961 horses present. SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810; SHAT C(8) 335, Registre, Macdonald to General Frère, 7 June 1810.

⁴⁸⁷SHAT, C(8) 335, Registre, Macdonald to Frère, 7 June 1810.

⁴⁸⁸SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

out on 8 June from Figueras in advance of the convoy (leaving on 11 June) clearing the countryside from the road to the coast, link up with a brigade of General Guillot's 5,514 man division⁴⁸⁹ occupying Hostalrich. General Guillot would with a reconnaissance in force likewise clear the main Gerona - Barcelona high road to Hostalrich and on Pignatelli's arrival then march on to Barcelona, and thus assure the passage of the convoy. Macdonald ordered Division Guillot's other brigade, under General Amey to march out inland towards Olot then to Hostalrich by 10 June, clearing the countryside on the way.⁴⁹⁰ Macdonald finally ordered General Devaux's brigade to sweep down along the coast clearing the country then concentrate at Hostalrich with the rest of Guillot's division.⁴⁹¹ General Guillot's division then would fan out in a reconnaissance in force pushing aside everything in its way and clearing the country of insurgents. General Rouyer's 3,100 man German division⁴⁹² would take up the task of convoy rear guard.⁴⁹³ General Severoli would precede the advanced guard of the convoy in two successive brigade elements of Brigade Mazzuchelli then Brigade Polimbini.⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁸⁹General Guillot took command of General Verdier's division composed of the troops; which had besieged Gerona in 1809. It consisted of French, Berg, and Westphalian units, and had 5,514 men and 110 horses, in three brigades, under Generals Amey, Guillot and Devaux. SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810; C(8) 335, Registre, Macdonald to Pignatelli, 8 June 1810.

⁴⁹⁰Ibid., Macdonald to General Amey, 8 June 1810.

⁴⁹¹Ibid., Macdonald to General Devaux, 8 June 1810.

⁴⁹²SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

⁴⁹³SHAT, C(8) 335, Registre, Macdonald to General Rouyer, 8 June 1810.

⁴⁹⁴Ibid., Macdonald to Severoli, 8 June 1810, Macdonald to Severoli, 9 June 1810.

The general operational scheme was the advance of Division Guillot fanning out on the Gerona-Hostalrich road and precipitation on that fortress. Division Pignatelli in two brigades followed on to Hostalrich by the 11th and relived Severoli's division which marched on to Barcelona.

The actual convoy would march from Gerona on 10 June, preceded by General Mazzucheli's brigade from Division Severoli which would occupy San Celoni by day break of 11 June; a grueling 35 mile march in one day.⁴⁹⁵ Macdonald surely planned to execute this convoy as quickly as possible in extraordinary forced marches.⁴⁹⁶ Following

⁴⁹⁵SHAT, C(8) Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements, Ordre de Mouvement pour le 11 June 1810, 10 June 1810. C(8) 335, Registre, Ordre de Mouvement, 10 June 1810.

⁴⁹⁶Clausewitz noted that a fifteen mile march is a good day's work, and an average day's march was ten miles. He also notes that forced marches may be 25 or 30 miles a day at most for a single march and 20 per day for successive marches. An 8,000 man division making a 25 mile march will need sixteen hours with several hours rest while a 30 mile forced march required at least twenty hours. This is quite a strain with an 80 lb. pack. Clausewitz, On War, Ed and Tns. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton NJ Princeton Univ. Press 1976) 319. Though soldiers of this period marched enormous distances, averaging some 1,000 miles in four months. The Grande Armée covered 700 miles for the Austerlitz campaign, averaging 18-20 miles/day. Although the staggering marching feats of Crawford's Light Division at 62 miles in twenty-two hours to reach Talavera in 1809 occurred these were unusual cases for they would virtually destroy the combat capacity of a unit. Richard Holmes, Firing Line, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985) 115-116. Such a march as Macdonald ordered of 30-35 miles on the first leg and 25 miles for the second leg next day was with full pack of two shirts, two pair shoes, nails and soles, canvas pants, gaiters, cleaning utensils, linen and lint for wounds, four biscuits, ten lbs. flour weighing 33 lbs. The rest of his kit included a bread sack of two loaves of breach (four days), cartridge box with 50 cartridges and some extra ammo, three flints, screwdriver, belts, musket great coat. The whole weighed some 65 lbs, and near 80 lbs. if he carried cooking pots and the other ration items, such as rice, salt, wine, lard or a chunk of preserved meat. Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 217; SHAT, C(8) 398, État du Nombre des Rations, 30 June 1810. Thirty five miles carrying this was quite an achievement even at the age of stupendous walking. Johnson, The Birth of the Modern, 702-703.

behind Brigade Mazzuchelli was Brigade Polombini which took possession of the Trentospassos, and San Celoni and held it for the arrival of the main column, while Mazzuchelli dashed on to Barcelona in a 25 mile march.⁴⁹⁷

Polombini's brigade formed the advanced guard reinforced with 200 cavalry and artillery. The convoy column itself consisted of 125 transport vehicles carrying 150,000 kg of supplies and 405 bullock, (405,000 rations or 101,250 kg of fresh meat).⁴⁹⁸ This was enough meat to last the 6,502 man garrison of Barcelona about 62 days.⁴⁹⁹

General Taviel, the army artillery commander, had command of the convoy and its immediate escort was Brigade Salm. The head at the column behind the advanced guard consisted of 50 troopers of the 3e Prov. Cuirassiers and the regimental artillery at the 3e Léger. The convoy column was a series of successive elements, that is, six elements of 20 vehicles and sixteen elements of 25 bullock each. Brigade Salm was divided between these elements with six infantry companies and artillery at the head, and between the vehicle elements, bodies of two to four infantry companies and 20-40 cavalry (platoon) with two bodies of 40 and 100 cavalry at the end. Immediately following was the bullock elements with one to three infantry companies and bodies of 40 cavalry

⁴⁹⁷SHAT, C(8) 133, Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements, Ordre de Mouvement, 10 June 1810; C(8) 335, Registre, Ordre de Mouvement, 10 June 1810.

⁴⁹⁸SHAT, C(8) 133, Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements, Ordre de Mouvement, 10 June 1810; C(8) 398, Etat du Nombre des Rations.

⁴⁹⁹SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

interspersed with the tail brought up by three infantry companies and 40 cavalry (platoon). The rear guard of the convoy was General Rouyer's division.⁵⁰⁰

The general convoy regulations were strictly enforced by Generals Salm and Taviel, such as the positioning and march order of troop escort units and convoy elements, (like the pack mules), dispersed amongst the escort units. Other tactical procedures included the use of flank guards drawn from the escort. In case of attack, the flank guards would counterattack at the bayonet and if the enemy attacks with larger than battalion strength, the column would halt while the escort beats the enemy back. General Frère's troops at the head of the column will fly to the assistance of the stricken troops. Finally, crossing the Trentospassos, Mazzucheli's brigade will hold the pass to allow the column to pass and take up position of rear guard afterwards.⁵⁰¹

Marshal Macdonald, accompanying the convoy as overall Corps commander, reached Granollers twelve miles from Barcelona on 12 June and wrote the Movement Order for the last leg of the journey. Generals Severoli and Frère fanned out and secured the mountain heights above Barcelona to allow the convoy to enter the city unmolested. General Severoli, with Brigade Polimbini marched out of Granollers on 13 June at 0200 to occupy Mollet on the main Barcelona road, Mongada on the road to Sabadell, north of Barcelona and the mountain pass to Caldan. General Frère took the 2er Léger, 42e

⁵⁰⁰See Table No. 37. SHAT, C(8) 133, Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements, Ordre de Mouvement, 10 June 1810.

⁵⁰¹Ibid.

Ligne, cavalry and artillery to the rear of Brigade Polimbini, round Barcelona to hold Ripullet on the main Sabadal and Caldan mountain roads.⁵⁰²

Marshal Macdonald anchored the defense on Polimbini's security force. In an insurgent attack will hold the enemy at bay till Salm's and Mazzuchelli's brigades came to their assistance.⁵⁰³ General Taviel, with the convoy, following Salm's troops along the high road in turn followed up by Mazzuchelli in the rear replaced Polimbini's and Frère's troops letting the convoy move into Barcelona in the following order: The artillery, GQG, bullock, and vehicles. The escort protected the column's flank into Barcelona. Once at the citadel, General Salm detached 240 troops from the 3e Léger to guard the convoy.⁵⁰⁴ The convoy was a complete success, considering the fact that no insurgents dared to attack such a formidable force which swept the country clean twice over before the long convoy toiled its way to Barcelona.

Once the supplies were discharged, the convoy made its cumbersome return journey to Gerona on 15 June. Naturally the previous reconnaissances in force made by Divisions Guillot and Pignatelli dashed back to Upper Catalonia, sweeping the country of insurgents to seal off the returning convoy.⁵⁰⁵ General Frère led the convoy to Hostalrich with an infantry bataillon, a cavalry squadron, and artillery. Division Severoli followed Brigade Polombini forming the convoy escort. At Hostalrich the convoy

⁵⁰²Ibid., *Ordre de Mouvement*, 12 June 1810.

⁵⁰³From the 3e-3e Léger, 7e Ligne and 3e Prov. Cuirassiers, in Salm's brigade. Ibid.

⁵⁰⁴The Battalion Commander detached 200 men to guard the vehicles and 40 to guard the Bullock. Ibid.

⁵⁰⁵Ibid., *Ordre pour la continuation du Mouvement du 15 Juin 1810*, 15 June 1810.

bivouaced, while Severoli's and Mazzuchelli's brigades bivouaced towards Gerona and the garrison there made food distributions.⁵⁰⁶

The convoy continued on its way on 16 June according to Macdonald's last Movement Order for this operation. Frère led the convoy out, past Severoli's brigade occupying its earlier positions, which took on the rear of the convoy and the GQG, at its head, back to Gerona.⁵⁰⁷

On the completion of this huge convoy, Macdonald issued a complete meat and rice ration to the troops in Upper Catalonia,⁵⁰⁸ and trumpeted the convoy's success in an Order of the Day on 19 June, especially noting that the insurgents concentrated at the mountain passes to attack after the previous reconnaissance in force operations, but the order and discipline of the convoy and its escort of Divisions Frère and Severoli dissuaded the insurgents and enabled the convoy to get through without a fight.⁵⁰⁹ At the end of November, Marshal Macdonald threw another large convoy into Barcelona, and followed the same expensive, though successful, operational scheme.⁵¹⁰

⁵⁰⁶Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷The attached 3e Léger and Gendarmerie, escorted the Army HQ baggage. Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸Ibid., *Ordre du Jour*, 17 June 1810.

⁵⁰⁹Ibid., *Ordre du Jour*, 19 June 1810.

⁵¹⁰Ibid., *Ordre de Mouvement*, 20 November 1810; *Ordre de Mouvement*, 21 November 1810; *Ordre*, 21 November 1810; *Ordre de Mouvement*, 22 November 1810; *Ordre de Mouvement*, 23 November 1810; *Ordre de Mouvement*, 23 November 1810; *Ordre de Mouvement*, 23 November 1810; *Ordre de Mouvement*, 24 November 1810; *Ordre de Mouvement*, 25 November 1810; *Ordre de Mouvement*, 27 November 1810; and *Ordre du Jour*, 28 November 1810.

The convoy then was the primary logistical instrument to supply the Army of Catalonia. Upper Catalonia was a simple matter with its shorter distances, and chain of French fortresses along the line of communications. It was certainly a more difficult supply line from Figueras and Gerona to Barcelona for these convoys required heavy escorts and were often attacked.⁵¹¹ The convoys to support Barcelona, then were some of the most taxing operations of the war and were an absolute plague to the French command, virtually bringing the French prosecution of the war to a standstill for days and even weeks at a time. Here, the insurgents were quite successful in temporally disjointing French operations and the occupation.

⁵¹¹In an interesting side note, in case of loss of goods transported in convoy the commander may be held personally liable. A convoy in 1808 lost 1,400 F. in goods belonging to the 14e Ligne and 2,475 F. to the 10e Léger. The convoy commander was court martialed but acquitted of responsibility and the Emperor indemnified the regiments for their loss. UCN, No. 1890, Decisions, 18 May 1808, 2:203.

§8. The Sea Link.

Waterways were often used as part of the lines of communications during the Napoleonic Wars, and were particularly useful in the movement of cumbersome cargoes, like grain, forage or siege materials.⁵¹² Lord Wellington, too used sea and river transport to support his army in the Peninsula.⁵¹³ During the Catalan war, the Mediterranean was the waterway used to supply French seacoast garrisons, particularly Barcelona, and the Army of Catalonia got merchant transport service, to perform this logistical task.

In 1806, Napoleon's use of water transport to support the Grande Armée in Prussia and Poland set a standard for the French armies.⁵¹⁴ The Intendance had responsibility for the water transport service and employees from the equipages auxiliaire managed it. The size of this operation also necessitated the use of contracts, (marchés) of which the Intendance completed 152. Many were urgent ones (marchés spéciaux) to haul high priority supplies.⁵¹⁵ The Commissaires des guerres and Inspecteurs des transports organized waterway navigation. The French sent some 1,500 boats to haul every type of supply from May to June 1807. Water transport was inexpensive, indeed it possessed an

⁵¹²Furse, Lines of Communication in War, 419, 429.

⁵¹³Wellington Dispatches, Wellington to the Commissioners of Transport, 22 September 1813, 7:14; Wellington to General Freye, 22 September 1813, 7:14.

⁵¹⁴Lechartier, Services de l'Arrière, 478-480; CN, No. 12790, Napoleon to General Rapp, 21 June 1807, 15:355; No. 12818, Napoleon to Comte Daru, 24 June 1807, 15:368-369; No. 12634, Napoleon to General Lemarois, 23 May 1807, 15:261-262.

⁵¹⁵Lechartier, Services de l'Arrière, 481-486; CN, No. 12645, Order, 24 May 1807, 15:266; No. 12645, Napoleon to Prince Jerome 24 May 1807, 15:265.

economy of 90% less by weight of freight hauled than over land transport. Water transport in Germany and Poland only cost two to seven centimes per quintal of freight.⁵¹⁶ Its only problem was that boat convoys, like land ones were vulnerable to partisan attack. Water transport was quite dangerous.

In Spain, Marshal Suchet used water transport extensively. During his operations for the conquest of Lower Catalonia supported by Marshal Macdonald, he used the River Ebro as his Aragonese line of communication.⁵¹⁷ The French command in Catalonia too, made extensive use of sea transport to haul vast amounts of supplies, particularly to supply Barcelona, which the Army's land transport could not cope for lack of resources and enemy interference.⁵¹⁸ In 1810 the garrison averaged 6,292 troops and 272 horses.⁵¹⁹ It consumed daily, 6,921 rations of food and 272 rations of fodder,⁵²⁰ that is 7,763.3 kg of food, 3,028 liters of liquids, and 5,954.1 kg of fodder.

In August 1810, the Army of Catalonia had two transport battalions with 288 vehicles,⁵²¹ capable of hauling 432,000 kg of supplies, enough to last twelve days. To

⁵¹⁶CN, No. 12782, Napoleon to Tallyrand, 20 June 1807, 15:352; No. 12641, Note, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 24 May 1807, 15:264; Lechartier, Services de l'Arrière, 485-486.

⁵¹⁷Suchet, War in Spain, 1:205-214.

⁵¹⁸SHAT, C(8) 335, Correspondance de l'État-Major général Registre d'ordres du jour. Ordre de Mouvement, 10 June 1810.

⁵¹⁹This average was taken from extant Situation Reports of 1810. SHAT C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January - 10 May 1810.

⁵²⁰SHAT, C(8) 398, Administration de la Guerre, État du Nombre des Rations.

⁵²¹AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 15 June 1810.

haul one months supply of provender would require virtually every vehicle and pack animal the army had, virtually immobilizing it.

Sea transport, despite the very real danger of Spanish corsair activity, was the most efficient transport, certainly to supply Barcelona. A single ship could haul some 40,000 kg of freight, two days provender at a cost 2 centimes per quintal,⁵²² as compared with the 6.00 F. per quintal⁵²³ cost of over land shipping. That day's ration then of 19,110.7 kg (191.1 qx) cost a mere 3.82 F. by sea and 1,46.60 F. over land.

The cost effectiveness of sea transport for the Army of Catalonia became evident to the General Dejean in 1809. That October, he ordered with the coordination of the Ministry of Marine, three ships to haul supplies to Barcelona. At that time, the VII Corps was fully embroiled in the Siege of Gerona and needed all available logistical support for Upper Catalonia.⁵²⁴ Considering the cost and material considerations of overland transport to Barcelona, sea transport was the most rational alternative.⁵²⁵

⁵²²SHAT, C(19) 8, Agde, 1811, État des Batimens chargés le 27 October an 1810, pour Barcelona.

⁵²³AN, AFiv 1183, Bureau des Étapes et Équipages, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 24 January 1810. In Barcelona, a six horse wagon cost 24 F./day and freight cost 1.60 F. per quintal. SHAT, C(19) 8, Armée de Catalogne, No. 163, Commissaire des guerres Raymondson to General Lacuée, 10 June 1812.

⁵²⁴In a letter to General Dejean, Napoleon was quite mystified on the dispatch of these ships: "I do not understand the meaning of this sending of three vessels to Barcelona. Who ordered it? Send me a copy of the orders." UCN, No. 3699, Napoleon to General Dejean, 31 October 1809, 3:295; No. 3702, Decision 31 October 1809, 3:299-300.

⁵²⁵UCN, No. 4165, Napoleon to General Clarke, 17 April 1810, 3:531; No. 4207, Napoleon to Lacuée, 4 May 1810, 3:550; No. 3951, Decision 21 January 1810, 3:421-422; No. 3958, Minutes of Council General of Finance, 24 January 1810, 3:429-430; No. 3990, Imperial Note 2 February 1810, 3:440-441; No. 4000, Imperial Note, 7 February 1810, 3:443-44.

From the beginning of the Peninsula War, Napoleon naturally saw the logistical advantages of sea transport, and charged Vice Admiral Denis Decrès, Duc de St. Germain (1761-1820), Minister of Marine, to secure coasts of France.⁵²⁶ He ordered him to refit ships at Toulon, and ready fifty warships and 116 transports.⁵²⁷

In early 1810, General Lacuée contracted merchant vessels from the French ports of Agde, Port de Sète, and Port Vendres, to haul supplies to Barcelona and Rosas. In May, Marshal Augereau, feeling the full weight and disruption of supplying Barcelona overland⁵²⁸ obtained from the Ministry of Military Administration an order that French warships safeguard his water supply convoys.⁵²⁹ Toulon was the base to maintain Naval

⁵²⁶CN, No. 13754, Napoleon to Vice Admiral Decrès 17 April 1808, 17:16-17; No. 13786, Napoleon to Decrès, 27 April, 1808, 17:43-44; No. 13854, Napoleon to Decrès, 11 May 1808, 92-94; No. 14907, Napoleon to Decrès, 16 March 1809, 18:356.

⁵²⁷CN, No. 13873, Napoleon to Decrès, 12 May 1808, 17:107-108. No. 13874, Napoleon to Decrès, 12 May 1808, 17:109; No. 13952, Napoleon to Marshal Joachim Murat, Grand Duke of Berg, Lieutenant General of the Kingdom of Spain, 21 May 1808, 17:176-179; No. 13982, Napoleon to Decrès, 25 May 1808, 17:198; No. 14005, Napoleon to Decrès, 28 May 1808, 17:218-220. No. 14008, Napoleon to Decrès, 28 May 1808, 17:221-222. No. 13877 Napoleon to Decrès, 13 May 1808, 17:112-114. No. 13937, Napoleon to Murat, 19 May 1808, 17:164, No. 13938, Napoleon to Murat, 19 May 1808, 17:164-166; No. 13998, Napoleon to Murat, 26 May 1808, 17:212-213; No. 14025, Napoleon to Decrès, 30 May 1808, 17:235-237; No. 14263, Napoleon to Decrès, 19 August 1808, 454.

⁵²⁸This was 1,759,999.9 kg of flour, and 25,714.3 kg of oats. SHAT C(8) 398, Etat du Nombre des Rations, 1 August 1810. This was based on a garrison of 8,000 men and 600 horses (as opposed to actual strength of 7,222 men and 198 horses). AN, AFiv 1175 Administration de la Guerre, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 13 June 1810; SHAT C(8) 362, Situation, Army of Catalonia, 15 June 1810. It would take 1,191 standard transport wagons to haul this vast store of supplies. AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 3 July 1811.

⁵²⁹CN, No. 14005, Napoleon to Decrès, 28 May 1808, 17:218-220; No. 13995, Napoleon to Decrès, 26 May 1808, 17:206.

communications in the Mediterranean,⁵³⁰ support strategic operations, support French commands holding coasts and fight British naval depredations. On 20 May a convoy of ships hauling 2,044 quintals of flour (898,036 rations) and other supplies, from Rosas to Barcelona. Despite its escort of a 20 gun sloop,⁵³¹ the Catalan corsairs attacked and captured two ships off Bagau. The sloop counterattacked and captured one corsair ship and took back 24 sacks (3,744 kg) of stolen grain.⁵³² Another small convoy required an escort of gun boats to get it through. The corsair dangers induced Marshal Augereau to order Ordonnateur en chef Rey to suspend convoys to Barcelona till adequate naval protection was available. Marshal Macdonald even temporarily continued Augereau's

⁵³⁰CN, No. 14482, Napoleon to Decres, 17 November 1810 18:65-66, No. 14521, Napoleon to Decres, 28 November 1808, 18:86, No. 14746, Napoleon to Decres, 27 January 1809, 18:244-245; No. 14630, Napoleon to Decres, 31 December 1808, 18:163; No. 14677, Decree to January 1809, 18:190-192; No. 14674, Napoleon to General Clarke, 10 January 1809, 18:188; No. 14675, Napoleon to Clarke, 10 January 1809, 18:188-189; No. 14676, Napoleon to Clarke, 10 January 1809, 18:189-190; No. 14907, Napoleon to Decres, 16 March 1809, 18:356.

⁵³¹A 20 gun Chaloup or Sloop is a sixth rate, double decked, three masted warship. They were often outfitted with oar ports to allow them to maneuver like a galley. Peter Goodwin, The 20-Gun Ship Blanford, Anatomy of the Ship Series, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988) 7-8.

⁵³²A sac or sack of grain or flour weighed 159 kg or 325 lbs. Doursther, Dictionnaire Universel, 473; Zupko, French Weights and Measures, 159. The sacks were quite valuable at 2.65 F. each in 1809. AN, AFiv 1180, Bureau des Fourrages et remotes, Chef de Bureau, Commissaire des guerres Bujardim Beaumet, Aperçu, de la dépense pour les Approvisionnement en Fourrages, 1 January 1809. The porters or 'forts' who labored under the backbreaking weight of these sacks heaped over their backs. It naturally required great physical strength. The Abbe Galiani remarked that it "almost strains the nuance between man and beast of burden." Stephen L. Kaplan, Provisioning Paris, Merchants and Millers in the Grain and Flour Trade during the Eighteenth Century (Ithica and London: Cornell University Press, 1984) 385, 511, 544.

policy till naval escorts were available.⁵³³ The French command realized the necessity of sea transport. The flour lost to the corsairs in the most recent sea convoy would have required 137 vehicles and 822 horses to haul it, more than the Army of Catalonia could manage with regular transport.

In the spring of 1809, Napoleon, became painfully aware of the vulnerability of the garrison of Barcelona to insurgent blockade. The blockade of late 1808 taught him the necessity of keeping that garrison adequately supplied by every means, land and sea. On 29 March 1809 he ordered Vice Admiral Honoré Ganteaume (1755-1818) Commander of the Mediterranean squadron, to outfit a division of five ships of the line, two frigates and two bricks at Toulon and enough transports to haul 30,000 qx marc grain, flour, and rice, three million pounds of powder⁵³⁴ and a million cartridges. He stressed the urgency of this convoy, noting that if part of the supplies were available immediately, that is, 12,000 qx of grain, flour, and rice, 1.5 million pounds of powder and 500,000 cartridges, the Navy must race on to Barcelona. In 1810-1811 the use of sea transport peaked with a cooperative effort between Marshal Macdonald, the Prefects of the Maritime

⁵³³AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur 13 June 1810; SHAT C(8) 335, Ordres, Macdonald to Ordonnateur en Chef Rey, 28 May 1810.

⁵³⁴CN, No. 14970, Napoleon to Vice Admiral Ganteaume, Commander, Mediterranean Squadron, 29 March 1809, 18:401-402. The Quintal Marc (qx marc) is a hundred weight marc. The marc equals .250 kg. Napoleon specified that the marc equal 16 onces (instead of eight) or .4895 kg. This 30,000 qx equals 1,468,500 kg. Doursther, Dictionnaire des Poids et Mesures, 214, 221, 250, 280, 368. Napoleon actually used the term milliard which equaled 1,000 lbs. marc or ½ tonneau (489.5 kg). It is also known as ten quintals marc. Zupko, French Weights and Measures, 111.

Departments on the Mediterranean, to include Port Vendres, Agde, and Sète, Marseille, and Toulon.

In May 1810, Marshal Macdonald arranged his first sea convoy of a Cabotage or coasting vessel and five armed Felorques from Toulon. He also requested from Admiral Decrès an eight sloop escort,⁵³⁵ which was indicative of the grave danger to French coastal shipping. On 28 May, Marshal Macdonald requested an escort for two more coasters from Frigate Captain Hurtel, naval commander of the Port Vendres flotilla.⁵³⁶ At this same time Macdonald was preparing a huge convoy to Barcelona which would virtually force a suspension of active operations for the corps size escort required for it, just to get it through to Barcelona, and this operation dominated the whole period from 7-21 June 1810.⁵³⁷ The Army of Catalonia could not effectively function with such vast disruptions three or four times a year. The cost effective method would be to haul these supplies by sea with a strong naval escort, allow an uninterrupted continuation of land operations, and to accomplish this, Macdonald enlisted the aid of the Ministry of Marine and French merchants to expand and protect the sea transport system.⁵³⁸

⁵³⁵This convoy is provided by the Maritime Prefect of Toulon. SHAT, C(8) 129, CM, Macdonald to the Maritime Prefect at Toulon, 24 May 1810.

⁵³⁶SHAT, C(8) 335, CM, Rapport, Detachement pour le Ravitaillement de Barcelone, 10 June 1810.

⁵³⁷Ibid.

⁵³⁸In October 1809 much of the provender used during the siege of Gerona was sea borne. This included 116,688 rations of biscuit, 11.87% of the 982,364 rations hauled (1808-10) virtually all of the 459,477 kg of grain, 194,086 kg of flour, 4.29% of the 4,528,439 kg of flour, and 74,039 kg of rice or 56.51% of the 131,026 kg shipped. AN, AFiv 1175, Administration de la Guerre, 1er Section Bureau des Vivres, Général Lacuée, État Indicatif des Denrées Versées, 2e, Dépense resultante de ces Versements de Denrées,

The corsair problem, like the insurgent one on land, was a significant one for French Mediterranean shipping. Private ship masters, often impoverished by the exactions and economic ravages of the continental blockade, raided merchant shipping to sell or trade their captured cargos. The French resorted to it in response to the British naval blockade, and the economic difficulties of Napoleon's Continental System. Of course, smuggling was a major activity to both sides of the economic war and formed a large 'sub economy' in England and France.

The Berlin and Milan Decrees of 1806 closed all French and allied ports to British shipping while the British tightened their existing blockade further restricting French shipping. The first effect was a rise in marine insurance rates, particularly for neutral carriers, while the French and their allies were doubly squeezed between the British blockade and Imperial restrictions on trade to neutral and even allied ports.⁵³⁹

This state of affairs encouraged French corsair activity in raiding English shipping despite its dangers and relative unprofitability. The only men to prosper under the Continental System were those like Raymond Durand, a French merchant in Barcelona during the Peninsular War, who sold to both the Army of Catalonia and to the insurgents and supplemented his business with a large scale smuggling operation.⁵⁴⁰

March 1810.

⁵³⁹Patrick Crowhurst, The French War on Trade, Privaterring 1793-1815 (Aldershot Scolar Press, 1989) 19-20; F. E. Melvin, Napoleon's Navigation System: A Study of Control During the Continental Blockade, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1919) 13, 133.

⁵⁴⁰Yves Roustit, "Raymond Durand, Commerçant à Barcelona (1808-1814)" Estudios de Historia Moderna, (1956-9) vi, 313-409.

The drag on French shipping of the British blockade induced Napoleon to attempt, unsuccessfully to use warships to haul trade in 1808. The Royal Navy, of course continued to bottle up French ports.⁵⁴¹ The beginning of the Peninsular War shut off much French trade in Spain with the extension of the British blockade, and Barcelona in particular suffered. The Spanish merchants and other seafarers on the Mediterranean coast felt the same impulse as the French to move towards privateering to make up for the loss in trade and attack the hated French at the same time.

The situation worsened in 1809 when the Americans broke trade ties with France. The U. S. Congress passed the non-intercourse act declaring that French shipping in American ports would be confiscated. Napoleon, however, eased trade restrictions within the framework of the Continental System. In general, the Continental System was remarkably successful, causing a deep trade crisis in Britain between 1810 and 1822.⁵⁴² This very success, however, led to an economic intensification of the necessity for the Spanish to engage in privateering, for corsairs could raid French Mediterranean commerce to resell valuable military commodities to the Spanish armies or merchants, particularly as the Continental System destroyed the complex commercial network used throughout Europe, and made commerce raiding for revenue and interest an attractive alternative.⁵⁴³

The Spanish corsairs operated within their territorial waters through the French Revolution, capturing neutral shipping. They would lie in wait at ports and on the

⁵⁴¹Crowhurst, The French War on Trade, 20-21.

⁵⁴²Ibid.

⁵⁴³Ibid., 36.

departure of merchant ships they would pounce and bring them back as prizes.⁵⁴⁴ French piratical depredations outweighed Spanish ones during the Quasi-War (1798-1801) but Spanish corsairs regularly attacked neutral shipping for ransom and sale of cargoes.⁵⁴⁵ The Ship Master Eban Shillaber noted that fifteen to eighteen Spanish privateers at Malaga were always waiting to pounce on merchant ships. They even joined the French in preying on American shipping in the Mediterranean.⁵⁴⁶ On 10 January 1799, for example, the corsair packet St. Roselia twice engaged an American slave sloop, the ten gun, 75 man Spanish ship overpowered the eight gun American ship (crew of fourteen men) ran her aground drowning all aboard but 27 slaves, then picked her clean.⁵⁴⁷

The Royal Navy was the other threat to French supply shipping to Catalonia. Vice Admiral Lord Collingwood, commanding the Mediterranean squadron began to cruise the Spanish coast in 1808, between Toulon and Cadiz. He blockaded Toulon bottling up the

⁵⁴⁴American vessels were subject to such depredations, often with the connivance of French diplomatic consuls, which according to the American Secretary of State, Timothy Pickering acted as a virtual Admiralty Court in the seizure of shipping. Navy Department, Naval Documents Related to the Quasi War between the United States and France, Naval Operations from February 1797 to October 1798 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1935) 20-21, 22, 32, LS, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering to Samuel Sewall, Committee of Commerce and Manufacturing 27 December 1797.

⁵⁴⁵Ibid., LS, U. S. Commercial Agent Stephen Cathalon, Jr. to Secretary Timothy Pickering, 24 May 1798, 79-81; LS, Stephen Cathalon to Timothy Pickering, 31 May 1798, 97-98. LS, D. Humphres, U. S. Minister of Spain to Secretary Pickering, 9 October 1798, 507.

⁵⁴⁶Naval Documents, LS, Eben Shillaber to Elias Hasket Derby, 22 March 1797, 2:501.

⁵⁴⁷Naval Documents, Extract from logbook of Captain Casach, 10 January 1799, 2:227-228.

French squadron there and preventing them from escorting French supply ships from Marseilles to Catalonia.⁵⁴⁸ This French squadron included thirteen ships of the line and seven frigates and Collingwood had some twenty line vessels and smaller ships to patrol the Catalan Coast. He not only patrolled, he offered assistance to the Catalan insurgents.⁵⁴⁹

His most lucrative operations, however, were the attacks against French supplies to Barcelona, coming in single ships, slipping out of the Languedoc ports to dash to Barcelona, coasting and slipping past British warships. For some months, the terror of the Catalan coast was Thomas Cochrane, Lord Dundonald (1775-1860), Captain of the Impérieuse. Lord Collingwood sent this 'Sea Wolf' from Cadiz in June 1808 to cut the French supply line in Barcelona.⁵⁵⁰

By August 1808, Cochrane had spread terror and destruction along the Catalan coast,⁵⁵¹ to the delight of the insurgents. He attacked French coastal installations between Marseilles and the Pyrénées, destroying coast artillery batteries, port facilities, and telegraph stations. in the hope of diverting French troops to coastal defense. A favored target was French shipping which the Impereuse ran aground and Cochrane's Marines then burned. He even captured the French Semaphore telegraph code without the knowledge

⁵⁴⁸Piers Mackesy, The War in the Mediterranean 1803-1810, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957) 281-283.

⁵⁴⁹Oman, Peninsular War, 1:44-57.

⁵⁵⁰Mackesy, War in the Mediterranean, 283.

⁵⁵¹Donald Thomas, Cochrane, Britannia's Last Sea King, (New York: The Viking Press, 1978) 130-131; J. W. Fortescue, Donald, English Men of Action Series (London: Macmillan and Co. 1895) 52.

of the French and gave the code as a 'present' to Lord Collingwood at the end of his Mediterranean cruise.⁵⁵²

Cochrane attacked Port Vendres the strongly defended French port in the Pyrénées Orientales, with the assistance of the HMS Spartan. By a brilliant ruse, they induced an advancing French column to move away from Port Vendres and the two frigates turned loose a furious bombardment on the town and port, then destroyed the coastal batteries and wharved ships.⁵⁵³

Lord Cochrane's tiny squadron continued to harass French coastal installations causing both destruction and severely damaging French morale. In November - December 1808 he assisted the insurgents in the defense of Rosas with three frigates, Impériéuse, Fame, and Magnificent, in one of the most daring amphibious defense operations of the war.⁵⁵⁴

⁵⁵²Thomas, Cochrane, 132; Fortescue, Dundonald, 53.

⁵⁵³On this occasion Cochrane displayed one of the finest feats of seamanship and naval gunnery ever recorded. A French cavalry squadron, advancing back to Port Vendres to repel the British Marines there, dashed up (north) the coast road. Cochrane's ship tacked parallel to them. As the French troopers caught up, Cochrane dropped his port anchor, the Impereuse swung round on the pivot and fired a starboard broadside at the cavalry virtually destroying the squadron. Thomas, Cochrane, 133; Fortescue, Dundonald, 130-134.

⁵⁵⁴Thomas, Cochrane, 134-145; Fortescue, Dundonald, 55-61; Edward Hughes, Ed., The Private Correspondence at Admiral Collingwood, Publications of the Navy Records Society, Vol. XCVIII (London: Navy Records Society, 1957) 259-260; LS No. 167, Collingwood to his Sister, 17 December 1808; James Henderson, the Frigates, An Account of the Lesser Warships of the Great French Wars 1793-1815 (New York: Dodd Mead and Co., 1970) 92-93.

The only way to haul supplies to Barcelona through the gauntlet of corsairs and Royal Navy, was by convoys.⁵⁵⁵ Naval convoys consisted of a grouping of merchant ships under the protection of naval or armed merchant ships. British trade in the Baltic, for example, made very extensive use of convoys. Vice Admiral Sir James Saumarez (1757-1836) commander of the Baltic Fleet, noted in 1808 that Baltic convoys were occasionally so large that it was impossible to protect them. Convoying trade was a full-time occupation on the Baltic station.⁵⁵⁶ Since the convoys were still subject to attack,⁵⁵⁷ Saumarez established a fortnightly convoy system to escort merchant ships through the Baltic lanes, or the 'Belt' through a gauntlet of French corsairs.⁵⁵⁸ In the Mediterranean, Vice Admiral Sir William Henry Dillon commanding the HMS Leopard convoyed four transports from England to

⁵⁵⁵ A 65 ship convoy from Havana to Europe, escorted by a ship of the line in August 1798. Naval Documents, Quasi-War, Armed American Merchantmen, 1798, 2:172.

⁵⁵⁶ A. N. Ryan, Ed. The Saumarez Papers, Selections from the Baltic Correspondence of Vice Admiral Sir James Saumarez, 1808-1812, Navy Records Society Series Vol. 110 (London: Navy Records Society 1966); Letter No. 53, Saumarez to Admiral William Wesley Polc, 21 November 1808 and 53a, Enclosure, Explanation by Saumarez, 552-58.

⁵⁵⁷ The Saumarez Papers, No. 54, Run Admiral Richard Goodwin Keats to Pole, 27 November 1808, 58.

⁵⁵⁸ The Saumarez Papers, No. 57, Pole to the Partners of the Merchant firm Emes, Möller and Emes, 7 March 1809, 65-67; No. 68, Admiral Keats to British Minister Plenipotentiary Anthony Merry, 11 March 1809, 67-68; No. 59, Emes, Möller, and Emes to Pole, 16 March 1809, 68; No. 60, Admiralty Secretary John Barrow to Saumarez, 4 April 1809; No. 60a Goldschmid to Barrow, 3 April 1809; No. 61, Isaac Solly of Isaac Solly and Sons to Sir Thomas Boulden, Royal Navy Comptroller, 8 April 1809, 70-71; No. 62, Saumarez to Lord Hood, 15 April 1809, 71-72.

Catalonia for the Anglo Sigilian Invasion in 1812,⁵⁵⁹ got a close look at Gibraltar's Spanish smugglers come corsairs:

"Beneath the walls may be seen an assemblage of small craft. Amongst them lay the Spanish smugglers, felucca rigged, with a heavy gun concealed under their deck hamper. . . these vessels take in their cargoes at the rock and watch their opportunity of landing it on the neighboring coast.⁵⁶⁰

The Royal Navy in 1812-13 so dominated the Catalan coast that Dillon hauled men and material with near impunity.⁵⁶¹ The French convoys had to contend with both this and the corsair threat; but this was an acceptable risk considering the critical lack of land transport, insurgent dangers, and the inability of the Army of Catalonia to hold points of occupation and deploy sufficient troops to escort land convoys; not without paralyzing itself. Hence, the French command used sea transport despite the danger.⁵⁶²

In May 1808, French merchant ships brought 5,987.87 qx of wheat to Barcelona and another convoy from Port-Vendres brought 19,932 rations of oats and a third on 2

⁵⁵⁹William Henry Dillon, A Narrative of my Professional Adventures (1790-1839) Ed. Michael A. Lewis, Navy Records Society Series, Vol. XCVII, (London: The Navy Records Society, 1956) 2:193-196.

⁵⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 2:198.

⁵⁶¹*Ibid.*, 2:203-212, 228-235.

⁵⁶²During the War of the Spanish success in the French suffered from the same naval transport problems. Admiral Sir John Leake commanding the British fleet off Barcelona in spring 1708 attacked a French escorted convoy of 90 transports carrying supplies to the Army of the Duc d'Orleans. The attack netted 75 transports and many of those that escaped fell prey to the Spanish. Stephen Martin-Leake, The Life of Sir John Leake, Rear Admiral of Great Britain, Ed. Geoffrey Callender, Navy Records Society Series Vol. LIII, (London: The Navy Records Society 1919) 2:209-211; David Francis, The First Peninsular War, 1702-1713, (New York St. Martin's Press, 1975) 266.

December 1808 of one ship, with 125,431 quintals of supplies.⁵⁶³ These convoys were lucky to elude Lord Cochrane's squadron, otherwise occupied at Rosas and got through.⁵⁶⁴

This state of affairs soon changed for the worse. In October 1809, a French convoy escorted by the Toulon squadron (three ships of the line) under Admiral François, Baron Baudin (1774-1842), prepared to sail to Barcelona, but the British squadron kept it bottled up at port. The French, however slipped out past the two British Frigates on guard. Admiral Collingwood meanwhile laid off Cape Sebastien waiting the convoy's arrival. When the French spotted Collingwood's larger squadron, the convoy dashed on to Barcelona with Collingwood's ships (in three divisions) at their heels.⁵⁶⁵ At Rosas Bay the British caught up with and attacked the French convoy burning five transport ships, taking five, and ran the rest of them aground. The British ran the French ships of the line, the Robuste, 84 Lion, 74 and Borée 74, aground near Sète. The French sailors then burned one of these vessels,⁵⁶⁶ and the other two later escaped undamaged back to Toulon.⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶³These provisions included 36 qx of lard, 16 qx of salt beef, 7.85 qx of cheese, 65.42 qx of haricots and 16.68 qx of salt. SHAT, C(19) 7, VII Corps, No. 353, Commissaire-Ordonnateur en Chef Rey to General Dejean, 4 January 1809.

⁵⁶⁴Oman, Peninsular War, 1:54-57.

⁵⁶⁵Collingwood, Correspondence, No. 191, Collingwood to his Sister, 1 November 1809, 301-303.

⁵⁶⁶Ibid.

⁵⁶⁷Ibid., No. 191 and No. 196, Collingwood to Vice Admiral Purvis, 15 December 1809, 308-310.

The French, like the British, established a system of commerce defense through naval escorted convoys or using naval ships to haul goods themselves. This was particularly true of hauling supplies to Catalonia from French or Catalan ports, including Agde, Port Vendres, Toulon, and Rosas, from which the convoys assembled and with escort sailed to Catalonia with some modicum of safety.

The period of 1810-1811 was the high water mark of sea transport to Barcelona, at the same time that Marshals Augereau and Macdonald were throwing huge land convoys into Barcelona. The smaller ports, Port-Vendres, Sète, Agde, and Rosas were particularly useful and they were the least guarded by the British⁵⁶⁸ and the convoys only had to contend with the corsairs.

In November 1810 an eleven ship convoy left Port Vendres carrying 384,091 kg of flour to Barcelona. The corsairs attacked it and captured two ships, burned two more off Palamos and another was lost, probably captured. The rest of the now dispersed convoy continued on. Four ships actually got through to Barcelona with 150,613.2 kg of flour and a fifth put in at Rosas.⁵⁶⁹ Of their convoy only five ships survived, bringing in 178,153.2 kg of flour, while the other six ships were lost (55%) with 205,937 kg of flour

⁵⁶⁸The large ports, Toulon and Marseilles were closely blockaded by the Royal Navy and practically nothing got out in 1810-1811.

⁵⁶⁹See Table 38; SHAT, C(19) 8, Port Vendres, 1810-1811 Frigate Captain Hurlet, Port Vendres Squadron, État des Bâtiments charges le 1er Novembre 1810 au comte du Gouvernement et destinés à faire partie d'une expédition, 28 November 1810.

or 53.6% of the cargo.⁵⁷⁰ A second five ship convoy later got through unscathed with 170,548 kg of grain and 9,600 kg of flour.⁵⁷¹

Frigate Captain Hurlet, Naval Flotilla Commander at Port-Vendres sent four convoys to Catalonia with more success in the spring of 1811. The first convoy, initially of eight ships with 134,186 kg of supplies sailed for Barcelona on 25 February 1811. Two ships were unable to sail and remained. The six remaining vessels, under pressure from corsair attack put into Rosas.⁵⁷² The other two ships made it to Rosas on 11 April.⁵⁷³ The third convoy was forced into Palamos under corsair pressure⁵⁷⁴ while the fourth remained at Port Vendres.⁵⁷⁵ Another fifteen ship convoy sailed to Barcelona on 22 April carrying 719,082 kg of supplies. Enroute, it came under attack and split in two; ten ships dashed back to Port Vendres and five put into Agde.⁵⁷⁶ Not one ship got through to Barcelona.

⁵⁷⁰Ibid.

⁵⁷¹SHAT, C(19) 8, Port Vendres, Captain Hurlet, État des Bâtiments arrivés à Barcelone, 28 November 1810.

⁵⁷²See Table 39; SHAT, C(19) 8, Captain Hurlet, État des denrées qui ont été versée dans les Magasins de Rosas, 19 April 1811; État des Bâtiments faisant partie de l'Expédition ordonnée pour Barcelone dans la 10e Division Militaire, nd.

⁵⁷³Ibid.

⁵⁷⁴Ibid.

⁵⁷⁵See Table 40. Ibid. It carried 273,572 kg of supplies.

⁵⁷⁶See Table 40. SHAT, C(19) 8, Captain Hurltel, 9e Division Militaire (convoys), 22 April 1811.

In all, Port-Vendre sent out 29 ships to Barcelona in 1810-11, hauling 962,316 kg of flour and oats. Of these only four ships got through with 123,073 kg of flour. Seven shiploads got to Rosas, another seven returned to Port-Vendres and one got to Palamos. Ten ships fell to enemy action losing 333,504 kg of provender.⁵⁷⁷ Only 45% of the ships got through and 16% of the cargos. This was a terrible success rate for any series of military operations and at enormous cost. Its only military justification was the dire need of the troops the relative lack of transport and the difficulties of remolding all current operations around supporting the Barcelona resupply effort.

The Port Agde operations to Barcelona were more successful. In January 1811, a convoy of seven ships got through to Barcelona, carrying 361,370 kg of supplies,⁵⁷⁸ and another eleven ship convoy got through with 470,524 kg of flour and rice.⁵⁷⁹ The 32 ships from Agde hauled 1,358,119 kg of provisions and fifteen ships with 509,577 kg of supplies was lost to the corsairs. This was 37.5% of freight carried;⁵⁸⁰ still a grim but better success rate than the Port-Vendres convoys. Only the convoys from Port Sète gave

⁵⁷⁷See Table 41. SHAT, C(19) 8, Port Vendres, 1810-1811, 10e Division Militaire, Commissaire des guerres Diutrass, État Général des Chargements effectués à Port Vendres pour le Ravitaillement de Barcelone pendant le 4e trimestre 1810 et l'premier trimestre 1811, 25 May 1811. These provisions included 749,070 kg of flour (12,348 sacks), 213,246 kg of oats (4,598 sacks).

⁵⁷⁸See Table 42; SHAT, C(19) 8, Agde, 1811, Mayor Douby of Port Agde, Résumé des Opérations faites dans le Port d'Agde depuis le Premier Janvier 1811 jus qu'au Premier Fevrier, pour le Ravitaillement de Barcelone, 2 February 1811.

⁵⁷⁹See Table 43; SHAT, C(18) 8, 9e Division Militaire Département de l'Herault, Agde, Mayor Dauby, Etat des Navires chargés au Port d'Agde qui sont partis pour Barcelone, 18 Mars 1811, 19 March 1811.

⁵⁸⁰Ibid.

a ray of sun to Marshal Macdonald and General Lacuée. Of nine ships sent, only three fell to corsairs, with a loss of 100,679 kg of supplies, a mere 29.8% loss rate!⁵⁸¹

The provender then, which actually got through to Barcelona was an even smaller amount counting ships diverted to other ports⁵⁸² or returned to the originating port for later shipment. Only 638,722 kg of provisions got through from Agde (47%).⁵⁸³ The success rate for supply shipments to other Catalan ports like Rosas was much better, mostly because it was a much shorter trip, and it was a safe haven for ships to Barcelona under corsair pursuit. In October 1809 Rosas received 791,781 kg of provision valued at 277,071.08 F.⁵⁸⁴

The daily requirements of providing to the garrison of Barcelona 8,000 rations of food and 600 rations of fodder relentlessly pressed Marshal Macdonald. Immediately after taking command he tried with only partial success to throw 2,850,000 rations of flour and 216,000 rations of oats into the city.⁵⁸⁵ This attempt was nearly as fruitless as

⁵⁸¹Ibid.

⁵⁸²There were, for example, eight ships of a total freight tonnage of 472,596 tons which were transferred to Port Vendres to load and ship on 16 January 1811. SHAT, C(19) 8 Agde, 1811, Mayor Dauby. État de l'Approvisionnement de Barcelone, 7 March 1811.

⁵⁸³See Table 44; Ibid.

⁵⁸⁴This included 116,686 rations of biscuits, 459,477 kg of wheat, 194,086 kg flour, and 74,039 kg of rice. This cost respectively 34,159.97 frs. for biscuit, 137,843.10 frs. for wheat, 58,225.80 F. for flour, and 46,848.21 F. for rice. AN, AFiv 1175, Administration de la Guerre, lère Section, Bureau des Vivres, Général Lacuée, État Indicatif, lère des Denrées versées à la 10e Division Militaire sur l'Armée de Catalogne, 2e: de la Dépense résultant de ces versements de denrées. March 1810.

⁵⁸⁵AN, AFiv 1175; Général Lacuée, Rapport, à l'Empereur, 13 June 1810.

Augereau's last convoy which lost 204,400 kg of flour inducing him to suspend sea transport till the arrival of adequate naval escort.⁵⁸⁶

The 'unrestricted' corsair war got so bad that when a ship got through it was a celebratory moment. On 26 and 27 October 1810 two ships, the Ste. Vierge and La Vierge Misericordia with 98,639 kg of wheat (12 days rations) from Agde arrived at Barcelona on 3 November 1810 and returned safely.⁵⁸⁷ General Lacuée triumphantly reported the event to Napoleon.⁵⁸⁸

This was certainly an exception for at that same time Frigate Captain Hurlot refused to dispatch five other ships because of corsairs prowling the coastal waters.⁵⁸⁹ He even stated to the Ordonnateur of the 10e Division Militaire that overland convoys were safer.⁵⁹⁰ Captain Hurlot's argument was from one perspective valid for there were insufficient escorts unlike overland. Marshal Macdonald had the troops to handle an overland convoy if he were willing to tolerate its disruption of his operations for nearly a month at a time. Napoleon, however, still made use of sea transport and in October sent

⁵⁸⁶A 20 gun sloop. AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 13 June 1810.

⁵⁸⁷SHAT, C(19) 8, Agde, 9e Division Militaire Department of Herault, Commissaire-Ordonnateur Serrot, État Général des Approvisionnements expédié à Port d'Agde pour le Ravitaillement de Barcelone, 10 May 1811.

⁵⁸⁸AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 15 November 1810.

⁵⁸⁹AN, AFiv 1175, Copy of a Letter of the Ordonnateur of the 10e Division Militaire, to Ministre-Directeur Lacuée, 10 November 1810.

⁵⁹⁰Ibid.

111,894 qx marc of supplies to Barcelona and of these sent 95,180 kg (85%) by sea from Toulon, Agde, Sète, and Port Vendres.⁵⁹¹

Adjudant-Commandant Carrion-Nisas, Commandant at Toulon, grasping the logistical impass which gripped the Army of Catalonia and French Ministries wrote to the Minister of War suggesting a solution to the current method of sea transport, by hiring commercial shippers for the job. He proposed that merchants haul supplies strictly as a commercial proposition, in exchange for an exception to the Berlin Decrees, allowing them to transship colonial goods back to France.⁵⁹² This would allow merchants to take advantage of the hitherto denied profit of free colonial trade and give them an incentive to haul military provender.

One of these merchants, Jean Baptiste Boyer Fonfrède of Toulouse responded to the Imperial Decree of 17 May 1810 to facilitate the resupply of Barcelona by commercial merchant shipping. He wrote to General Lacuée that no one would brave the extreme dangers of the Mediterranean if the commercial advantages were not lucrative enough.⁵⁹³ He proposed to the Minister Director to contract two Greek ships⁵⁹⁴ to haul grain, flour,

⁵⁹¹This included 105,000 qx marc of flour, 4,242 qx marc of rice, 2,652 qx marc of salt. The ships hauled 90,000 qx of grain and flour, 3,350 qx of rice, 1,830 qx of salt. AN, AFiv 11175, General Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 17 November 1810.

⁵⁹²Ibid.

⁵⁹³AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 1 August 1810.

⁵⁹⁴Greek shippers were more than willing to haul these supplies. The rigor of the British blockade bottled up Greek and Ottoman ships at Marseilles and Toulon, leaving the shipmasters idle and without income. Any commercial occupation was therefore welcome. The Greek shippers were also quite daring. In 1807, an expedition (convoy) of forty Greek ships carrying cotton and other goods ran the British blockade from Smyrna to Marseilles, losing six ships. Pierre Échinard, Grecs et Phillènes à Marseille

and rice to Barcelona, for the right to import by land or sea, and equal quantity of colonial goods from Spain, such as sugar from Havana or Vera Cruz, Indigo from Caracas or Guatemala, cotton, untanned hides, dye, cocoa, vanilla, and cochineal.⁵⁹⁵

The current cost of hauling these supplies had now become prohibitive unlike in 1806-1809 as noted above, and included a flat freight charge of 0.36 F. per kg of cargo, that is 360.16 F. per metric ton plus a freight surcharge of 17.00 F. per ton (tonnage). In October 1810, ten ships left Agde for Barcelona with 343.612 metric tons of grain and flour for a freight charge of 123,755 F.,⁵⁹⁶ while the average price for the grain was 351.08 F. per metric ton.⁵⁹⁷ Transport was now more expensive than the actual goods, not including the freight charge per tonneau or special gratifications. For example, the ship La Ville de Port Maurice hauled 25,064.55 kg of grain and flour at a cost of 13,309 F. or 530.99 F. per metric ton. The shipper also received a 44 ton freight charge of 17.00

de la Révolution Française à l'Indépendance de la Grèce, (Marseille: l'Institut Historique de Provence, 1973) 54-55.

⁵⁹⁵Cochineal is a brilliant red dye made by drying and pulverizing the bodies of female cochineal a tropical American insect. AN, AFiv 1175, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 1 August 1810.

⁵⁹⁶See Table 45, SHAT, C(19) 8 Agde, État des Bâtiments chargés le 27 Octobre an 1810 pour le compte du Gouvernement destinés à faire partie d'une expedition ordonnée pour Barcelone.

⁵⁹⁷This included 286.94 F. per metric ton for grain (459,477 kg purchased for 137,843.10 F.) and 356.24 F. per metric ton of flour, (4,564,143 kg purchased for 1,625,950.40 F.). AN, AFiv 1175, État Indicatif, (2e) de la dépense de ces versements.

F./ton or 748.00 F. plus a gratification of 600.00 F. and other repretations of 290.70 F. Total shipping costs then were 14,947.70 F. or 596.37 F. per ton.⁵⁹⁸

The idea of M. Boyer Fonfrède and Adjudant-Commandant Carrion-Nisas then was a welcome one to an Emperor who paid transport through the nose even with other commercial advantages to the shippers. On 2 October 1810, Boyer-Fonfrède wrote to General Lacuée and proposed this method to ship 16,500 metric quintals of provisions to Barcelona.⁵⁹⁹

Boyer-Fonfrède obtained two Greek ships at Marseilles, for he was unable to procure French shippers to take such risks. The Greek shippers would haul these provisions but demanded Marine insurance of 50% of the value of their ships, and in case of their capture or destruction, the contracting merchant, Boyer-Fonfrède would assume financial burden for the loss of the cargo.⁶⁰⁰

The cargo was reduced to 10,000 qx marc⁶⁰¹ of grain and 1,000 qx marc of rice at a price of 18.00 F./qx marc for grain and 37.50 F./qx marc for rice. Sacks were

⁵⁹⁸This was a particularly expensive shipper, probably because he sailed an armed sloop. The Assumption, a 126 ton ship hauled 94,839.338 kg of grain and flour (89,259.338 kg grain and 5,580 kg of flour) at a cost of 23,359 F. or 246.30 F./metric ton plus freight of 122 tonneau at 15.50 F./ton or 1,891.00 F. a gratification of 1,000.00 F. and reparation expense of 87.50 F. The total cost was 26,337.50 F. or 277.71 F./metric ton. SHAT, C(19) 8, Agde, État des Bâtiments, 27 October 1810.

⁵⁹⁹This included 15,000 metric quintals of wheat and 1,500 metric quintals of rice.

⁶⁰⁰The financial responsibility would otherwise fall to the ship owner/captain and on his death, his estate.

⁶⁰¹The French marc used in commerce is here used and equals .250 kg. - Doursther, Dictionnaire Universel, 250.

additional charge of 35,500 F. The total cost of the convoy was 253,000 F.⁶⁰² Insurance charges were 280,000 F. and freight loss charge of 100,000 F. This 380,000 F. however, fell to M. Boyer-Fonfrède as a business expense.⁶⁰³ The loading charge (portage) at both ends was 12.00 F./qx marc. The freight charge was 12.00 F./qx marc (10,132,00 F.) to haul the goods from Marseilles to Gerona, and a higher additional charge of 30.00 F./qx marc, 330,000 F., from Gerona to Barcelona. These charges were negotiated down to a flat freight charge of 6.00 F./qx marc or 66,000 F., and a flat portage charge of 1.00 F./qx marc or 11,000 F. This negotiation reduced the total cost from 1,059,500 F. to 978,000 F.⁶⁰⁴ plus a 15,000 F. export fee on the price of the grain, and the 330,000 F. in freight.⁶⁰⁵

In return for hauling this provender, the Emperor gave to Boyer-Fonfrède the right to import 5,500 qx of colonial merchandise for net profit of 1,058,200F.⁶⁰⁶ This deal was

⁶⁰²This includes 180,000 F. for the wheat and 37,500 F. for rice. SHAT, C(19) 8, Letter (copy) Jean Baptiste Boyer-Fonfrède to General Lacuée, 2 October 1810.

⁶⁰³This 380,000 F. insurance charge was an enormous 175% of the value of the freight (217,500 F.) and this was in addition to the 50% rate for the value of the ships. The enormous charge was undoubtedly because of the great risk of these shipments to loss, at about 50%. No marine insurance underwriter would take such a risk at even a 50% premium rate. Add to this the imperfect calculation of risk current during the 18th Century and one has a recipe for financial ruin. G. Clayton, British Insurance, "Monographs on British Economic Institutions Series", E. V. Morgan Ed., (London: Elek Books, 1971) 49; Also see chapter 2.

⁶⁰⁴See Table 47. SHAT, C(19) 8, General Lacuée, Report, 27 October 1810.

⁶⁰⁵This export fee was 12,500 F. for the wheat (1.25 F./qx marc) and 2,500 F. for the rice (2.50 F./qx marc). Ibid.

⁶⁰⁶The colonial goods were 500 qx of cotton, 1,500 qx crude sugar, 1,500 qx of sugar, 600 qx of coffee, 100 qx of indigo, 30 qx of cochineal, 400 qx of dye (compèche) and 870 qx of leather. Gross import profit is 1,969,345 F., minus the old import cost of 911,145 F. leaving Boyer-Fonfrède with 1,058,200 F. See Table 46. Ibid.

certainly lucrative for both parties. The Emperor got the grain through at a reasonable cost, where charges were 74.1% of the total cost and Boyer-Fonfrède made an enormous profit in imported goods. These goods were certainly present in Catalonia and in Barcelona in particular⁶⁰⁷ for purchase.

A second merchant who supplied the Army of Catalonia through the war was Raymond Durand (1768-18-?). He was the most active and successful merchant supplying the French. He began business under General Duhesme and his Ordonnateur, M. Augier.⁶⁰⁸ When the war began, he became Vice President of the Junta of Commerce. His shipping company engaged in legal and illegal commerce and held a working relationship with all of the French army commanders of Barcelona.⁶⁰⁹ he shipped by land and sea and was ever ready to float a military contract to haul military freight.⁶¹⁰

It was sea transport, though, where he had his most lucrative business. Many of the ships hauling supplies from French and Catalan ports to Barcelona were contracted by the House of Durand, from various ports, such as Port Vendres, Nouvelle, Sete, Rosas

⁶⁰⁷One Sieur Camps at Figueras had five quintals of coffee, in June 1810 (Arrêté No. 11); and Sieur Farinos had seven quintals of sugar (Arrêté No. 17). SHAT C(8) 185, Bulletin des Actes du Gouvernement Général de la Catalogne (Barcelona: Chez J. Alzine et P. Barbrera, 1810) 1:23-24.

⁶⁰⁸Roustit, "Raymond Durand, Commerçant à Barcelone (1808-1814), 319-325; Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 120-121. Laffaille, Memoires, 133.

⁶⁰⁹Roustit, "Raymond Durand," 351-355.

⁶¹⁰Ibid., 355.

or Genoa.⁶¹¹ In return, for these shipments, Durand exported to France colonial goods, such as sugar, coffee or indigo, as Boyer Fonfrède did in 1811. The House of Durand, in fact, contracted sixty-seven ships to French ports hauling colonial goods.⁶¹² Between September 1811 and 18 March 1812, he exported to France 2,938 qx/c of sugar, 144 qx/c of coffee, 1,011 qx/c of dye, 706 qx/c of cotton and 423 qx/c of wood. The whole was valued at 549,560 F. in goods.

This was a growing commercial concern for seven commercial houses including Perret, Thorndike Arabet Gautier et Cie., Dodero, Pollan, Compete et Cie., and, of course, Durand. Through the war they exported to France, across the dangerous sea lanes, a vast quantity of goods valued at 1,967,982 F.⁶¹³ This method of supplying the garrison of Barcelona was then expensive and risky, but the only efficient means available.

Once transported, the logisticians at the receiving port sent the provisions to the magazines and accounted for it the same as any other received supply. In April 1811 eight ships from Port-Vendres and Sète arrived at Rosas carrying 35,363 kg of grain, 153,780 kg of flour (2,563 sacks), 2,195 kg of rice (30 sacks) according to ships manifests.

⁶¹¹SHAT, C(19) 8, État des Bâtiments expédiés pour Barcelone depuis 1er Octobre 1811 jusqu'au 20 Mars 1812; LS, Adjutant Commandant Carion-Nisas to General Lacuée 20 March 1812; État des Bâtiments expédiés pour Barcelone depuis 1 Octobre 1811 jusqu'au 31 Mai 1812 LS, Carrion-Nisas to General Lacuée, 15 June 1812.

⁶¹²Roustit, "Raymond Durand", 406-407.

⁶¹³This included 11,548 qx/c of sugar; 5,230 qx/c of dye; 1,691 qx/c of cotton; and 3,179 qx/c of various rare woods. Ibid., 404-405.

The unloading and movement to the citadel magazine was witnessed by officers of the garrison, who assured their proper execution. The Garde Magazine and his workers managed storage and accounting. The team of experts examined the cargo for the required quality. In this case they found losses due to defective sacks and rats who ate into the supplies. They found a loss of 3,830 kg of the cargo, for which the French government was not required to pay.⁶¹⁴

Sea transport then was the supplement to land transport and the use of both together was the only way to feed the Army of Catalonia in general and Barcelona in particular. Alone, neither were sufficient to supply the Army, unable to provide for all of its own logistical wants. In either system, the severity of insurgent and corsair depredations so interfered with logistical movement that a large part of supplies, particularly those hauled by sea were lost.

Sea transport, regardless of its poor return rate of 45% - 70% delivered goods, was nevertheless absolutely essential, without which the Army of Catalonia would have to virtually suspend military operations to protect the convoys thus ending the Army's role as a military force and making it into a logistical one. Sea transport then was a valid economy of force measure.

⁶¹⁴SHAT C(19) 8, Denrées Debarquées à Rosas pour le Service de l'Armée, 16 April 1811.

CHAPTER V

THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1808-1810.

The establishment of a coherent military government, and the maintenance of the local administrative apparatus is critical to the pacification and governing of a country.¹ The French government in Catalonia suffered from problems which seriously hampered the occupation and the war effort. Its abuse of power, destructiveness, cruelty and corruption irreparably poisoned relations between the French and the populace from the very beginning of the war.

The organization of administrative services in the Division and Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales was incomplete at the beginning of the war;² and General Duhesme partly completed them in February 1808.³ He depended then on the Captain General of Catalonia to support the Corps, and even needed his superior, Marshal Joachim Murat, (1767-1815), to have the Paymaster General provide him with 250,000

¹Paul Thiebault. Manuel Général du Service des États-Majors, Généraux et Divisionnaires dans les Armées Actives, 7e subdivision de la 1ère Division de la Première Partie, (Paris: Chez Magimel, 1813) 11-13, 14-18.

²SHAT, C(8) 485, Situation, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 15 December, 1807. C(8) 5, Letter, General Lechi to General Clarke, 5 January, 1808; Letter, General Duhesme to Clarke, 8 February, 1808. Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 91.

³Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 39, 91.

F. for expenses.⁴ Napoleon even sent a Commissaire des guerres to Barcelona to organize Duhesme's administrative services.⁵ General Reille's hastily assembled division also suffered a lack of organization,⁶ and even the new VII Corps, concentrating at Perpignan in August, 1808 had an administrative apparatus as incomplete as Duhesme's before it. When General Gouvion Saint-Cyr took command he found it in abysmal condition.

This haphazard organization was tragically reproduced in the military government. Prior to May 1808, General Duhesme's Corps was only an unwelcome guest supported by Captain General Count d'Ezpeletta.⁷ Napoleon did not expect a long occupation and made no clear provisions to govern the kingdom.⁸

⁴Murat, Lettres et Documents, No. 3072, Murat to General Duhesme, 12 March, 1808, 5:330-331. Murat assumed titular control of Duhesme's Corps on 26 February 1808. No. 3029, Murat to Duhesme, 26 February 1808, 5:291-292.

⁵"...on the 5th of March no war commissary had reached the division of the Oriental Pyrenees. Choose the nearest one at hand...in the 10th Military Division, and send him to Barcelona." UCN, No. 1693, Napoleon to General Dejean, March 10, 1808, 2:109.

⁶CN, No. 14172, Napoleon to Marshal Berthier, 9 July 1808, 17:360-362. No. 14256. Note Pour les Ministres de la Guerre et de l'Administration de la Guerre. 17 August, 1808, 17:443-448. No. 14257. Napoleon to Eugene Napoleon, Vice-Roi., 17 August 1808, 17:448-449. AN, AFiv 1607. Letter. Marshal Berthier to Napoleon, le 30 June 1808. Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 90-91, 304-305. CN, No. 14092, Ordres 14 June 1808, 17:304-305; No. 14141. Ordres, 29 June 1808, 17:338-339; No. 14151. Napoleon to General Reille, 2 July 1808, 17:346-347; Gouvion Saint-Cyr, Journal des Operations, 18,25.

⁷Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 118.

⁸One major cause of the disorganization of the French staffs and the poor quality of troops sent to Spain was the sheer contempt which Napoleon regarded the Spanish State and its Army. He considered it a weak poorly led kingdom which even a poor French Army could quickly subdue. Rudorff, War to the Death, 70-71.

The great insurrection of May 1808 transformed the situation, as Insurrectionary Juntas rose, violently overthrowing provincial governments.⁹ In Catalonia, the insurrection spread like wildfire¹⁰ and the Captain General, terrified by the surly attitude of the populace of Barcelona, relinquished his command in June to General Duhesme, and remained only as a figure head.¹¹ As the Royal provincial government collapsed, General Duhesme established a hastily improvised government in its stead, which was a Junta of Barcelona notables representing the nobility, clergy and merchant class whose main purpose was to support his Corps with supplies and money.¹²

General Duhesme's first task was to prevent revolt in Barcelona, disarm the populace of the city and place a representative of the French command on the Junta.¹³ In July 1808, he began forced requisitions and contributions, alienating the populace, increasing numbers of civil servants, went over to the insurgents.¹⁴ By August the insurrection in Catalonia was in full bloom and General Duhesme, was at odds with the Catalan civil service which protested his high handed actions. He responded to this passive resistance by tightening his grip on the city. He forced its cooperation, turning

⁹Georges Roux, La Guerra Napoléonica de España, Colección Austral; (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1971) 69-72.

¹⁰Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, Vol. 2, Primera Campaña de 1808, 17.

¹¹General Duhesme demanded a "transférât une autorité supérieure" Conard, Napoleon et la Catalogne, 119.

¹²Ibid., 102.

¹³Laiffaille, Mémoires, 135-136.

¹⁴Conard, Napoléon et le Catalogne, 123.

the Captain General into a rubber stamp, and ultimately assumed the supreme command himself.¹⁵

As the insurrection deepened, Duhesme's position became ever more tenuous.¹⁶ He and the garrison commander, General Lechi squeezed Barcelona more rigorously, for supplies which intensified the insurgency,¹⁷ demanding ever harsher repression. They even tried to fill vacant civil posts with expatriate Frenchmen to begin a working government. On Gouvion Saint-Cyr's arrival in December, Duhesme remained commandant of Catalonia, and Ordonnateur en chef Rey, took the financial reins of the province.¹⁸

The Provincial Captain General held supreme executive and military power, and the Intendant, supreme administrative and financial powers.¹⁹ The Provincial districts or Corregidats (such as Barcelona, Figueras) were headed by appointed Corregidores who held full administrative and judicial authority which they exercised through the Alcaldes

¹⁵Lafaille, Mémoires, 135-136. Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 205-209.

¹⁶"Ma position sera aussi tres difficile à Barcelone où je n'aurai ni grain, ni argent, ni viande et un peuple à contenir que le besoin mettra au désespoir". Letter, Duhesme to Marshal Berthier, 12 August 1808, Quoted in Conard Napoléon et la Catalogne, 124.

¹⁷AN, AFiv 1607, Général Duhesme, Journal des Opérations des Pyrénées-Orientales.

¹⁸Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 150-159.

¹⁹The Intendant also had control of recruiting for the Army billeting and maintenance of troops. Bariel Lovett, Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain, Vol. I, The Challenge to the Old Order, (New York: New York University Press, 1965) 33. The Captain General also had an executive council on Audience over which he presided, which advised him and administered different areas of the province. Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 10-11.

Mayores, (a combination mayor and judge).²⁰ The Corregdor, as the local Royal representative was subordinate to the Captain General in political and military matters, but superior to the Royal Intendant in administrative and financial ones.²¹ For General Duhesme the Corregidor was the interface between the populace and the French command.

With the accession of King Joseph Bonaparte there was a concerted Royal effort to reestablish the links between Madrid and the provinces, which the insurrection had cut. In February 1809, King Joseph appointed a Royal Commissioner, a Francophile Catalan and Royal pensioner, Don Joseph Garriga to reestablish the Royal administration on a French model and firmly establish Madrid's authority in Catalonia.²²

The key to Royal power in Spain was its command relationship with French corps commanders, but Napoleon undermined this by continuously sending orders directly to French commanders instead of through King Joseph and his Chief of Staff, Marshal Jean Baptiste Comte Jourdan (1762-1833). Indeed, the Emperor established a special Bureau in the Ministry of War to handle the administration and control of the army in Spain. Corps commanders too, habitually worked with Paris, as had Generals Duhesme and Saint-Cyr. Even when Marshal Berthier informed him that any further orders would be

²⁰Lovett, Napoleon and the Birth of Modern Spain, 1:33; Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 154-156; Richard Herr, The Eighteenth Century Revolution in Spain, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958) 11.

²¹Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 154-156.

²²Ibid, 160; Joseph Bonaparte, King of Spain, Mémoires et Correspondance du Roi Joseph, Ed. Albert Du Casse. 2nd Ed. (Paris: Perroitin, 1859) 5:200-209; CN, No. 14543, Allocution de l'Empereur, en Réponse aux Félicitations du Corregidor de Madrid, 9 December 1808, 18:107-109.

issued from Madrid,²³ Saint-Cyr ignored this and continued to work with the Ministry of War in Paris, just as General Duhesme and Reille had before. In fact, the only order Marshal Jourdan sent to the VII Corps, General Saint-Cyr politely declined to comply.²⁴

Ordonnateur en chef Rey too was ostensibly under the authority of the Royal Intendant Général, M. Dennié²⁵ but Rey, like Saint-Cyr ignored Royal direction.²⁶ For example, an Imperial Decree of 4 December 1808 abolished feudal and seignoral rights, the inquisition, certain taxes and reduced the convents. General Saint-Cyr actioned this decree,²⁷ but admitted his allegiance to Napoleon only.²⁸

When the Royal Commissioner arrived in March 1809 to reform Catalan government, he met with a chilly indifference from General Saint-Cyr's staff which

²³Ibid., 162-163; Jean Baptiste, Comte Jourdan, Mémoires Militaires du Maréchal Jourdan, Ed. Vicomte de Grouchy (Paris: Ernest Flammarion, 1899) 129-130.

²⁴"Sire, I have always considered the VII Corps...was to subdue Catalonia. There will be a lengthy occupation of the province and [I] will be unable to concur with joint operations...", AN, AFiv 1621, LS, Gouvion Saint-Cyr to King Joseph, 25 June 1809.

²⁵SHAT, C(8) 398, Armée d'Espagne, Intendant Général Denniée. Administration Générale de l'Armée d'Espagne, Personnel, 15 December 1809

²⁶Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 171.

²⁷AN, AFiv plaq 2512 and 2524, Decret, 4 and 12 December 1808.

²⁸In June 1809, General Clarke admonished General Saint-Cyr to subdue Catalonia following the example set in Basque by "rendering from each city...persons responsible for the conduct of others...the VII Corps would gain tranquility in the rear. The certainty that commune property would be respected...would produce the same calming effects as in Navaire and Biscay." General Clarke to General Gouvion Saint-Cyr, 3 June 1809, quoted in Conard Napoléon et la Catalogne, 173-174. Saint-Cyr replied: "the measures that you proposed...which was applicable to the north is completely impractical here, where not a single inhabitant rests in the areas occupied by the Army". Quoted in Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 174.

stymied and eventually destroyed the effort to reestablish a viable Royal government. Indeed, King Joseph admonished Garriga (in a desperate attempt to gain some influence on the French Staff), to facilitate the logistical support of the VII Corps. This not only rendered him administratively impotent but made him into a virtual organ of Saint-Cyr's administration.²⁹

The French military government of Catalonia from 1808-1810 then was a stumbling attempt to support the occupying corps and leave actual government to a supposedly intact apparatus. General Duhesme and the Emperor only anticipated grafting French reforms onto the existing structure. Napoleon also anticipated a quick end to Spanish resistance. When Catalan civil servants began deserting their posts, and the administrative structure faltered, Duhesme and Saint-Cyr had little to replace it with leaving the makeshift government stillborn.

The fundamental error was not anticipating during the first months of the war that a strongly imposed military government was necessary, as in the conquest of Naples in 1806, in which the Marshal, André Massena (1758-1817), in the face of a vicious insurgent war pacified and imposed a harsh military³⁰ then regularized civil government on the French model.³¹ A similar insurgent war emerged in Catalonia and a successful occupation required military success, and efficient government. General Duhesme was

²⁹Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 177-182.

³⁰Edouard Gachot, La Troisième Campagne d'Italie (1805-1806), 2nd Ed., Histoire Militaire de Massena Series (Paris: Plon-Nourrit, 1911), 247-248.

³¹Owen Connelly, Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms, (New York: The Free Press, 1965) 70-77.

clearly negligent in not quickly organizing a viable if improvised government within the first three months of the war. It was only during Saint-Cyr's command that he began to do so. Essentially, the government was designed only to support the VII Corps. Efficient administration was secondary, which effectively nullified it as an instrument to govern the rebellious province.³²

When Marshall Augereau took command of the VII Corps he fully turned his attention to governing the rebellious province. In December 1809 then, he investigated its governmental apparatus for its organization and its ability to support the army.³³ He was completely dissatisfied with the Royal government, its chaotic administration, and particularly with the Royal Commissioner, Joseph Garriga.³⁴ He blamed this situation, with some reason, on Saint-Cyr and his old enemy General Duhesme.³⁵ Suspecting serious government malfeasance, Augereau established an invistagative Administrative

³²Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 139-140, 203-206.

³³SHAT, C(8) 35, LS (copy), Marshal Augereau to the Director Général des Douanes de Perpignan, 6 December 1809.

³⁴SHAT, C(8) 35, LS, Marshal Augereau to General Clarke, 6 December 1809.

³⁵SHAT, C(8) 49, LS, Augereau to Clarke, 24 August 1810, Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 389.

Commission on 27 February 1810.³⁶ He understood that the previous military regime was both inefficient and corrupt, the Royal government was worthless.³⁷

Meanwhile, on 8 February 1810, Napoleon created by decree four independent military governments. Catalonia, Aragon, Navarre and Biscaye. He upgraded the occupying Corps to Armies and designated their commanders as military governors. These governments were, henceforth, independent of Madrid and answered only to Paris, like Vice Royalities.³⁸ The decree promoted the VII Corps to the Army of Catalonia, and the province, the independent government of Catalonia, with Marshal Augereau as governor, responsible for provincial administration and the complete support of the army. Finally, Napoleon declared Catalonia in a state of siege and authorized martial law.³⁹

This decree was promulgated as much to satisfy the demands of Napoleon's military budget as for any strategic consideration. Available funds were always a critical factor in many of Napoleon's actions and policies. He saw too, that Madrid was incapable of either managing the outlying provinces or combat the insurgents. Napoleon

³⁶It was intended "de rechercher les moyens de diminuer les charges du peuple sans nuire au Trésor Public". Its members were Commissaire des guerres Grobert (President), Chef de bataillon Fouqué, Payeur Lehodey, Captain Pelletier and Administrateur des domaines Lapasset. SHAT, C(8) 42 Arrête, 27 February 1810; C(8) 44, General Rey to General Clarke, 26 March 1810; Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 389-390. AN, F (7) 6352, Letter, Adjutant Commandant Ordonneau to Marshal Augereau, 3 April 1810; SHAT C(8) 40, Letter Augereau to Clarke, January? 1810, N.D.

³⁷SHAT C (18) 42, LS, Augereau to Clarke, 16 February 1810.

³⁸SHAT, C(8) 41, Napoleon, Decree (copy) 8 February 1810.

³⁹See Appendix III, SHAT, C(8) 41, Napoleon, Decree, 8 February 1810; Decree (Extrait) 8 February 1810; Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance Diplomatique, Vol. 672 Napoléon, Décret, 8 February 1810.

specifically ordered Marshal Augereau to establish a provisional administration in Catalonia on the heels of his decree. He reasserted Augereau's command independence of Madrid as a Vice-Roy, and authority to impose martial law, that is, place Catalonia in a state of siege.⁴⁰ In his reply to its receipt, Marshal Augereau pledged that he would establish a viable military government discipline the present governor and forward to the Ministry of War, plans to implement the Imperial decree.⁴¹

Marshal Augereau, now established his Commission Administrative which was to investigate the policies and actions of the incumbent command, and to study the whole structure of the province, its commerce, taxes, government administration, and judiciary. It would catalogue all of its resources so as to allow the new government to properly administer the province and most importantly support the army.⁴²

⁴⁰Napoleon wrote to General Clarke:

Vous lui ferez connaître que, si les communications sont ouvertes, il doit se concerter avec Madrid, mais qu'il ne fait partie de l'Armée d'Espagne; que l'armée qu'il commande est l'Armée de Catalogne, et qu'il ne doit recevoir des ordres que de moi; qu'il doit même établir une administration provisoire dans le pays, faire arborer, au lieu de l'étendard espagnol; l'étendard français et Catalan, et ne souffrir aucune espèce de communication entre les habitants et le Roi.

CN, No. 16275, Napoleon to General Clarke, 21 February, 1810, 20: 233-234; No. 16272, Napoleon to General Clarke, 19 February 1810, 20: 232.

⁴¹Marshal Augereau made a veiled reference to Generals Duhesme and Lechi and Police Chief Casanova, and the beginning of his vendetta against them. SHAT, C(8) 41, LS, Marshal Augereau to General Clarke, 24 February 1810.

⁴²SHAT, C(8) 42, Arrêté pour la création d'une Commission Administrative Provisoire du Gouvernement de Catalogne, 27 February 1810. General Thiebault discusses at length in the Manuel Général gathering the appropriate information on the occupied country, cataloguing it onto a series of 'Tableaux' on matrix charts. These were 1) the communes, population, artisans and produce; 2) means of transport; 3) agricultural produce; 4) industry and commerce; 5) government institutions and 6) government administrators. Thiebault, Manuel Général, 96-97, Models A-F.

While the commission gathered the needed information on the province and investigated General Duhesme,⁴³ Marshal Augereau prepared to establish his new government.⁴⁴ On 25 February he proposed to the Minister of War the organization of Catalonia into four Divisions Militaires.⁴⁵ 1er Division Militaire of Upper Catalonia at Gerona and in Lower Catalonia, the 2e, 3e and 4e Divisions Militaire headquartered at Barcelona, Tarragona and Lerida respectively.⁴⁶ These geographical divisions were designed to administer the district in support of the army and pacify the country. Each division militaire was based upon a fortified headquarters.⁴⁷

Augereau naturally tried to regularize contributions, improving on the virtual rapine used by Duhesme. He appointed a Receveur, headquartered at Barcelona, with branches in the Corregiments which were to collect contributions,⁴⁸ and a commissaire de police to begin organizing a new government administration.⁴⁹

⁴³SHAT, C(8) 41, LS, Augereau to General Clarke, 23 February 1810; See Chapter II, § 5.

⁴⁴SHAT, C(8) 41, LS, Augereau to Clarke, 24 February 1810.

⁴⁵SHAT, C(8) 42, LS, Augereau to General Clarke, 25 February 1810.

⁴⁶This breakout of districts was premature on Augereau's part for it would be a year before Tarragona and Lerida would be conquered, and then by General Suchet, to fall under the authority of the Army of Aragon, SHAT, C(8) 42, Marshal Augereau to General Clarke, *Projet de Répartition du Gouvernement de Catalogne en Quatre Divisions Militaires*, 25 February 1810; C(8) 41, LS, Augereau to Clark, 24 February 1810.

⁴⁷Ibid; C(8) 40, *Arrêté*, (Receveur) n.d. (February 1810?); C(8) 35, Augereau to Clark, 6 December 1809.

⁴⁸SHAT, C(8) 42, Marshal Augereau, *Arrete*, 27 February 1810.

⁴⁹SHAT, C(8)41, LS, Augereau to Clarke, 24 February 1810.

The Marshal, however, opened his new government with cruel repression, by issuing a hanging law on 28 December 1809 which declared any insurgent caught under arms would be summarily hanged as a bandit. Indeed, Generals Souham and Pino erected a line of gallows on the road between Gerona and Figueras hanging every insurgent caught.⁵⁰

Augereau, despite his laudatory attempts to create a working military government was certainly the least capable of its Governors. His inability to pacify the country, support his army, gain decisive results in the field and embarrassing personal vendettas led to his dismissal from command by May 1810.⁵¹

Comparatively, Augereau organized his governmental operations very much like General Suchet did in Aragon, who imposed monetary and 'in kind' contributions, established a finance administration with a Receveur and fostered an efficient civil government.⁵² Suchet, however, managed to subdue Aragon and Augereau did not. This critical factor made his government unworkable. Additionally, the cruelty of his occupation short circuited any attempt at pacification. His many hangings, right out of Goya's The Disasters of War, were particularly horrifying. The punishment of towns and villages accused of helping insurgents with huge levies over and above the normal heavy contributions, only inflamed Catalan hatred. For example, he fined thirteen towns

⁵⁰Oman, Peninsular War, 3:288; Belmas, Journaux des Sièges, 1:429; Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia; Arteché, Guerre de la Independencia, 8:221 and 225.

⁵¹Oman, Peninsular War, 3:311.

⁵²Suchet, War in Spain, 2:313-316.

373,100 F. in the first months of 1810.⁵³ Augereau also paid the price in hatred for the misdeeds of the Duhesme regime, such as the Canton Murder⁵⁴ and other excesses revealed by the Commission administrative.⁵⁵ Augereau's command then was a failure on both the operational and the administrative level.

In any case, a dissatisfied Emperor replaced the aging Marshal with Marshal Macdonald in the hopes that this Scots fire eater could break the rebellious province. When he took command, he found that his task was a daunting one. Not only did Augereau fail to pacify Catalonia and establish a government, he found enormous logistical problems which taxed both Catalan and French resources. Marshal Macdonald would have to move heaven and earth to correct these problems with limited resources.

The new Marshal attacked this challenge vigorously and began organizing his government only days after arriving in Catalonia. His first act was to issue an Order of the Day to declare his intent to re-establish discipline in the army, end arbitrary levies guarantee the safety and well being of the populace and establish an efficient and just

⁵³SHAT, C(8) 34, Arrêtés, Palames, Belcane, Bagus, Albuns, Olot nd.

⁵⁴On 15 December 1808 two of Duhesme's police commissioners in Barcelona murdered a Catalan citizen one Joseph Canton attempting to extract alleged hidden contribution. This caused a huge scandal, inflaming the city. This was the worst charge that Augereau levied against Duhesme and the garrison commander General Lechi. AN, F (7) 6554, Letter, Beaumont-Brivazac to Savaroy 30 June 1812, AFiv 1625, Commission Administrative, Rapport, 11 January 1809; BB(18) 73, Mémoire, General Léchi to Marshal Berthier, 24 December 1810, Conard, Napoléon et la Catalogne, 314-320; See Chapter II § 5.

⁵⁵SHAT, C(8) 42, Commission Administrative to Marshal Augereau, nd.

government.⁵⁶ Macdonald was as good as his word, as he threw himself into forming a new government. On 1 June 1810, he issued another Order of the Day establishing and enforcing tight discipline in the army, rules for levying requisitions and public security.⁵⁷

During a huge convoy to Barcelona to revictual the garrison, for example, Macdonald kept a firm hand on his often unruly troops.⁵⁸ He ordered the arrest and court martial of the commander of the 2e Ligne Napoléon for financial misconduct.⁵⁹ In another case, he received a complaint from a local woman along the march route from whom soldiers of General Severoli's division had stolen a goat. Macdonald ordered Severoli to either replace it or reimburse the cost of the animal and punish the soldier.⁶⁰

By mid June, Macdonald began organizing his government, with the Régie des Domaines Nationaux en Catalogne, to manage provincial tax levies province. Headquartered at Barcelona, and under his direct authority, it was organized with a

⁵⁶SHAT, C(8) 281, Registre des Ordres du Jour 28 May to 30 October 1810, Ordre du Jour, Arrêté Concernant des repression d'abus, 28 May 1810. Macdonald in this instance followed directly in Augereau's footsteps whose Chief of Staff General Guillemot issued a similar document, General Guillemot Ordre du Jour, 25 April 1810.

⁵⁷SHAT, C(8) 133, Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements, 2e Cahier, 31 October 1810 to March 1811, Ordre du Jour, 1 June 1810, C(8) 281, Registre, Ordre du Jour, 1 June 1810.

⁵⁸Particularly the Neapolitan units.

⁵⁹SHAT, C(8) 335, Registre, Marshall Macdonald to General Pignatelli, 17 June 1810.

⁶⁰SHAT, C(8) 335, Registre, Marshal Macdonald to General Severoli, 15 June 1810; Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Picton (1758-1815) underwent a similar experience during the Salamanca Campaign of 1812, when he caught one of the soldiers of the Irish Connaught Rangers stealing a goat. William Gratton, Adventures with the Connaught Rangers, 1809-1814, (London: 1901; reprint edition London: Greenhill Books, 1989) 20-21, (page references to reprint edition).

Directeur-Général two Administrateurs Généraux, who actually administer the organization, and several Administrateurs, who sat in council to deliberate matters before the Director Général. He also established a Secretarial-Général to administer the central office, with four bureaus de correspondance and one of compatabilite.⁶¹ The Corregimens too had its office with a Directeur, Inspecteur, Verificateurs⁶² and Receveurs.⁶³

Marshal Macdonald's organization actually built an administrative structure to finance the army and government from the ground up instead of grafting new faces on to the old royal organization. He was the first then to form a viable civil administration in Catalonia, albeit along lines envisioned by Marshal Augereau. He organized his government with a military administration consisting of an artillery, engineer and administrative/logistical staff, gendarmerie, and arrondissement and fortress commands. The civil government also had a central administration (Conseil) with Arrondissements and offices of finance, justice, police, administration, commerce and marine.⁶⁴

The civil and military government was organized in four Arrondissements. The Ter, headquartered at Gerona, the Llobregt at Barcelona, the Ebre at Reuss and the Segre

⁶¹This office was separate from the Intendants des finances which was strictly a civil functionary, and who would regularly work with this new Régie des Domaines, SHAT, C (8) 50, Reglement sur l'Organisation de la Regie des Domaines en Catalogne, 18 June 1810.

⁶²The Verificateur is the local manager of the work in the Corregimens, Ibid.

⁶³The Receveurs actually carry out the collections, Ibid.

⁶⁴See Appendix III, SHAT, C(8) 50, Marshal Macdonald, Projet d'Organisation de la Province de Catalogne en Divisions Militaires, 24 June 1810;

at Urgel.⁶⁵ At its inception, however, Macdonald manned only a portion of this government organization, choosing personnel in time.⁶⁶

Macdonald appointed officers for his government from the Imperial government. Many were his personal acquaintances, while others came highly recommended by the Minister of War, General Savaroy, Duc de Rovigo, or Intendant Général Daru. There was, for example, an Imperial Prefect as the Civil Intendant of the Arrondissement of Gerona and two Sous-Prefets, as Civil Intendants and a Judge as Commissaire de Justice. There were also landlords, administrators of the Imperial police officials, etc.⁶⁷ These French officials though highly recommended, gave Macdonald's government a decidedly colonial flavor for there were, unlike earlier the French military government no Catalan officials in the upper administration, at least not in June 1810.⁶⁸

The Augereau-Macdonald government was modeled on a truncated image of the Imperial government though certainly not on the scale of the Napoleonic satellite kingdoms.⁶⁹ The Catalan government did, however, closely resemble General Thiebault's

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Manning the government posts is a problem universally encountered problem among military governors in Catalonia whose citizens were naturally loath to participate as Afrancesados in the French occupation of their country, as collaborators or traitors. Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹See Appendix III; Connelly, Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms, 237-241, 250-253.

schematic Military Government in his Manuel Général,⁷⁰ or the French Colonial Government, established by General Louis-Hubert Lyautey in Morocco in 1912.⁷¹

In any case, Macdonald tried to fill his central and arrondissement government with experienced Frenchmen, recommended by notables of the Imperial Government and who were known quantities to himself. He had seen first hand the difficulties of previous governments. He needed an efficient and trustworthy administration, and it was clearly his intent to build one. To maintain his personnel in these offices he issued arrêtés proclaiming their salaries and the budgets for their bureaux such as the Commissaire Ordinaire at Gerona and Figueras.⁷² He even paid promptly the existing functionaries such as the Inspector of Forests at Gerona and La Bispal.⁷³

Macdonald opened his government with a flurry of eight arrêtés or decrees from 23 May to 10 June, and on 22 May he began publishing a Bulletin of Government Acts. On 27 May he decreed measures to end military abuse (arrêtés No. 3),⁷⁴ the establishment of the Intendance of Gerona (No. 5 and 6),⁷⁵ and the creation of a local National Guard

⁷⁰See Appendix III; Thiebault, Manuel Général, 73 Subdivision, 1er Division, 1er Partie, 14-17.

⁷¹Alan Scham, Lyautey in Morocco, Protectorate Administration 1912-1925 (Berkley: University of California Press, 1970) 61-69; Douglas Porch, The Conquest of Morocco, A Savage Colonial War (London: Papermac, 1986) 294-295.

⁷²See Appendix III; SHAT, C(8) 60, Macdonald, Arrêté 17 November 1810 and Copy.

⁷³See Appendix III; SHAT, C(8) 60 Macdonald, Arrêté 17 November 1810.

⁷⁴SHAT C(8) 185, Bulletin des Actes du Gouvernement Général de la Catalogne (Barcelona: Chesz J. Alzine et P. Barrera, 1810), 1:2;

⁷⁵Ibid, 1:5

for towns and villages of over 200 people (No. 7).⁷⁶ Other areas included commercial and individual acts. In the former case, Macdonald established economic policy, such as the importation of French manufactured goods (No. 8) bringing Catalonia into the fold of the Continental System and using commerce to support the Army.⁷⁷ Some arrêtés acted on individual cases such as reimbursing the price of five quintals of coffee (No. 11),⁷⁸ or the sequestration of personal goods as a punitive measure against collaboration with the insurgents or nonpayment of contributions (No. 21).⁷⁹ Other acts include payments to the Provincial Receveur,⁸⁰ currency valuations (No.53),⁸¹ and criminal arrests, particularly of corrupt members of the government (No.61).⁸² Normal government functions, included actions on passports (No.87),⁸³ the appointments to and meetings of the local Juntas,⁸⁴ and obtaining money or supplies for the army (No.75 and 76).⁸⁵

⁷⁶Ibid, 1:6

⁷⁷Ibid, 1:11; Roustit, "Raymond Durand", 339-341.

⁷⁸Ibid, 1:13

⁷⁹Ibid, 1:24

⁸⁰Ibid.

⁸¹Ibid, 1:32

⁸²Macdonald made efforts to render his government trustworthy, such as his arrest of the Directeur des Domaines at Gerona, Ibid, 1:35.

⁸³Ibid, 1:40

⁸⁴Ibid, 1:24

⁸⁵Ibid, 1:37-38

For the first time, a French commander seriously governed Catalonia as his correspondence and arrêtés reveal. He applied to the Corregidor at Gerona as to the provision of forrage for General Frère's division,⁸⁶ the use of local corvée workers,⁸⁷ or cutting timber in dangerous woods along supply routes, where convoys were frequently attacked by insurgents⁸⁸ or the reimbursement of confiscated goods for the army.⁸⁹ In this way he highlighted the legitimacy of his government.

The results of Macdonald's government was the blunting of the harshness the war from previous French commanders. He was determined to pacify the province with just and efficient government, stripped of scandal, cruelty and with military victory. It was, however, the military side which finally defeated him, for he never subdued the insurgents. While covering Suchet's siege of Tortosa the insurgent activity was intense enough to force the Marshall to use summary executions in September 1810.⁹⁰ From the end of 1810 through 1811, the Army of Catalonia, was inundated in the grim business of counter insurgency, while engaged in the thankless task of supporting Suchet's victorious sieges of Tortosa, Tarragona, Lerida and Mequininza. He suffered here a series of

⁸⁶SHAT, C(8) 129, CM-I, Macdonald to the Corregidor of Gerona, 30 May 1810.

⁸⁷Ibid, Macdonald to M. Piazzola Commander of the Arrondissement de Cadagues, 5 June 1810.

⁸⁸Ibid., Macdonald to the Corregidor of Gerona, 9 June 1810; Macdonald to General Amey, Governor of Gerona, 9 June 1810; Macdonald to General Pignatelli, 9 June 1810; and Macdonald to General Guillet, Governor of Figueras, 9 June 1810.

⁸⁹Ibid., Macdonald to M. Luppé, Intendant of Finances of Gerona, 19 June 1810, and MacDonald to General Amey, 19 June 1810.

⁹⁰Oman, Peninsular War, 3:496.

setbacks. In September he occupied the plains of Lower Catalonia, continuously harassed by the insurgents, which occasionally attacked and destroyed French cantonments, and units, making every movement hazardous. Macdonald responded with Augereau-like reprisals, burning villages and summarily shooting captured insurgents.⁹¹ He even sent General Severoli on a destructive, though fruitless, raid for provisions returning with little except casualties.⁹² Meanwhile, the insurgent commander, General O'Donnel raided Upper Catalonia, held by the very capable General Baraguey d'Hilliers, and destroyed a French brigade at La Bisbal, capturing its commander, the ever unlucky General Schwartz and 1,183 troops on September 14.⁹³ Two of Macdonald's brigades (Brigades Eugenio and Salm) also met a sharp check at Cardona on 21 October in Lower Catalonia.⁹⁴

Once he got news of the disaster at La Bisbal, Macdonald temporarily returned to Upper Catalonia to assist Baraguey d'Hilliers reconsolidate the French hold in November.⁹⁵ In January 1811 the insurgents cut up a 650 man French calvary foraging party near Lerida and inflicted yet another severe check on Macdonald at the action of

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Ibid., 3:496-497.

⁹³Lopez, Guerra de la Independencia, 5:342-344.

⁹⁴Vaciani, Storia della Campagne, 2:631-632, Oman, Peninsular War, 3:499-500.

⁹⁵Oman, Peninsular War, 3:501-502.

Pla near Lerida on 15 January, losing some 600 men.⁹⁶ The insurgents even attempted in March though unsuccessfully, to capture Montjuich at Barcelona.⁹⁷

The disastrous fall in April of Figueras and the succeeding four month siege was the last straw for the Emperor who relieved Macdonald replacing him with General Decaen. The sheer weight of the ever ruthless insurgent war which Macdonald was unable to successfully contain, despite valiant efforts nullified the work of his government. Even the Emperor served to 'conspire' against him by placing many of his troops at General Suchet's disposal.

Despite its ultimate failure, Marshal Macdonald's administrative and government reforms added a new dimension to the war effort and set the province on a path to pacification. He left a workable government to his successor, who made no fundamental changes and operated with success to the end of the war. Like Suchet, famous as the best administrator in Spain, Macdonald made a substantial contribution of no less value to the French War effort and which in fact kept the French occupation intact with no appreciable reinforcement of the Army.⁹⁸

The last stage of the military government fell under the commands of General Decaen and Marshal Suchet. Both employed the government administration that Marshal

⁹⁶Ibid, 4:241-244.

⁹⁷Ibid., 4:244-245.

⁹⁸Though Macdonald clearly failed in his field operations, critical to the occupation, Richard Humble's assessment that his efforts contributed little to the French War effort is certainly wrong. Macdonald's government was certainly one of the best French military governments in Spain and made continued occupation and the support of the Army of Catalonia possible till 1814. Richard Humble, Napoleon's Peninsular Marshals, 207-208.

Macdonald established and neither made any fundamental changes in it. The only change that did occur though only on paper was in September 1811, after Macdonald finally reduced Figueras at the end of a four month siege. Napoleon attempted formally annex Catalonia to the French Empire.⁹⁹ He even had the official proclamation drawn up¹⁰⁰ and drew up a preliminary provincial organization which divided the province into four departments, the Ter (Capital at Gerona), Montserrat (Barcelona), Bouches-de-l'Ebre (Lerida) and Segre (Puigcerda). He ordered the appointment of Prefects and Catalonia administered (such as Justice) in the name of the Emperor.¹⁰¹ Of course, this meant nothing for Catalonia remained unsubdued and the bulk of the province not even under French occupation.

⁹⁹Miot de Melito, Memoires of Count Miot de Melito, Minister, Ambassador, Councillor of State, and Member of the Institute of France, Between the Years 1788 and 1815, Ed. General Fleischmann, trans. Cashel Hoey and John Lillie, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1881) 582; Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance Diplomatique Espagne, Vol. 672, Letter, Marshal Berthier to King Joseph 5 September 1811.

¹⁰⁰The Proclamation was actually drawn up in January 1811. Napoleon had this project in the back of his mind for sometime. Oman, Peninsular War, 4:215.

¹⁰¹*Ibid*, 5:97.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The Army of Catalonia was called upon to subdue the most rebellious province in Spain. To accomplish this, it required crack troops led by the best generals and an adequate supply system providing the necessities of war.

In the first case the actual forces of the French army in Eastern Spain hampered the French war effort. The quality of troops brigaded into General Duhesme's Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales at the beginning of the war were so poor and led inevitably to difficulties in the field. Only the most experienced and best led soldiers could cope with the demands of the ferocious insurgent war, the virtual conscripts, which General Duhesme and more so General Reille led, could not. The conscripts, which the utterly untalented and luckless, General Schwartz, led at the engagement of Bruch in June 1808 were simply incapable of handling the mass insurgent movement intent on their destruction. The Italian units were filled with green soldiers, fresh out of the depots. The Neapolitan troops were far worse. At their best, mere lazzaroni sweepings and at their worst out and out criminals which King Joseph of Naples was ridding his country. By 1810 their quality worsened and Napoleon in a fit of pique against King Joachim of

Naples withdrew these riff raff.¹ One can but imagine the disciplinary agonies General Floristano Pignatelli encountered in commanding the Neapolitan Division.²

General Severoli's Italian Division, unlike its Neapolitan counterpart, did creditable service in Catalonia. Marshal Macdonald sorely missed it when Napoleon transferred it to Suchet's Army of Aragon in 1811.

The hodgepotch of German troops from the newly formed Rhenish and Westphalian realms were transferred to the VII corps for the Siege of Gerona and served bravely in Catalonia until 1813 when the demands of the war in the east drew off the Westphalians. The treason of Colonel Medor in Soult's Army of Spain led to the virtual disarming and transfer in disgrace of the Nassau Regiment in the Army of Catalonia, not for any misdeed, but as a precaution during the difficult days of 1813 which saw the defection of all of Napoleon's German allies. This was a tragic story of honor maintained at the twilight of the Empire.

The problems of this polyglot force were mainly administrative. They were the stuff of funding of units, different languages, troop replacements, unit masses and provision of equipment, all things that are more or less under the control of a French commander. They were a worry to a whole series of commanding generals as is evident in their extensive correspondence with Paris.

During the war the organization of the army greatly influenced its ability to conduct the war. At its beginning General Joseph Lechi built the Division d'Observation

¹UCN, No. 4304, Decision, 14 June 1810, 3:603-604.

²SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

des Pyrénées Orientales on a virtual shoestring, and he never completed the organization of its staff until after the war broke out. The Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, later assigned to the fiery General Guillaume Duhesme, who was versed in the realities of insurgent warfare and independent command, was also a recently tested veteran of the campaigning in Naples both in 1799 and in 1806, as well as 4th Division commander in Italy 1805.

He marched into Catalonia with the greenest of troops and only a sprinkling of veteran and these mostly non-French.³ The insurrection caught Duhesme and Napoleon utterly by surprise. The ferocity of the resistance and its universality was nothing like Duhesme had experienced in Naples. His Corps, swallowed up in Barcelona was virtually cut off from France and clearly too small to conduct any offensive operations nor could it hold down the occupied areas and maintain the line of communications to France.

Napoleon responded to Duhesme's pleas and sent General Reille to lead in a new division, scrapped together of troops even worse than Duhesme's. Division Reille had not only depot scrapings but a large mixture of unwilling national guard conscripts. This division too was swallowed up in Upper Catalonia and could barely maintain its communications with France since it continuously fought insurgents' attacks against its convoys. Its only offensive operation, the second siege of Gerona was an out and out failure which cost lives, prestige and tightened the noose around Barcelona. If anything was now painfully clear, Duhesme's Corps was too small and too green to handle its task.

³Napoleon was aware of the poor quality of Duhesme's troops and cautioned him to impose the harshest discipline. CN, No. 13496, Napoleon to General Clarke, 28 January 1808; 16:281-282.

against Generals Duhesme and Lechi were the faults that Napoleon tolerated the least - he hated a complainer. These combined failings resulted in Augereau's dismissal from command.

The VII Corps and Army of Catalonia underwent a profound change over 1809-10. It grew in size and prestige but the bifurcation that characterized the rest of the war between a field and arrondissement army began, though informally.

In May 1810 the newest commander in this meat grinder took over Marshal Macdonald, lion hearted, good natured, honest and freshly handed his baton. He took on his task with a will, reordered the province, established a military government and set to the sisyphian task of resupplying Barcelona.

Like his predecessors, he found Catalonia, almost impossible to manage. He organized his army for the field and occupation completely in 1810. This was the only way to hold the country and continue field operations. There were, however, logistical and secondary support operations to Marshal Suchet's conquest of Lower Catalonia, which must have galled Macdonald greatly.

What Macdonald needed, however, was fresh troops to feed his "two armies." This was the only thing to break the deadlock between occupation and conquest. Troops, however, were not forthcoming, and the army was, in fact, reduced and later slashed by two divisions loaned to Suchet. This effectively ended any chance of offensive operations by Macdonald. All he could hope to do was to hold his posts, subdue part of the country, and supply his army.

Macdonald's command also collapsed under the weight of continued logistical problems and disasters in the field, such as Figueras. By August 1811 Napoleon would replace the now disgraced Macdonald with General Decaen, recently Governor of French India. Talented, politically adept and experienced, Decaen suffered from precisely the same problems of his predecessors. He, however, had the very difficult problem of the Anglo-Sicilian invasion of 1813 which finally destroyed his credit with Paris, leading to his fall. His army of Catalonia remained structurally unchanged from 1811-1813 but continued to shrink.

General Decaen's successor, Marshal Suchet, combined the two armies of Aragon and Catalonia. His operations were characterized by the slow relinquishing of French occupied eastern Spain as the army retired on the Pyrenees, and the army shrank as a result of Napoleon's demands for even more troops to bolster his eastern front and the French frontier of the 1814 campaign.

The major headache for each and every French commander in Catalonia was logistics. It is here that Napoleon's standing dictum "let war feed war" fell flat. Catalonia was a particularly poor country and simply could not support two contending armies and masses of insurgents in the best of times, but with a dramatically reduced agricultural output, due to the ravages of war, continual requisitions and the displacement of the populace, it was impossible.

The successive Ordonnateurs en chef, Augier for Duhesme, Rey for St. Cyr, Bourdon for Macdonald and Decaen and Bonderand for Suchet, were particularly talented and hard working. This was especially true of Ray and Bourdon, who nearly worked

themselves to death to secure adequate supplies, haul them, and pay for them. This was an uphill battle fought often against Imperial interference.

The procurement of supplies was only partly done off the land which was both halting an unsure, particularly off long occupied ground. This threw the Army of Catalonia onto France and the Pyrenees districts of the 10e Division Militaire in particular for continued supplies. France was quite hard pressed to support the enormous demands of the army. Its dependence became so consuming that General Lacuée, the Minister-Directeur, bowing to repeated Imperial storms put his foot down and restricted his hitherto generous support of the Army of Catalonia. He demanded offensive movement as the tonic for lack of supplies. New ground to support would provide adequate new supplies and money to pay for the army.

This 1811 policy certainly took a leaf from Suchet's book, but the Army of Catalonia lacked adequate forces and was incapable of launching such offensives. Nearly half of the army was needed for occupation services and a large portion of the 'Armée Active' too was required to fight the insurgent war, leaving about a division capable of offensive operations. The collapse of this plan finally threw the Army of Catalonia onto the resources of France for the rest of the war.

Hauling these supplies was another problem which forever plagued the logisticians. From 1808-1809 there was an utterly inadequate auxiliary equipage service. Not only was provender scarce in Catalonia but transport was too. The VII Corps lived virtually from hand to mouth in this respect and only the infusion of some pack mule brigades kept the corps from logistical paralysis. This too provided inadequate and Napoleon under General

Lacuée's continual prompting gave way to the transfer of two equipage battalions to Catalonia.

These units did grueling service there along some of the worst roads in Europe. Their operations virtually destroyed these battalions, and it was only the continual intercession of General Lacuée that caused the one battalion to remain in Catalonia until 1814, operational.

The land convoys to the ever hungry Barcelona consumed a vast quantity of time and troops. They virtually suspended military operations and consumed vast quantities of transport, mostly auxiliary transport stripped from the screaming Prefects of the Pyrénées Departments. Some of these enormous convoys required 1,000 wagons and three divisions to escort, an index of the ferocity of the war. The sea transport used to feed the Army of Catalonia, and Barcelona in particular, suffered from the same drawbacks except that they expended naval resources. The same intensity of the war here was certainly evidenced by the near 50% loss rate of ships and many tons of supplies. The insurance rates and transport costs became so great that they were more costly than the actual cargo. The sea transport service was only partly successful due to the Corsair and British naval interference, but even a 50% success rate kept the garrison fed.

The cost of this support was enormous. Since the army could never depend on local contributions it had to depend on French funding. For subsistence alone we speak of millions of francs per annum, a cost that France could ill afford and which Napoleon was loath to pay. It was the cost that caused many of the headaches of the Ordonnateurs.

Commanders and Ordonnateurs worked ceaselessly to support the army under the worst military circumstances. It was their work and that of the French staffs at every level that kept the war effort alive and the army undefeated until 1814 and the fall of the Empire. The lack of troops and logistical support from France made winning the war impossible in the long run, but the Herculean efforts of the staff and command in the Army of Catalonia staved off defeat and made the occupation unbreakable, under the most difficult circumstances. For this the French commanders, logisticians and staffs can be said to have done a genuinely creditable job at managing their war. Little glory accrued to them, but they doggedly held on to Catalonia under conditions that would have destroyed most armies.

This dissertation has examined in detail the structure, operations and logistics of the Army of Catalonia which fought one of the most harrowing series of campaigns of the Napoleonic Wars. This work is, in point of fact, a unique treatment of this area of Napoleonic studies. At present there is no adequate operational or logistical treatment of the war. The studies of the nineteenth century were simply operational ones and rarely, if ever, touch upon the aspects of the organization of the Army of Catalonia and its impact on the operations of the war.

The historians who address this aspect of the war (at all) include Sir Charles Oman in his A History of the Peninsular War, Juan Lopez's Guerra de la Independencia 1808-1814, and Gomez de Arteché y Mono's enormous Guerra de la Independencia are the best of the narrative histories of the war. Oman, in particular, discussed the Army of Catalonia per se but not in detail. More recently, Scott Bowden's Armies at Waterloo and

Napoleon's Grande Armée: 1813 and Scott Bowden and Charles Tarbox's Armies on the Danube: 1809 all presented analyses of Napoleonic Armies. They only offer, however, an examination of the Grande Armée for a single campaign, not a whole war, and nor do they explore the force structure of the Army and its influences on the conduct of operations.

In the area of logistics no one examines this critical area at all in any substantive way. The studies of the French Army, such as Elting's Swords Around a Throne, do examine the French logistical system but not in the light of any sustained military operation. This study, on the contrary, remedies this historical deficiency by not only examining the logistical structure of the Army of Catalonia but treating the logistical organization in action, that is, the process of logistical support operations to the Army of Catalonia.

It examines, in turn, the logistical structure used in the Corps d'Armée and the Army of Catalonia in particular. Our discussion proceeds to a bird's eye view of the whole structure in its operation during the Peninsular War. Then, we proceed to a worm's eye view, the examination of a single area of logistical support - meat procurement and supply. Finally, I examine the problem of military transportation in Catalonia which effected the scheme of operations as profoundly as any factor of the war.

In the area of logistics, then, this study breaks completely new ground by proving the difficulties of Napoleonic supply in Spain, and its profound effect on the conduct of operations. Secondly, the discussion on supply in Catalonia provides some desperately needed perspective on the notion of Napoleonic armies living off of the land, which were

traditionally held as the standard logistical system of the Grande Armée. It demonstrates that such supply was, in Catalonia, impossible, and the needs of the Army necessitated the establishment of formal lines of communication from France.

The area of transportation is one which is not discussed to any extent in the modern literature as, for example, only briefly by Elting and that from a strictly organizational perspective. Georges Lechartier in his Les Services de l'Arrière à la Grande Armée en 1806-1807 and A. Pernot's Aperçu Historique sur le Service des Transports Militaires, both treat of transportation more extensively, discussing its organization, and land and water transport. This dissertation goes further in examining the transport problem in Catalonia both at the ministerial and army level and in describing these operations within the perspective of the overall strategic thrust of the war. No other historian examines Napoleonic logistics as completely. This portion alone fills a wide gap in our knowledge of the organization and logistical operations.

The last chapter on the French Military Government of Catalonia is a unique treatment of the organization of military government. The dissertation discusses the theoretical schema of a military government as laid down in General Paul Thiebault's Manual Général du Service des États-Majors. Then it examines the military and political background of the French occupation and the establishment of an improvised government and its failure, leading into the establishment of a formal government. Only Connelly in his Napoleon's Satellite Kingdoms discusses the organization and politics of the various Napoleonic Kingdoms, but never below the royal level, while Conard in his unfinished Napoléon et de Catalogne only discusses the improvised government. This dissertation

fills another gap in the history of the period by discussing provincial government as organized by the French command and discusses it in terms of the strategic necessities of the occupation, the pacification of the province and the support of the army.

This dissertation makes an important contribution to the field of Napoleonic military history. First, it discusses a rarely considered area of the history of the Peninsular War, the war in Catalonia, which is of itself one of great importance. Second, I discuss the French military organization, operations, logistics and military government in a detailed and balanced manner, which gives unique insights into this area of history which other historians have neglected. Third, this dissertation discusses the war in terms of the above mentioned functions of the Army of Catalonia,⁵ adding a unique perspective on the war. Finally, its conclusions and criticism of French policy in Catalonia (both military and political) offer a balanced view of how the Napoleonic military system worked and the practical and often intractable problems it faced.

In these ways then, this unique perspective and handling of a little known area of Napoleonic history sheds light on the workings of Napoleonic armies and has added materially to our knowledge of how Napoleon managed his wars, and on the art of war in general.

⁵Don Alexander in his Rod of Iron discusses the war in Aragon in the light of the counterinsurgent policy of the French occupation.




Figure 1. Lower Catalonia




Figure 2. Upper Catalonia




Figure 3. The French Pyrenees

APPENDIX I

TABLES

TABLE 1

**Infantry Regiment Staff
and Unit Organization¹**

<u>Position</u>	<u>Number</u>
Colonel	1
Major	1
Chefs de Bataillon (Bn. Cdr.)	4
Adjutants-Major (Bn. XO)	5
Quartier-maître Trésorier (Quartermaster: Paymaster)	1
Officier Payeur (pay officer)	1
Porte-Aigle (Eagle Bearer)	1
Chirurgien-Major (surgeon major)	1
Aides-Chirurgiens (assistant surgeons)	4
sous-aides (under assistant surgeons)	5
Adjutants sous-officiers (assistant adjutants)	10
2e et 3e Port-Aigle	2
Tambor-Major (Drum Major)	1
Caporal-Tambor (corporal drummer)	1
Musiciens dont un chef (bandsmen and bandmaster)	8
Maîtres Ouvriers (master craftsmen)	4
TOTAL	50

The Regimental Battalions

1er, 2e et 4e Bataillon de guerre-	
Compagnie de Grenadiers	1
Compagnie de Voltigeurs	1
Compagnie de Fusiliers	4
3e Bataillon de guerre-	
Compagnie de Fusiliers	6
Bataillon de Dépôt	
Compagnie de Fusiliers	3
Compagnie Supplémentaire détachée	1
Five Battalions	
(108 officers and 3,862 men)	2
8 companies	

¹CN, No. 13574. Décret. 18 February 1808, 16:338-341; H.C.B. Rogers, Napoleon's Army, (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1974)61-62.

Table 1 - continued**The Battalion Staff**

Chef de Bataillon	1
Adjutant-Major	1
Maréchal des Logis Chef	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	5²

Infantry Company³

<u>Position</u>	<u>Number</u>
Capitaine	1
Lieutenant	1
Sous-Lieutenant	1
Maréchal des logis	1
Sergeant	4
Caporal-Fourrier (Quartermaster Corporal)	1
Caporal	8
Soldats	121
Tambor	<u>2</u>
TOTAL	140

²Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 61.

³CN, No. 13574. Décret. 18 February 1808, 16:338-341.

TABLE 2**Cavalry Regimental Staff⁴**

1 Colonel	1 Aide-Major
1 Major	2 Sous-Aides-Major
2 Chefs d'Escadron	1 Brigadier-Trompette
2 Adjudants-Majors	1 Veterinary-Surgeon
1 Payeur-Quartre maître	6 Maîtres (tailor, saddler, cobbler, breeches maker, and spur maker)
1 Surgeon-Major	

Total Regimental Strength: 800-900 men

Cavalry Company Organization

1 Captain	1 Fourier
1 Lieutenant	8 Brigadiers
1 Sous-Lieutenant	1 Trumpeter
1 Maréchal-des-logis-chef	82 Troopers
4 Maréchaux-des-Logis	

⁴Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 40; Bukhari, Emir, Napoleon's Cuirassiers and Carabiniers, Men-At-Arms Series, (London: Osprey Publishing, Ltd., 1977)4.

TABLE 3

Artillery Regimental Staff⁵

<u>Grade/Position</u>	<u>Number</u>
Colonel	1
Chefs de Bataillon	4
Adjudants	2
Quartermasters	1
Regimental Sergeants Major	2
Surgeon Major	1
Drum Major	1
Corporal Drummer	1
Bandsmen	8
Master Craftsmen	3

⁵Rogers, Napoleon's Army, 75-77; Nofi, Napoleon at War, 58-61; Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 258-259; Robert-Wilkinson-Latham, Napoleon's Artillery, Men-At-Arms Series, (London: Osprey, 1975)13-16; S. J. Park and G. F. Nafziger, The British Military: Its System and Organization 1803-1815, (Cambridge, Ontario: FAFM Co., Inc., 1983) 40.

TABLE 4

Engineer Park⁶

<u>Tools</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Tools</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Shovels	3,589	Sand Bags	220,000
Pickaxes	3,280	Baskets	10,000
Billhooks	316	Cord Bundles	160
Axes	295	Scaling Ladders	200
Pouches de Sappe	6	Iron Stitching (Bale)	20
Iron Wedges	18	16cm Nails (Kegs)	8
Sledge Hammers	24	8cm Nails (Kegs)	20
Large Iron Pincers	6	Wagons	2

<u>Materials</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Packets (Spare Iron)	7
Iron (Barrels)	70
Iron Ingots (Barrels)	81
Poliveaux	20
Brick (Cubic Meters)	10

⁶Belmas, *Journaux des Sièges*, 2:654; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Division de Général Reille, 1 April 1809; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809; SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Siège de Gironne, 15 September 1809.

TABLE 5

**The Allied Contingents
Army of Catalonia**

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
Berg Contingents: Brigade Army, Division Verdier ⁷		
1st-1st Régiment du Berg	751	12
2d-1st Régiment du Berg	723	10
1st-2d Régiment du Berg	722	15
2d-2d Régiment du Berg	<u>723</u>	<u>16</u>
TOTAL	2,919	63
Berg Contingent-September 1809 ⁸		
1st	577	24
2d	<u>591</u>	<u>21</u>
TOTAL	1,168	45
2nd Westphalian Division-Divisions General Graf Morio ⁹		
1st Brigade-Brigade General Boerner		
2d Berg (2 battalions)	1,092	26
4th Berg (2 battalions)	929	12
2d Brigade-Oberst von Ochs		
3d Berg (2 battalions)	1,554	21
1st Berg Light Battalion	323	12
1st,2d/1st Artillery Regiment	120	14
Cuirassiers	<u>12</u>	<u>12</u>
TOTAL	4,030	97

⁷SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Division de Général Reille, 1 April 1809; Belmas, *Journaux des Sièges*, 2:663.

⁸Belmas, *Journaux des Sièges*, 2:612.

⁹SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809; von Pivka, *Napoleon's German Allies*, 1:15-16; von Pivka, *Armies of the Napoleonic Era*, 256-258.

Table 5 - continued

Division Pignatelli ¹⁰		
1er Lèger Napolitain	1,076	6
1er Ligne Napolitain	1,685	18
2e Ligne Napolitain	2,172	13
1er Chasseurs à cheval Napolitaine	240	232
2e Chasseurs à cheval Napolitaine	<u>184</u>	<u>64</u>
TOTAL	5,357	338

Saxon Infantry Regiment¹¹
(1806)

The 4th Prinz Clemens Infantry Regiment had two battalions of two grenadier and four line companies each.

REGIMENTAL STAFF

<u>Position</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Number</u>
Colonel	1	Fahenjunker (Cadets)	2
Lieutenant Colonel	1	Stabfourrier	
Majors	2	(Staff Quartermaster)	1
Adjutants-Majors	2	Drum Corporal	1
Regimental Quartermaster	1	Musicians 1st Class	8
Auditeur (Regimental Judge)	1	Musicians 2d Class	12
Regimental Surgeon	1	Armorers	2
Assistant Surgeon	1	Provost	1
		TOTAL	38
The Companies			
Captains 1st Class	6	Surgeons	5
Captains 2d Class	4	Corporals	100
Lieutenants	10	Drummers (grenadier)	6
Unterlieutenants	20	Drummers (musketeer)	24
Feldwelel	10	Sappers (grenadier)	4
Sergeants	20	Sappers (musketeer)	16
Fouriers	10	Grenadiers	360
Surgeons	5	Musketeers	1,440
		Total	2,043

¹⁰SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1809; Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810.

¹¹Nafziger, Weirolowski and Devoe, Poles and Saxons of the Napoleonic Wars, 153.

TABLE 6

Gendarmerie d'Espagne
Force Structure¹²

Command	
Commander	1 Chef d'Escadron
Executive Officer (detail)	1 Lieutenant
Gendarmes à cheval	10 eight man brigades
Commander	1 Lieutenant
Cavalry	1 Sous-lieutenant
	1 Maréchal des logis-chefs
	2 Maréchaux des logis ordinaires
	1 fourier
	6 brigades
Total	30 gendarmes ¹³
	38 cavalry ¹⁴
	2 trumpeters ¹⁵
Total	82 soldiers
Gendarmes à pied	10 twelve man brigades
Commander	1 Lieutenant
Infantry	2 Sous-lieutenants
	1 Maréchal des logis-chefs
	2 Maréchaux des logis ordinaires
	1 fourier
	6 brigades
	50 gendarmes
	58 infantry
	2 trumpeters
Total	123 soldiers

¹²Martin, La Gendarmerie Française, 19; Charon, "Gendarmerie Impériale" 322.

¹³Gendarmes drawn from units of the Légions de l'Interieur, both horse and foot.

¹⁴Gendarmes drawn from cavalry and infantry regiments.

¹⁵Trumpeters drawn from the cavalry and infantry contingents.

TABLE 7

**Légion de Catalogne
Organization
21 June 1810¹⁶**

Superior Officers	
Commander:	1 Colonel
Executive Officers:	2 Chefs d'Escadron

Company (Marshal Moncey's version)

Commander	1 Captain
Lieutenance Leaders	5 Lieutenants
Quartermaster	1 Sous-Lieutenant
Cavalry	2 Maréchaux des logis à cheval
	3 Brigades à cheval
Infantry	25 Gendarmes à cheval
	10 Maréchaux des logis à pied
	15 Brigades à pied
	125 Gendarmes à pied
Total	187 Men

Company (Ministry version)

Commander	1 Captain
Lieutenance leaders	5 Lieutenants
Quartermaster	1 Sous-Lieutenant
Cavalry	1 Maréchal des logis à cheval
	4 Brigades à cheval
	25 Gendarmes à cheval
	8 Maréchaux des logis à pied
	17 Brigades à pied
	125 Gendarmes à pied
Total	187 Men

¹⁶SHAT, X(f)171, Ministère de la Guerre, 2ème Division, Bureau de la Gendarmerie Impériale, Chef de Bureau Pryvé, Rapport fait au Ministre, 21 June 1810.

Table 7 - continued

The Lieutenance	
Commander	1 Lieutenant
Cavalry	1 Sous-Officer à cheval
	5 Gendarmes à cheval
Infantry	2 Maréchaux des logis à pied
	3 Brigades à pied
	25 Gendarmes à pied
Total	37 Men

Gendarme brigade	
Gendarme Sous-Officer or veteran	2
Soldiers drawn from the line	4
Total	6

Legion Totals	
Four Companies @ 187 men	748
Superior Officers	3
Total	751

Gendarme contribution to the Legion	
Horse	40
foot	200
Total	240

Line contribution to the Legion	
horse	80
foot	400
Total	480

Total	720
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Gendarme detachment in Catalonia	28
Staff	3
Total	751

TABLE 8

Légion de Catalogne¹⁷

2 January 1811

Unit	Quantity/Grade
Commander	Colonel le Marchant
Major	Chef d'Escadron
1er Compagnie	Chef d'Escadron Casabianca
2e Compagnie	Chef d'Escadron Lenoir
3e Compagnie	Capitaine Richard
4e Compagnie	Capitaine Sempé
5e Compagnie	Capitaine Niderlinder
6e Compagnie	Capitaine Castlenau
(1er,2e Compagnies)	
Commander	1 Chef d'Escadron
Lieutenants	5 Lieutenants
Quartermaster	1 Sous-lieutenant
Cavalry	2 Maréchaux des logis chef
	2 Brigadiers à cheval
	27 Gendarmes à cheval
	1 Trumpeter
	6 Maréchaux des logis à pied
	14 Brigades à pied
	218 Gendarmes à pied
	2 Drummers
Total	279
(3e,4e,5e,6e Compagnies)	
Commander	1 Captain
Lieutenants	4 Lieutenants
Quartermaster	1 Sous-lieutenant
Cavalry	1 Maréchal des logis à cheval
	2 Brigades à cheval
	20 Gendarmes à cheval
	1 Trumpeter
Infantry	5 Maréchaux des logis à pied
	10 Brigades à pied
	263 Gendarmes à pied
	2 Drummers
Total	210

¹⁷SHAT, X(f)171, Extrait des Minutes de la Secrétaire d'Etat, 2 January 1811.

TABLE 9

**Recruits to the 3e Compagnie
Légion de Catalogne
1 April 1811¹⁸**

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Maréchal des Logis</u>	<u>Corporal Brigadier</u>	<u>Pvt.</u>	<u>Total</u>
1er Légion			2	2
9e Légion		1		1
4e Dragons			2	2
24e Dragons			1	1
24e Chasseurs			2	2
26e Chasseurs			2	2
29e Chasseurs	1	1		2
12e Légion			1	1
27e Légion			4	4
28e Légion		1		1
7e Léger	1	2		3
11e Ligne	1			1
13e Ligne	4	2	2	8
23e Ligne		2	1	3
24e Ligne	1			1
26e Ligne			1	1
35e Ligne		2	4	6
53e Ligne	1	3	9	13
60e Ligne		3		3
62e Ligne	3	3	8	14
79e Ligne		2		2
84e Ligne	2	10	3	15
92e Ligne	3	5	5	13
95e Ligne		1		1
106e Ligne	1	4	4	9
118e Ligne		2	1	3
120e Ligne			1	1
122e Ligne	1	3	12	16
5e Ligne		2		2
18e Ligne	2	2		4

¹⁸SHAT, X(f)171, Procès Verbal d'Organisation de la 3e Compagnie de Gendarmerie de la Légion de Catalogne, 1 April 1811.

TABLE 10

**Organization Legion Catalan
October 1811¹⁹**

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>
1er Compagnie à cheval	1 Captain 1 Lieutenant 1 Maréchal des logis chef 4 Brigades 24 Gendarmes
2e Compagnie à cheval	1 Captain 1 Lieutenant 1 Maréchal de logis chef 3 Brigades 20 Gendarmes
3e Compagnie à pied	1 Captain 1 Lieutenant 1 Maréchal de logis 2 Brigades 1 Trumpeter 38 Gendarmes
<u>Staff</u>	
Commander	1 Colonel 1 Major 2 Chefs d'Escadron 2 Chefs de Bataillon
Quartermaster	1 Lieutenant

¹⁹SHAT, X(f)170, Ministère de la Guerre, 2e Division Bureau de la Gendarmerie, Chef de Bureau Pryvé, Rapport fait au Ministre de la Guerre, 14 October 1811.

TABLE 11

**Compagnie Municipale
Barcelona 1808²⁰**

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Number</u>
Colonel	1
Adjudant-Major	1
Aumonier ²¹	1
Captain	1
Lieutenant	2
Sous-Lieutenant	2
Sergeant Major	2
Sergeant Fourrier	6
Corporal	9
Appointés	14
Drummer and Fife	6
Soldiers	92
Infirmiers	13
Total	150

²⁰AN, AFIV 1118, Bureau de l'Inspection, Général Clarke, Rapport à l'Empereur, 2 July 1811.

²¹Normally Napoleon only allowed Chaplains in his allied and foreign units regardless of the origin of their organization, e.g., the Swiss units in French employ.

TABLE 12

Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales²²
Général de Division Comte Joseph Lechi

<u>Units</u>	<u>Strength</u>
1er Brigade-General Millossewitz	
2e-2e de Ligne Italien	708
3e-4e de Ligne Italien	554
2e-5e de Ligne Italien	798
1er Velites Royaux	422
2e Brigade	
3e-2e de Ligne Suisse	448
3e-16e de Ligne	773
1er-1er de Ligne Napolitain	968
2e-1er de Ligne Napolitain	944
Régiment Provisional de Chasseurs/Dragons	
1Cie. Chasseurs Royaux Italiens	150
1Cie. Dragons Italiens	150
1Cie. Dragons Napoléon	150
1Esc.-2e Chasseurs Napolitains	160
Cavalry Brigade General Bertrand Comte Bessières	
Régiment Provisional de Cuirassiers	
1Cie/5e-4e Cuirassiers	118
1Cie/5e-6e Cuirassiers	111
1Cie/5e-7e Cuirassiers	102
1Cie/5e-8e Cuirassiers	109
Régiment Provisional de Chasseurs à cheval	
1Cie/4e-14e Chasseurs à cheval	122
1Cie/4e-15e Chasseurs à cheval	106
1Cie/4e-19e Chasseurs à cheval	100
1Cie/4e-23e Chasseurs à cheval	82

²²No staff had yet been formed for the division, which lacked an Inspecteur aux revues, Commissaire des guerres, Chef d'Etat-Major, a brigade and Division Artillery commander. SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées-Orientales, 15 December 1807.

Table 12 - continued**Artillerie**

11eCie Artillerie Italien	79
1Cie Train d'Artillerie Italien	74
6e/6e (bis) du Train	61

Cannon

four 8pd and eight 4pd cannon (à pied)
 two 8pd and four cannon (à cheval)

Division Total 7,887

TABLE 13

Artillery Structure: Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales²³

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Artillery</u>
11e/1er d'Artillerie à pied	76 men	four 12 pdr
one Co/3e d'Artillerie à pied		eight 4 pdr
one Co/2e d'Artillerie à cheval	100 men	two 8 pdr
one Co/du Train d'Artillerie Italien	120 Horses	four 4 pdr
6e/6e Bataillon (bis)	230 horses	62 caissons
du Train d'Artillerie	80 vehicles	

March Columns**Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales²⁴**

<u>Column</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Arrival Date</u>
1	1er Ligne Napolitaine	14 January 1808
2	2e and 4e Ligne Italien	15 January 1808
3	5e Ligne Italienne, Velites Royaux 11e Cie Artillerie Train d'Artillerie Italien	17 January 1808
4	Chasseurs Dragoon Provisional regiment	
5	Cavalry Brigade	18 January 1808
6	6e/6e (bis) du Train	19 January 1808

²³SHAT, X(d)354, Artillerie, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées, 1808, 6e Division Bureau de l'artillerie, Ministère de la Guerre, Rapport à l'Empereur, 1 January 1808. On 4 January, General Gassendi wrote to General Gerard, outlining his switch of the 6e/7e du Train to the 6e/6e (bis) du Train, the purchase of 1,000 horses and concentrating this unit at Perpignan on 25 January. *Ibid.* Chef de la 6e Division, Bureau d'Artillerie au Général Gérard, Chef de la 3e Division, 4 Janvier 1808.

²⁴SHAT, C(8)485, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 15 December 1807.

TABLE 14

Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, Barcelona²⁵

Commander: Général de Division Duhesme

Chief of Staff: Chef d'Escadron Ordonneau

Artillery: Colonel Fabre

Engineers: Captain Ménard

1st Division: General Chabran

	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
1st Brigade: General Goullus		
3e-2e Suisse	603	5
3e-16e Ligne	708	6
7e Ligne	1,905	14
2d Brigade: General Nicolas		
3e-2e Ligne	605	4
3e-37e Ligne	563	4
3e-56e Ligne	819	7
3e-93e Ligne	795	5
DIVISION TOTAL	6,168	45
2d Division: General Joseph Lechi		
1st Brigade: General Millossewitz		
Vélites Royaux	521	14
2e-2e Ligne	776	9
3e-4e Ligne	607	5
2e-5e Ligne	863	5
TOTAL	2,767	33
2d Brigade: Général Lechi		
EM, 1er, 2e, 3e-1er Ligne Napolitaine	2,028	17
DIVISION TOTAL	4,795	50
Regiment Wimpffen (attached)	2,108	
DIVISION TOTAL	6,903	50

²⁵SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 28 May 1808.

Cavalry: General Bessières

1st Brigade: General Bessières

3e Régiment Provisoire de Cuirassiers	421	428
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Régiment Provisional de Chasseurs	485	486
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2d Brigade: General Schwartz

Chasseurs Prince Royal	520	455
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2e Régiment de Chasseurs	396	399
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Calvary Total	1,822	1,768
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Artillery

1er Artillerie de Division

7e/2e d'Artillerie Légère	123	96
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6e/6e (bis) du Train	90	199
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2e Artillerie de Division

11e Artillerie à Pied	79	
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1er Train d' Artillerie de la Garde	68	104
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Artillery Total	360	399
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Two twelve pounder cannon

Two eight pounder cannon

Twelve four pounder cannon

Two six pounder howitzers

Corps Total	15,253	2,262
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Totals	13,521	2,145
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Present under arms	1,089	117
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Detached	594	
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Prisoner of war	4	
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Furlough	44	
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TABLE 15**Division Reille²⁶**

Commander: Général de Division Honoré Charles Comte Reille
(1775-1860)

Brigades: Generals Dialier, Guillot and Joba

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
4e-16e Ligne	1,007	6
Bataillon Valaison	456	
5e Légion de Réserve	666	4
Bataillon de Perpignan	447	
4e-2e Ligne	795	3
4e-56e Ligne	947	6
1er,2e-113e Ligne	1,409	2
Gendarmerie	103	38
28e Chasseurs à cheval	173	173
2e Chasseurs Napolitains	260	286
2e Artillerie à cheval	53	
Train d'Artillerie	10	19
Train de Réquisition	43	75
1er-32 Léger	463	75
Cannoniers Vétérans	64	
Cannoniers Gardes-Côtes	20	
TOTAL	6,915	602

²⁶SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, Division de Général Reille, nd.

TABLE 16

VII Corps
5 December 1808²⁷

Staff

Commander: Colonel General Gouvion Saint-Cyr
 Chief of Staff: General Louis Emmanuel Rey (1768-1846)
 Artillery: General Ruty
 Engineers: General Sanson
 Gendarmerie: Captain Casabiana
 Wagonmaster General: Adjudant-Sous Officier Provost
 Inspecteur aux revues: Sous Inspecteur aux revues Soutras
 Ordonnateur en chef: Commissaire Ordonnateur Rey

Division Reille: General Reille
 Brigades: Generals Joba and Guillot

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
16e Ligne	959	3
5e Légion de Réserve	940	6
Chasseurs Éclaireurs	613	
Bataillon Valaisan	326	1
28e Chasseurs à cheval	328	230
Gendarmerie	90	33
32e Léger	635	5
2e Ligne	782	9
56e Ligne	938	5
113e Ligne	889	7
2e Chasseurs à cheval	443	335
10e/4e Artillerie à Pied	122	
2e Artillerie à cheval	82	74
TOTAL	6,987	698

²⁷SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 5 December 1808.

Table 16 - continued

Division Chabot: General Louis, Baron Chabot (1757-1837)

1er, 2e-3e Ligne Napolitan	1,546	13
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Division Pino: General Pino

Brigades: Generals Mazzuchelli and Fontane, Adjutant Commandant Balabio.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
2e Léger	1,929	
4e Ligne	1,991	
Chasseurs Royaux	569	535
1er Léger	1,752	
6e Ligne	2,369	
7e Ligne	712	
Dragons Napoléon	534	506
Velites Royaux	122	
5e Ligne	521	
Artillerie à Pied	96	
Artillerie à cheval	92	84
Train	155	252
Sappers	96	
Total	10,398	1,377

Division Souham: General Joseph, Comte Souham (1760-1837)

Brigades: Generals Dumoulin and Verger

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
1er Léger	2,208	18
4e-3e Léger	833	3
42e Ligne	3,131	18
4e-7e Ligne	532	
4e-67e Ligne	812	
4e-112e Ligne	781	
24e Dragons	706	755
13e/4e Artillerie à Pied	63	3
5e Artillerie à cheval	32	32
6e Artillerie à cheval	10	10
15e Ouvriers	5	
4e (bis) du Train	86	149
5e (bis) du Train	39	72
TOTAL	9,238	1,060

Division Duhesme: General Duhesme, General Joseph Lechi
 Brigades: General Joseph, Comte Chabran (1763-1843), François
 Baron Goullus (1758-1833), Jean Baron Nicholas (1765-1833),
 Millosewitz François-Xavier, Baron de Schwartz (1762-1826), and
 Bertrand, Baron Bessières (1773-1854)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
3e-2e Suisse	787	5
7e Ligne	2,234	21
4e-16e Ligne	97	4
2e-2e Ligne	-	-
4e-37e Ligne	889	5
3e-56e Ligne	96	1
3e-93e Ligne	1,006	7
Bataillon de Réserve	594	4
7e/3e Artillerie à cheval	120	91
6e/6e (bis) du Train	101	166
Velites Royaux	486	16
2e-2e Ligne	728	9
3e-4e Ligne	571	5
2e-5e Ligne	826	5
1er Ligne Napolitan	1,668	17
11e/Artillerie à Pied	78	8
Train d'Artillerie de la Garde	61	100
3e Provisoire Cuirassiers	446	340
3e Provisoire Chasseurs	657	543
Régiment Prince Royal	486	331
2e Chasseurs Napolitains	89	65
Total	12,020	1,743

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
Artillery		
12e,13e/4e Artillerie à Pied	181	
10e,11e/7e Artillerie à Pied	219	10
3e Compagnie d'Ouvriers	56	
3e/3e de Pontonniers	95	
6e Artillerie à cheval	22	22
9e Artillerie à pied Italien	50	
1er/Artillerie à cheval Italien	23	18
1er,2e,3e,5e,6e/4e (bis) du Train	226	330
6e du Train	10	19
Total	1,293	1,123
Engineers		
2e/3e Sappeurs	127	7
4e/1er Sappeurs	97	2
7e/2e Sappeurs	101	4
Total	325	13
 Total	 42,503	 6,155
Present Under Arms	34,172	5,439
Detached	2,827	716
Hospital	5,116	
Prisoners of War	387	
Furlough	1	

TABLE 17

Armée de Siège VII Corps
1 July 1809²⁸

Commander:	Général de Division Comte Verdier
Chef de l'Etat-Général:	Adjutant Commandant Requin
Commandant d'Artillerie:	Général de Brigade Baron Taviel
Directeur du Parc:	Chef de Bataillon Charrue
Commandant du Génie:	Général de Division Sanson
Chef d'Attaque:	Chef de Bataillon Fleury
Ordonnateur:	M. Raet
Inspecteur aux revues:	M. Gauti

Division Verdier: General Verdier

	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
Brigade Joba-General Joba		
32e Léger	1,042	11
7e Ligne	864	6
16e Ligne	990	3
Detachment Valaisan	309	2
28e Chasseurs à cheval	183	176
Brigade Guillot-Général Guillot		
2e Ligne	717	6
56e Ligne	893	5
113e Ligne	1,101	6
Brigade Amey-General Amey		
Rgt. de Wurtzburg	1,703	35
1er Berg	1,559	19
2e Berg	1,548	54
Be. des Princes	802	19
Gendarmerie	20	8
Division Total	11,729	350

²⁸SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809. Belmas, Journaux des Sièges faits ou Soutenus par les Français dans la Peninsule, de 1807 à 1814; (Paris: Chez Firmin Didot Frères et Cie 1836), 2:651-652. Numbers are for effectives, including Present Under Arms, Hospital, detached, etc., that is Grand Totals.

Table 17 - continued

Division Mario: Général de Division Mario

	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
Brigade Borner-General Borner		
2e Ligne	1,092	26
4e Ligne	929	12
Brigade Ochs-General Ochs		
1er Léger	323	7
3e Ligne	1,554	21
Cuirassiers	12	12
Division Total	3,910	78

Division Lechi: General Lechi

Brigade Millossewitz-General Millossewitz		
Velites Royaux	541	13
5e de Ligne Italien	1,372	9
Chasseurs Prince Royal	385	225
Brigade Zenardi-General Zenardi		
1er de Ligne Napolitaine	1,295	11
2e de Ligne Napolitaine	1,470	8
2e Chasseurs Napolitaine	434	369
Det. d'Artillerie	28	35
Det. du Train	51	60
Division Total	5,576	730

Artillery/Engineers

2e,5e,12e/3e Art. à pied	357	21
10e,12e,13e/4e Art. à pied	353	19
4e,14e/6e Art. à pied	158	12
1er,2e/1er Art.		
Westphalien	128	14
Art. du Duc de Berg	44	3
Dépôt Art. à Pied	15	0
3e,9eCos Ouvriers		
d'Artillerie	50	5
2e Art. à cheval	74	62
1er de Pioneers	176	1
12e du Train	251	416
2e (bis) du Train	66	123
4e/13e (bis) du Train	98	100
5e Co. Mineurs	98	16

Table 17 - continued

411

2e/3e de Sappeurs	115	12
4e Co. Sappeurs Italien	94	4
7e/2e Sappeurs	80	4
Grand Total	23,382	1,970

TABLE 18

Army of Catalonia²⁹
31 May 1810

Commander:	Marshal Macdonald, Duc de Tarente
Chief of Staff:	General Guilleminot
Artillery:	General Taviel
Engineers:	Lieutenant Colonel ³⁰ Tournadre
Gendarmerie:	Captain Casabianca
Wagonmaster Général:	Adjuant Officer Provost
Inspecteur aux revues:	Inspecteur aux revues Porte
Ordonnateur en chef:	Commissaire Ordonnateur Rey

Division Frère:	General Frère
1st Brigade:	General Augereau
2d Brigade:	General Loreney

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
1er Léger	1,928	19
7e Ligne	3,567	20
4e Ligne	2,716	19
93e Ligne	966	6
3e Provisoire de Chasseurs		
à cheval	468	272
24e Dragons	815	740
Artillerie à pied	90	4
Sappeurs	<u>107</u>	<u>4</u>
Total	10,655	1,084

²⁹SHAT, C(8)362, Situation, l'Armée de Catalogne 31 May 1810.

³⁰The grade of Lieutenant Colonel is called Colonel in second in the French system and is applied to regimental level commanders and major staff heads, like the Engineer Commandant. They are in essence a "second in command."

Table 18 - continued

Division Severoli: General Severoli
 1st Brigade: General Mazzuchelli
 2d Brigade:
 3d Brigade: Général Palombini

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
1er Léger	1,690	
6e Léger	1,445	
7e Ligne	812	
2e Léger	1,877	
4e Ligne	1,698	
Dragons Napoléon	262	252
Chasseurs Royaux	75	70
Sappeurs	110	
Train	130	87
Artillerie à cheval	80	52
Artillerie à pied	<u>86</u>	<u>7</u>
Total	8,265	468

Division Verdier: Général de Division Verdier
 1st Brigade: General Amey
 2d Brigade: General Guillot
 3d Brigade: Adjudant Commandant Devaux

32e Léger	856	16
2e Ligne	843	5
16e Ligne	690	3
56e Ligne	987	4
Bataillon Valaisaon	343	2
Régiment Wurtzbourg	1,330	32
1er Régiment de Berg	928	24
2e Régiment de Berg	858	21
Bataillon des Princes	211	6
4e Bataillon Tour d'Auvergne	286	4
Régiment Léger Westphalien	204	7
2e Ligne Westphalien	388	12
3e Ligne Westphalien	555	12
4e Ligne Westphalien	<u>542</u>	<u>17</u>
Total		165

Table 18 - continued

Division Pignatelli: General Pignatelli

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
1er Léger Napolitain	1,076	6
1er Ligne Napolitain	1,685	18
2e Ligne Napolitain	2,172	13
1er Chasseurs à cheval Napolitain	240	232
2e Chasseurs à cheval Napolitain	<u>184</u>	<u>64</u>
Total	5,357	333

Division Rouyer: General Rouyer
 1st Brigade: General Schwartz
 2d Brigade: Colonel de Second de Chamband

4e de Saxe	1,658	60
5e de Confédération du Rhin	1,313	38
6e de Confédération du Rhin	<u>1,005</u>	<u>25</u>
Total	3,976	123

Barcelona: General Lacombe St. Michel

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
5e Ligne Italien	1,177	16
Chasseurs des Montagnes	331	7
4e-37e Ligne	804	5
4e-67e Ligne	915	6
2e Suisse	347	4
Det/79e Ligne	329	4
4e-112e Ligne	559	
Companie Municipale	161	
Sappeurs Royaux	113	
1er de Nassau	1,270	
Cuirassiers	316	99
Artillerie et Train Italien	<u>180</u>	<u>20</u>
Total	6,502	164

GQG

3e Léger	942	21
3e Prov. Cuirassiers	358	269
Gendarmerie Impériale	<u>68</u>	<u>23</u>
Total	1,368	312

Table 18 - continued

Artillerie:

General Noury

3e Artillerie à Pied	319	15
4e Artillerie à Pied	231	13
6e Artillerie à Pied	188	10
7e Artillerie à Pied	102	5
2e Artillerie à cheval	143	110
5e Artillerie à cheval	26	9
3e Compagnie d'Ouvriers	55	5
9e Compagnie d'Ouvriers		22
3e Bataillon de Pontonniers	80	5
Pionniers	78	
Artillerie Westphalienne	59	4
Artillerie de Berg	89	4
12e Bataillon Principal du Train	112	84
4e Bataillon (bis) du Train	492	447
13e Bataillon (bis) du Train	<u>234</u>	<u>106</u>
Total	2,170	817

Engineers:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
5e/1er Bataillons de Mineurs	85	2
7e/2e Bataillons de Sappeurs	<u>120</u>	<u>4</u>
Total	205	6

Present Under Arms	33,127	3,096
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Absent With Pay:

Embarked	--	--
Detached	2,278	373

Absent Without Pay:

Hospital	2,799
Prisoners of War	2,292
Furlough, etc.	23

Total Effective Strength	47,519	3,469
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TABLE 19

Armée Active
Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne
15 March 1811³¹

Division Quesnel	
Commander:	General Quesnel du Torpt
Chief of Staff:	Adjudant Commandant Nogues
Commissaire des guerres:	M. Lapinière

1st Brigade:	General Garreau
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<u>Unit</u>	<u>Effective Strength</u>	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
3e-3e Ligne	673	2
1er,3e-32e Léger	689	17
4e-2e Ligne	483	6
3e-60e Ligne	910	2
4e-29e Chasseurs à cheval	<u>232</u>	<u>190</u>
Total	2,987	207

2d Brigade:	General Palmarol	
1er,2e-23e Léger	1,348	4
3e-79e Ligne	639	2
4e-37e Ligne	856	4
Baraillon Valaisien	275	2
3e-2e Suisse	412	3
Régiment du Wurtzbourg	551	28
20e Chasseurs à cheval	---	--
Artillery	12	--
Train	15	16
Total	4,108	59
Division Total	7,095	276

Brigade Dummoulin:	General Dummoulin	
1er,2e,4e-3e Ligne	3,723	
3e-24e Dragons	<u>313</u>	<u>211</u>
Total	4,036	211

Brigade Clément:	General Clément	
1er,2e,3e,4e-67e Ligne	2,585	
Detachment/24e Dragons	<u>32</u>	<u>32</u>
Total	2,617	32

³¹SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute-Catalogne, 15 March 1811.

Table 19 - continued

Brigade Lefèbvre:

General Lefèbvre

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Effective Strength</u>	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
2e,3e-102e Ligne	1,640	16
Detachment/24e Dragons	<u>46</u>	<u>42</u>
Total	1,686	58
Total-Armée Active	15,554	657

1er Arrondissement Territorial: General Guillet

4e-16e Léger	537	8
Bataillon Westphalien	328	11
Detachment/24e Dragons	34	32
Dépôt-1er Léger Italien	197	
Dépôt-3e Léger Italien	194	
Dépôt-4e Ligne	200	1
Dépôt-5e Ligne	288	
Dépôt-6e Ligne	82	
Dépôt-1er Léger Westphalien	297	
Dépôt-1er Ligne	301	
Dépôt-3e Ligne	155	
Dépôt-Bataillon de Tarn	24	3
Dépôt-18e Léger	<u>213</u>	<u>—</u>
Total	2,850	55

2e Arrondissement Territorial: Adjudant Commandant Mollard

4e-112e Ligne	291	2
4e-La Tour d'Auvergne	147	3
Dépôt-1er Léger	200	
Dépôt-5e Ligne	33	
Dépôt-7e Ligne	167	
Dépôt-112 Ligne	37	
Dépôt-23e Ligne	44	
Dépôt-42e Ligne	234	
Dépôt-56e Ligne	17	
Dépôt-81e Ligne	67	
Dépôt-93 Ligne	66	
Chasseurs de Montagne	47	
4e Compagne d'Infirmes	<u>65</u>	<u>—</u>
Total	1,405	5

Table 19 - continued

Corps Artillery:

Général Noury

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Effective Strength</u>	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
5e/3e Artillerie à pied	89	7
3e/2e Pontoniers	82	4
3e,9e/Ouvriers d'Artillerie	26	2
Detachment/4e (bis) du Train	91	73
Detachment/9e (bis) du Train	53	3
Detachment/12e (bis) du Train	42	34
1er,2e/Artillerie Westphalienne	44	
1er/Valaisan	44	
Dépôt-Artillerie à pied et cheval	17	3
3e/12e Artillerie à pied	70	7
12e/4e Artillerie à pied	92	7
Detachment/13e (bis) du Train	51	
4e/6e Artillerie à pied	30	5
Detachment/Artillerie du Berg	<u>36</u>	
Total	767	145
Engineers: Chef de Bataillon Michel		
4e,5e/1er Mineurs	106	4
2e Sappeurs	1	
3e Sappeurs	<u>4</u>	
Total	111	4
<u>Recapitulation</u>		
Present Under Arms	15,812	731
Absent With Pay		
Embarked	--	--
Detached	1,268	18
Absent Without Pay		
Hospital	2,051	
Prisoners of War	487	
Leave, etc.	<u>531</u>	
Effective Total	20,149	749

TABLE 20

Armée de Catalogne³²
1 December 1811

Command Group	
Commander:	Général de Division Comte Decaen
Chief of Staff:	Général de Brigade Baron de Plauzonne
Assistant Chief of Staff:	Adjutant Commandant Monistrol
Artillery:	General Taviel
Engineers:	Major Michel
Gendarmerie:	Chef d'Escadron Lenoir
Waggon Master General:	Beauregard
Inspecteur aux revues:	M. Prisyé
Ordonnateur en chef:	Commissaire-Ordonnateur Bourdon

Division Lamarque	
Commander:	General Baron Lamarque
Chief of Staff:	Adjutant Commandant Behr

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Effective Strength</u>	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
1er,2e,3e-11e Ligne	2,355	23
1er,2e,3e-67e Ligne	1,893	19
1er,2e,3e,4e-29, Chasseurs à cheval	649	572
Miquelets	102	
1er,2e,3e,4e-3e Léger	2,845	49
4e,60e Ligne	944	5
Det-1er Léger	529	1
2e-20e Chasseurs à cheval	202	210
Det-18e Léger	33	
Det-5e Ligne	120	
Det-7e Ligne	478	
Det-23e Ligne	17	
Det-42e Ligne	346	
Det-56e Ligne	21	
Det-Nassau	258	
4e-16e Ligne	377	8
3e-81e Ligne	618	
Total	10,936	887

³²SHAT, C(8)370, Situation, l'Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1811.

Table 20 - continued

Brigades	
Brigade Clement:	General Clément
Brigade Hamelinaye:	General Hamelinaye
Brigade Vigier:	Adjudant Commandant Vigier

1er Arrondissement Territorial	
Mont Louis/Rosas:	General Gareau

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Effective Strength</u>	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
2e-Chasseurs de Montagne	824	
1er-Bataillon de Lande	453	
1er-Bataillon de Haute-Garonne	663	
3e-2e Suisse	143	
1er-1er Wutzbourg	<u>512</u>	
Total	2,595	

2e Arrondissement Territorial-		
Figueras:	General Quesnel de Torpt	
Chief of Staff:	Adjudant Commandant Nogues	
Brigade Lefèbvre:	General Lefèbvre	
Brigade Beurmann:	General Beurmann	
1er,2e-23e Léger	1,812	14
3e-24e Dragons	338	201
1er-32e Léger	527	9
1er-Westphalien	415	15
Bataillon de Tarn Garonne	483	
Bataillon de Gear	640	
Gendarmerie à pied	46	
Dépôt Italien	413	
1er,2e,3e-79e Ligne	<u>2,371</u>	<u>19</u>
Total	6,448	262

3e Arrondissement Territorial Gerona:	Adjudant Commandant Dumolard
3e-81e Ligne	
2e,3e-102e Ligne	
Miquelets	
1er,2e/Gendarmerie à cheval	
Total	

6e Légion, Gendarmerie Impériale	1,163	155
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Artillery:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Effective Strength</u> <u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
5e,12e/3e Artillerie à pied	236	10
12e,17e/4e Artillerie à pied	228	10
4e/6e Artillerie à pied	97	5
3e,92/Ouvriers d'Artillerie	20	2
1er,2e/Artillerie Westphalien	35	5
3e/4e Bataillon du Train	102	106
4e/9e Bataillon du Train	75	34
4e/13e Bataillon du Train	98	83
1er Pionniers Volontaire Étrangers	48	
Dépôts	<u>6</u>	
Total	949	<u>255</u>
Engineers		
4e/1er Bataillon de Mineurs	91	10
7e/2e Bataillon de Sappeurs	<u>70</u>	<u>3</u>
Total	101	13
Corps Totals		
Present Under Arms	13,900	1,246
Absent With Pay-Detached	2,004	324
Absent Without Pay-Hospital	8,738	
Absent Without Pay-Furlough	4	
Absent Without Pay-Prisoners of War	84	
Absent Without Pay-Court Martial	<u>7</u>	
Total Effectives	24,740	<u>1,660</u>

TABLE 21

Army of Catalonia

16 July 1812³³

Commander:	Général Decaen
Chief of Staff:	Général de Brigade Hamelinaye
Artillery:	Général de Brigade Prost
Engineers:	Major Michel
Gendarmerie:	Collonel Galliot
Waggon Master General:	M. Beauregard
Inspection aux revues:	Inspecteur aux revue Prisye
Ordonnateur en chef:	Commissaire Ordonnateur Bourden

Division de Sègre

Commander: General Quesnel

Brigades: Generals Garreau and Beaurmann Men Horses

1er,2e-20e Ligne		
1er,2e,3e-102e Ligne	1,067	
3e-116e Ligne	612	
1er-3e Bayonne	968	
1er-1er Wurtzbourg	465	
3e-2e Suisse		
1er-3e Berg	859	
Chasseurs de Montagne	410	
5e/6e Légion de Gendarmerie	181	24
29e Chasseurs à cheval	109	90
Total	5,571	114

Division en Haute Catalogne

Commander: General Lamarque

1st Brigade: General Esprit

1er,2e,3e-3e Léger	2,028	
1er,2e,3e-79e Ligne	2,168	
2e,4e/29e Chasseurs à cheval	116	119
Total	4,312	119

2d Brigade: Colonel Petit

1er,2e,3e-5e Ligne	2,439	
1er,2e-67e Ligne	1,471	
Miquelets de St. Coloma	131	12
5e/29e Chasseurs à cheval	78	83
Total	4,119	95

³³SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 16 July 1812.

Arrondissement de Figueras: General Lefebvre	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
1er,2e,3e,4e-60e Ligne	2,821	
Det/67e Ligne	70	
Det/79e Ligne	72	
Art/79e Ligne	69	
Det/81e Ligne	17	
Art/3e Léger	59	
Det/8e Léger	9	
Det/23e Léger	7	
Det/32e Léger	5	
1er Bn Tarn et Garonne	435	
1er Bn du Gear	388	
2e,6e/6e Légion de Gendarmerie	444	57
1er Bn Westphalien	332	
Det/29e Chasseurs à cheval	91	89
Total	4,759	146
Arrondissement de Gironne: Adjudant Commandant Vigier		
Det/5e Ligne	117	
Det, Art/11e Ligne	328	
Det/42e Ligne	21	
Det/67e Ligne	13	
3e-81e Ligne	447	
Det/1er Léger	10	
Det/3e Léger	205	
3e-8e Léger	523	
Det/23e Léger	104	
1er,3e,4e/6e Légion de Gendarmerie	540	79
3e-32e Léger	754	
1er Guides Catalans	57	37
Det/29e Chasseurs	52	45
Total	3,171	174
Division Total	16,361	534

Division en Basse Catalogne

Commander: General Maurice Mathieu

Brigades: Generals Nicholas, Devaux

	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
3e,4e-18e Ligne	1,295	
3e-20e Ligne	746	
1er,2e-1er Léger Nassau	1,725	
Det/Chasseurs de Montagne	52	
Compagnie Municipale	153	
1er Chasseurs Miquelets	80	
Det/1er Léger	68	
Det/16e Ligne	25	
Det/20e Ligne	182	
Det/42e Ligne	214	
Det/60e Ligne	65	
1er,3e,4e-115e Ligne	2,323	
3e/24e Dragons	248	185
Det/6e Légion de Gendarmerie	61	11
Total	7,235	196

Garrison of Tarragonna: General Bertoletti

1er-20e Ligne	491	
1er,2e,3e-7e Ligne Italien	2,001	
1er Gendarmerie Espagnole	68	
Partisans	38	
Total	2,598	

Garrison of Lerida

2e,3e,4e-20e Ligne	1,758	42
1er,2e,3e-42e Ligne	1,788	
Det/60e Ligne	202	64
Art/7e Ligne Italien	62	12
1er,2e,3e/Chasseurs Royaux Italiens	506	308
Total	4,316	426

Division Total	14,249	622
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Brigade de Réserve

1er,2e,3e-11e Ligne	2,049	
1er,2e-23e Léger	1,378	
Miquelets	156	20
1er,6e/29e Chasseurs à cheval	213	217
Total	3,796	237

Artillery	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
2e,5e,12e,17e/3e Artillerie à pied	432	
12e.13e.17e/4e Artillerie à pied	326	
1er,4e/6e Artillerie à pied	219	
10e/7e Artillerie à pied	119	
3e/9e/Ouvriers d'Artillerie	79	
7e/2e Artillerie à cheval	28	25
1er,2e/Artillerie Westphalien	29	
8e,10e/1er Artilleries Italien	126	
1er,2e,3e,6e/4e Bn (bis) du Train	205	228
1er/Pionniers Volontaires Étrangers	38	
1er/1er Bn du Train Italien	63	10
Total	1,756	258
Engineers		
4e/1er Bn de Mineurs	78	
7e/2e Bn de Sappeurs	64	
1er/Sappeurs Royaux	43	
Total	185	
Recapitulation		
Line Infantry	23,988	172
Light Infantry	6,443	
Gendarmerie	1,226	171
Foreign Battalions	5,543	12
National Guard	1,438	
Cavalry	1,413	1,136
Artillery	1,756	261
Engineers	185	
Irregulars	530	69
Total	40,816	1,659
Present Under Arms	33,792	1,723
Detached	1,030	45
Hospital	5,830	
Furlough	91	
Prisoners of War	1,071	
Court Martial	2	
Effectives	40,816	1,659

TABLE 22

**Army of Catalonia³⁴
1 January 1813**

Staff:	
Commander:	General Decaen
Chief of Staff:	Général Hamelinage
Artillery:	Général Prost
Engineers:	Colonel Szoard
Gendarmerie:	Colonel Gailliot
Vaguemestre Général:	M. Beauregard
Inspecteur aux revues:	M. Prisye
Ordonnateur en chef:	M. Bourdon
Division de Sègre:	General Quesnel General Gareau

<u>Unit</u>		<u>Effective Strength</u>	
		<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
EM, 1er, 2e-102e Ligne		1,266	
3e-116e Ligne	525		
Chasseurs de Montagne		410	
29e Cohorte ³⁵		685	
30e Cohorte		604	
31e Cohorte		778	
Det/1er Hussards	116	115	
Total		4,375	115

³⁴SHAT, C(8)371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1813.

³⁵Napoleon often invoked Roman history in naming troops, such as velite or units. The cohort, named after the Roman 600 man battalion. In 1813 he conscripted 80,000 National Guards by Senatus Consulture (11 January 1813) into cohorts of some 900 men then reorganized them into 88 battalions divided between 22 line regiments. He formed veteran cadres for these cohorts drawn from NCOs four Imperial Guard Regiments from Spain. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 866-867; Flavius Vegetius Renatus, The Military Institutions of the Romans, Tns. John Clark, Ed. Thomas Phillips (Harrisburg: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1944) 40-43; Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War, vol. 1. Warfare in Antiquity, Tns. Walter Renfroe (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1975) 415.

Division en Haute-Catalogne:	General Lamarque	
1st Brigade:	General Beurmann	
	<u>Effective Strength</u>	
<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
EM,1er,2e,4e-60e Ligne	1,996	
EM,1er,2e,3e,4e-115e Ligne	1,772	
2e-3e Berg	635	
Det/2e Hussards	50	52
Chasseurs du l'Ampurdam	204	30
Total	4,669	82
2e Brigade:	Colonel Baron Petit	
EM,1er,2e,Art-67e Ligne	1,195	
1er-32e Léger	589	
Chasseurs Gironne	141	20
3e,7e/29e Chasseurs à cheval	112	110
Total	2,093	130
Arrondissement de Figueras:	General Lefèbvre	
Commandant d'Armes:	General Palmoral	
Art/5e Ligne	44	
Det,Art-11e Ligne	305	
3e-60e Ligne	704	
Art/79e Ligne	53	
Depot-81er Ligne	24	
3e-102e Ligne	578	
3e Provisoire de Bayonne (31e & 26e Léger)	931	
Det/23e Léger	5	
1er Westphalien	303	
1er Bataillon du Tarn Garonne	461	
1er Bataillon du Gear	289	
Det/29e Chasseurs à cheval	23	27
3e-81e Ligne	378	
Total	4,098	27
Arrondissement de Girone:	General Lamarque	
Det/5e Ligne	50	
Det/11e Ligne	66	
Det/42e Ligne	13	
Det/60e Ligne	167	
Det/67e Ligne	68	
Det/79e Ligne	120	
Det/115e Ligne	85	
1er/Guides Catalanes	103	37
Dets-3e Léger	376	

Det/32e Léger	90	
Det/1er Léger de Nassau	247	
1er-1er Wurtzbourg	432	
Dets/3e Berg	161	
Det, Dépôt-29e Chasseurs à cheval	117	94
Total	2,095	131
Division Total	12,955	370

Division en Basse-Catalogne (Barcelona): General Comte Maurice Mathieu
1st, 2d Brigades: Generals Devaux and Baron Nicolas

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Effective Strength</u>	
	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
EM,1er,2e,3e-5e Ligne	2,209	
Dépôt/7e Ligne	13	
Dépôt/11e Ligne	8	
Dépôt/16e Ligne	14	
Dépôt/20e Ligne	45	
3e-23e Ligne	534	
Det-42e Ligne	515	
EM,1er,2e,3e-79e Ligne	1,821	
Det/115e Ligne	104	
Det/1er Léger	18	
3e,4e-18e Léger	1,245	
Det/23e Léger	17	
Det/7e Ligne Italien	50	
EM,1er,2e-1er Léger de Nassau	1,533	
Det/Chasseurs de Montagne	38	
Chasseurs de Barcelone	114	
Compagnie Municipale	153	
2e,6e/29e Chasseurs à cheval	191	180
Total	8,632	180

Garrison of Tarragonna:	General Bertoletti	
1er-20e Ligne	499	
EM,1er,3e-7e Ligne Italien	638	
Partisans	57	
Gendarmerie Espagnole	14	
Det/1er de Chasseurs Italiens	26	27
Total	1,294	27

Garrison of Lerida:	General Henriot	
Art/20e Ligne	46	
EM,1er,2e,3e-42e Ligne	1,153	
Det,Art/60e Ligne	155	
Art/7e Ligne Italien	52	
Det/1er Chasseurs Italiens	174	160
Total	1,580	160

Division Total	11,506	367
Brigade de Réserve: General Esprit		
EM, 1er, 2e-23e Léger	1,457	
Elite, 5e/29e Chasseurs à cheval	165	165
Total	1,622	165
	<u>Effective Strength</u>	
<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
6e Légion de Gendarmerie:		
Colonel Gaillot	1,225	162
Artillery		
2e, 5e, 12e, 17e/3e Artillerie à pied	390	
12e, 13e, 17e/4e Artillerie à pied		286
1er, 4e/6e Artillerie à pied	173	
10e, 11e/7e Artillerie à pied	188	
7e/2e Artillerie à cheval	28	21
3e, 9e/Ouvriers d'Artillerie	90	
1er, 2e/Artillerie Westphalien	29	
3e/3e (Ppl) du Train	103	258
3e/4e (bis) du Train	256	363
1er/1er du Train Italien	81	18
1er/Pionniers Étrangers	30	
Total	1,654	660
Engineers		
4e/1er Mineurs	69	
7e/2e Sappeurs	57	
Det/Train du Genie	34	42
Branches		
Line Infantry	17,524	
Light Infantry	3,797	
Gendarmerie	1,225	162
Spanish Battalions	1,190	
Foreign Regiments	4,051	
Chasseurs à cheval	808	763
Hussars	165	167
Foot Artillery	1,066	
Horse Artillery	28	21
Artificers	90	
Pionniers	30	
Artillery Train	440	589
Miners	69	
Sappers	87	
Engineer Train	34	42
Cohorts	2,067	

Table 22 - continued

430

Irregulars	856	87
Present Under Arms	29,132	1,881
Detached	17	
Hospital	4,169	
Furlough	11	
Prisoners of War	46	
Court Martial	3	
Effectives	33,497	1,881
Grand Total		

TABLE 23

Army of Aragon and Catalonia
15 January 1814³⁶

General in Chief:	Marshal Suchet
Chief of Staff:	General Baron Saint-Cyr Nugues
Artillery:	General Baron Valée
Engineers:	Major Plagniot
Waggonmaster General:	Adjudant Sous-Offcier Tournal
Inspecteur aux revues:	Inspecteur aux revues Pryse
Ordonnateur en chef:	Ordonnateur Bondurand

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
1st Division: General Musnier		
1st Brigade: General Paris		
1er, 2e-1er Léger	1,442	
1ère, 2-121e Ligne	1,502	
2d Brigade: General Pannitier		
1er, 2e-114e Ligne	1,337	
10e Ligne		
Total	4,281	
2d Division: General Mesclop		
1st Brigade		
1er, 2e-7e Ligne	1,646	
1er, 2e-44e Ligne	1,503	
2d Brigade		
1er, 2e, 3e-116e Ligne	2,347	
81e Ligne		
Total	5,496	
3d Division: General Gudin		
1st Brigade: General Esteve		
1er, 2e-14e Ligne	1,289	
1er, 2e-16e Ligne	1,283	
2d Brigade: General Ordonneau		
1er, 2e, 3e-117e Ligne		
2e-3e Léger	867	
2e-11e Ligne		
Total	3,439	

³⁶SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814.

4th Division: General Millet

1st Brigade

1er,2e-18e Léger

1ère,2e-5e Ligne

2d Brigade

1ère,2e,3e-20e Ligne

1,355

1ère,2e,79e Ligne

1,222

Total

2,577

5th Division: General Lamarque

1st Brigade: General Nogues

1ère,2e-23e Léger

963

1ère,2e-67e Ligne

1,196

2d Brigade: General Beuremann

1ère,2e,3e-60e Ligne

1,228

1ère,2e-115e Ligne

1,449

Total

4,836

Division de Cavalerie: General Digeon

1st Brigade: General Delort

1er,2e,3e,4e-13e Cuirassiers

744

733

1er,2e,3e-24e Dragons

734

736

29e Chasseurs: General Guillemet

1er,2e-29e Chasseurs à cheval

492

468

2d Brigade: General Meyer

1er,2e,3e,4e-4e Hussards

890

849

1er,2e,3e-12e Hussards

579

613

Total

3,439

3,399

Arrondissement de Haute-Catalogne: General Habert

Figueras: General Palmoral/Rosas: Chef d'Escadron L'Huillier

Det-32e Léger

250

Det-11e Ligne

120

3e-60e Ligne

730

Det-79e Ligne

40

Bataillon Provisoire de Bayonne (31e Léger and
26e Ligne)

520

Gendarmes de Tarragone

80

Total

1,740

Arrondissement de Gironne: Colonel Broyer (incl. Montlouis, Hostalrich and Palamos)

Det-23e Léger	334	
Det-32e Léger	18	
Det-11e Ligne	23	
Det-60e Ligne	127	
Det-67e Ligne	96	
Det-79e Ligne	91	
Det-115e Ligne	211	
1er,2e-143e Ligne	1,375	
Bataillon Provisoire de Bayonne	100	
Chasseurs de l'Ampurdam	240	41
Guides Catalans	128	50
Chasseurs de Gironne	228	40
Total	2,971	132

Arrondissement de La Bispal

Det-32e Léger	234	
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Brigade de Cerdagne: General Esprit de la Tour

3e-81e Ligne	583	
1er,2e-102 Ligne	1,303	
Total	1,886	

Gouvernement de la Basse-Catalogne/Barcelona: General Habert
Brigades: Generals Lefèbvre and St. Clair

3e,4e-18e Léger	1,248	
1ère,2e-5e Ligne	1,864	
3e-42e Ligne	557	
1ère,2e,3e-117e Ligne	2,013	
3e,4e-143e Ligne	1,592	
Det-79e Ligne	124	
Artillerie-3e Léger	49	
Chasseurs de Barcelone	74	
Compagnie Municipale	131	
Total	7,652	

Engineers

4e/1e Mineurs	108	
4e/2e Mineurs	86	
7e/Sappeurs	140	
4e/4e Sappeurs	106	
4e Train du Génie	45	64
Total	485	64

Equippage		
5e Bataillon du Train	328	278
11e Bataillon du Train	353	440
9e Brigae de Mulets de bât	61	90
Total	742	808
Gendarmerie		
Diverses Légions	38	43
6e Légion de Gendarmerie	206	112
Total	244	155
Infirmiers		
4e Cie d'Ambulance	94	
5e Cie d'Ambulance	304	
Total	398	
Artillery		
7e/2e Artillerie à Cheval (1st Division)	65	63
7e/5e Artillerie à Cheval (2d Division)	88	68
14e/3e Artillerie à Cheval (3d Division)	100	
5e/3e Artillerie à Cheval (4th Division)	95	
13e/4e Artillerie à Cheval (5th Division)	105	
17e/3e Artillerie à Cheval (Cerdagne)	96	
20e/4e Artillerie à Cheval (Parc)	115	
2e/Ouvriers (Parc)	47	
9e/Ouvriers (Parc)	10	
2e/1er Pontoniers (Parc)	18	
2e/2e Artillerie à pied (Barcelona)	101	
12e/2e Artillerie à pied (Barcelona)	103	
11e/7e Artillerie à pied (Barcelona)	94	
3e/Ouvriers (Barcelona)	20	
9e/Ouvriers (Barcelona)	5	
12e/4e Artillerie à pied (Figueras)	117	
17e/4e Artillerie à pied (Figueras)	23	
3e/Ouvriers (Figueras)	43	
17e/4e Artillerie à pied (Gerona)	90	
Total	1,335	131

Artillery Trains

2e/3e (Ppl) du Train (1st Division)	104	150
5e/3e (Ppl) du Train (2d Division)	108	162
6e/3e (Ppl) du Train (3d Division)	113	165
3e/4e (bis) du Train (4th Division)	135	166
3e/3e (Ppl) du Train (5th Division)	92	159
3e/4e (bis) du Train (Cerdagne)	27	41
4e/3e (Ppl) du Train (Parc)	122	177
2e/4e (bis) du Train (Parc)	139	190
3e/4e (bis) du Train (Barcelona)	16	31
3e/3e (Ppl) du Train	11	21
3e/4e (bis) du Train	7	13
Total	874	1,275
Grand Total	43,799	5,964

Recapitulation

Staff	176	
Infantry	20,629	
Cavalry	3,439	3,399
Artillery and Train	2,209	1,406
Engineers	485	64
Cerdagne	1,886	
Upper Catalonia	5,939	132
Lower Catalonia	7,252	
Gendarmes	244	155
Equipage	1,140	808
Grand Total	43,799	5,964

TABLE 24³⁷

**Army of Aragon and Catalonia
1 May 1814**

General in Chief:	Marshal Suchet
Chief of Staff:	General Saint-Cyr Nugues
Artillery:	General Valée
Engineers:	Chef de Bataillon Reville
Gendamerie:	Chef d'Escadron Corso
Inspecteur aux revues:	Inspecteur Prisye
Ordonnateur en chef:	Ordonnateur Bondurand

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
1st Infantry Division: General Lamarque		
Brigades: General Millet		
1ère,2e,Art-5e Ligne	1,945	
3e/4e Ligne	648	
1ère,2e,3e-60e Ligne	2,120	
1ère,2e-121e Ligne	2,019	
Total	6,732	
2d Division: Garrison of Barcelona: General Habert		
1st Brigade: General Lefèbvre		
3e,4e-18e Léger	1,212	
3e-42e Ligne	716	
1ère,2e-44e Ligne	1,408	
Total	3,336	
2d Brigade: General St. Clair		
1ère,2e,3e-117e Ligne	1,993	
3e,4e-14e Ligne	1,501	
Total	3,494	
Det/4e Hussards	85	88
Gendarmerie	35	26
Artillery		
2e,12e/3e Artillerie à pied	202	
11e/7e Artillerie à pied	91	
3e Cie Ouvriers	10	
9e Cie Ouvriers	15	
Det/4e (bis) du Train	37	64
Art (3e Léger)	60	
Art (5e Ligne)	90	
Total	505	64

³⁷SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814.

Engineers		
7e/2e Sappeurs	68	
4e/1er Mineurs	25	
4e/Train du Génie	4	3
Total	97	3
Navy	147	
4e/Infirmiers	70	
Compagnie Municipale	153	
Division Total	7,912	181
Reserve: General Mesclop-Montpillier		
1er,2e-14e Ligne	1,816	
1er,2e,6e-114e Ligne	2,246	
Total	4,062	
Cavalry: General Meyer		
1er,2e,3e,4e/29e Chasseurs à cheval	754	795
1er,2e,3e-24e Dragons	689	535
Total	1,380	1,541
Gendarmerie	192	104
Equippage		
5e Bataillon du Train	664	320
11e Bataillon du Train	334	361
9e Brigade de Mulets de Bât	53	80
Total	1,080	761
Infirmeries	220	
5e Cie d'Ambulance		
Division des Pyrénées Orientales: General Paris		
Brigades: General Lafite and Colonel Roquemaurel		
2e,Art-3e Léger	835	
1ère,Art-11e Ligne	972	
6e-44e Ligne	386	
3e-81e Ligne	742	
4e-186e Ligne	366	
6e,7e-117e Ligne	646	
Total	3,947	
Artillery		
14e,5e/3e Artillerie à pied	202	
20e/1er Artillerie à pied	115	
2e,3e/Ouvriers	79	
2e Pontonniers	18	
17e/3e Artillerie à pied	97	
12e/4e Artillerie à pied	116	
Total	626	

Artillery Train		
3e,4e,5e,6e/3e (Ppl) du Train	512	642
2e/4e (bis) du Train	204	238
Total	1,342	880
Engineers		
4e,7e/2e Mineurs	204	
4e/Train du Génie	10	
Total	214	
Grand Total	19,315	3,305
Recapitulation		
Staff	83	
Infantry	14,741	
Cavalry	1,443	1,541
Artillery and Train	1,342	880
Engineers	214	19
Gendarmerie	192	104
Equippages	1,080	761
Infirmiers	220	
Grand Total	19,315	3,305

TABLE 25

**Fortress Commands in Aragon and Catalonia
1 April 1814³⁸**

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
Figueras: General Palmoral		
1ère, 2e-143e Ligne	675	
3e/5e-31e Léger	355	
Dépôt d'Isales (Barcelona)	61	
Det/60e Ligne	182	
Art/11e Ligne	42	
13e, 17e/4e Artillerie à pied	164	
3e/Ouvriers	31	
7e/2e Sappeurs	26	
4e/2e Mineurs	10	
4e/Pionniers Volontaires	16	
4e/3e (Ppl) du Train	15	25
5e/Infirmiers Militaires	30	
Total	1,607	25
Hostalich: Chef de Bataillon Voisson		
Cie/115e Ligne	103	
Cie/116e Ligne	99	
Cie/143e Ligne	102	
1er/4e Artillerie à pied	50	
7e/2e Sappeurs	1	
Det/5e Cie Infirmiers	5	
Total	360	
Tortosa: General Robert		
1er-11e Ligne	602	
2e-20e Ligne	424	
4e-114e Ligne	702	
4e-117e Ligne	675	
1er-3e Léger	582	
3e-5e Léger	630	
Malades	900	
Cie/Cavalry	73	61
4e/3e Artillerie à pied	42	
6e, 14e/6e Artillerie à pied	73	
2e/Ouvriers d'Artillerie	43	
2e/1er Pontonniers	45	
4e/4e Sappeurs	47	
4e/2e Mineurs	23	
Total	4,780	61

³⁸SHAT, C(8)372, Situation, Armée d'Espagne et de Catalogne, 1 April 1814.

Saguntum: General Rouëlle	
4e-81e Ligne	388
3e-114e Ligne	375
18e/3e Artillerie à pied	89
4e/4e Sappeurs	17
4e/2e Mineurs	10
Total	1,179
Pensicola: Chef de Bataillon Bardous	
½ Cie/16e Ligne	54
Det/16e Léger	25
Det/18e Ligne	43
Det/45e Ligne	52
Det/51e Ligne	95
Det/54e Ligne	89
7e/5e Artillerie à pied	45
4e/4e Sappeurs	6
4e/2e Mineurs	4
Total	413
Denia: Chef de Bataillon Bin	
1e/117e Ligne	97
7e/5e Artillerie à pied	10
4e/2e Mineurs	6
Total	113
Venasque: Chef de Bataillon Fouques	
6e/6e Artillerie à pied	6
2e,3e/Chasseurs de Montagnes	194
Total	200

TABLE 26
Rations, Imperial Rate
August 1810³⁹

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Breads</u>	<u>Rice Legume</u>	<u>Salt</u>	<u>Meat</u>	<u>Fuel</u>	<u>Forrage</u>
Etat Major						
Marshal	24	24	24	24	24	24
Général en Chef	16	16	16	16	16	16
Colonel General	10	10	10	10	10	10
Général de Division	8	8	8	8	8	
Général de Brigade	6	6	6	6	8	6
Adjudant Commandant	3	3	3	3	6	4
Aide-de-Camp						
Colonel	3	3	3	3	6	4
Chef de Bataillon/Escadron	2	2	2	2	4	3
Captain	2	2	2	2	4	3
Lieutenant	2	2	2	2	4	2
Intendant Général	10	10	10	10	10	10
Inspecteurs aux revues						
Inspecteur	6	6	6	6	8	6
Sous-Inspecteur	3	3	3	3	6	4
Sous-inspecteur 2e Classe	2	2	2	2	4	3
Commissaires des guerres						
Commissaire Ordonnateur en chef	8	8	8	8	8	8
Commissaire-Ordonnateur	3	3	3	3	8	4
Commissaire des guerres	2	2	2	2	6	3
Adjoints	2	2	2	2	4	2

³⁹SHAT, C(8) 398, Administration de la Guerre, État du Nombre des Rations allouées à chaque grade 30 June 1810 X(s) 114, Armée de Portugal, Règlement pour le service des Étapes et Convois Militaires, 1 July 1810.

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Breads</u>	<u>Rice Legume</u>	<u>Salt</u>	<u>Meat</u>	<u>Fuel</u>	<u>Forrage</u>
Medical						
Chief Surgeons, Physicians, Pharmacists	2	2	2	2	6	3
Surgeon-majors foot/horse	2	2	2	2	4	½
Aides, Sous-Aides	2	2	2	2	4	1
Ambulance Medical Men	2	2	2	2	4	1
Administration						
Payeurs généraux	3	3	3	3	8	4
Directeurs Généraux des services réunis						
Régisseurs (subsistance)						
Inspecteurs Généraux (clothing, transport)						
Inspecteurs principaux des services réunis	2	2	2	2	6	3
Agents en chef, Directeurs principaux (subsistance, hospitals, transport, and printing presses)						
Postes Militaires (Inspecteurs and Directeurs en chef)						
Payeurs divisionnaires	2	2	2	2	4	2
Caissier du Payeur General						
Chefs aux constructions des vivres						
Directeurs de Correspondance et de comptabilité des services réunis						
Caissiers						
Gardes Magasins principaux						
Inspecteurs/Contrôleurs (subsistance, clothing, transport)						
Economes divisionnaires						
Inspecteurs/Directeurs - Poste	1½	1½	1½	1½	4	2

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Breads</u>	<u>Rice Legume</u>	<u>Salt</u>	<u>Meat</u>	<u>Fuel</u>	<u>Forrage</u>
Chefs de parc/Gardes parc (vivres viande)						
Gardes Magasin/Commis (subsistance, clothing, hospital)						
Economes, Directeurs - hospitals						
Chef de parc brigade, Adjudants Sous-Adjudants (Transport)						
Contrôleurs, Caissiers, Employes - Postes						
Employes des Postes 2e and 3e Classe	1	1	1	1	2	1
Other Employés, commis	1	1	1	1	2	
Vaguemestre (by Grade)						
Boulangers, Equipage employés						
Charretiers, Romainiers, Butchers, Drovers, Workmen						
Sous-Employés-Poste						
Artillery	1	1	1	1	2	1
Gardes, conducteurs						
Engineers						
Gardes, porters						
Other Staff Employees	1	1	1	1	2	
<u>Installations</u>						
Commandants d'Armées 1er Classe	3	3	3	3	6	3
2e Classe	2	2	2	2	4	2
3e-4e Classe	2	2	2	2	4	1
Adjudants de Place (by Grade)						
Secretaries	1	1	1	1	2	
<u>Troop Units</u>						
Colonels (en second) Majors Infantry	3	3	3	3	6	3
Artillery, Cavalry, Engineers	3	3	3	3	6	4

<u>Grade</u>	<u>Breads</u>	<u>Rice</u> <u>Legume</u>	<u>Salt</u>	<u>Meat</u>	<u>Fuel</u>	<u>Forrage</u>
Chef de Bataillon - Infantry	2	2	2	2	4	2
Artillery, Engineer	2	2	2	2	4	3
Chef d'Escadron	2	2	2	2	4	3
Quartermasters - Infantry	2	2	2	2	4	1
Engineer, Cavalry, Artillery	2	2	2	2	4	2
Adjudants - Major, Infantry	1½	1½	1½	1½	4	1
Engineer, Cavalry, Artillery	2	2	2	2	4	3
Captains Infantry	1½	1½	1½	1½	4	
Engineer, Artillery, Cavalry	2	2	2	2	4	2
Lieutenants - Infantry	1½	1½	1½	1½	4	
Engineers, Cavalry, Artillery	2	2	2	2	4	2
Officers de veterans; by rank as Infantry, Aumoniers, Ministers, Judges of foreign units	2	2	2	2	4	2
Trains-Artillery, Engineer Equippage						
Inspecteur Généraux, Major	3	3	3	3	6	4
Inspecteur Ordinaire, Captain	3	3	3	3	4	3
Adjudants-major, Quartermaster, Lieutenants	2	2	2	2	4	2
Veterinarians						
Noncommissioned officers	1	1	1	1	2	
Corporals, Brigadiers, Soldiers	1	1	1	1	1	
Infirmiers:						
Centeniers, Sous Centeniers	1½	1½	1½	1½	4	
Noncommissioned officers	1	1	1	1	2	
Soldiers	1	1	1	1	1	

		Rations ⁴⁰		
<u>Type</u>	<u>Weight</u>	<u>Volume (l)</u>	<u>Measure</u>	<u>Number</u>
Bread	7½ hg			
Biscuit	5½ hg			
Salt lard	2 hg			
Rice	3 hg			
Legumes (dried)	6 hg			
Salt	1/60 kg			
Wine		¼		
Brandy		1/16		
Vinegar		1/20		
Forrage ⁴¹				
Oats A		8½		
B		8½		
C		9½		
D		8½		
Hay A	7 kg			
B	5 kg			
C	7 kg			
D	5 kg			

⁴⁰Rations are measured in hectograms, i.e. 100 grams or 3 ounces, 8 4/9, drachmes 3.83 ounces, liters and kilograms.

⁴¹Forrage rations are measured by the type of horse or mule. 'A' denotes Cuirassiers, Carabiniers, Dragons, light Artillery and Guides. 'B' denotes Chasseurs, Hussars, Artillery and Engineer train and equipment saddle horses. 'C' denotes Artillery and Engineer Train, equipment and other draft horses. 'D' denotes mules.

Straw	A	5 kg
	B	5 kg
	C	4 kg
	D	4 kg

	<u>Type</u>	<u>Measure</u>	<u>Weight</u>	<u>Number</u>
Firewood	Winter	$\frac{1}{150}$ stere ⁴²	20 hg	
	Summer	$\frac{1}{300}$ stere	10 hg	
Coal	Winter		10 hg	
	Summer		5 hg	
Peat	Winter		10 hg	
	Summer		5 hg	
Candles ⁴³				

⁴²The stère was a cubic measure for firewood and equaled one cubic meter (1.30802 cu. yds. or 35.31658 cu. ft.). A corde of wood is the now common measure and equaled 3.058 steres or 108 cubic feet, or a stack 12 feet high and 3 feet long.

⁴³The Barcelona Ration, SHAT C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus. Candle ration varied but was about 0.01 kg or 1 gm per ration.

TABLE 27

**Total Daily Subsistence Requirements
Army of Catalonia
1807 - 1814⁴⁴**

Division/Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées - Orientales

<u>No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Rations</u>	<u>Rtn Weight</u>	<u>Tons</u>
1.	15/12/07 ⁴⁵	7,887	8,094.5	15,159.6 kg	16.7
2.	28/05/08 ⁴⁶	15,253	15,656.5	29,317.7 kg	32.3
VII Corps					
3.	5/12/08 ⁴⁷	42,503	43,622.5	81,694.9 kg	90.1
4.	6/01/09 ⁴⁸	48,518	49,796	93,256.3 kg	102.8
5.	1/07/09 ⁴⁹	54,794	56,237	105,319.4 kg	116.1
6.	1/12/09 ⁵⁰	44,269	45,440	85,089.2 kg	93.8
7.	1/01/10 ⁵¹	44,552	45,725.5	85,633.2 kg	94.4
Army of Catalonia					
8.	31/05/10 ⁵²	47,519	48,770.5	91,336.1 kg	100.7

⁴⁴SHAT, C(8) 398, État du Nombre des Rations, 30 June 1810.

⁴⁵SHAT, C(8) 485, Situation, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 15 December 1807.

⁴⁶SHAT, C(8) 485, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 28 May 1808.

⁴⁷SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 5 December 1808.

⁴⁸SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 6 January 1809.

⁴⁹SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809.

⁵⁰SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1809.

⁵¹SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810.

⁵²SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Rations</u>	<u>Rtn Weight</u>	<u>Tons</u>
9.	1/10/10 ⁵³	45,348	47,568.5	89,085.3 kg	98.2
10.	1/12/10 ⁵⁴	59,232	60,792	113,849.6 kg	125.5
Corps d'Armée en Haute-Catalogne					
11.	15/04/11 ⁵⁵	20,149	20,680	38,728.3 kg	43.0
12.	1/08/11 ⁵⁶	25,290	25,956	48,609.8 kg	53.6
Army of Catalonia					
13.	1/12/11 ⁵⁷	24,740	25,391.5	47,442.7 kg	52.4
14.	1/01/12 ⁵⁸	24,906	25,562	47,871.7 kg	52.8
15.	16/07/12 ⁵⁹	40,816	41,891	78,952.3 kg	86.5
16.	1/12/12 ⁶⁰	35,680	36,620	68,580.4 kg	75.6
17.	1/01/13 ⁶¹	33,497	34,379	64,384.5 kg	71.0
18.	30/06/13 ⁶²	23,925	24,555	45,986.2 kg	50.7
19.	1/11/13 ⁶³	26,520	27,216	50,969.0 kg	56.2

⁵³SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 October 1810.

⁵⁴SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1810.

⁵⁵SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne, 1 August 1811.

⁵⁶SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute Catalogne, 1 August 1811.

⁵⁷SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1811.

⁵⁸SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1812.

⁵⁹SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 16 July 1812.

⁶⁰SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1812.

⁶¹SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1813.

⁶²SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 30 June 1813.

⁶³SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 November 1813.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Rations</u>	<u>Rtn Weight</u>	<u>Tons</u>
Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne					
20.	15/01/14 ⁶⁴	43,799	44,952.5	84,185.9 kg	92.8
21.	1/05/14 ⁶⁵	19,315	19,824	37,125.3 kg	40.9

Bread, Biscuit, Rice, Legumes, Salt (kg)

No.	Bread (wt)	Biscuit	Legumes	Rice	Salt
1	6,070.8	4,452.0	4,856.7	2,428.4	134.9
2	11,742.4	8,611.1	9,393.9	4,697.0	260.9
3	32,716.9	23,992.4	26,173.5	13,086.8	727.0
4	37,347.0	27,387.8	29,877.6	14,938.8	829.9
5	42,177.8	30,930.4	33,742.2	16,871.1	937.3
6	34,080	24,992	27,264	13,632	757.3
7	34,294.1	25,149	27,435.3	13,717.7	762.1
8	36,577.9	26,823.8	29,262.3	14,631.2	812.8
9	35,676.4	26,162.7	28,541.1	14,270.6	792.8
10	45,594	33,435.6	36,475.2	18,237.6	1,013.2
11	15,510	11,374	12,405	6,204	344.7
12	19,467	14,275.8	15,573.6	7,786.8	432.6
13	19,043.6	13,965.3	15,234.9	7,617.5	423.2
14	19,171.5	14,059.1	15,337.2	7,668.6	426.0
15	31,418.3	23,040.1	25,134.6	12,567.3	698.2
16	27,465	20,141	21,972	10,986	610.3
17	25,784.3	18,908.5	20,627.4	10,313.7	573
18	18,416.3	13,505.3	14,733	7,366.5	409.3
19	20,412	14,968.8	16,329.6	8,164.8	453.6
20	33,714.4	24,723.9	26,971.5	13,485.8	749.2
21	14,868	10,903.2	11,894.4	5,947.2	330.4

⁶⁴SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814.

⁶⁵SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814.

<u>No.</u>	<u>Fresh/Salt Meat</u>	<u>Salt Lard</u>	<u>Wine (lt)</u>	<u>Vinegar (lt)</u>	<u>Brandy (lt)</u>
1	2,023.6	1,618.9	2,023.6	1,011.8	505.9
2	3,914.6	3,131.3	3,914.6	1,957.1	978.5
3	10,905.6	8,724.5	10,905.6	5,452.8	2,726.4
4	12,449	9,959.2	12,449	6,224.5	3,112.3
5	14,059.3	11,247.4	14,059.3	7,029.6	3,514.8
6	11,360	9,088	11,360	5,680	2,840
7	11,431.4	9,145	11,431.4	5,718.2	2,859.1
8	12,192.6	9,754.1	12,192.6	6,096.3	3,048.2
9	11,892.1	9,513.7	11,892.1	5,946.1	2,973.0
10	15,198	12,158.4	15,198	7,599	3,799.5
11	5,170	4,136	5,170	2,585	1,292.5
12	6,489	5,191.2	6,489	3,244.5	1,622.3
13	6,347.9	5,078.3	6,347.9	3,173.9	1,587
14	6,390.5	5,112.4	6,390.5	3,195.3	1,597.7
15	10,472.8	8,378.2	10,472.8	5,236.4	2,618.2
16	9,155	7,324	9,155	4,577.5	2,288.8
17	8,594.8	6,875.8	8,594.8	4,297.4	2,148.7
18	6,138.8	4,911	6,138.8	3,069.4	1,534.7
19	6,804	5,443.2	6,804	3,402	1,701
20	11,238.1	8,990.5	11,238.1	5,619.1	2,809.5
21	4,956	3,968.8	4,956	2,478	1,239

TABLE 28

**Grain Requisitions
10e Division Militaire⁶⁶
August 1813**

<u>Department</u>	<u>Grain</u>	<u>Quan.</u>	<u>Price</u>	<u>Cost</u>	<u>Freight</u>	<u>Total</u>
Gerd	Wheat	4,500	33.33	145,485	49,320	194,805
	Rye	1,500	21.77	32,655	16,440	49,095
Herault	Wheat	4,500	35.73	160,785	37,260	198,045
	Rye	1,500	21.43	32,145	12,420	44,565
Haute-Garonne,	Wheat	750	29.83	22,373	4,433	26,805
	Rye	350	23.12	8,092	2,069	10,161
Aude	Wheat	750	36.12	27,090	3,139	30,229
	Rye	350	28.86	10,101	1,465	11,566
Pyrénées-Orientales,	Wheat	350	38.88	13,608		13,608
	Rye	150	30.74	4,611		4,611
Arriege	Wheat	350	34.93	12,226		12,226
	Rye	<u>150</u>	<u>26.52</u>	<u>3,978</u>		<u>3,978</u>
Total		15,200		473,148	126,545	599,693

⁶⁶AN, AFiv 1176, General Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 12 August 1813; État des Requisitions Faites pour la Subsistance de l'Armée de Catalogne, August 1813. Carriage, freight and total costs rounded to nearest Franc.

TABLE 29

**Meat Requirements
Army of Catalonia
1807 - 1814**

<u>Period</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Rations</u>	<u>Fresh/Salt Beef</u>	<u>Salt Pork/Lard</u>	<u>Mutton</u>
12/07 ⁶⁷	7,887	8,111	2,028	1,623	2,028
05/08 ⁶⁸	15,253	15,686	3,922	3,138	3,922
12/08 ⁶⁹	42,503	73,709	10,927	8,742	10,927
01/09 ⁷⁰	48,518	49,894	12,474	9,979	12,474
07/09 ⁷¹	54,794	56,348	14,087	11,270	14,087
12/09 ⁷²	44,269	45,524	11,381	9,105	11,381
01/10 ⁷³	44,522	45,785	11,447	9,157	11,447
05/10 ⁷⁴	47,519	48,867	12,217	9,774	12,217
10/10 ⁷⁵	46,348	47,663	11,916	9,533	11,916
12/10 ⁷⁶	59,234	60,914	15,229	12,183	15,229

⁶⁷SHAT, C(8) 485, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 15 December 1809.

⁶⁸SHAT, C(8) 485, Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 28 May 1808.

⁶⁹SHAT, C(8) 485, Situation, VII Corps, 5 December 1808.

⁷⁰SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 6 January 1809.

⁷¹SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809.

⁷²SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1809.

⁷³SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 January 1810.

⁷⁴SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 31 May 1810.

⁷⁵SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 October 1810.

⁷⁶SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1810.

04/11 ⁷⁷	20,149	20,721	5,180	4,145	5,180
08/11 ⁷⁸	25,290	26,008	6,502	5,202	6,502
12/11 ⁷⁹	24,740	25,442	6,361	5,089	6,361
01/12 ⁸⁰	24,906	25,613	6,404	5,081	
07/12 ⁸¹	40,816	41,768	10,442	8,354	
12/12 ⁸²	35,680	36,692	9,173	7,136	
01/13 ⁸³	33,497	34,448	8,612	6,890	
11/13 ⁸⁴	26,520	27,272	6,818	5,455	
01/14 ⁸⁵	43,799	43,800	10,950	8,760	
05/14 ⁸⁶	19,315	19,863	4,966	3,973	

The calculation of the above figures are based on the strength of the Barcelona garrison on 27 February 1814, at 8,111 officers and men, consuming 8,341 rations per day. Rations consumed then are 2.758% higher or a factor of 1.0283565.⁸⁷

⁷⁷SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute-Catalogne, 15 March 1811.

⁷⁸SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Corps d'Armée en Haute-Catalogne, 1 August 1811.

⁷⁹SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1811.

⁸⁰SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1812.

⁸¹SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 16 July 1812.

⁸²SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1812.

⁸³SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1813.

⁸⁴SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 30 June 1813.

⁸⁵SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814.

⁸⁶SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814.

⁸⁷SHAT, C(8) 271, Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

TABLE 30
Bovine Epidemic⁸⁸
Hostalrich 1811

<u>Process Verbal</u>	<u>Bullock</u>	<u>Cattle</u>	<u>Animal #</u>	<u>Series #</u>	<u>Weight (kg)</u>
A	2		34	1	880
	2		38	3	1,115
	2		53	3	930
	1		51	2	531
	1		53	2	482
		2	59	2	776
		1	11	3	402
Total					5,125
B	1		10	1	469
	1		16	1	539
	2		19	3	1,013
		2	51	1	713
		1	11	3	402
Total					3,150
C	1		65	5	539
D		1	10	3	396
		1	12	3	377.5
		1	15	3	391.5
		1	16	3	374.5
		1	25	3	351
Total					1,890
E	1		60	1	545
F	1		55	2	495
		1	16	3	374

⁸⁸SHAT, C(19) 7, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Vivres, 1er Section, No. 1562, Chef de Bureau Légère Rapport au Ministre-Directeur, 15 November 1811; Draft of Report No. 1562.

Table 30 - continued

<u>Process Verbal</u>	<u>Bullock</u>	<u>Cattle</u>	<u>Animal #</u>	<u>Series #</u>	<u>Weight (kg)</u>
		1	17	3	347
Total					1,216
G	1		27	1	515.5
	1		43	2	440
		1	12	3	377.5
		1	14	3	381
		1	20	3	351
Total					2,065
H	1		38	1	463.5
		2	8	3	724
		1	10	3	396
		1	14	3	381
		1	15	3	391
		2	18	3	755
		1	6	3	348
Total					3,458.5
Grand Total	18	24			17,988.5

TABLE 31

Bataillons du Train des
Équipages MilitairesSituation⁸⁹ 30 May 1809Dépôt de PauCommander: Lieutenant HanetStation: PauSituation

	<u>Off.</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Horses</u>	<u>Vehicle</u>	<u>Harness</u>	<u>Hosp.</u>	<u>POW</u>
Effectives	5	277	282	45	7	28		

Situation 15 June 1810⁹⁰2e Bataillon - En Route from CommercyCommander: Captain Macord

<u>Staff</u>	<u>Off.</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Horses</u>	<u>Vehicles</u>	<u>Harness</u>	<u>Hosp.</u>	<u>POW</u>
Effectives	2	11	13	8	-	-	-	-
1er Co.	1	109	110	168	36	152		
2e Co.	1	108	109	165	36	152		
3e Co.	1	113	114	166	36	152		
4e Co.	1	99	100	149	36	144		
<u>Totals</u>								
Present	6	419	425	644	141	592		
Absent		8	21	12	3	8	12	1
Effectives	8	438	446	644	144	600		

⁸⁹AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 30 May 1809.

⁹⁰AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires Situation, 15 June 1810.

5e Bataillon (Enroute from Commercy)Commander: Captain GoubertStaff

Effectives	4	9	13	12			
1er Co.	1	101	102	127	36	152	
2e Co.	1	109	110	157	36	152	
3e Co.	1	103	104	155	36	152	
4e Co.	1	104	105	152	36	152	
<u>Totals</u>							
Present	8	398	406	595	142	600	
Absent	5	28	8	2	8	22	1
Effectives	8	426	434	603	144	608	
Depot	4	256	260	123	4		

Situation
15 August 1810⁹¹

2e Bataillon (Catalonia)Commander: Captain Macord, Lieutenant Larochette

Staff	1	15	16	13			
1er Co.	1	102	103	162	36	152	
2e Co.	1	107	108	164	36	152	
3e Co.	1	110	111	159	36	152	
4e Co.	1	105	106	134	36	152	
<u>Total</u>							
Present	5	407	412	632	114	608	
Absent		4	32				28
Effectives	8	436	444	632	144	608	

5e Bataillon (Catalonia)Commander: Captain Grobert

Staff	4	8	13	12			
1er Co.	1	90	102	127	36	152	
2e Co.	1	104	110	157	36	152	

⁹¹AN, AFiv 11184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation 15 August 1810.

3e Co.	1	101	104	155	36	152		
4e Co.	1	100	109	152	36	152		
<u>Total</u>								
Present	8	398	406	595	142	600		
Absent		5	28	8	2	8	22	1
Effectives	8	426	434	603	144	608		
Depot	4	246	250	50	7	38		

Situation⁹² 15 January 1811

2e Bataillon (Narbonne and Figueras)

Commander: Captain Macord
Lieutenant Larochette

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>1er Co.</u>	<u>2e Co.</u>	<u>3e Co.</u>	<u>4e Co.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Personnel	15	104	86	66	100	371
Horses	13	87	82	72	88	342
Vehicles		33	27	28	36	124
Harness		122	122	87	170	501

5e Bataillon (Catalonia)

Commander: Captain Grobert

Personnel	12	102	110	104	100	428
Horses	12	50	61	79	46	248
Vehicles		24	36	36	24	120
Harness		96	152	152	96	496

Depot (Pau)

Commander: Lieutenant Caplet

Personnel						262
Horses						48
Vehicles						7
Harness						28

⁹²AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillon du Train des Équipages Militaires Situation, 15 January 1811.

Situation⁹³
15 April 1811

2e Bataillon (Commercy)⁹⁴

Commander: Captain Macord

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>1er Co.</u>	<u>2e Co.</u>	<u>3e Co.</u>	<u>4e Co.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Personnel		7	18	24		49
Horses		10	35	39		84
Vehicles		3	9	8		20
Harness		12	34	36		82

5e Bataillon (Catalonia)

Commander: Captain Goubert

Personnel	9	118	111	90	77	405
Horses		64	67	61	64	256
Vehicles		54	44	16	17	181
Harness		130	145	127	127	547

Depot (Pau)

Commander: Lieutenant Caplet

Personnel						130
Horses						66
Vehicles						7
Harness						76

⁹³AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires Situation, 15 April 1811.

⁹⁴Only detachments of the companies remained in Catalonia. Only troops in Catalonia are listed the bulk of the Battalion was at the Depot of Commercy to refit.

Situation⁹⁵
Armée d'Aragon et Catalogne
January 1814

5e Bataillon

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>1er Co.</u>	<u>2e Co.</u>	<u>3e Co.</u>	<u>4e Co.</u>	<u>5e Co.</u>	<u>6e Co.</u>	<u>Depot</u>	<u>Total</u>
Personnel	9	127	165	173	174	162	124	8	942
Horses	4	204	16	15	16	15	137		407
Mules			44	55	94	94			287
Vehicles		42					42	1	85

⁹⁵AN, AFiv 1184, Situation des Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires et Brigades des Mulets de Bât à loyer attaches aux Armée d'Espagne d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 16 December 1813 and 1 January 1814.

TABLE 32

**Combined 5e Bataillon
du Train
(5e ppl) Bataillon and
5e (bis) Bataillon⁹⁶**

	Effectives		
	<u>5e (bis)</u>	<u>5e (ppl)</u>	<u>Total</u>
Officers	8	2	10
NCO	64	32	96
Men	299	154	453
Saddle Horses	57	-	57
Draft Horses	-	-	-
Vehicles	-	21	21
Harness	-	77	77
Mules	540	-	540
Mules Harness	599	-	599

	Complete Battalion		Needed	
	<u>6 Cos.</u>	<u>4 Cos.</u>	<u>6 Cos.</u>	<u>4 Cos.</u>
Officers	17	13	7	3
NCO	93	65	-	-
Men	690	461	237	8
Saddle Horses	99	67	42	10
Draft Horses	376	188	376	188
Vehicles	84	42	63	21
Harness	376	188	299	111
Mules	600	450	60	-
Mule Harness	600	450	1	-

⁹⁶AN, AFiv 1183, Général Lacuée Rapport à l'Empereur, 20 November 1811.

TABLE 33
Draft Animal Provision 1811⁹⁷

<u>Div. Mil</u>	<u>Department</u>	<u>Furnished</u>		<u>Required</u>	
		<u>Horses</u>	<u>Mules</u>	<u>Horses</u>	<u>Mules</u>
10e	Gers			50	60
	Ht. Pyr.			25	30
	Bs. Pyr.			30	50
11e	Landes			10	30
	Gironde			20	30
	Deux Sevres	75	200		
12e	Vendée	75	200		
	Vienne	80	200		
	Charenlien	55	44	25	
20e	Chareute	75	101		
21e	Ht. Vienne	47		20	55
Total		407	745	180	225

Provision by Type

	<u>Departments</u>	<u>Purchase</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>With Unit</u>
Horses	407	180	45	110
Mules	745	255	350	-
Total: Horses	765			
Mules	1,350			

⁹⁷AN, AFiv 1183, Administration de la Guerre, Bureau des Étapes, Convois, Transports et Équipages Militaires, Général Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 24 July 1811.

TABLE 34

**Pack Mule Brigades
VII Corps
30 May 1809⁹⁸
(Brigades de Mulets de Bât)**

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Commander</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Mules</u>
16e Brigade	Ss. Lt. Armieu	1	42	43	89
17e Brigade	Ss. Lt. Simon	1	31	32	62
18e Brigade	Ss. Lt. Daudier	1	47	48	91
19e Brigade	Ss. Lt. Gasc	<u>1</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>50</u>	<u>95</u>
Total		1	169	173	337
Avg Strength		1	42	43	84

⁹⁸AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train, Situation, 30 May 1809.

Army of Catalonia⁹⁹
15 June 1810

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Commander</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Hosp</u>	<u>POW</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Mules</u>
16e Brigade	Ss. Lt. Armieu	1	26	4		31	27
17e Brigade	Ss. Lt. Simon	1	23	1		25	31
18e Brigade	Ss. Lt. Campenac	1	14	7		22	12
19e Brigade	Ss. Lt. Gasc	1	32	7	2	42	55
Total		4	95	19	2	120	125
Avg. Strength		1	24	5	2	30	31
% Change							
<u>Unit</u>		<u>Officers</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Hosp</u>	<u>POW</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Mules</u>
16e Brigade		-	-26.2	-	-	-65.2	-69.7
17e Brigade		-	-22.6	-	-	-59.7	-50.0
18e Brigade		-	-55.3	-	-	-75.8	-86.8
19e Brigade		-	-16.3	-	-	-55.8	-42.1
Total % Change		-	-29.0	-	-	-30.6	-62.9

⁹⁹AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillon du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 15 June 1810, and Situation 30 May 1809.

15 April 1811¹⁰⁰

Army of Catalonia

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Commander</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Mules</u>
16e	Armien	1	23	24	15
17e	Simon	1	14	15	17
18e	Campemas	1	8	9	6
19e	Gasc	1	31	32	39
Total		4	76	80	77
Avg.		1	19	20	19

% Change

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Mules</u>
16e	0	-23.3	-22.5	-44.4
17e	0	-41.6	-40.0	-45.2
18e	0	-61.9	-59.1	-50.0
19e	0	-24.4	-23.8	-29.1
Total % Chg from 1809	0	-55.0	-53.8	-77.2

¹⁰⁰ AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train des Équipages Militaires, Situation, 15 April 1811.

Situation, Brigades de Mulets de Bât
August 1809¹⁰¹

<u>Division</u>	<u>Bdes</u>	<u>Employees</u>	<u>Mules</u>	<u>Bâts</u>
GQ	17e, 18e	28	63	63
1er	18e, 19e	48	80	80
2e	16e	31	54	54
3e	-	4	5	-
4e	18e	5	3	3
Total		116	205	200

% Change		
Total	<u>Men</u>	<u>Mules</u>
	-32.9	-39.2

¹⁰¹SHAT, C(8) 362, VII Corps, Rapport du Situation, Mouvements et Emplacement du Corps d'Armée pendant, la mois de Aout 1809, Ordonnateur en Chef Rey, 5 September 1809. AN, AFiv 1184, Bataillons du Train, Situation, 30 May 1809.

Pack Mule Requisition
1810¹⁰²

<u>Department</u>	<u>Division Militaire</u>	<u>Conductors</u>	<u>Pack Mules</u>
Tarn	10e	16	41
Arriège	10e	17	46
Gers	11e	41	85
Bouches du Rhone	9e	47	93
Vaucluse	9e	33	63
Total		154	328

¹⁰²AN, AFiv 1183, Bureau des Étapes, Transports, Convois et Équipages Militaire, General Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur 25 July 1810.

Bataillon Léger des Equipages Militaire
Organization, 1811¹⁰³

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>NCOs</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>	<u>Mules</u>
Battalion Staff	4	8		14	
(Mule Company) ¹⁰⁴	(1)	(8)	(51)	(9)	(92)
Six Companies	6	48	300	54	552
Workers ¹⁰⁵			18		
Trumpeters			6		
Total	10	56	324	68	552

¹⁰³AN, AFiv 1183, General Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 30 January 1811.

¹⁰⁴The soldier-muleteers included trumpeters. General Lacuée simply notes 306 soldats et trumpeters. There must have been one trumpeter per company, six in all. Ibid.

¹⁰⁵The unit workers included blacksmiths (Ouvriers-Maréchaux), and pack harness makers. For maintenance operations, they were probably divided as one blacksmith and one harness maker per company (twelve) and three each at the depot. General Lacuée does not enumerate where these men are, he only notes that total of eighteen workers. Ibid.

TABLE 35

**Pack Mule Brigades
Origins, 1809¹⁰⁶**

<u>Department</u>	<u>Conscripts</u>	<u>Mules</u>	<u>Concentration</u>
Pyrénées Orientales	100	200	Perpignan
Basses Pyrénées	250	660	Pau
Haute Pyrénées	245	220	Tarbes
Arriège	310	500	Foix
Aude	45	90	Carcassonne
Haute-Garonne	130	220	Toulouse
Gers	210	330	Auch
Landes	<u>90</u>	<u>180</u>	Mont de Marlin
Total	1,380	2,400	

¹⁰⁶AN, AFiv 1183, Bandesson, Rapport, 9 January 1809.

TABLE 36

**Pack Mule Brigades
Organization 1809¹⁰⁷**

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Saddle Horses/Mules</u>	<u>Pack Mules</u>
Commander, Lieutenant	1	1	
Maréchal des logis chef	1	1	
Maréchal des logis	2	2	
Brigadiers	4	4	
Trumpeter	1	1	
Solider Muleteers ¹⁰⁸	70		120
Harnessmaker ¹⁰⁹	1		
Farriers ¹¹⁰	2		
Total	82	9	120

¹⁰⁷AN, AFiv 1183, Minute de Decret Imperial, Projet de Decret, Organization, Compagnie de Mulets de Bât, nd., (8 February 1809).

¹⁰⁸Each soldier managed two pack mules, that is 60 soldier muleteers to handle the 120 pack mules. This left ten men as spares 'haut le pied.'

¹⁰⁹Harness makers were bourreliers or batiers.

¹¹⁰Farriers or horse shoers. These, of course, specialised in mule shoeing and medical treatment.

TABLE 37

**Supply Convoy to Barcelona¹¹¹
June 1810**

Advanced Guard¹¹²
Brigade Polombini
Dragons Napoleon
Artillery

Column Head¹¹³

General Taviel

Artillery¹¹⁴

(3e Léger Artillery)

HQ Baggage Vehicles¹¹⁵

Pack Mules

3e prov. Cuirassiers (50 men)

¹¹¹SHAT, C(8) 133, Register, Ordres du Jour et des Mouvements, Maréchal Macdonald, Ordre du Mouvement, 10 June 1810; C(8) 335, Registre, Macdonald, Ordre du Mouvement, 10 June 1810.

¹¹²General Polombini's Brigade is from Genreal Severoli's Division and had here an artillery 'slice' of a howitzer and an 8pdr cannon; and 200 cavalry, probably the Dragons Napoleon, SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810; C(8) 133, Ordres du Jour, and C(8) 335, Registre, Macdonald, Ordre du Mouvement, 10 June 1810.

¹¹³Général de Brigade Taviel was Army Artillery Commander and overall convoy commander, personally commanding the head of the convoy column. SHAT C(8) 362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810; C(8) 133, Ordres du Jour, and C(8) 335, Registre, Macdonald, Ordre du Mouvement, 10 June 1810.

¹¹⁴The disposable artillery with General Taviel was the regimental artillery of the 3e Léger, the HQ attachment regiment. SHAT C(8) 362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810; C (8) 133, Ordres du Jour, and C(8) 335, Registre, Macdonald, Ordre du Mouvement, 10 June 1810.

¹¹⁵The Headquarters (HQ) baggage and pack mules undoubtedly fell under the authority of the Vaguemester Général, though Marshal Macdonald invested the actual convoy command to General Taviel.

CONVOY

Brigade Salm¹¹⁶ (Division Frere)

(Dispersed through Convoy)

6 Cos. infantry

60 Cavalry

1 cannon

25 vehicles

2 Cos. infantry

20 Cavalry

20 Vehicles

4 Cos. Infantry

40 Cavalry

20 Vehicles

2 Cos. Infantry

20 Cavalry

20 Vehicles

4 Cos. Infantry

40 Cavalry

20 Vehicles

2 Cos. Infantry

20 Cavalry

¹¹⁶Général de Brigade Salm's brigade was in Division Frere. He was attached to the HQ Staff and when Général de Brigade Augereau, commanding that brigade returned to France with his brother, Marshal Augereau, Salm took command of it. Ibid.

20 Vehicles

4 Cos. Infantry

40 Cavalry

100 Cavalry

1 Co. Infantry

30 Bullock

1 Co. Infantry

25 Bullock

1 Co. Infantry

25 Bullock

3 Cos. Infantry

40 Cavalry

25 Bullcok

1 Co. Infantry

25 bullcok

1 Co. Infantry

25 Bullcok

1 Co. Infantry

25 Bullcok

3 Cos. Infantry

25 Bullock

3 Cos. Infantry

40 Cavalry

25 bullcok

1 Co. Infantry

25 bullcok

1 Co. Infantry

25 bullcok

1 Co. Infantry

25 bullcok

3 Cos. Infantry

40 Cavalry

25 Bullcok

1 Co. Infantry

25 Bullcok

1 Co. Infantry

25 Bullcok

1 Co. Infantry

25 bullcok

1 Co. Infantry

25 Bullock

3 Cos. Infantry

40 Cavalry

Order of Battle
Supply Convoy to Barcelona
11 June 1810¹¹⁷
(Present under arms)

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
Reconnaissance in Force Division Guillot (Verdier) Three Brigades, of Generals Amey, Guillot and Devaux		
32e Léger	530	16
2e Ligne	465	3
16e Ligne	566	3
56e Ligne	659	4
Bataillon Valaisan	265	2
Regiment Wurtzbourg	711	15
1er Ligne Berg	493	24
2e Ligne Berg	486	21
Bataillon de Prince	180	6
4e Bataillon Tour d'Auvergne	267	4
1er Léger Westphalien	112	5
2e Ligne Westphalien	214	1
3e leger Westphalien	320	1
4e Ligne Westphalien	246	5
Total	5,514	110
Division Pignatelli		
1er Léger Napolitan	780	6
1er Ligne Napolitan	1,166	18
2e Ligne Napolitan	1,494	13
1er Chasseurs à cheval Napolitan	223	232
2e Chasseurs à cheval Napolitan	69	64
Total	3,732	383

¹¹⁷SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
Division Rouyer		
Two Brigades of Generals Schwartz and De Chambard		
4e ligne de Saxe	1,437	60
5e de la Confederation du Rhin	1,128	38
6e de la Confederation du Rhin	535	18
Total	3,100	116
Division Severoli		
Two Brigades of Generals Mazzuchelli, Polimbini (Fontane)		
1er Léger	1,218	
6e Ligne	1,637	
7e Ligne	403	
2e Léger	1,457	
4e Ligne	1,189	
Dragons Napoleon	262	252
Chasseurs Royoux	75	70
Sappers	90	
Train	108	85
Artillerie à cheval	61	50
Artillerie à pied	9	
Total	6,309	457
Division Frere ¹¹⁸		
Two Brigades of Generals Salm and Loreney		
1er Léger	1,489	19
42e Ligne	1,791	19
93e Ligne	500	3
24e Dragons	711	686
Artillerie à pied	76	4

¹¹⁸Division Frère detached one small brigade under General Loreney to remain in Upper Catalonia. It included the 7e Ligne, 1,809 men and 20 horses, and the 3e Prov. Chasseurs à cheval with 242 men and 206 horses, Ibid.

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Men</u>	<u>Horses</u>
Sappers	81	4
Total	4,890	941
GQG		
Marshal Macdonald and Général de Brigade Guillemont		
3e Léger	849	20
3e Prov. Cuirassiers	139	118
Gendarmerie Imperiale	61	43
Total	1,049	161
Grand Total	24,594	1,823
Detached Troops		
Division Frère	452	123
Division Severoli	179	11
Division Guillot	848	55
Division Pignatelli		
Division Rouyer	434	7
GQG	209	151
Total	1,274	347

TABLE 38

Convoys
Port Vendres to Barcelona
1 November 1810¹¹⁹

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Flour</u>	<u>Fate</u>
<u>Hirondelle</u>	20,624.4 kg	Captured off Palamos
<u>Valonte de Dieu</u>	42,840 kg	Captured off Rosas
<u>St. Jean</u>	41,616 kg	Lost at sea
<u>N. des Carmin</u>	27,540 kg	Arrive at Rosas
<u>Hypolite</u>	42,840 kg	Lost at sea
<u>Jean l'Herese</u>	21,296.6 kg	Burned off Palamos
<u>Misercorde</u>	36,720 kg	Burned off Palamos
<u>St. Joseph</u>	26,377.2 kg	Arrived
<u>Eulerlie</u>	55,080 kg	Arrived
<u>Assumption</u>	50,796 kg	Arrived
<u>ND des Carmen</u>	18,360 kg	Arrived
Total	384,091 kg	

¹¹⁹SHAT C(19) 8, Port-Vendre, 1810-1811 Frigate Captain Hurlet, Port Vendres squadron, État des Batiements changes les ler 9 bre 1810 pour comte du GouVERNment et destines à faire partie d'one expedition, 28 November 1810.

TABLE 39

**Convoys to Barcelona¹²⁰
1810-1811**

Ship	Wheat	Flour	Rice	Oats
Convoy I¹²¹				
<u>L'Infortune</u>		19,200 kg		
<u>St. Jean</u>		16,620 kg		
<u>Scorpion</u>		6,000 kg		2,774 dl
<u>Les Deux Frères</u>		16,800 kg		
<u>St. Nicolas</u>		31,800 kg		
<u>Deux Marées</u>	35,363 kg	16,560 kg	2,195 kg	
Total	35,363 kg	106,980 kg	2,195 kg	2,774 dl
Convoy II¹²²				
<u>St. Esprit</u>		21,000 kg		
<u>St. Pierre</u>		25,800 kg		
Total		46,800		
Total	35,363 kg	153,780 kg	2,195 kg	2,774 dl
Convoy III¹²³				
<u>L'Hirondelle</u>		49,200 kg		
<u>Vierge du Rosaire</u>				32,016 kg

¹²⁰SHAT, C(19) 8, Port-Vendres, 1810-11, Frigate Captan Hurtel, État Denrées qui ont été versées dans les Magasin de la place de Roses, 19 April 1811, État des Batiments Faisant partie l'Expedition andonné pour Barcelone dans la 10e Division Militaire nd.

¹²¹This six ship convoy left Port-Vendres on 25 February 1811, put into Rosas to discharge their cargos, destined for Fort Figueras. Successful voyage.

¹²²Departed Port-Vendres 11 April 1811 for Rosas and cargo for Figueras. Successful voyage.

¹²³Departed Port-Vendres 12 April 1811, for Palamos. Arrived and remained due to presence of the enemy.

Convoy IV¹²⁴

<u>La Providence</u>		44,100 kg		3,300 kg
<u>La Marie</u>		48,000 kg		
<u>La Confiance</u>		36,780 kg		
<u>Vierge des Graces</u>				62,889 kg
<u>Pierre Bienfaisant</u>				40,197 kg
<u>La Conception</u>				17,553 kg
<u>Le Salomon</u>				20,753 kg
Total	-	128,880 kg	-	144,692 kg
Grand Total	35,363 kg	272,660 kg	2,195 kg	141,392 kg

¹²⁴Convoy held at Port-Vendre.

TABLE 40

**Convoys, 9e Division Militaire
Port Vendres - Barcelona
April 1811¹²⁵**

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Flour</u>	<u>Rice</u>
Convoy I ¹²⁶		
<u>St. Jean</u>	40,860 kg	2,895kg
<u>La Victoire</u>	27,000 kg	7,294 kg
<u>Le Bien Aimé</u>	58,440 kg	1,810 kg
<u>Les Deux Frères</u>	61,500 kg	
<u>L'Annonciation</u>	25,200 kg	1,728 kg
<u>Les Amis Réunis</u>	51,000 kg	2,416 kg
<u>La Ste. Françoise</u>	48,000 kg	2,070 kg
<u>Le St. Pierre</u>	69,000 kg	6,192 kg
<u>Le St. Michel</u>	24,000 kg	947 kg
<u>des Carmes</u>	<u>42,000 kg</u>	<u>2,171 kg</u>
Total	447,000 kg	27,523 kg
Convoy II ¹²⁷		
<u>L'Amiable Maguerite</u>	93,000 kg	
<u>St. Pierre</u>	42,000 kg	1,251 kg
<u>La Hte. Garonne</u>	42,000 kg	
<u>Le Amiable Victoire</u>	48,000 kg	
<u>La Clémence</u>	<u>47,082 kg</u>	
Total	272,082 kg	1,251 kg
Grand Total	719,082 kg	28,774 kg

¹²⁵SHAT, C(19) 8, Port-Vendres, 1810-11, Frigate Captain Hurlet, 9e Division Militaire (Convoys), 22 April 1811. This was one whole convoy but was split in two.

¹²⁶This ten ship convoy returned to port due to enemy threat.

¹²⁷This five ship convoy sailed but put into Agde.

TABLE 41

**Transport Ships
Port Vendre to Barcelona
1810-1811¹²⁸**

<u>Ship No.</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Departure Date</u>	<u>Unload</u>	<u>Barce- lona</u>
1	<u>L'Hirondelle</u>	39	2/12/10		
2	<u>La Jeune Thérise</u>	35	2/12/10		
3	<u>La Miséricorde</u>	61	2/12/10		Palamos
4	<u>Le St. Joseph</u>	39	2/12/10		Arrive
5	<u>L'Assumption</u>	86	2/12/10		Arrive
6	<u>des Carmes</u>	27	2/12/10		Arrive
7	<u>La Valonte des Duex</u>	64	27/12/10		
8	<u>des Carmes</u>	48	27/12/10		Arrive
9	<u>L'Eidalie</u>	91	27/12/10		
10	<u>St. Jean</u>	70	10/01/11		
11	<u>L'Hypolite</u>	67	10/01/11		
12	<u>St. Antoine</u>	49	10/01/11		
13	<u>Greusson</u>	44	10/01/11		
14	<u>Deux Frères</u>	27	25/02/11	Rosas	
15	<u>Scorpion</u>	29	25/02/11	Rosas	
16	<u>St. Jean</u>	28	25/02/11	Rosas	
17	<u>L'Infortune</u>	28	25/02/11	Rosas	
18	<u>St. Nicolas</u>	61	25/02/11	Rosas	
19	<u>St. Esprit</u>	42	11/04/11	Rosas	
20	<u>St. Pierre</u>	38	11/04/11	Rosas	
21	<u>L'Hyrondelle</u>	71	11/04/11	Palamos	

¹²⁸SHAT C(19) 8, Port Vendres, 1810-11, 10e Division Militaire Commissaire des guerre Diutrass, État General des chargément effectués à Port Vendres pour le Ravitaillement de Barcelone, pendant le 4e Trimestre 1810 et le premier Trimestre 1811, 25 May 1811.

22	<u>La Vierge du</u> <u>Rosaire</u>	?	13/04/11	Vendres
23	<u>La Providence</u>	77	13/04/11	Vendres
24	<u>La Marie</u>	68	13/04/11	Vendres
25	<u>La Confiance</u>	69	13/04/11	Vendres
26	<u>La Vierge des</u> <u>Grâces</u>		31/03/11	Vendres
27	<u>Bienfait</u>		31/03/11	Vendres
28	<u>La Conception</u>		31/03/11	Vendres
29	<u>Salomon</u>		31/03/11	Vendres

Ship No.	Flour Kg	Sacks #	Oats dl	Sacks #	Comments
1	20,624.4	337			Captured at Palamos
2	21,297.6	348			Burned at Palamos
3	36,720	600			Unloaded at Palamos
4	26,377.2	431			Arrive at Barcelona
5	50,796	830			Arrive at Barcelona
6	18,360	300			Arrive at Barcelona
7	42,840	700			Captured by Corsairs
8	27,540	450			Arrive at Barcelona
9	55,080	900			Captured by Corsairs
10	41,616	680			Captured by Corsairs
11	42,840	700			Captured by Corsairs
12	33,598.8	549			Captured by Corsairs
13	16,080	268	2,956	232	Captured by Corsairs
14	16,800	280			Cargo discharged at Rosas
15	6,000	100	2,774	227	Cargo discharged at Rosas
16	16,620	277			Cargo discharged at Rosas
17	19,200	320			Cargo discharged at Rosas
18	31,800	530			Cargo discharged at Rosas
19	21,000	350			Cargo discharged at Rosas
20	25,800	430			Cargo discharged at Rosas
21	49,200	820			Discharged at Palamos
22			7,372	673	(Captured, recaptured to Barcelona)
23	44,100	735	3,300	366	Returned to Port-Vendres
24	48,000	800			Returned to Port-Vendres
25	36,780	613			Returned to Port-Vendres
26			14,220	1,280	Returned to Port-Vendres
27			8,850	992	Returned to Port-Vendres

28			4,327	340	Returned to Port-Vendres
29			4,666	488	Returned to Port-Vendres
Total	749,070	12,348	48,465	4,598	

RECAPITULATION

<u>Nos. Ships</u>	<u>Flour</u>	<u>Oats</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
4	123,073.2		Arrived at Barcelona
12	85,920		Discharged at Palamos
9	273,976.8	10,328	Victim of Corsairs
7	137,220	2,774	Discharged at Rosas
7	128,880	35,363	Discharged at Port Vendres
29	749,070	48,465	

TABLE 42

Convoy
Port d'Agde to Barcelona
27 October 1810¹²⁹

Ship No.	Ship	Tons	Freight Tons	Price/ Ton	Freight Charge
1	<u>L. Vierge de Lucelle</u>	57	55	15.50	11,841.00
2	<u>Port Maurice</u>	46	44	17.00	13,309.00
3	<u>La Conception</u>	47	45	17.00	12,578.00
4	<u>L. Vierge des Grâces</u>	50	48	15.50	11,479.00
5	<u>L'Assumption</u>	126	122	15.50	23,359.00
6	<u>L. Vierge d'Ausaire</u>	49	47	17.00	10,461.00
7	<u>St. Joseph</u>	10	38	17.00	8,404.00
8	<u>L. Vierge de Miséricorde</u>	66	64	15.50	10,626.00
9	<u>Jésus et Marie</u>	28	27	17.00	8,728.00
10	<u>La Ste. Vierge</u>	<u>65</u>	<u>63</u>	<u>15.50</u>	<u>12,970.00</u>
Total		574	553		123,755.00

¹²⁹This provender was packed in 14,967 sacks. SHAT, C(19) 8, Agde, 1811, État des Bâtiments chargés le 27 October 1810 pour le compte du Gouvernement destinés à faire partie d'une expedition ordonnée pour Barcelone.

Table 42 - continued

<u>Ship No.</u>	<u>Cargo (kgs)</u> <u>Grain</u>	<u>Flour</u>	<u>Advance</u> <u>Payment</u>	<u>Gratification</u>	<u>Other</u> <u>Expenses</u>
1	26,477.613	2,400	850.00	800.00	
2	18,284.550	6,780	750.00	800.00	290.70
3	27,095.993	2,820	750.00	800.00	
4	27,017.260	3,060	750.00	800.00	
5	89,259.338	5,580	1,800.00	1,300.00	87.50
6	26,507.537		750.00	800.00	
7		7,920	650.00	800.00	
8	41,926.394		950.00	800.00	
9	13,311		450.00	800.00	68.00
10	56,713.8		950.00	800.00	
Total	300,085.938	28,560	8,650.00	8,500.00	446.20

TABLE 43

Convoys
Agde to Barcelona
October 1810 - May 1811¹³⁰

<u>Ship No.</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Depart Date</u>	<u>Comments</u>
1	<u>La Vielle de Port</u>	21, 23	Arrive Barcelona 27
	<u>Maurice</u>	10/10	October 1810
2	<u>La Conception</u>	10/10	October 1810
3	<u>La Vierge des Carmes</u>	24/10/10	Taken by Corsairs
4	<u>L'Assumption</u>	24/10/10	Arrive Barcelona 11 Jan 1811. Joined Toulon Convoy
5	<u>La Vierge de Lorette</u>	24/10/10	Sunk at sea
6	<u>St. Joseph</u>	24/10/10	Captured by Corsairs
7	<u>St. Vierge</u>	24/10/10	Arrive Barcelona 3 Nov. 1810
8	<u>La Vierge de Miséricorde</u>	24/10/10	Arrive Barcelona 3 Nov. 1810
9	<u>St. Joseph et Marie</u>	24/10/10	Toulon to Barcelona, arrived
10	<u>La Vierge du Rosaire</u>	31/10/10	Arrive Barcelona, 3 Nov. 1810
11	<u>La Vierge des Carmes</u>	19/01/11	Captured by Corsairs
12	<u>Les Deux Frères</u>	19/01/11	Ship diverted
13	<u>La Vierge</u>	19/01/11	Arrived at Barcelona
14	<u>La Bien Armée</u>	24/01/11	Arrived at Barcelona
15	<u>St. Jean-Baptiste</u>	26/01/11	Arrive at Barcelona
16	<u>St. Antoine</u>	2/01/11	Arrive at Barcelona
17	<u>L'Union</u>	29/01/11	Attacked by Corsairs, burned off Palamos
18	<u>Les Deux Navires</u>	29/01/11	Attacked by Corsairs, burned off Palamos

¹³⁰SHAT, C(19) 8, Agde, Commissaire des guerres Serrot, 9e Divison Militaire, Etat General des Approvisionnements expédiés pour le ravitaillement de Barcelone, pendant le dernier Trimestre 1810 et le premier trimestre 1811, Jusqu'au, 7 Mai 1811, 10 May 1811.

19	<u>L'heureuse Magdelaine</u>	29/01/11	Attacked by Corsairs, burned off Palamos
20	<u>L'Auguste</u>	29/01/11	Attacked by Corsairs, burned off Palamos
21	<u>La Victoire</u>	30, 31/01/11	Probably lost at sea (Corsairs)
22	<u>L'Annonciation</u>	12/02/11	Probably lost at sea (Corsairs)
23	<u>Les Ames Réunies</u>	15/02/11	Probably lost at sea (Corsairs)
24	<u>St. Françoise</u>	17, 18/02/11	Probably lost at sea (Corsairs)
25	<u>St. Pierre</u>	4, 10/03/11	Probably lost at sea (Corsairs)
26	<u>La Vierge des Carmes</u>	4, 10/03/11	Probably lost at sea (Corsairs)
27	<u>St. Michel</u>	10, 11/03/11	Probably lost at sea (Corsairs)
28	<u>St. Pierre</u>	13, 15/03/11	Returned to Agde (Corsairs)
29	<u>L'Aimable Marguerite</u>	18/03/11	Returned to Agde (Corsairs)
30	<u>L'Aimable Victoire</u>	20/03/11	Returned to Agde (Corsairs)
31	<u>La Haute-Garonne</u>	21/03/11	Returned to Agde (Corsairs)
32	<u>La Clémence</u>	24/03/11	Returned to Agde (Corsairs)

Table 43 - continued

Port d'Agde (2)					
<u>Ship No.</u>	<u>Grain</u>	<u>Flour</u>	<u>Rice</u>	<u>Salt</u>	<u>Sacks</u>
1	18,284	6,780			113
2	27,095	2,820			47
3	27,017	3,060			51
4	89,359	5,640			93
5	26,477	2,400			40
6	14,967	7,420			326
7	56,713				
8	41,926				30
9	13,311				25
10	26,507				40
11		76,649			1,240
12		61,500			1,025
13		30,014			495
14		60,250			999
15		43,725			721
16		31,306		62,500	500
17		29,580	7,313		593
18			2,495		30
19			4,388		60
20			2,199		30
21		27,000	7,294		550
22		25,200	1,722		445
23		51,000	2,416		885
24		48,000	2,070		830
25		69,000	2,492		1,180
26		42,000	2,171		730
27		24,000	947		413
28		42,000	1,254		719
29		93,000			1,550

Table 43 - continued

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30		48,000			800
31		42,000			700
32		47,082			785
Total	341,556	891,823	62,240	62,500	16,015

TABLE 44

Convoys
Port d'Agde to Barcelona
1810-1811¹³¹

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Grain</u>	<u>Flour</u>	<u>Arrive</u>
<u>La Vierge de Lorette</u> ¹³²	57	26,477.613	2,400	-
<u>La Ville de Port Maurice</u>	46	18,284	6,780	27/10/10
<u>La Conception</u>	47	27,095.993	2,820	25/10/10
<u>La Vierge des Grâces</u> ¹³³	50	27,017.250	3,060	-
<u>L'Assumption</u> ¹³⁴	40	14,967.100	7,920	-
<u>La Vierge du Rosaire</u>	49	26,507.534		3/11/10
<u>St. Joseph</u> ¹³⁵	40	14,967.100	7,920	-
<u>La Vierge de Miséricorde</u>	66	41,926.394		3/11/10
<u>Jésus, Joseph, Marie</u> ¹³⁶	28	13,311		-
<u>La Ste. Vierge</u>	65	56,713.800		3/11/10

¹³¹SHAT, C(19) 8, Agde, Résumé des Operations faites pour le Ravitaillement de Barcelone, 6 May 1811.

¹³²La Vierge de Lorette sunk at sea.

¹³³La Vierge des Grâces diverted with cargo to Sardinia and captured on discharging cargo.

¹³⁴L'Assumption was forced to Marsailles, joined later convoy.

¹³⁵Le St. Joseph captured by Corsairs at Mahonais.

¹³⁶Jesus, Joseph, Marie ran around.

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Tons</u>	<u>Flour</u>	<u>Rice</u>	<u>Salt</u>	<u>Arrive</u>
<u>St. Pierre</u> ¹³⁷	64	42,000	1,251		
<u>Ste. Francoise</u>	71	48,000	2,070		14/03/11
<u>Les Amés Réunis</u>	81	51,000	2,416		10/03/11
<u>L'Annonciation</u> ¹³⁸	37	25,200	1,728		
<u>Le St. Pierre</u> ¹³⁹	112	69,000	2,192		
<u>Le St. Michel</u> ¹⁴⁰	46	24,000	947		
<u>La Notre Dame des Carmes</u> ¹⁴¹	77	42,000	2,171		
<u>La Haute Garonne</u> ¹⁴²	64	42,000			
<u>L'Aimable Victoire</u> ¹⁴³	76	48,000			
<u>La Clemence</u> ¹⁴⁴	83	47,082			
<u>Le St. Jean Baptiste</u> ¹⁴⁵	55	40,860	2,895		
<u>Le St. Antoine</u>	132	24,000	7,306	62,500	14/03/11
<u>La Vierge des Carmes</u>	48	28,200	1,824		10/03/11
<u>La Victoire</u> ¹⁴⁶	66	27,000	7,294		
<u>La Vierge des Carmes</u> ¹⁴⁷	114	62,400	12,241		

¹³⁷St. Pierre not sent, cargo shipped on new vessel.

¹³⁸L'Annonciation got to Barcelona, Corsaires captured en return journey.

¹³⁹Le St. Pierre sunk at Sette, Corsair action.

¹⁴⁰St. Michel sunk at Sette Corsair action.

¹⁴¹La Notre Dame sunk at Sette, Corsair action.

¹⁴²La Haute Garonne returned to Agde.

¹⁴³La Aimable Victoire returned to Agde.

¹⁴⁴La Clemence returned to Agde.

¹⁴⁵Le Ste. Jean Baptiste not sent, cargo on new vessel.

¹⁴⁶La Victoire not sent, cargo on new vessel.

<u>Les Deux Frères</u> ¹⁴⁸	95	61,500		
<u>La Bien Aimée</u> ¹⁴⁹	89	58,440	1,810	
<u>L'Aimable Marguerite</u> ¹⁵⁰	124	93,000		
Total	341,560.01	862,242	46,165	62,500

Port at Agde
Ships Lost
October 1810 - March 1811

<u>Ship No.</u>	Freight (kg) <u>Grain</u>	<u>Flour</u>	<u>Rice</u>	<u>Sacks</u>
3	27,017	3,060		51
5	26,477	2,400		40
6	14,967	7,420		326
11		76,649		1,240
17		29,580	7,313	593
18			2,495	30
19			4,388	60
20			2,199	30
21		27,000	7,294	550
22		25,000	1,722	445
23		51,000	2,416	85
24		48,000	2,070	830
25		69,000	2,492	1,180
26		42,000	2,171	730
27		24,000	947	413
Total	68,461	405,109	35,507	7,403

¹⁴⁷La Vierge des Carmes captured by Corsairs at Toulon after convoy.

¹⁴⁸Les Deux Freres captured by Corsairs at Toulon after convoy.

¹⁴⁹La Bien Aimée arrived at Barcelona.

¹⁵⁰L'Aimable Marguerite returned to Agde.

Quantities Lost

<u>Item</u>	<u>Total Hauled</u>	<u>Goods Lost</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Goods Saved</u>	<u>%</u>
Grain	341,556 kg	68,961 kg	20.0	272,595 kg	80.0
Flour	891,823 kg	405,109 kg	45.4	486,714 kg	54.5
Rice	62,240 kg	35,507 kg	57.1	26,733 kg	42.9
Salt	62,500 kg	-	-	62,500 kg	100.0
Sacks	16,015 kg	7,403 kg	46.2	8,612 kg	53.8
Ships	32 kg	15 kg	46.9	17 kg	53.1
Total Freight	1,358,119 kg	509,577 kg	37.5	848,542 kg	62.5

Port de Sète¹⁵¹

<u>Ship No.</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Comments</u>
1	<u>L'Auguste</u>	19/01/11	Captured at Matero
2	<u>L'Heureuse Magdelle</u>	19/01/11	Captured at Matero
3	<u>L'Union</u>	21/01/11	Arrived 20 March 1811
4	<u>Les Deux Maires</u>	21/01/11	Cargo discharged at Rosas
5	<u>St. Jean Baptiste</u>	19/01/11	Ship lost off St. Filieu
6	<u>La Conception</u>	20/01/11	Arrived at Barcelona ¹⁵²
7	<u>Le Savori</u>	19/01/11	Arrived at Barcelona ¹⁵³
8	<u>St. Espirit</u>	21/01/11	Returned to Sete (Corsairs)
9	<u>St. Louis</u>	21/01/11	Arrived at Barcelona ¹⁵⁴

¹⁵¹Ibid.

¹⁵²La Conception captured by Corsairs during return trip 30 March 1811.

¹⁵³Le Savori captured by Corsairs during return trip, 30 March 1811.

¹⁵⁴St. Louis captured by Corsairs during return trip 30 March 1811.

<u>Ship No.</u>	<u>Grain</u>	<u>Flour</u>	<u>Rice</u>	<u>Salt</u>	<u>Sacks</u>
1	32,792	7,916	1,447.25		900
2	18,270	19,920			608
3		24,000		12,400	400
4	35,363	16,560			891
5	7,250	12,000	1,083		325
6	14,500	36,000	7,062.5		1,000
7	18,125	12,000	1,439.5		600
8	7,250	18,000			500
9	10,950	6,000	1,086.5		400
Total	144,500	168,404	12,119	12,400	5,624

Port of Sete
Ships Lost
1810 - 1811

<u>Ship No.</u>	<u>Freight Grain</u>	<u>Flour</u>	<u>Rice</u>	<u>Salt</u>	<u>Sacks</u>
1	32,792	7,916	1,447.5		900
2	18,270	19,920			608
5	7,250	12,000	1,083		325
Total	58,312	39,836	2,530.5		1,833

Quantities Lost

<u>Item</u>	<u>Total Hauled</u>	<u>Goods Lost</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Goods Saved</u>	<u>%</u>
Grain	144,500 kg	58,312	40.4	86,188	59.6
Flour	168,404 kg	39,836	23.7	128,568	76.3
Rice	12,119 kg	2,530.5	26.9	9,588.5	79.1
Salt	12,400 kg	-	-	12,400	100.0
Sacks	5,624	1,833	32.6	3,791	67.4
Ships	9	3	30.0	6	60.0
Total Freight	337,423 kg	100,678.5	29.8	236,744.5	70.1

TABLE 45

**Provisions to Barcelona
Requests and Supply
September 1810¹⁵⁵**

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Requests Gen. Lacombe St. Michel</u>	<u>Prefect Corregiment</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Quantity Obtained</u>
Quintals	Wheat	18,980	2,263	21,243	6,454
Marc ¹⁵⁶		7,280	1,630	8,910	3,829
Marc		1,950		1,950	57
Marc		38,500	274	28,774	4,967
Marc			14,100	14,100	
Marc					26
Marc					2
Liters	Wine				1,678

Resupply Quantities (qx)

<u>Method</u>	<u>Origin</u>	<u>Flour/Meal</u>	<u>Rice</u>	<u>Salt</u>
Sea	Toulon	60,000	2,850	1,580
Sea	Cette, Agde, Port Vendre	30,000	500	250
Land	Perpignan	15,000	898	422
Total		105,000	4,248	2,652

¹⁵⁵AN, AFiv 1175, 1er Section, Bureau des Vivres, General Lacuée, Rapport à l'Empereur, 17 November 1810.

¹⁵⁶The Quintal Marc (qx Marc) is a hundred weight in the Marc standard of weight. The French Marc equals 244.75 grams (3,777.5 English grains). This is the measure used here. The Barcelona Marc equals 229.82 grams (3,550.75 grains). Doursther, Dictionnaire Universel, 247-251.

TABLE 46

Imported Colonial Goods
J. B. Boyer - Fonfrede
Contract¹⁵⁷

<u>Old Rate</u>			
<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity (qx)</u>	<u>Rate/quintal, F.</u>	<u>Price, F</u>
Cotton	500	120.00	60,000
Sugar (crude)	1,500	110.00	165,000
Sugar	1,500	200.00	300,000
Coffee	600	300.00	180,000
Indigo	100	30.00	3,000
Cachenelli	30	8.00	240
Dye (wool)	400	4.00	1,600
Leather	<u>870</u>	1.50	<u>1,305</u>
Total	5,500		911,145
<u>New Rate</u>			
Cotton	500	600.00	300,000
Sugar (crude)	1,500	300.00	450,000
Sugar	1,500	400.00	600,000
Coffee	600	400.00	240,000
Indigo	100	900.00	90,000
Cachenelli	30	2,000.00	60,000
Dye (wool)	400	44.00	17,600
Leather	<u>870</u>	13.50	<u>11,745</u>
Total	5,500		1,969,345
Gross Income	1,969,345		
	<u>911,145</u>		
Net Income	1,058,200		

¹⁵⁷SHAT C(19) 8, General Lacuée, Rapport à Napoleon, Le Transport du Grains ou Farines, 27 October 1810, Tableau No. 1

Table 46 - continuedLosses¹⁵⁸

<u>Cargo Loss</u>	<u>Marine Insurance</u>	<u>Freight Damage</u>	<u>Reimbursement</u>	<u>Total Expense</u>	<u>Grain Loss</u>
0	280,000 F.	100,000 F.		38,000 F.	
¼	280,000 F.	75,000 F.	63,250 F.	481,250 F.	24,750 F.
⅓	280,000 F.	66,666 F.	84,334 F.	431,000 F.	33,000 F.
½	280,000 F.	50,000 F.	126,500 F.	456,500 F.	49,500 F.
⅔	280,000 F.	33,333 F.	168,667 F.	482,000 F.	66,000 F.
¾	280,000 F.	25,000 F.	189,750 F.	494,750 F.	74,250 F.
All	280,000 F.		253,000 F.	533,000 F.	99,000 F.

Profits¹⁵⁹

<u>Cargo Loss</u>	<u>Expense</u>	<u>Receipt</u>	<u>Losses</u>	<u>Profit</u>
0	380,000 F.	1,058,200 F.		678,200 F.
¼	418,250 F.	993,650 F.		375,400 F.
⅓	431,000 F.	705,467 F.		274,467 F.
½	456,500 F.	529,100 F.		92,600 F.
⅔	482,000 F.	352,467 F.	129,533 F.	
¾	494,750 F.	264,550 F.	230,000 F.	
All	533,000 F.		533,000 F.	

Maximum loss includes 380,000 in insurance and cargo damage and in case of loss of whole cargo a loss of 533,000 F. or a total of 913,000 F.

¹⁵⁸Ibid., Tableau 2.

¹⁵⁹Ibid.

TABLE 47

**Projected Sea Transport¹⁶⁰
Grain Prices**

<u>Grain</u>	<u>Province</u>	<u>Price</u>	<u>Cost</u>
30,000 qx marc	Fance	18.00 F/qx	540,000 F.
20,000 qx marc	Genoa	22.00 F/qx	440,000 F.
20,000 qx marc	Livorene	20.00 F/qx	400,000 F.
30,000 qx marc	Alger	18.00 F/qx	540,000 F.
Total 100,000 qx marc, (18.80 F. avg.)			1,920,000 F
Other Charges, Sacks, etc.			<u>280,000 F</u>
Total			2,200,000 F
Shipping fees (6.00 F/qx marc)			600,000 F
Portage fees (1.00 F/qx marc)			100,000 F
All other expenses			<u>440,000 F</u>
Total Expenses			1,100,000 F
Total Cost (total rate per qx - 33.40 F.)			3,340,000 F
Other Commodities			
Rice - 3,000 qx at 37.50 F.			112,500 F
Salt - 1,000 qx at 14.00 F.			14,000 F
Shipping (6.00 F/qx)			24,000 Fs
Other charges (portage)			<u>9,500 F</u>
Total			160,000 F
Grand Total			3,500,000 F
<u>Barcelona Commodity Prices</u>			
One Quintal Marc of Wheat (Oct. 1810)			50.00 F
Other Charges (shipping, insurance, etc.)			30.40 F
Profit margin			16.60 F
Total Cost, 100,000 qx marc grain			1,660,000 F

¹⁶⁰SHAT, C(19) 8, Général Lacuée, Rapport, 27 October 1810.

APPENDIX II

INTENDANCE STRUCTURE, ARMY OF
CATALONIA, 1807-1814

Appendix II

When the Ministry of War organized the Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales,¹ it lacked an administrative infrastructure, even a Inspecteur aux revues. Paymaster or Commissaire des guerres.² As the division expanded into a corps, the Ministry of Military Administration assigned an Intendance.

**1. Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales
1807 - 1808³**

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Positions</u>	<u>Name</u>
Corps Hq	Commissaire Ordonnateur en chef Assistant	Augier Pinot
Division Chabran	Commissaire des guerres	Laffosse
Division Lechi	Commissaire des guerres	Gini
Cavalry Division	Commissaire des guerres	

The VII Corps Intendance expanded in proportion, to support the now 43,000 men Corps to:

¹CN, No. 13411, Napoleon to Clarke, 23 December 1807 16:24-212; No. 13413, Napoleon to Clarke, 23 December 1807, 16:212-214.

²Pierre Conard notes that this Observation Division lacked a transport service. Napoléon et la Catalogne, 39; SHAT, C(8) 485, Division d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 15 December 1807. Commissaire des guerres Chambon of the 10e Division Militaire provided logistical support to the fledgling division.

³SHAT, C(8) 485, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales 28 January 1808; Situation, Corps d'Observation des Pyrénées Orientales, 28 May 1808.

2. VII Corps 1808⁴

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
VII Corps	Commissaire Ordonnateur en chef Commissaire des guerres (two) Adjoint (two) Adjoint Provisoire (four)	Rey Sapia, Lousteau Thieff, Pinot Lapienne, Lidonie, Souilhagon, Muguet
Division Reille	Commissaire des guerres	Grobert
Division Pino	Commissaire des guerres	Panabelli, Galbiati
Division Souham	Commissaire des guerres	Marchand
Division Chabran		
Division Chabot		
Division Allemande		
Division Westphalienne		
Division Duhesme	Commissaire Ordonnateur Commissaire des guerres Commissaire des guerres Adjoint	Augier Lafosse Pinot Muguet

By July 1809, the Intendance continued to fill, with only some personnel changes in the Division.⁵ As the Corps restructured itself to besiege Gerona, General Verdier's formations received an Intendance/Administrative staff:

⁴SHAT, C(8) 485, Situation, VII Corps, 5 December 1808; C(8) 362, Situation, VII Corps, 6 January 1809.

⁵SHAT, C(8) 485, Situation, VII Corps, 1 July 1809; Situation, VII Corps, 1 December 1809.

3. Siege of Gerona⁶

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
HQ	Commissaire Ordonnateur Adjoint	Grobert Souillagon
1st Division		
2nd Division	Commissaire des guerres	Grobert
3rd Division	Commissaire des guerres	Gini

The Intendance structure of Army of Catalonia in February 1810 retain its basic structure:

4. VII Corps/Army of Catalonia, 1810⁷

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
HQ	Commissaire Ordonnateur en Chef Commissaire des guerres	Rey Grobert, Sapin, Mullet
	Adjoint	Bois, Martin
Division Frere	Commissaire des guerres	Marchand
Division Saseroli	Commissaire des guerres	Galbati
Division Pignatelli		
Division Rouyer	Commissaire des guerres	Cusin
Division St. Michel	Commissaire des guerres	Augier

In June 1810, the Post of Ordonnateur en chef passed to Commissaire-Ordonnateur Bourdon.⁸ Marshall Macdonald formed in mid-1810 a second Corps, the Corps d'Armée d'Haute-Catalogne with it's own Intendance organization. Commissaire des guerres Fain

⁶SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation, Siège de Girone, 15 September 1809.

⁷SHAT, C(8) 362, Situation VII Corps, 1 January 1810; Situation Armée de Catalogne, 31 May 1810.

⁸SHAT, C(8) 133, CM, Ordres du Jour et Mouvements, Order of the Day 9 June 1810. C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 October 1810, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1810.

served as Commissaire Ordonnateur, assisted by four Commissaires des guerres, (Robert, Mongenot, Catalogne, and Schaument) and two assistants (Muget and Menard).⁹ Lower Catalonia, under General Maurice Mathieu had a Commissaire Ordonnateur (Commissaire des guerres Pierre) two Commissaires des guerres (Augier and Pinot) and three assistants (Bonard, Guidin, and Supemire).

When General Decaen took command of the downsized Army of Catalonia in late 1811 he also got an appropriately reduced Intendance:

5. Army of Catalonia, 1811¹⁰

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
HQ	Ordonnateur en Chef	Bourdon
	Ordonnateur	Blanchard
	Commissaire des guerres	Baymondon
	Adjoints (five)	Leumont,
		St. Martin,
Division Lamarque	Commissaire des guerres	Bois, Mongenot,
1e Arr. Territoriale		Millet
2e Arr. Territoriale	Commissaire des guerres	Garnot
3e Arr. Territoriale		Leaumont, Fain,
		Catalonge

Structurally, the army Intendance remained unchanged through 1812¹¹ when another army restructuring presented yet another reworking of the Intendant staff:

⁹SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1810.

¹⁰SHAT, C(8) 370, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1811.

¹¹SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1812; Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 16 July 1812.

6. Army of Catalonia, 1812¹²

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
HQ	Commissaire Ordonnateur en Chef Commissaire des guerres	Bourdon Bernard, Couvois, Mongonet
Division de Segre	Commissaire des guerres	Fain
Arr. de Figueras	Commissaire des guerres	Leaumont
Arr. de Gironne	Commissaire des guerres	Catalogne, Roullon
Tarragonna	Commissaire des guerres	Millet
Lerida	Commissaire des guerres	Rilliot
Brigade de Reserve		

The Intendance again stabilized through 1813 (except for some changes in personnel)¹³ and only changed when Marshal Souchet took command of the combined armies of Aragon and Catalonia in December 1813, when he restructured the entire organization. For example, he replaced General Decaen's Commissaire Ordonnateur en chef, M. Bourdon, with his own man, M. Bondurand. In 1814 then, Marshal Souchet restructured it as follows:

7. Army of Aragon and Catalonia, 1814¹⁴

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
HQ	Ordonnateur en Chef Commissaire des guerres Adjoints	Bondurand Benard, Mongenot St. Marint, Laperriere, Leperney,

¹²SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 December 1812.

¹³SHAT, C(8) 371, Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 January 1813; Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 30 June 1813; Situation, Armée de Catalogne, 1 November 1813.

¹⁴SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 15 January 1814.

		Bernard,
		Demailly
1st Division	Commissaire des guerres	Larreguy
2nd Division	Commissaire des guerres	Bonnard
3rd Division	Commissaire des guerres	Recamier
4th Division	Commissaire des guerres	Reymondon
5th Division	Commissaire des guerres	Augler
Cavalry Division	Commissaire des guerres	Verniac
Cerdagne Brigade	Commissaire des guerres	Fain
Barcelona	Commissaire des guerres	Mongenot
Barcelona	Commissaire des guerres	Laperrier
Pensicola	Commissaire des guerres	Fouet
Jaca	Commissaire des guerres	Faivre
Tortosa	Commissaire des guerres	Ducrest, Cusin
Lerida	Commissaire des guerres	Artiguennaire

The final structural change in the Intendance occurred in April 1814, as the Ministry of War continued its radical draw-down of troops in the Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne to feed the 'front' in Eastern France:

8. Army of Aragon and Catalonia, 1814¹⁵

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
HQ	Ordonnateur en Chef Commissaire des guerres	Bondurand Beraud, de Leumont Millet, Benard, Larreguy de Mailley.
1st Division	Commissaire des guerres	Monnier
Reserve	Commissaire des guerres	Recamier
Barcelona	Commissaire des guerres	Mongonot
	Adjoint	Roulon
Figueras	Commissaire des guerres	Montelrond
Tortosa	Commissaire des guerres	Lieutenant Gibon
Sagonte	Adjoint Provisione	Paperrica
Pensicola	Adjoint	

¹⁵SHAT, C(8) 372, Situation, Armée d'Espagne, 1 April 1814; Situation, Armée d'Aragon et de Catalogne, 1 May 1814.

The Corps and Army level Intendance staffs as noted above only presents a small portion of the logistics personnel. The posts and fortresses, of course, had their own Intendance staffs which may be found in the Installation 'Situation' Reports. Figueras, for example, had four men on its staff: Commissaire des guerres Catalogne, Garde-Magazine des vivres, and Garde-Magazine de habillement.¹⁶ The divisions were similarly manned. One of the largest divisions, the garrison of Barcelona had a uncharacteristically large Intendance, capable of administering not only its 8,000 odd man strength, but the huge quantities of supplies required to feed and cloth it. Additionally, they kept the fortresses in Barcelona, Monjuich, the Citadel, and so forth, in a constant state of readiness to withstand a siege and to support other units moving through or near Barcelona which needed support for active field operations throughout Lower Catalonia.

9. Garrison of Barcelona, 1814¹⁷

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>
HQ	Commissaire des guerres	Mongenot
Vivres Pain	Directeur	Jourdain
	Inspecteur	Lenoir
	Adjoint	Delille
	Garde-Magazine Principal	Simon, Durbon
	Aide Garde-Magazine	Sprigas, Benson
		Bechard, Andre,
		Rave, Seve
Viures Viande	Aide Garde-Magazine Le	La Place
	Brigadier Principle	Carlet
	Sous Employées des vivres (27)	
	Grande Parc	Harlet

¹⁶SHAT, C(8) 411, Situation, Fort de Figueras, 1 March 1812; Situation, Fort de Figueras, 1 June 1812.

¹⁷SHAT, C(8) 271 Commissaire des guerres Mongenot, Journal du Blocus.

	Aide-Garde Parc	Chabnas
	Sous Employées des vivres	3
Fourrages	Grande Magazine de fourrages	Subza (pene)
	Aide-Garde Magazine	Subza (fits)
	Aide-Garde Magazine	Troubet
Transports Auxilaire	Chef du Parc	Durand
	Sous-Chef du Parc	Grosseau (pere)
	Brigadier	Grosseur (fils)
	Brigadier	Alzine

The organizational structure of the Intendance remained basically the same through the war, shadowing the force structure changes within the Armée de Catalogne. The exceptional cases involved logistical support to newly organized formations, such as the Corps d'Armée de Haute Catalogne or the large garrisons which required a large staff.

APPENDIX III
MILITARY GOVERNMENT
IN CATALONIA

1.
**Imperial Decree Creating the Military
 Government of Catalonia¹**
8 February 1810
(Extract)

Title I
 Government of Catalonia (1st Government)

Article 1

The VII Corps of the Army of Spain is titled the Army of Catalonia.

Article 2

The Province of Catalonia will form a particular government under the title of the Government of Catalonia.

Article 3

The Commander in Chief of the Army of Catalonia is also the Governor of the Province and is invested full civil and military powers.

Article 4

Catalonia is considered in a State of Siege.

Article 5

The Governor is charged with the Administration of Police, Justice and Finances. He has the power to name all of his employees and institute necessary regulations.

Article 6

All revenues of the Province both ordinary and extraordinary levies are to be entered into the Army's chest to defray the cost of soldier pay and other military expenses.

Authorized Extract
 Prince de Wagram, et de
 Neuchatel, Major-General

Alexandre Bertier

Authorized Copy
 Chief of the Historical Section

¹SHAT, C(8) 48, Letter, Marshal Augereau to General Clarke 24 February 1810; Ministry of War, Imperial Decree, (Copy) 8 February; Imperial Decree (Extract Copy) 8 February 1810.

2. Scheme of a French Military Government²

Executive - Governor 1 Commander in Chief
Conseil du Gouvernement - (Council of Government)
Secrétaire - General

- | | | |
|----|---------------------------------|---------------|
| 1. | Administration and Justice | Conseiller du |
| 2. | Police and Religion | Gouvernement |
| 3. | War and Marine | (4 members) |
| 4. | Finances, government statistics | (by province) |

Provinces

Military - Provincial Commander
Executive - Intendant (Prefect)
Conseil de Province - Six members
 Landlords (2)
 Merchants (2)
 Lawyers (1)
 Finance Employee (1)

Cantons

Conseil de Canton - four memebbers

Commune

Conseil Municipal - three members/1,000 citizens (12,000 - 22 members)
(+12,000 , 2 members/1,000)

²Thiebault, Manuel Général, 7e Subdivision, 1er Divsion, 1er Partie, 14-17.

3.
**Project to Organize Catalonia into
 Military Divisions,
 24 June 1810³
 1er Tableau**

Generals:

one Général de Division Commandant of Barcelona
 four Général de Brigade to Command the Arrondissements

Gendarmerie:

two Legions à pied
 one Squadron

Artillery: Two Directeurs
 Engines: Two Directeurs
 Navy: One Directeur

Military Administration:

one Commissaire Ordonnateur
 four Commissaires des guerres
 one Inspecteur aux revues
 four Sous-Inspecteurs aux revues

Military Commands:

Commands of the 1st Class:	Lerida, Tortosa, Tarragona, Barcelona
Commands of the 2nd Class:	Rosas, Figueras, Gerona, Hostalrich
Commands of the 3rd Class:	Urgel, Cardona, Berga
Commands of the 4th Class:	All other posts

Arrondissements or Intendances:

³SHAT, C(8) 50, Marshal Macdonald Projet d'Organization de la Province de Catalogne en Divisions Militaires, (1er Tableau), 24 June 1810. To be sure this project was originally the work of Augereau which Macdonald brought to fruition. Letter, Augereau to Clarke, 25 February 1810.

1er-Ter:	Territory of Gerona and Vich Headquarters - Gerona
2e-Llobregat:	Territory of Mataro, Barcelona, Villa Franca, Cervera and Manrosa Headquarters - Barcelona Military Residence - Manresa
3e-Bouches de l'Ebre:	Territory of Tarragona, Tortosa and Lerida Headquarters - Reuss Military Residence - Tarragona, Tortosa
4e-Segre:	Territory of Aran, Talarn, Andorra, and Puigcerda Headquarters - Urgel

Civil Administration

Government: Governor General (Marshal Macdonald)
Secretary General

Conseil: Intendant Général des Finances
Intendant Général civil ou Administratif
Commissaire Général du Justice
Commissaire Général de Police
Commissaire Général de Marine et de Commerce

Arrondissements/Intendances:

1er Arrondissement - Headquarters: Gerona
Staff: Intendant des finances
Intendant Civil ou Administratif
Commissaire de Justice
Commissaire de Police
Commissaire de Marine et de Commerce

2e Arrondissement - Llobregat, Headquarters: Barcelona
Staff: Same as above

3e Arrondissement - Bouches de l'Ebre, Headquarters: Reuss
Staff: Same as above

4e Arrondissement - Ségre, Headquarters: Urgel
Staff: Intendant des finances
Intendant Administratif et de Commerce
Commissaire de Justice
Commissaire de Police

Civil subdivisions/Sous-intendances

1er Arrondissement - Gerona

Sous-Intendances: Figueras, Gerona, Vich

2e Arrondissement - Barcelona

Sous-Intendances - Mataro, Barcelona, Villa-Franca, Cervera, Manrosa

3e Arrondissement - Reuss

Sous-Intendances - Tarragona, Tortosa, Lerida

4e Arrondissement - Urgel

Sous-Intendances: Aran et Talam and Andorra et Puigcerda

4.
2e Tableau

Government Personnel⁴
(Proposition des Places)

Conseil du Gouvernement - Général

<u>Post</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Observations</u>
Secrétaire Général du Gouvernement de la Catalogne	Joseph Souque	Secretary general of the Dept. of Loire, Secretary of Amiens, member; Corps Legislatif. Wise, talented. Macdonald wanted without delay.
Intendant Général des Finances Secrétaire Général		
Intendant Général Civil ou Administratif Secrétaire Général		
Commissaire Général de Justice		
Commissaire Général de Police	M. Bonecarrere	Macdonald requested his conformation
Commissaire Général de Marine et de Commerce		
Arrondissements		
1er Arrondissement - Gerona		
Intendant des Finance	M. Rouyer de Lametz	Administrator of finances active, honest, friend of Marshal Macdonald

⁴SHAT C(8) 50, Marshal Macdonald, Proposition a des Places, (2d Tableau), 24 June 1810; 2d Copy, Proposition a des Places, (2d Tableau) 24 June 1810.

<u>Post</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Observations</u>
Intendnat Civil ou Administratif	M. Belloc	by Prince Chandlier, Ex-Prefect
Secretary General Commissaire de Justice	M. Billaloys - Boismont	A judge
Commissaire de Police	M. Beaumont - Brivasac	Recommended by the duc de Rovigo
Commissaire des Marine 2e Arrondissement	Barcelona	
Intendant des Finances	M. de Suppé	Intendant Provisoire des Finances-Gerona, recommended by General Clarke
Secetaire General	M. Lasplaigne	Recommended by Intendant General Daru
Intendant Civil et Administratif	M. Robert de Gardien	Landlord, Ex-Administrator of the Lesere, honest, zealous, active, devoted to the Emperor, intimate friend of Macdonald
Commissaire de Justice		
Commissaire de Police	M. Tourval	Recommended by General Clarke
Commissaire des Marine et Commerce		
3e Arrondissement	Reuss	
Intendant des Finances	M. Durant	Paris landlord, honest man, friend of Macdonald
Secretarie Général	M. Syvoir	Recommended by General Clarke
Intendant Civil ou Administratif	M. Perria - Duluc	Sous-Prefet of Sanurre, Diplomat, good adminstrator
Secetaire Général		

<u>Post</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Observations</u>
Commissaire de Justice		
Commissaire de Police		
Commissaire des Marine et Commerce		
4e Arrondissement	Urgel	
Intendant de Finances		
Secrtaire Général		
Intendant Civil ou Administratif	M. Petit	Legislator, Ex-Sous-Prefet of Sanure, good aministrator
Secrtaire Général		
Commissaire de Justice		
Commissaire de Police		

5.
Divisions Militaire
Catalonia⁵
Central Administration

<u>Administrations</u>	<u>Number</u>
Directors of Artillery	2
Directors of Engineers	2
Naval Director	1
Commissaire Ordonnateur	1
Commissaires des guerre	4
Inspecteurs aux revues	1
Sous-Inspecteur aux revues	4
Gendarmerie (two legions spied, one squadron)	

<u>Arrondissements</u>		
<u>Arrondissement</u>	<u>Territory</u>	<u>HQ</u>
Ter	Gerona and Vich	Gerona
llobregat	Mataro, Barcelona, Cervera & Manressa	Barcelonal ⁶
Bouches de l'Ebre	Tarragona, Tortosa and Lerida	Reus ⁷
Segre	Aran, Talam, Andora and Puigcerda	Urgel

⁵SHAT, C(8) 50, Marshal Macdonald Project d'Organisation de la Province de Catalogne en Divisions Militaire, Premier Tableau, 24 June 1810.

⁶Military Residence was Manresa, Ibid.

⁷Military Residence was Tarragona and Tortosa, Ibid.

Fortress Commands

<u>Class</u>	<u>Post</u>
1st Class	Lerida, Tortosa, Tarragona, Barcelona
2nd Class	Rosas, Figueras, Gerona, Hostalrich
3rd Class	Urgel, Berga, Cardona

Civil OrgnaizationCentral Government

Governor General

Secretary General

Council

Intendant - Général des Finances

Indendant - Général civil aux Administratif

Commissaire Général de Justice

Commissaire Général de Police

Commissaire Général de Marine et Commerce

<u>Arrondisse- ments</u>	<u>Capital</u>	<u>Sous-Intendants</u>	<u>Council</u>
Ter (1st)	Gerona	Gerona Figueras Vich	Intendants de Finances ⁸ Intendnat Civil au Administratif ⁹ Commissaire de Justice Commissaire de Police Commissaire de Marine et de Commerce
Llobregat (2d)	Barcelona	Barcelona Mataro Villa Francs Cervera Manresa	Same

⁸This office had a Secretaire Général, Ibid.

⁹This office had a Secretaire Geééral, Ibid.

<u>Arrondisse- ments</u>	<u>Capital</u>	<u>Sous-Intendants</u>	<u>Council</u>
Bouches de l'Ebre (3d)	Reuss	Tarragona Tortosa Lerida	Same
Ségre (4th)	Urgel	Aran Talam	Intendant de Finances Intendant de Administratif et Commerce
		Andora Puigcerda	Commissaire de Justice Commissaire de Police
de l'Ebre		Tortosa	

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VITA

The author, John Leckey Morgan, Jr., is the son of John Leckey and Laverna Morgan. He was born January 30, 1954 in Chicago, Illinois.

His elementary education was obtained in the Catholic Schools of Chicago, Illinois and his secondary education was completed in 1972 at Hales Franciscan High School, Chicago, Illinois.

In September 1972 Mr. Morgan entered Loyola University of Chicago, receiving the degree of Bachelor of Arts in History in June 1976. In September 1976, Mr. Morgan entered Graduate School with assistantships to complete the degrees of Master of Arts and partial fulfillment of the requirements of Doctor of Philosophy in 1982. That year, Mr. Morgan took a leave of absence to complete his service in the U.S. Army, attaining the rank of Captain of Field Artillery.

In September 1992, Captain Morgan was honorably released from Active Service and took a post in the University of Alabama at Birmingham.

APPROVAL SHEET

The doctoral dissertation submitted by John L. Morgan, Jr. has been read and approved by the following committee:

Dr. Walter D. Gray, Director
Professor, History
Loyola University of Chicago

Dr. Jo N. Hays
Professor, History
Loyola University of Chicago

Dr. Thomas A. Knapp
Professor, History
Loyola University of Chicago

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation committee and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated and that the dissertation is now given final approval by the Committee with reference to content and form.

The dissertation is, therefore, accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Ph.D.

Date 3-23-94

Director's Signature Walter D. Gray